British American Tobacco (BAT) was established in 1902 when the Imperial Tobacco Company and the American Tobacco Company formed a new joint venture.¹² Headquartered in London in the United Kingdom (UK), its businesses operate in all regions of the world.³ It operates as Reynolds American Inc. (RAI) in the US, after acquiring the company in 2017, and retains the name Imperial Tobacco in Canada (note that the UK based company Imperial Tobacco is now known as Imperial Brands). BAT is the second largest international tobacco company in the world (based on number of cigarettes sold), after Philip Morris International (PMI).⁴ This is excluding the Chinese National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC), with which BAT has a joint venture.¹⁵⁶

According to Euromonitor International, in 2020, BAT held just over 12.2% of the total global cigarette market (by retail volume, including China, figures rounded).⁶⁷ In June 2020, it reported total revenue of nearly UK£12.3 billion (US$16.5 billion), with 90% of its earnings coming from cigarettes and other conventional products.⁷

Popular BAT cigarette brands include Dunhill, Kent, Lucky Strike, Pall Mall, Rothmans and Camel.⁸ BAT also has a range of newer tobacco and nicotine products, including e-cigarettes (also known as electronic nicotine delivery systems, or ENDS) and heated tobacco products (see below for details). However, as BAT states “combustible cigarettes remain the largest global tobacco category”.⁹

Acquisitions and Interests

BAT owned 42.2% of RAI shares from 2004 to 2017.¹ In January 2017, BAT announced that it had agreed to acquire the remaining 57.8% stake.¹⁰ This acquisition was completed by July 2017.¹¹¹

In 2019, BAT held international interests with two other tobacco companies:¹²¹³

• ITC Private Limited (formerly known as the Indian Tobacco Company Private Limited): In 1985, BAT and ITC set up a joint venture in Nepal, the Surya Nepal Private Limited (Surya Nepal).¹⁴¹⁵ BAT owns 29.7% of ITC shares.¹⁶¹⁷ According to media reports, BAT unsuccessfully attempted to increase its stake in ITC on several occasions.¹⁸¹⁹²⁰
• China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC): in August 2013, BAT and CNTC established a joint venture named CTBAT, which is headquartered in Hong Kong.⁵

In 1961, BAT diversified into paper, cosmetics and food industries. It also entered the retail industry, acquiring Argos and Saks Fifth Avenue in the UK and US, respectively. In the late 1980s, BAT moved into the insurance industry, acquiring Eagle Star, Allied Dunbar and Farmer’s Group in the UK. However, in the late 1990s BAT industries divested its non-tobacco business.¹ Further historical background information can be found here.²

In the 2000s, the company once again diversified, this time into non-cigarette tobacco and nicotine products. BAT founded and wholly owns the Nicoventures group of companies. Nicoventures Ltd was set up as a division of BAT in 2011, originally dedicated to the production of licensed nicotine products.²¹²² A new holding company was set up in 2012, and from 2014 two subsidiaries focussed on different types of product:

• Nicoventures Trading Ltd – until 2014 named CN Creative, a company acquired by BAT in 2012. By 2014, this company was focussed on unlicensed products, including e-cigarettes.²³
• Nicovations Ltd – in 2014, Nicoventures Ltd changed its name to Nicovations Ltd.²⁴ This company’s focus remained licenced (or “regulatory approved”) inhaled nicotine products, including, for example, products licenced by the UK Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA).²¹ BAT had plans to develop a nicotine inhaler named Voke in a collaboration with the company Kind Consumer Limited, a project which was abandoned in January 2017.²⁵²⁶ By early 2018, the Nicovations website was no longer available, the company listed no employees and its only business activity was the leasing of equipment ²⁷

Two further related subsidiaries were registered in the UK: Nicoventures U.S. Ltd (2015) and Nicoventures Retail (UK) Ltd (2016/17).

• BAT also owns Fiedler & Lundgren, a Swedish company which produces snus. See below for more on BAT’s non-cigarette products

In 2020, as part of its “transformation” agenda, BAT set up a new investment arm called Btomorrow Ventures.²⁸ See below for details.

In January 2022, BAT announced the creation of biotech investment company KBio Holdings Limited (KBio) to “leverage the existing and extensive plant-based technology capabilities of BAT and Kentucky BioProcessing Inc”.²⁹. For more information see Tobacco Companies Investments in Pharmaceutical Products and NRT.

Employees and Board Members: Past and Present

In May 2023, BAT announced that Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jack Bowles was stepping down with immediate effect.³⁰ Bowles had been appointed CEO in April 2019, succeeding Nicandro Durante.³¹

Bowles was replaced by Tadeu Marroco, previously BAT Group Finance Director.³⁰

In October 2020, BAT announced that Richard Burrows would be stepping down as Chairman after the 2021 AGM.³² He would be replaced by Luc Jobin, who has a long history in the tobacco industry.³³ Jobin held senior roles at Imperial Tobacco Canada from 1998 to 2005 and was Non-Executive Director of RAI before it was acquired by BAT, after which he became Non-Executive Director of BAT.³³

A current list of BAT’s Board of Directors can be found on the BAT website.

Other persons that currently work for, or have previously been employed with, the company:
Jeffries Briginshaw |  Jeannie Cameron (see JCIC International) | Kenneth Clarke | Mark Cobben | David Crow |  David Fell | Ann Godbehere | Giovanni Giordano | Andrew Gray | Tomas Hammargren | Robert Lerwill | Jean-Marc Lévy | Adrian Marshall | Des Naughton | Christine Morin-Postel | Gerard Murphy | Shabanji Opukah | David O’Reilly | Kieran Poynter | Michael Prideaux | Anthony Ruys | Nicholas Scheele | Karen de Segundo | Naresh Sethi | Ben Stevens | Kingsley Wheaton | Neil Withington

Affiliations

Memberships and Partnerships

In 2019, BAT disclosed it was a member of the following associations:³⁴
The American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union | British Chamber of Commerce in Belgium | BusinessEurope | Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) | Confederation of British Industry | Confederation of European Community Cigarette Manufacturers (CECCM; now Tobacco Europe) | European Cigar Manufacturers Association (ECMA) | European Smoking Tobacco Association (ESTA) | Institute of Economic Affairs | International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) UK | International Trademark Association (INTA) | ICC Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) |  Kangaroo Group|

According to BAT’s previous entries on the EU register it has also been a member of: ³⁵ American European Community Association | European Policy Centre | European Risk Forum | Ad Hoc Council (The European Government Business Relations Council) | European Smokeless Tobacco Council (ESTOC) | The Mentor Group |

BAT is a member of the following trade and business associations: Association of Convenience Stores (UK) | UK Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association (TMA) | UK Vaping Industry Association (UKVIA) | Tobaksproducenterne (Tobacco Manufacturers Denmark)³⁶ | Scottish Grocers’ Federation |

It has previously been a member of the following:
Czech Association for Branded Products | European Travel Retail Confederation | Federation of Wholesale Distributors | MARQUES | Scottish Wholesale Association | Tobacco Industry Platform (TIP) | Transatlantic Business Dialogue | UniteUnite |

BAT is also a founding member of the industry-funded Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing Foundation (ECLT).³⁷ From 2002 to 2018, ECLT had a partnership with the International Labour Organization (ILO), a United Nations (UN) agency, focussed on issues related to labour such as international labour standards, social protection and unemployment.³⁸
See below for more on BAT’s CSR activity relating to child labour.

BAT has also provided financial support to:
Alliance of Australian Retailers | Anti-Counterfeiting Group | All-Party Parliamentary Corporate Responsibility Group (APCRG) | All-Party Parliamentary Corporate Governance Group (APPCGG) | Business in the Community (UK) | Benkert | Business Action for Africa³⁹ |  Commonwealth Business Council | Conference Board⁴⁰ | Consumer Choice Center | European Council on Research, Development and Innovation⁴¹ | European Science and Environment Forum | Forest | Forum for EU/US Legal-Economic Affairs | Global Reporting Initiative  | Institute of Business Ethics | International Tax and Investment Center  | International Tobacco Growers Association | The Common Sense Alliance  | Rural Shops Alliance  | VNO-NCW

Consultancies

In 2019, the following businesses listed BAT as a client:
Business Platform Europe⁴² | EUK Consulting | EUTOP Brussels SPRL⁴³ | Red Flag

Other companies that have provided services for BAT include: Bernstein Public Policy⁴⁴ | BXL Consulting | Bureau Veritas⁴⁵ | Clifford Chance | Corporate Responsibility Consulting (CRC) | Crosby Textor Group | Edelman | FTI Consulting | Goddard Global | Hume Brophy | Instinctif Partners  | Kantar | Morris and Chapman⁴⁵ | Pappas & Associates ⁴⁶ | Simply Europe⁴⁷ | Weber Shandwick (see also Priti Patel)

Individuals that have consulted for BAT include: Axel Gietz | Delon Human | Peter Lee | John Luik | Carl V Phillips | Riccardo Polosa | Francis Roe

Think Tanks

The following think tanks have a history of being funded by BAT:
Centre for European Reform | Centre for Policy Studies | Chatham House | European Policy Centre | European Science and Environment Forum | Fraser Institute Free Market Foundation | Institute for Competitiveness (I-Com)| Institute of Economic Affairs | Institute of Public Affairs | Niagara Institute (See John Luik)

Controversial Marketing Strategies

Targeting Youth

Although BAT has stated that it is “committed to carry out youth smoking prevention”, the company has been accused of targeting youth in their marketing activities.⁴⁸⁴⁹

Some of the countries where the company has been accused of such tactics, include: Argentina⁵⁰, Brazil,⁴⁸ Ethiopia,⁵¹ Malawi,⁵² Mauritius,⁵² Nigeria,⁵² Sri Lanka, and Uganda.

Targeting Women and Girls

Women, who smoke less than men globally, are a key demographic for tobacco companies.⁵³ Tobacco companies have identified packaging and brand design as important ways to appeal to women.

Large transnational tobacco companies have launched female-targeted brands. For example, in April 2011, BAT introduced Vogue Perle, described as “the UK’s first demi-slim cigarette”.⁵⁴ BAT defended itself against claims it “downplayed” the health risks associated with smoking in favour of the “trappings of style, supermodels and staying slim”.⁵⁵

Read more on our page Targeting Women and Girls.

Funding Education programmes

In 2011, BAT’s introduction of cigarettes targeted at women coincided with the revelation that the company was funding scholarships for four Afghan girls at Durham University. The university was criticised for accepting a GB£125,000 donation from BAT.⁵⁶

The tobacco industry also attempts to enhance its reputation, and gain legitimacy, by funding universities. In 2000, Nottingham University came under scrutiny for its decision to accepts GB£3.8 million from BAT to establish an International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility.⁵⁷⁵⁸⁵⁹

BAT has also funded education organisations and programmes as part of its CSR relating to child labour. For example, in 2001 BAT launched the “Our Florece” programme (meaning blossom) in Mexico, to set up and equip centres near tobacco growing farms providing migrant labourers’ children with access to education and health services.⁶⁰

Read more on our page CSR: Education, and below for BAT’s other CSR activity.

Tactics to Subvert Tobacco Control Campaigns and Policies

Using British Diplomats to Lobby Foreign Governments on its Behalf

There have been several instances of senior UK diplomats lobbying governments on behalf of BAT in low and middle income countries (LMICs), including Bangladesh, Panama and Venezuela.

For more information, go to UK Diplomats Lobbying on Behalf of BAT.

Intimidating Governments with Litigation or Threat of Litigation

BAT has legally challenged the following tobacco control measures in the respective countries:

• Health Warnings/Plain Packaging in Australia (also see Plain Packaging in Australia and Australia: Trademark Claims), Namibia, Kenya, Sri Lanka, UK, and Scotland.⁶¹
• The Display Ban in the UK.
• The Tobacco Products Directive in the European Union (also see Legal Challenges).
• The Uganda Tobacco Control Bill 2014.
• The Kenya Tobacco Control Bill 2017, and 2014 regulations.

Fabricating Support through Front Groups

In May 2012, the Tobacco Control Research Group asked BAT to reveal the British-based think tanks it had funded during the previous five years, as well as those it had funded that were active in the plain packaging debate.

The company replied:

“British American Tobacco is happy to support those who believe in the same things we do – whether that be retailers against display bans or farmers against being forced out of growing tobacco;

* Our support may be financial support, or resources in kind;

* We do not tell these bodies what to say or how to spend the money;

* Many of the bodies, in particular the retailers, feel deeply patronised at the suggestion they are merely industry stooges.”⁶²

In May 2013, in response to questions asked at the company’s Annual General Meeting by health advocacy Action on Smoking and Health, the company disclosed that it funded:⁶³ FOREST, The Common Sense Alliance, Rural Shops Alliance, Scottish Wholesalers Alliance, Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association, and Tobacco Retailers’ Alliance

Also see: BAT Funded Lobbying Against Plain Packaging, The Plain Pack Group, Australia: Campaigning Websites, Australia: International Lobbying,  Digital Coding & Tracking Association (DCTA)

• A list of tobacco industry allies can be found on the STOP website.

For more examples of BAT working through third parties, see the section below on its efforts to undermine illicit trade policy.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Initiatives

After its rebrand in 2020, BAT’s website prominently featured its “socially responsible” practices: “Our companies and our people ensure they are managed as responsibly as possible – from the crop in the fields through to the consumer”.⁶⁴ TCRG research has revealed how the underlying motivation of BAT’s CSR and stakeholder management activities is to promote their corporate image, neutralise opposition and influence policy.⁶⁵ Others have documented similar evidence, including in Malaysia⁶⁶ and Malawi.⁶⁷

CSR in Bangladesh

BAT Bangladesh (BATB) has close connections to government in the country due to its strategic CSR donations. BATB runs several programmes targeted at the environment, including reforestation, with the Bangladeshi Department for Agricultural Extension.⁶⁸

Another BATB run programme, the Prerona Foundation, states that its goal is to “promote economic inclusion of marginalised communities, women empowerment and youth development through skills enhancement programmes”, and that its work is shaped by the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).⁶⁹ Managing Director of BATB, Shezad Munim, stated that the Prerona Foundation was created to increase the scope of BATBs CSR activities.⁷⁰ In 2020, during the Covid-19 pandemic, the foundation introduced its own brand of hand sanitiser, reportedly distributing at least 100 000 units to different influential administrative bodies, law enforcement agencies and government institutions.⁷¹⁷²

BATB has also provided direct donations to the government’s Welfare Fund, administered by the Ministry of Labour and Employment.⁷³ These CSR programmes afford BATB access to influential government officials (Image 1). Between 2014 and 2017, BAT received five exemptions from the country’s labour law in clear violation of FCTC Article 5.3 Guideline 7.1, which prevents government from giving privileges or benefits to tobacco companies for simply running their business.⁷⁴

Image 1: BAT Bangladesh employees handing over a cheque to State Minister for Labour and Employment Begum Mannujan Sufian in the conference room at the Secretariat in September 2020. (Source: United News of Bangladesh)

BAT’s assertions also do not line up with its business practices. Apart from evading labour laws in Bangladesh, the company faces a lawsuit over its alleged use of child labour⁷⁵ and stands accused of using bribery to undermine tobacco control legislation and weaken competition in Africa.⁷⁶

• More on way the industry, including BAT, uses environmental reporting and CSR programmes to greenwash its business practices can be found on Greenwashing. A general overview of industry CSR techniques is on the CSR Strategy page.
• You can read more about BAT’s rebrand and how it aligns with its newer products strategy on Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products: British American Tobacco.

Influencing Science and Scientists

Documents in the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents collection, an archive of previously secret tobacco industry documents, reveal BAT’s efforts to mislead the public on the science of smoking and disease. In 1958, BAT scientists, alongside other industry scientists, understood that smoking caused lung cancer. BAT’s public denial of this fact continued into the 1980’s, when, according to an internal BAT memo, it changed direction, to acknowledge “the probability that smoking is harmful to a small percentage of heavy smokers”.⁷⁷

Documents from the 1970s show BAT scientists had confirmed that second-hand smoke, also known as environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), was harmful. However, in public, BAT lawyers denied the harm, saying: “the question is not really one of a health hazard but perhaps more of an annoyance”.⁷⁸ To distract from health concerns such as ETS, in the late 1980s BAT discussed the need for a public relations (PR) and political campaign focussed on protecting smokers’ rights.⁷⁹ It also funded research into ‘sick buildings’, to promote the idea that building design was responsible for ill health rather than ETS. A review of the Truth Tobacco documents covering the period 1985 – 1995 concluded that “At times scientists seemed to be acting more like public relations specialists than scientists.”⁸⁰

On the science of addiction, the Truth Tobacco documents show that scientists working for BAT, and its subsidiary Brown and Williamson, concluded in the early 1960s that nicotine was addictive. Despite this, in 1994, the CEO of Brown and Williamson, testified before the US Congress alongside the CEOs of Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds (later acquired by BAT). Each said: “I believe nicotine is not addictive.”⁸¹

To prevent the release of further scientific documents in the 1980s, lawyers advised BAT not to conduct research in countries where legal action might be taken against the company.⁸²

In Europe in the 1990s, BAT worked to secure the right for the tobacco industry to be consulted on any tobacco policy informed by science, allowing tobacco companies to self-police, despite the clear conflict of interest.⁸³

• For more information see the pages on: Influencing Science

Involvement in the illicit tobacco trade

Like other transnational tobacco companies, BAT has a long history of facilitating tobacco smuggling. For example, internal BAT documents from the 1980s and 1990s revealed that in Africa, BAT used the smuggling of its own products as a business strategy to achieve a range of objectives including: gaining access to emerging markets, gaining leverage in negotiating with governments, competing for market share and circumventing local import restrictions.⁸⁴

In September 2000, BAT faced action by the Departments (States) of Colombia which alleged that it committed violations of racketeering laws: “…arising from its involvement in organized crime in pursuit of a massive, ongoing smuggling scheme”.⁸⁵⁸⁶

In 2008, BAT subsidiary Imperial Tobacco Canada pleaded guilty to customs charges related to cigarette smuggling.

In 2010, BAT signed a cooperation agreement with the European Union (European Control Association, EUCA) and its member states to help tackle illicit tobacco trade. BAT agreed to pay the EU US$200 million over 20 years.  “In return, the manufacturers are released from any civil claims arising out of past conduct relating to illicit trade”, a UK government press release pointed out.⁸⁷

In 2014, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) fined BAT for oversupplying the Belgian market- a practice which can facilitate the smuggling of products across borders.⁸⁸

In 2021, BAT stated it “had agreed to dispose of” its subsidiary in Iran.⁸⁹ It did not provide further detail on the reasons for its departure from a country in which it held the second largest market share,⁹⁰ and generated approximately UK£170 million in revenue and UK£60 million in profit in 2020.⁹¹ In April 2023, following a criminal investigation by US authorities, BAT agreed to pay penalties exceeding US$629 million to resolve charges of bank fraud and sanctions violations charges in North Korea, another country facing international sanctions.⁹² In a press release, BAT stated in response that “adhering to rigorous compliance and ethics standards has been, and remains, a top priority”.⁹³ In 2023 TCRG published research on BAT’s activities in Iran.⁹⁴ Using internal BAT documents covering 2000-2014, the paper – through the case study of Iran – tests the credibility of BAT’s claim to adhere to compliance and ethics standards. It points to BAT’s potential involvement in illicit tobacco trade, and explains how BAT’s extensive engagement with government authorities to tackle illicit trade focused primarily on reputational and commercial purposes, at the expense of controlling its own supply chain.⁹⁴

• For more details see BAT Involvement in Tobacco Smuggling

Efforts to undermine policy to address illicit tobacco trade

Previous TCRG research has outlined how tobacco companies, including BAT, have attempted to interfere with the implementation of tracking and tracing implementation. This included using front groups (such as the Digital Coding and Tracking Association) to promote their own ineffective and inefficient technology, formerly knowns as Codentify (now the Inexto Suite). In Kenya in 2012, BAT unsuccessfully tried to influence a track and trace tender outcome in favour of the Codentify system through the use of a third party, Fracturecode.Internal industry documents indicate that Fracturecode was closely linked to BAT. For more details, see our page, Kenya- BAT’s Tactics to Influence Track and Trace Tender.

In 2016 the European Union (EU) ran a public consultation for the European Union’s track and track system. TCRG research (published in October 2020) found that the tobacco industry lobbied extensively for the EU to adopt a system controlled by the industry. Transnational tobacco company’s interests were repeatedly represented through consultation submissions by multiple trade associations, which were not always transparent about their membership. .⁹⁵  For more details see Track and Trace.

Limiting Its Tax Bills

TCRG research published in March 2020 found that “Very little profit based taxation has been paid in the UK [by tobacco companies] despite high levels of reported profits, both in the domestic market and globally.”⁹⁶ While BAT has a relatively small share of the UK tobacco market (less than 10%), the company made hundreds of millions estimated profit in the UK and hundreds of billions globally. However, since 2010 it has paid virtually no UK corporation tax (effectively 0%) despite paying 20-30% in other countries.⁹⁶

An investigation by journalists from the Investigative Desk and TCRG researchers, found that BAT uses “aggressive tax planning” strategies to reduce the amount of tax it pays.⁹⁷⁹⁸

Analysis of BAT company reports between 2010 and 2019, found that BAT (and the other main transnational tobacco companies, PMI, JTI and Imperial) use several methods to avoid or lower their tax bills:⁹⁷

• Shifting dividends – for example, each year BAT shifts around €1 billion in dividends via Belgium, paying tax at less than 1 percent.
• Group relief – losses from interest paid on internal loans lead to group tax relief, meaning BAT paid almost no UK corporation tax.
• Notional interest deduction – €3.5 billion in assets were held in holding companies in Belgium, helping BAT to deduct several millions in notional (fictitious) interest between 2010-2017.
• Profit shifting via intra-firm transactions – for example, BAT Korea Manufacturing Ltd in South Korea sold its cigarettes – on paper – to Rothmans Far East, another BAT subsidiary. The cigarettes were then re-sold back to BAT Korea Ltd at a much higher price. By this method BAT moved an average of €98m of Korean profits to the Netherlands.

BAT was able to reduce its tax bill by an estimated £760 million over 10 years.⁹⁷ While seen as morally wrong by many, or at least socially undesirable, tax avoidance is not illegal; it is sometimes referred to as ‘tax planning’, whereas tax evasion is a crime. However BAT’s activities do not even appear to be in the spirit of its own code of business conduct.⁹⁹. BAT states that it “complies with all applicable tax legislation and regulations in the countries where we operate”.¹⁰⁰ However, as of November 2020, BAT had been, or was still, involved in tax disputes in multiple countries: Netherlands (the largest claim,€1.2 billion), Brazil, South Korea and Egypt.⁹⁷ In September 2019, the European Commission announced an investigation into tax avoidance by 39 multinational companies, including BAT.⁹⁷¹⁰¹

You can read more about the tobacco industry and taxation on our page, Price and Tax.

Behtr Pakistan Campaign

BAT has also developed PR campaigns to support its goals to reduce its tax bill. The Behtr Pakistan campaign was launched in 2021 and states that it aims to “to create awareness about tax collection in Pakistan, identify effective solutions to enhance tax collection and make the country progress”. The campaign represents itself as a “nationwide public service, national interest initiative” but was created by Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited, a subsidiary of British American Tobacco.¹⁰² Behtr Pakistan uses arguments regularly used by the industry, stating that increased taxes in the tobacco sector have resulted in an increase in illicit trade.¹⁰³

Accusations of Corruption and Bribery in Africa

From 2017 to 2021, BAT was under investigation by the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) after allegations of corruption and bribery in Africa.^76104105106In January 2021 the SFO announced it was closing the investigation saying: “The evidence in this case did not meet the evidential test for prosecution as defined in the Code for Crown Prosecutors.”¹⁰⁷

Further accusations followed in 2021. Read The BAT Files, which detail how BAT bought influence, interfered with tobacco control measures, and undermined its competitors across the continent.

BAT has consistently denied the allegations.¹⁰⁸

Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products

As the harms from conventional products have become better understood, and tobacco control measures have been put in place, the cigarette market – from which tobacco companies make most of their profits – has started to shrink. To secure the industry’s longer-term future, transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have invested in, developed and marketed various newer nicotine and tobacco products.¹⁰⁹  BAT also has an interest in new cannabis products (see below).

In March 2020, BAT rebranded its corporate website with the tagline “A Better Tomorrow”, which was originally registered by Nicoventures and used to promote BAT’s newer products. However, in 2020, over 90% of BAT’s revenue still came from cigarettes and other conventional tobacco products.⁷ It also stated that its revenue growth since 2019 “was driven by combustibles”.⁷

To read more about BAT’s products and strategy, including its 2020 rebrand, visit our page Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products: British American Tobacco.

BAT Expansion “Beyond Nicotine”

BAT has been accused of “health washing” its reputation by connecting itself to wellness products while continuing to sell tobacco products: there are concerns that the ‘health halo’ from wellness products could normalise its brand. The health claims of many wellness products in general have been described as ‘baseless’ but make good sales due to effective marketing.¹¹⁰

Btomorrow Ventures

In 2020, BAT set up a new investment unit called Btomorrow Ventures.¹¹¹ As part of a “transformation”, BAT announced plans to go “beyond nicotine”.¹¹² The new division invited investment in areas ranging from “BioTech & Science, Technology, Wellbeing & Stimulation to Environmental Social Governance”.²⁸¹¹³ BAT launched a dedicated website in July 2021 and invited companies to pitch for investment to help “accelerate this transformation”, specifically those relating to “digital transformation” and the “sustainability agenda” (see Greenwashing).²⁸¹¹⁴

• BAT’s current investments can be found on the BTomorrow Ventures website

The Waterstreet Collective

In April 2022, The Waterstreet Collective, a company wholly owned by BAT, was registered at UK Companies House.¹¹⁵ for “the development, procurement, marketing and sale of wellbeing and stimulation products and associated accessories”.¹¹⁶. Its Ryde drinks are made in the US and have been marketed in Canada and Australia.¹¹⁷¹¹⁸ Free samples were handed out to Australian university students without BAT’s ownership being disclosed to the students or the university, or on the product packaging.¹¹⁰ As of January 2024, The Waterstreet Collective LinkedIn Profile states that it “partners” with Btomorrow Ventures.¹¹⁹

• For more information see pages on Tobacco Companies Investments in Pharmaceutical Products and NRT and Cannabis

TobaccoTactics Resources

• The BAT Files
• British American Tobacco in Africa: A History of Double Standards.
• UK Diplomats Lobbying on Behalf of BAT
• BAT Involvement in Tobacco Smuggling
• Imperial Tobacco Canada: Involvement in Cigarette Smuggling
• Kenya- BAT’s Tactics to Undermine the Tobacco Control Regulations
• Kenya- BAT’s Tactics to Influence Track and Trace Tender
• Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products: British American Tobacco

Relevant Link

• British American Tobacco company website
• Btomorrow Ventures website

TCRG Research

• “Unlawful Bribes?”: A documentary analysis showing British American Tobacco’s use of payments to secure policy and competitive advantage in Africa,  R.R. Jackson, A. Rowell, A.B. Gilmore, 13 September 2021, UCSF: Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education. Available from: escholarship.org/uc/item/4qs8m106
• The Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility: Techniques of Neutralization, Stakeholder Management and Political CSR, G. Fooks, A. Gilmore, J. Collin et al, Journal of Business Ethics, 2013, 112:283. doi:10.1007/s10551-012-1250-5
• “Working the System”—British American Tobacco’s Influence on the European Union Treaty and Its Implications for Policy: An Analysis of Internal Tobacco Industry Documents, K.E. Smith, G. Fooks, J. Collin, et al, PLoS Med, 2010; 7(1): e1000202, doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.1000202
• Trade policy, health and corporate influence: British American Tobacco and China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, C. Holden, K. Lee, A. Gilmore et al, International Journal of Health Services, 2010, 40: 421-441, doi:10.2190%2FHS.40.3.c
•  The invisible hand: how British American Tobacco precluded competition in Uzbekistan, A.B. Gilmore, M. McKee, J. Collin, Tobacco Control, 2007; 16:239-247, doi: 10.1136/tc.2006.017129
• “The law was actually drafted by us but the Government is to be congratulated on its wise actions”: British American Tobacco and public policy in Kenya, P. Patel, J. Collin, A.B. Gilmore Tobacco Control, 2007; 16:e1, doi:10.1136/tc.2006.016071
• British American Tobacco’s erosion of health legislation in Uzbekistan, A.B. Gilmore, J. Collin, M. McKee, BMJ, 2006; 332-355, doi:10.1136/bmj.332.7537.355

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including TCRG research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to TCRG publications.

References

The post British American Tobacco appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Philip Morris International (PMI) is the largest tobacco company in the world (excluding the Chinese National Tobacco Corporation).¹²³ The company is headquartered in New York in the United States (US), but also based operationally in Lausanne, Switzerland and Hong Kong. According to the Associated Press, Altria decided to separate Philip Morris USA and its international operations in order to “clear the international tobacco business from the legal and regulatory constraints facing its domestic counterpart, Philip Morris USA”.¹²⁴

In 2018, PMI and its subsidiaries sold its products in over 180 markets, selling cigarettes, other tobacco products and newer nicotine and tobacco products. The company reported in 2019 that it held 28.4% of the global market for cigarette and heated tobacco products (HTPS) excluding the US and China.¹²⁵ The company owned six of the top 15 international cigarette brands in 2018. Its global cigarette brands are Marlboro (the world’s bestselling international brand), Merit, Parliament, Virginian S, L&M, Philip Morris, Bond Street, Chesterfield, Lark, Muratti, Next and Red & White. The company reported owning a market share of at least 15% or over in 100 countries in 2018, although in the UK PMI held only fourth position for cigarette market share behind Imperial Tobacco, Japan Tobacco International (JTI) and British American Tobacco (BAT).¹²⁶

According to Euromonitor International, PMI’s global share of the cigarette market (by retail volume) was under 14% in 2018, and fell to 12% in 2020 (figures rounded). ¹²⁷

On 27 August 2019, global news outlets reported that PMI and Altria were considering a merger to reunite the brands that had split in 2007.^128129130 However the merger was called off the next month, in response to news that the FDA was considering a ban on flavoured e-cigarettes.¹³¹¹³² On March 21, 2018, PMI acquired Tabacalera Costarricense, S.A. and Mediola y Compañía, S.A. for USD$95 million, which sell Derby, Marlboro and L&M cigarettes in Costa Rica.¹²⁵

Employees or Board Members: Past and Present

Jacek Olczak was appointed the Chief Executive Officer of PMI in May 2021.¹³³ Previously he was the company’s Chief Operating Officer. He succeeded André Calantzopoulos who was appointed Executive Chairman of the Board. The previous chairman Louis C. Camilleri, stepped down in Decemer 2020. A full list of the company’s leadership team can be accessed at PMI’s website. Other persons that currently work for, or have previously been employed with, the company:

Massimo Andolina | Chris Argent | Drago Azinovic | Emmanuel Babeau | Werner Barth | Charles Bendotti | Frank de Rooij | Frederic de Wilde | Suzanne Rich Folsom | Stacey Kennedy | Martin King | Michael Kunst | Andreas Kurali | Bin Li | Marco Mariotti | Mario Massroli | Deepak Mishra | Silke Muenster | John O’Mullane | Paul Riley | Marian Salzman | Gregoire Verdeaux | Michael Voegele | Stefano Volpetti | Jerry Whitson |  Martin J. Barrington | David Bernick | Bertrand Bonvin | Harold Brown | Patrick Brunel | Mathis Cabiallavetta | Louis C. Camilleri | Andrew Cave | Herman Cheung | Kevin Click | Marc S. Firestone | John Dudley Fishburn | Jon Huenemann | Even Hurwitz | Jennifer Li | Graham Mackay | Sergio Marchionne | Kate Marley | Kalpana Morparia | Jim Mortensen | Lucio A. Noto | Matteo Pellegrini | Robert B. Polet | Ashok Rammohan | Carlos Slim Helú | Julie Soderlund | Hermann Waldemer | Stephen M. Wolf | Miroslaw Zielinski

Affiliations

Memberships

In 2019, PMI declared membership of the following organisations on the European Transparency Register:¹³⁴

The American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union | American European Community Association (AECA) | American Chamber of Commerce of Lithuania | Ass. Industrial Portuguesa (AIP) | Business Europe | Centromarca | CEOE | Czech Association Branded Goods | Czech Foodstuff Chamber | Economiesuisse | Estonian Chamber of Commerce | European Communities Trademark Association (ECTA) | European Policy Centre (EPC) | Kangaroo Group | Latvian Chamber of Commerce | Latvian Traders Association | Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists | MARQUES | Spanish Tobacco Roundtable | VBO-FBE

PMI had previously listed memberships of: International Trademark Association (INTA) | The Trans-Atlantic Business Council (TABC) | | European Risk Forum | European Smokeless Tobacco Council (ESTOC) | British Chamber of Commerce | Public Affairs Council | APRAM | LES France | AmCham Germany | Bund fur Lebensmittelrecht & Lebensmittelkunde | Europaischer Wirtschaftssenat (EWS) | Wirtschaftsbeirat der Union e.V. | American Chamber of Commerce of Estonia | American Lithuanian Business Council | Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists | Investors’ Forum | AmCham Spain | Unindustria (Confindustria) | Consumer Packaging Alliance | British Brands Group | Foodstuff Chamber The company is also a donor to the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing Foundation (ECLT), alongside BAT, Imperial Brands, JTI and Swedish Match, among others.¹³⁵

In May 2015, ECLT and the International Labour Organization (ILO) entered into an agreement to develop global guidance on occupational health and safety with regards to child labour in the tobacco industry.¹³⁶ PMI was a member of the Confederation of European Community Cigarette Manufacturers (CECCM), but left in 2006 following a dispute with other members.¹³⁷

Consultancies

PMI has worked with numerous Public Relations (PR) and law consultancies:

• In 2020 and 2021 PMI released white papers and held events on public trust in science in partnership with the Industry Transformation Coalition.
• In January 2020, PMI released a white paper entitled “Unsmoke Your Mind: Pragmatic Answers to Tough Questions for a Smoke-Free Future”. The company enlisted the consulting firm Povaddo, which works across public affairs, strategy and research,¹³⁸ to conduct an opinion-based survey of smokers across 14 countries.¹³⁹ The report was heavily criticised in The Lancet medical journal (see below)¹⁴⁰ who pointed out that its findings were based on a “self-funded online survey”.¹⁴⁰ In July 2020, PMI published another white paper called “In Support of the Primacy of Science”, which was also based on online surveys conducted by Povaddo, on the public’s views on science.¹⁴¹¹⁴² In March 2021 PMI released the results of a third online survey, conducted by Povaddo in 20 countries, on public attitudes to newer nicotine and tobacco products and collaboration between governments and tobacco companies.¹⁴³ Povaddo has conducted previous research for PMI.¹⁴⁴
• In December 2019, researchers and academic institutions received invitations from the consulting firm, Handshake, to commission research on behalf of PMI on how companies navigate corporate transformation.¹⁴⁵
• In 2016, Philip Morris UK was a client of London-based PR and communications company Instinctif Partners.
• That same year, media also linked Brussels-based PR company Pantarhei Advisors to Philip Morris.
• In 2014, UK-based Media Intelligence Partners was PMI’s media contact during Sir Cyril Chantler’s plain packaging review.
• In 2014, German PR company Communications & Network Consulting AG (CNC) listed Philip Morris as a client on the EU Transparency Register.
• In that same year, Luxembourg-based Felula SA, a one-person consultancy run by Serge Estgen, listed PMI as its client on the EU Transparency Register.
• In 2013, Edinburgh-based Halogen Communications supported PMI’s opposition to Scotland’s plans to introduce Plain Packaging.
• In 2012 and 2013, PMI worked with London-based PR and media company Pepper Public Affairs on PMI’s Anti-Plain Packaging Media Campaign.
• In 2012, the UK branch of Crosby Textor Group, helped PMI oppose Plain packaging in the UK.
• Law firm Clifford Chance has a history of lobbying for PMI in the UK and European Union (EU). In 2009, the firm submitted anonymous Freedom of Information requests to a UK university on behalf of the tobacco company, and in 2011 and 2012 Clifford Chance’s Michel Petite lobbied on the EU Tobacco Products Directive.
• From 2009 to 2011 PR company Gardant Communications worked for Philip Morris UK. In 2009, the PR company supported Philip Morris’ PR Campaign Against the Display Ban and was involved in Philip Morris’ Regulatory Litigation Action Plan Against the Display Ban.
• APCO Associates‘ collaboration with PMI goes back to the 1990s when it helped the company set up the European Science and Environment Forum. More recently, it was involved in Philip Morris’ PR Campaign Against the Display Ban.
• London-based PR company INHouse Communications also played a part in Philip Morris’ PR Campaign Against the Display Ban.
• Ogilvy Group‘s collaboration with Philip Morris goes back to the 1950s when it ran one of its advertising campaigns.
• José María Aznar, the former Spanish Prime Minister (see below)

Controversial Marketing Strategies

Since its controversial “Be Marlboro: Targeting the World’s Biggest Brand at Youth” campaign in 2014, PMI have been accused on multiple occasions of targeting their products at young people. On its website, PMI says that it is “committed to doing our part to help prevent children from smoking or using nicotine products”. ¹⁴⁶ It further states that its “marketing complies with all applicable laws and regulations, and we have robust internal policies and procedures in place so that all our marketing and advertising activities are directed only toward adult smokers”.¹⁴⁶ Despite these assurances, PMI has been accused of, and fined for, running marketing campaigns that target young people. For more information see Be Marlboro: Targeting the World’s Biggest Brand at Youth. PMI has increasingly used social media to market its newer products, including e-cigarettes (also known as electronic nicotine delivery systems, or ENDS) and heated tobacco products.

• For more information on PMI’s newer, including IQOS, visit Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products: Philip Morris International and Heated Tobacco Products: Philip Morris International.

In December 2023 The Times newspaper highlighted PMI’s role in third party campaigns promoting e-cigarettes in the UK.¹⁴⁷ For more information visit the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World page.

Complicity in Tobacco Smuggling

PMI portrays itself publicly as a victim of illicit tobacco trade, with the company reporting that tobacco smuggling results in “considerable financial losses” and “damage” to manufacturers’ brands.¹⁴⁸ To help tackle illicit trade, PMI launched a funding initiative called PMI IMPACT in 2016, worth US$100m and aimed at bringing together “organisations that fight illegal trade and related crimes, enabling them to implement solutions”.¹⁴⁹¹⁵⁰ In its first call for proposals in 2016, PMI asked for “projects that have an impact on illegal trade and related crimes in the European Union…”¹⁵¹ The second call, made in 2017, expanded the areas of focus to include the Middle East, North Africa, South and Central America and South and Southeast Asia.¹⁵² For more information, visit our page on PMI IMPACT. In contrast to the company’s public persona of being part of the smuggling solution, evidence shows that the company was, in fact, part of the problem. In 2000, the European Commission (backed by a majority of EU member states) started court proceedings in the US Courts against PMI and other tobacco companies for its complicity in tobacco smuggling. The Commission claimed that the tobacco companies “boosted their profits in the past by deliberately oversupplying some countries so that their product could be smuggled into the EU”, costing the EU millions of euros in lost tax and customs revenue.¹⁵³¹⁵⁴ PMI and the Commission settled their dispute in 2004, when the company agreed to pay the Commission £675m to fund anti-smuggling activities.¹⁵⁵ The two Parties signed an Anti-Counterfeit and Anti-Contraband Cooperation Agreement,¹⁵⁶ referred to by the company as Project Star. As part of this agreement, PMI commissioned KPMG to measure annually the size of the legal, contraband and counterfeit markets for tobacco products in each EU Member States. Project Star’s methodology and data have been strongly criticised for lack of transparency, overestimating illicit cigarette levels in some European countries, and serving PMI’s interests over those of the EU and its member states.¹⁵⁷

Tactics to Subvert Tobacco Control Campaigns and Policies

PMI has strongly opposed tobacco control legislation and regulations across the world, including plain packaging in Australia and the UK, the EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD), and tobacco control decrees in Uruguay. The company has used a variety of strategies and tactics to influence tobacco control policies and subvert existing regulations.

Funding Pro-Tobacco Research and Discrediting Independent Evidence

In response to plain packaging proposals in the UK, PMI funded research, expert opinion and public relations activities which supported its position. One of the people that PMI funded for this purpose was Will O’Reilly, a former Detective Chief Inspector with the London Metropolitan Police. O’Reilly was appointed as a PMI consultant in 2011,¹⁵⁸ conducting undercover test purchases of illicit tobacco and publicising his findings in UK regional press.¹⁵⁹ One of PMI’s arguments to oppose plain packaging was that the public health measure would lead to an increase in illicit tobacco, including counterfeited plain packs. For background on, and a critique of, this argument, go to Countering Industry Arguments Against Plain Packaging: It will Lead to Increased Smuggling. O’Reilly’s test purchases appear to have enabled PMI to secure significant press coverage of its data on illicit tobacco.¹⁶⁰ In March 2019, Euromonitor International, a market research organisation, received funding through two PMI initiatives: the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World and PMI IMPACT.^161162163 Examples of other organisations and individuals that have received funding from PMI to produce research or expert opinions or critiques of independent evidence, in order to oppose tobacco control legislation are: Deloitte | KPMG | Transcrime | Roy Morgan Research | Ashok Kaul | Michael Wolf | Populus | Centre for Economics and Business Research¹⁶⁴¹⁶⁵ | Compass Lexecon¹⁶⁶ | Rupert Darwall¹⁶⁷ | James Heckman¹⁶⁸ | Lord Hoffman¹⁶⁹ | Alfred Kuss¹⁷⁰ | Lalive ¹⁷¹ | LECG^172173174 | London Economics | Povaddo¹⁴⁴| SKIM Consumer Research¹⁷⁵

• To see a list of all organisations funded through PMI’s Foundation for a Smoke-Free World (FSFW), visit our pages on the FSFW’s Centres of Excellence and grantees.
• For more information on the tobacco industry’s use of research to undermine legitimate independent evidence see: Plain Packaging in the UK: Tobacco Industry Funded Research, Expert Opinion and Public Relations.

Using Freedom of Information Requests to Acquire Public Health Research Data

Freedom of Information (FOI) requests are one strategy that the tobacco industry uses to undermine tobacco control legislation, often covertly using third parties.¹⁷⁶ In 2009, and again in 2011, PMI sent Freedom of Information requests to Stirling University (UK) requesting access to a wide range of data from its research on teenage smoking. PMI alleged that it wanted “to understand more about the research project conducted by the University of Stirling on plain packaging for cigarettes”.¹⁷⁷ The FOI requests were eventually dropped. For more information on these FOI requests, and an explanation on how these requests impacted the University of Stirling, go to our page FOI: Stirling University.

Fabricating Support through Front Groups

PMI has used front groups to oppose tobacco control measures. Front Groups are organisations that purport to serve a public interest, while actually serving the interests of another party (in this case the tobacco industry), and often obscuring the connection between them. In Australia, leaked private documents revealed that the supposed anti-plain packaging retailer grass roots movement, the Alliance of Australian Retailers was set up by tobacco companies and that the Director of Corporate Affairs Philip Morris Australia, Chris Argent, played a critical role in its day-to-day operations.^178179180

• For more information on this front group, and Philip Morris Australia’s involvement, visit the Alliance of Australian Retailers page.
• For more information on front groups funded and/or organised by PMI and other tobacco companies, see the list on the Expose Tobacco website.

Lobbying of Decision Makers

Article 5.3 of the The World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) explicitly aims to reduce industry influence in public health policymaking by obliging parties to protect their health policies from tobacco industry interests and interference.¹⁸¹ Yet tobacco industry representatives, and third-parties regularly attempt to influence public health policymaking in the industry’s favour. This section details some of these incidents involving PMI and the response of the governments and the global health community.

EU

PMI reported that it spent between €1,250,000 and €1,499,999 in 2019 lobbying EU institutions, employing only 2 fulltime equivalent staff in its Brussels office.¹³⁴ If this data is correct, it suggests that PMI relied heavily on external lobbying firms. A 2013 leaked internal PMI document revealed that the company had 161 lobbyists working to undermine the revision of the EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD).¹⁸² The objective of PMI’s campaign was to either “push” (i.e. amend) or “delay” the TPD proposal, and “block” any so-called “extreme policy options” like the proposed point of sales display ban and plain packaging.¹⁸³

• For more information on PMI’s campaign to undermine the TPD, go to EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision and PMI Mobilised Support from Retailers.

UK

The leaked internal PMI documents from 2013 also revealed the extent of a multi-faceted campaign against Plain Packaging in the UK, including a detailed media campaign using dozens of third parties (both individuals and organisations) to promote its arguments against the policy. The documents also included a detailed political analysis of potential routes of influence for the tobacco company (Image 1).¹⁵⁸

One third party appointed in November 2011 to help PMI oppose the plain packaging proposal was the Crosby Textor Group. This appointment led to a conflict of interest scandal, given that Lynton Crosby co-Director of the Crosby Textor Group, was also the political election strategist for the UK’s Conservative Party, which was in power in the UK. David Cameron, then Prime Minister, insisted that Crosby never lobbied him about plain packaging. ¹⁸⁴¹⁸⁵ Despite a lack of evidence that Crosby lobbied the Prime Minister and Health Minister on plain packaging, documents released under FOI legislation, obtained by the University of Bath Tobacco Control Research Group, show that Crosby lobbied the UK Government on plain packaging via Lord Marland, the then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Intellectual Property, to oppose plain packaging. For more information on this lobbying scandal, go to Lynton Crosby’s page.

• For more detail on PMI’s attempts to undermine plain packaging proposals in the UK, visit: PMI Mobilised Support from Retailers | PMI’s Anti-Plain Packaging Lobbying Campaign | PMI’s Anti-Plain Packaging Media Campaign | PMI’s “Illicit Trade” Anti-Plain Packaging Campaign
• For information on the tobacco industry’s tactics to undermine this tobacco control measures, visit our pages on: Plain Packaging in the UK: Tobacco Company Opposition | Plain Packaging in the UK: Tobacco Industry Funded Research, Expert Opinion and Public Relations | Plain Packaging in the UK: Tobacco Industry Built Alliances | Plain Packaging in the UK: Tobacco Industry Funded Third Party Campaigns
• PMI also opposed the tobacco product display ban gradually introduced in the UK from 2012. More information on PMI’s tactics to stop this measure, see: Philip Morris’ PR Campaign Against the Display Ban

Australia

Australia has one of the least hospitable regulatory environments for the tobacco industry, having passed regulations banning advertising since 1976, a point of sale ban in 2011, and a plain packaging law in 2012. It also has regulation in place to prevent the sale of nicotine products, including e-cigarettes and HTPs.¹⁸⁶

The industry has not, however, given up on attempting to market its products and lobby decision makers across the country. In a 2019 article, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that Tammy Chan, Managing Director of PMI Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific wrote letters to health organisations urging them to enter into a “dialogue” on PMI’s “smoke-free” vision in the lead up to a parliamentary select committee meeting on the impact of e-cigarettes on “personal choice”.¹⁸⁷

In March 2019, PMI was accused of “subliminal advertising” in its sponsorship of the Ferrari Formula One team during the Australian Gran Prix in Melbourne. PMI has been accused of attempting to evade advertising bans by sponsoring motorsports teams.

• For more information see Motorsport Sponsorship

Latin America

José María Aznar, the former Prime Minister of Spain, has been widely reported by media outlets as having taken up a position as a lobbyist for PMI in Latin America.^188189190191

• For more information on his meetings with public officials in Chile and Peru, as well as his history of association with the tobacco industry while in office, see our page on José María Aznar.

Intimidating Governments with Litigation or Threat of Litigation

PMI has legally challenged tobacco control regulations across the globe, including:

• Comprehensive No Smoking Ordinance (2010 and 2016) and Tobacco-Free Generation Ordinance (2016) in Balanga, Philippines. A front group for the world’s biggest tobacco companies, including PMI, called the Philippine Tobacco institute (PTI) sued the city of Balanga in August 2017 over the Comprehensive No Smoking Ordinance, which it argued was “arbitrary and oppressive” and cost PMI USD$420,000 a month in lost sales. In July 2018, regional courts ruled in PTI’s favour, noting that although the city’s tobacco control efforts were “commendable”, they were also unconstitutional. PTI launched another lawsuit in May 2018 to challenge the constitutionality of the city’s Tobacco-Free Generation Ordinance.¹⁸⁷
• The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Packaging and Labelling) Second Amendment Rules, 2018 text and pictorial health warnings law in India. PMI affiliate Godfrey Phillips India sought a stay of implementation of new legislation requiring health warnings to increase to cover 85% of the surface of cigarette packaging, from the High Court of Karnataka in Bangalore, India. The Court rejected the request for stay in August 2018. The legality of the Rules themselves was at the time pending in the Supreme Court.¹⁹³
• The May 20, 2016 Decree plain packaging law in France. In December 2016, the Conseil d’Etat (the Council of State, the highest administrative jurisdiction in France) dismissed a six-part legal challenge jointly brought against the plain packaging law by JTI, Philip Morris France, BAT France, a tobacco paper manufacturer and The National Confederation of Tobacco Retailers of France (Confédération Nationale des Buralistes de France).¹⁹⁴
• In 2013, the mayor of Popayán, a city in southwestern Colombia, issued a decree prohibiting tobacco sales within 500 metres of schools, libraries and health institutions. Following heavy lobbying from Coltabaco, a Philip Morris affiliate, the radius was decreased to 200 metres. Coltabaco sued Popayán in March 2015, arguing that a mayoral decree was insufficient to effect legitimate regulation. Coltabaco won its lawsuit in September 2015.¹⁹⁵
• The Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products Regulations 2015 (UK). Following the passage of the legislation in March 2015, PMI and others launched a legal action, which it lost in May 2016 (the day before the legislation was due to come into force).¹⁹⁶¹⁹⁷
• The 2014 EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). PMI and BAT attempted to invalidate the TPD as a whole, or various provisions within it, but this legal challenge was dismissed in the European Court of Justice in May 2016.¹⁹⁸ More details can be found on the page TPD: Legal Challenges.
• The Ministry of Public Health Notice of Rules, Procedures, and Conditions for the Display of Images, Warning Statements, and Contact Channels for Smoking Cessation on Cigarette Labels of 2013 (Thailand). In July 2013, Philip Morris Thailand and Japan Tobacco International (JTI) Thailand requested a temporary injunction against an increase of picture and text health warnings from 55 to 85 percent of the front and back of cigarette warnings. Though their request was initially granted in August 2013 in the Central Administrative Court of Thailand, the injunction was reversed in May 2014 by the Supreme Administrative Court following appeal by the government. PMI and JTI ultimately withdrew their legal challenge.¹⁹⁹
• Following heavy criticism of its “Be Marboro” campaign worldwide (see below), Germany banned PMI from displaying “Be Marlboro” advertising in the country. A German court overturned the ban in 2015, stating that the wording of the advertisements did not explicitly target younger than legal age smokers.²⁰⁰
• National Systems of Health Oversight RDC No. 14/2012 Brazil. The Brazil Health Regulatory Agency’s (ANVISA) resolution No. 14 banned tobacco additives and flavours. The National Confederation of Industry (Confederação Nacional da Indústria) challenged the ban as an unconstitutional use of regulatory power. In February 2018, the highest court in Brazil, the Supreme Federal Tribunal, upheld the 2012 ban and reaffirmed the right of ANVISA to regulate tobacco products.²⁰¹
• The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Australia). PMI fiercely opposed the legislation, fearing that it might set a global precedent. The company fought this legislation unsuccessfully on three fronts:
  • World Trade Organization (WTO) challenge: In 2014, PMI supported a request by the Dominican Republic government before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, alleging that Australia’s plain packaging laws breach the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).²⁰² Similar requests were submitted by Ukraine, Cuba, Indonesia and Honduras, and furthermore, a record number of more than 40 WTO members joined the dispute as third parties.²⁰³
  • Constitutional challenge: In March 2012, PMI supported a claim made by British American Tobacco (BAT) in December 2011 before the Australian High Court that plain packaging was in breach of the Australian constitution.²⁰⁴ On 15 August 2012, the Hight Court ruled that plain packaging was not in breach with the Australian constitution as there had been no acquisition of property as alleged by the tobacco companies.²⁰³
  • Bilateral Investment challenge: In 2011, PMI started legal proceedings against the Australian government for allegedly violating the terms of The Australia – Hong Kong Bilateral Investment Treaty.²⁰⁵ In December 2015, The Permanent Court of Arbitration issued a unanimous decision that it had no jurisdiction to hear the claim. For more information on all three claims go to Australia: Challenging Legislation.
• Executive Decree No. 611 passed on 3 June 2010 in Panamá. Philip Morris Panamá joined onto a claim of unconstitutionality brought by British American Tobacco (BAT) against a ban on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (TAPS) and tobacco product display at the point of sale. BAT Panama claimed the ban violated freedom of expression and property rights, among others. The Supreme Court ruled in May 2014 against BAT, noting that, among other things, freedom of expression could be restricted in order to protect public health.²⁰⁶
• 2010 Amendment to the 1973 Act relating to the Prevention of the Harmful Effects of Tobacco (the Tobacco Control Act) in Norway. The Norwegian display ban on tobacco products came into effect on 1 January 2010 after an amendment was passed by the government in favour of the prohibition of visible tobacco products, smoking accessories and vending machines of tobacco products. PMI unsuccessfully challenged the ban as imposing a barrier to trade; the Oslo District court ruled in favour of the display ban in September 2012.²⁰⁷
• Ordinance 514, dated 18 August 2008, and Decree 287/009 dated 15 June 2009 (Uruguay). PMI unsuccessfully challenged the Uruguayan Tobacco Control Act which included a mandate for 80% health warnings on tobacco packets. The case was decided in favour of public health in 2017.²⁰⁸ PMI brought its claim under the Switzerland-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty at the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. The tribunal ruled in favour of Uruguay in July 2016.²⁰⁹

Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products

As the harms from conventional products have become better understood, and tobacco control measures have been put in place, the cigarette market – from which tobacco companies make most of their profits – has started to shrink. To secure the industry’s longer-term future, transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have invested in, developed and marketed various newer nicotine and tobacco products.¹⁰⁹  

In January 2017, PMI issued a press release which stated that the company intended to move its business away from conventional tobacco products entirely (see Image 2).²¹⁰ The company’s much publicised vision for a “smoke-free” future is one in which PMI plays a central role in “[providing] better alternatives to smoking for those who don’t quit”.¹²⁵ Integral to this vision was the release of IQOS in 2014. By 2016, PMI was the market leader in heated tobacco products (HTPs), accounting for over 99% of the global HTP market.¹⁹² By 2018, PMI’s share of the global HTP market had fallen to around 80%.¹⁹²²¹¹ PMI reported that by the end of 2019, IQOS was available in 52 markets, including the United States (US), and a number of lower income countries.²¹²

• For more information on IQOS and PMI’s newer products see Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products: Philip Morris International and Heated Tobacco Products: Philip Morris International.
• See also PMI’s Promotion of IQOS Using the FDA’s 2020 Modified Risk Tobacco Product (MRTP) Order

In April 2019, a life insurance company Reviti was launched. Registered in the UK at Companies House, Reviti is a wholly owned subsidiary of PMI.²¹³²¹⁴ The London-based company specialises in offering policies to smokers, with discounts for those who reduce or switch to PMI’s newer products.²¹⁵

In May 2022, PMI made an offer of US$16 billion deal to acquire Swedish Match, a manufacturer of snus and nicotine pouches, as well as chewing tobacco, snuff and cigars.²¹⁶²¹⁷ Swedish Match had planned to sell its cigar business but these plans were put on hold in March 2022.²¹⁸ PMI CEO Jacek Olczak said of the deal: “An important aspect of this proposed combination is the opportunity in the U.S., which is the world’s largest market for smoke-free products.”²¹⁹PMI is also hoping to significantly increase its market share of newer nicotine products in Europe and Asia.²²⁰ 

As of 28 November 2022, PMI had acquired over 90% of Swedish Match, gaining control of the company and enabling it to buy the remaining shares and take Swedish Match off the stock market.²²¹²²²

• For details see Swedish Match

Tobacco companies, including PMI, also invest in therapeutic products, such as nicotine lozenges, gum and inhalers. More information can be found on this page: Tobacco Company Investments in Pharmaceutical & NRT Products

“Smoke-Free” Campaigns

PMI has run various “smoke-free” campaigns promoting its newer products, including “Hold My Light” (UK); “Unsmoke Your World” (global); “It’s Time” (targeting policy makers); and “Futuro sin Humo” (in Mexico).

• For details see: Philip Morris International: “Smoke-Free” campaigns

Participation in Global Platforms to Rehabilitate Image

PMI has attempted to gain access to many high-level international events as a means of “rehabilitating its image and securing influence over global institutions and policy elites”. Since January 2019, PMI presence has been documented at:¹⁹²

January 2019

• World Economic Forum (WEF; Davos, Switzerland): PMI launched its first “white paper” to coincide with WEF. Though it was not an invited guest, PMI held a side-event co-hosted by the Wall Street Journal, and sponsored the Davos Playbook, Politico’s daily newsletter distributed to attendees.

June 2019

• (Group of 20) G20 Summit (Osaka, Japan): PMI took out a two-page advertisement in The Japan Times promoting its corporate transformation and reiterating the need for dialogue between decision-makers and industry.
• Cannes Lions International Film Festival of Creativity (Cannes, France): PMI attended Cannes to talk about newer tobacco products and potentially recruit celebrity activists to its cause.²²³ In addition, PMI had its own schedule of events, hosted by actress Rose McGowan and rapper Wycliff Jean. It also spoke in the festival’s Good Track stream alongside organisations including Greenpeace and UN Women. The decision to include PMI on the Good Track was heavily criticised in the light of “the ethics of proclaiming a smoke-free philosophy while continuing to sell billions of cigarettes a year”.²²⁴²²⁵

October 2019

• United Nations General Assembly (UNGA; New York City, USA): Though barred from participating directly in the UNGA, PMI hosted a parallel event at Concordia, a high-level event to foster partnerships between businesses, governments and UN agencies. In attendance were officials from the UN’s World Food Program, the UN Foundation and the World Bank as well as PMI’s Vice President of Global Partnerships and Cooperation, who spoke at the event. Bob Eccles, a paid PMI advisor, spoke at the UNGA during a side event on Exclusion and Engagement in Sustainable Investing.

TobaccoTactics Resources

• PMI Mobilised Support from Retailers
• PMI’s Anti-Plain Packaging Lobbying Campaign
• PMI’s Anti-PP Media Campaign
• PMI’s “Illicit Trade” Anti-Plain Packaging Campaign
• PMI IMPACT
• Philip Morris vs the Government of Uruguay
• Philip Morris’ PR Campaign Against the Display Ban
• Philip Morris’ Regulatory Litigation Action Plan Against the Display Ban
• Philip Morris’ Marlboro Brand Architecture
• Codentify
• Motorsport Sponsorship
• Digital Coding & Tracking Association (DCTA)
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World: How it Frames Itself for a detailed analysis of the ways in which the Foundation portrays itself and those who oppose the Foundation, plus the counter evidence to these portrayals
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World People
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World Grantees
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World Centres of Excellence
• Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products: Philip Morris International
• Heated Tobacco Products: Philip Morris International

Relevant Links

• Read the STOP report: Addiction At Any Cost: The Truth About Philip Morris International
• Philip Morris International company website
• Cancer Council Australia’s Critiques of KPMG Australia illicit tobacco trade reports
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World website
• PMI Impact website

TCRG Research

• The Philip Morris-funded Foundation for a Smoke-Free World: tax return sheds light on funding activities, T. Legg, S. Peeters, P. Chamberlain, A. Gilmore, The Lancet, 2019, 393(10190):2487-2488
• The revision of the 2014 European tobacco products directive: an analysis of the tobacco industry’s attempts to ‘break the health silo’, S. Peeters, H. Costa, D Stuckler, M. McKee, A. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2016, 25(1):108-117
• ‘It will harm business and increase illicit trade’: an evaluation of the relevance, quality and transparency of evidence submitted by transnational tobacco companies to the UK consultation on standardised packaging 2012, K. Evans-Reeves, J. Hatchard, A. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2015, 24(e2):e168-e177
• Illicit trade, tobacco industry-funded studies and policy influence in the EU and UK, G, Fooks, S. Peeters, K. Evans-Reeves, Tobacco Control, 2014, 23(1):81-83
• Transnational tobacco company interests in smokeless tobacco in Europe: Analysis of internal industry documents and contemporary industry materials, S. Peeters, A. Gilmore, PLoS Medicine, 2013, 10(9):1001506
• Towards a greater understanding of the illicit tobacco trade in Europe: a review of the PMI funded ‘Project Star’ report, A. Gilmore, A. Rowell, S. Gallus, A. Lugo, L. Joossens, M. Sims, 2013, Tobacco Control, doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2013-051240

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to the Bath TCRG’s list of publications.

References

The post Philip Morris International appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

This page summarises some of those arguments, focussing on the run up to an increase in tobacco tax in the UK in 2012.

See also pages on Price and Tax, which details tobacco industry tactics, including those used in low and middle-income countries.

“Tobacco Tax Should Be Cut”

From 2004, the Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association (TMA) consistently argued that higher taxes increase smuggling:

• In March 2012, the TMA claimed that the UK Chancellor’s announcement of an above-inflation increase in tobacco taxation “will do nothing to reduce the level of tobacco smuggling and crossborder shopping which cost Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury up to £3.6 billion in lost tax revenue in 2009/10.”²²⁸ Tobacco companies, members of the TMA, voiced the same concerns individually. Imperial Tobacco said that the budget would “tempt more smokers to buy illicit tobacco products”²²⁹, while the managing director of Japan Tobacco International UK said that “crime bosses will be tapping on their calculators to work out their new profit margins”²³⁰
• In March 2011, the TMA responded to the budget by arguing that the UK “Government has today increased tobacco duties by 2% above inflation which clearly demonstrates a complete lack of joined-up-thinking as taxation is the acknowledged driver of the illicit tobacco trade.”²³¹
• In February 2011, the trade magazine, Tobacco Reporter featured arguments against using tax as a deterrent to smoking.²³² In the editor’s memo, Taco Tunistra argued that the use of tax to generate money and “nudge people towards more wholesome lifestyles” was unworkable “if tobacco is addictive – taxation will not-cannot-reduce consumption”. Nicotine-dependent smokers will simply obtain their ‘fix’ from tax-avoiding sources, he argued.²³³
• In March 2010, in response to the UK budget, the TMA predicted that because the Government had “imposed the largest tax increase on tobacco products in ten years” it would “only provide further stimulus to those who seek to profit from the illicit trade in tobacco.”²³⁴
• In April 2009, the TMA responded to the budget by saying that it believed “the high level of tobacco tax” which was the “root cause of the high level of tobacco smuggling, needs to be addressed and a fundamental review of fiscal policy must be undertaken.”²³⁵
• In 2007, the TMA replied to the budget that “we maintain that a fundamental review of the UK’s tobacco tax policy, which is the root cause of the problem, must be undertaken.”²³⁶
• In 2005, the TMA argued that “High tobacco tax, one of the cornerstones of the UK government’s tobacco policy for almost a decade, has resulted in high levels of smuggling and crossborder shopping, with little effect on levels of smoking.”²³⁷
• In 2004, in its pre-budget meeting, the TMA argued for tax cuts of £1 on 20 cigarettes and £4 on 50g handrolling tobacco. It argued that “Tobacco tax should be cut to discourage smokers from buying abroad and so that smuggling becomes less profitable for the gangs who mastermind it.”²³⁸

Tobacco Industry Concerns “Not Borne Out by the Evidence”

In their budget submission in 2012, anti-smoking charity Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) and the UK Centre for Tobacco Control Studies rebutted these arguments. In a submission endorsed by over 90 health organisations, they wrote that:

“The argument that tax increases and enhanced regulation inevitably lead to increases in smuggling are not borne out by UK evidence. In the UK smuggling has been significantly reduced over the last decade by strong enforcement measures. Reintroduction of the tax escalator, increasing taxation above the rate of inflation while sustaining a tough anti-smuggling strategy has been successful. It has not led to increasing levels of illicit tobacco, as predicted by the tobacco industry”.²³⁹

A systematic review published in 2012 has also outlined the flaws behind arguments frequently used to oppose increases in tobacco taxation:²⁴⁰

Higher tobacco taxes lead to a fall in tax revenue

The tobacco industry, and allied organisations frequently claim that an increase in tobacco taxes will lead to a fall in consumption of tobacco products (or at least a fall in consumption of legal tobacco products) and therefore lead to a fall in tobacco tax revenue.²⁴¹ However a review from the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) demonstrated that this was not the case, with an increase in tax revenues in the short to medium term, while below-inflation tax increases led to a fall in tax revenue in real terms.²⁴⁰²⁴²

Higher taxes lead to increased smuggling and use of counterfeit tobacco

Despite tobacco companies claiming that tax increases would lead to more smuggling, they continued to increase cigarette prices on most brands by 4-6% above the tax increase and rate of inflation.²⁴³ Furthermore, although higher tobacco taxes create an increased incentive to purchase illicit tobacco, tobacco industry-funded research often significantly overstates the prevalence of illicit tobacco products. It is recommended that governments increase efforts to tackle illicit trade rather than postponing tax increases for fear of a rise in illicit tobacco.²⁴⁴ Claims over the ‘tax revenue lost’ to the black market also ignore the increase in revenue generated by tax increases, as discussed above.

Lower taxes would reduce smuggling and increase revenue

The TMA also claimed that a decrease in tax would lead to an increase in revenue, as legal tobacco products would become more competitive against illicit tobacco products.^{241 245} However, Sweden increased its tobacco taxes in 1996 and 1997, generating a 9% increase in tobacco tax revenues. The increase was repealed in 1998, and tax revenues returned to their previous level, despite a 50% increase in cigarette sales per person.²⁴⁶

In 1994 Canadian federal and provincial cigarette taxes were reduced significantly in response to an “aggressive industry-sponsored campaign.”²⁴⁶ Provinces that lowered their tax rates saw a rise in tobacco consumption, as well as a 33% fall in federal tax revenues and a 40% fall in tobacco tax revenue in provinces that lowered their tobacco taxation, while revenue in other provinces was stable.²⁴⁶ New Hampshire also experienced a fall in tax revenue after reducing tobacco taxes.²⁴⁷²⁴⁸

Higher taxes will cost jobs

The 2012 review article also found no evidence that higher tobacco taxes would cause significant job losses, as very few businesses are tobacco-dependent. The authors added that the money which had previously been spent by smokers on tobacco would be spent on other products.²⁴⁰

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Price and Tax

References

The post Tobacco Industry Arguments Against Taxation appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Tobacco Industry Use of Evidence to Oppose Policy

The tobacco industry’s attempts to deny the evidence, even when evidence exists, is a tactic aimed at influencing public opinion. Placing this argument in the public domain creates a level of doubt which permeates even when credible evidence is presented to the contrary. This tactic has been used to oppose earlier policies (such as advertising bans and smoke-free legislation) which were strongly associated with positive health outcomes and reductions in health inequalities.^{257258259260261262263264 265266}
Insisting on real world evidence before regulating, as the tobacco industry has argued in the case of plain packaging,²⁵⁶ would effectively place a block on all new laws likely to promote public health and welfare, irrespective of advances in scientific knowledge.
In opposing plain packaging, the tobacco industry has used the principles and processes (public consultations and impact assessments) of Better Regulation to support its argument that there is insufficient evidence to support the implementation of the policy.²⁶⁷ Better Regulation was lobbied for by the industry and requires risks, costs and benefits to be weighed against one another before new regulatory burdens are placed on businesses. ^268269270

Flawed Tobacco Industry Evidence

Australia – Critique of Tobacco Industry Graphic Health Warnings Research

A report by Deloitte (2011), commissioned by BAT, suggested that health warnings on cigarette packets had not been successful in reducing cigarette consumption and therefore plain packaging was unlikely to be effective.²⁷¹ However, Cancer Council Victoria (Australia) reviewed the analyses forming the basis of this conclusion and found the methodology weak in several respects.²⁷² For instance, Deloitte made an error in their analysis by starting it in 1990, whereas health warnings were introduced in 1987. In addition to this error, the data used were not actually consumption data but rather duty paid shipment volumes. It has been reported that duty paid does not necessarily amount to consumption because in some years cigarettes are over-produced and surplus is often kept in storage until needed.²⁷³ Looking only at BAT brands, Deloitte concluded that volumes did not decline any more steeply than normal. However, when data on all duty paid tobacco products was assessed, Cancer Council Victoria reported that excise and customs duty declined more than would be predicted following the introduction of health warnings.²⁷²

UK – Critiques of Industry Evidence that Plain Packaging Will Not Work

Peer-reviewed research has shown how global tobacco companies commissioned, cited and critiqued evidence as part of a campaign to prevent the introduction of plain packaging for their products in the UK.^256274275276
Tobacco companies used this strategy to argue that plain packaging “won’t work”. Evidence to support this claim was promoted through the media and in submissions to government.
This strategy was examined in a series of peer-reviewed research papers, which highlighted the misleading nature of tobacco companies’ evidence on plain packaging, emphasising that:

• Tobacco companies cited evidence that did not directly consider plain packaging to argue that regulation “won’t work”;²⁵⁶
• Evidential critiques commissioned by tobacco companies used misleading techniques to discredit public health research on plain packaging;²⁷⁴
• Quoted statistics on illicit tobacco were over-estimated to exaggerate the risks of the policy.²⁷⁵²⁷⁶

The Importance of Branding and Packaging to the Tobacco Industry

Despite the tobacco industry’s claims that plain packaging will not work because packaging is not important to marketing, internal industry documents show how important tobacco branding is, with innovations (packaging and product) leading to a 10% increase in market share for BAT in 2011.²⁷⁷ Internal industry documents reveal a long held understanding by the tobacco industry that cigarette packets and tobacco pouches represent mobile advertisements. One Rothmans document from 1982, for example, stated that the company was:

“very aware that every customer carries the Rothmans logo, on the package, with him or her all the time. That package comes out many times a day, and every time it is seen makes a personal comment about the person who carries and shows it.”²⁷⁸

In 1994, Philip Morris said:

“In the absence of any other marketing messages, our packaging — comprised of the trademark, our design, color sic and information — is the sole communicator of our brand essence. Put another way — when you don’t have anything else — our packaging is our marketing.”²⁷⁹

The tobacco industry claims that cigarette packaging has no bearing on people’s smoking behaviour, however advertising works for every other industry. The tobacco industry has long argued that tobacco advertising is aimed at building brand loyalty, not trying to persuade young people to smoke or smokers to continue and not quit. However, others within the advertising industry have disputed this categorically.
Advertising executive Emerson Foote, former Chairman of the Board of McCann-Erickson, which handled $20 million in tobacco account sales, argued that:

“The cigarette industry has been artfully maintaining that cigarette advertising has nothing to do with total sales. This is complete and utter nonsense. I am always amused by the suggestion that advertising, a function that has been shown to increase consumption of virtually every other product, somehow miraculously fails to work for tobacco products.”²⁸⁰

In 2004, BAT acknowledged packaging innovations as the reason for the increased success of their Dunhill brand: “In Australia and Taiwan, the continued success of the new packaging led to increased volumes of 7 per cent and 20 per cent respectively”.²⁸¹

Global – Pre-Implementation Evidence For Plain Packaging

Prior to the implementation of plain packaging in Australia a large volume of peer-reviewed research supported the measure. The research showed that when branding is removed from tobacco packaging, health warnings are more salient²⁸²²⁸³ packs appear less attractive and of a lower quality, and there is less confusion about the relative harm from different brands, e.g. Marlboro gold packs are viewed as less harmful than Marlboro red packs.²⁷²²⁸² Furthermore, a number of studies evaluated in a systematic review for the UK Department of Health found that cigarette packaging influences children and is an important consideration in children’s smoking behaviour.²⁸² A few examples of studies included in the systematic review are:

• A study of school children in Canada and the US found that the majority of children, when asked, would prefer to take home a branded rather than a plain cigarette pack as the plain pack was “ugly” and “boring”.^284285286
• A Scottish study found that amongst 10-17 year olds, plain cigarette packs were seen by the majority as “unattractive”, “uncool” and “a pack you would not like to be seen with”.²⁸⁷

Prior to the implementation of the policy in the UK and Ireland, two plain packaging evidence reviews by both the UK (the Chantler Review), and Irish Governments (the Hammond Review) concluded that that this population-scale measure is likely to be effective in reducing youth uptake of smoking. For example, in the UK, Sir Cyril Chantler’s review concluded that:

“Having reviewed the evidence it is in my view highly likely that standardised packaging would serve to reduce the rate of children taking up smoking and implausible that it would increase the consumption of tobacco. I am persuaded that branded packaging plays an important role in encouraging young people to smoke and in consolidating the habit irrespective of the intentions of the industry. Although I have not seen evidence that allows me to quantify the size of the likely impact of standardised packaging, I am satisfied that the body of evidence shows that standardised packaging, in conjunction with the current tobacco control regime, is very likely to lead to a modest but important reduction over time on the uptake and prevalence of smoking and thus have a positive impact on public health.”²⁸⁸

While the Hammond Review, commissioned by the Irish Government, concluded:

“The evidence indicates that tobacco packaging is a critically important form of tobacco promotion, particularly in jurisdictions with comprehensive advertising and marketing restrictions, such as Ireland. The evidence indicates that plain packaging reduces false beliefs about the risks of smoking, increases the efficacy of health warnings, reduces consumer appeal among youth and young adults, and may promote smoking cessation among established smokers.
Overall, there is very strong evidence that plain packaging would be effective in regards to four of Ireland’s specific policy objectives:

• Prevent non-smokers including children and young people from starting to smoke;
• Encourage, motivate and support current smokers to quit;
• Reduce recidivism rates among those who have quit;
• Limit the societal impacts of smoking and protect society, especially those under 18 years, from the marketing practices of the tobacco industry.”²⁸⁹

Australia – Early Evidence that Plain Packaging Works

Following the introduction of plain packaging in Australia in December 2012, calls to Quitline increased,²⁹⁰ individual pack display decreased,²⁹¹ cigarette sales fell 3.4%,²⁹² there was no increase in transaction times, no defection to larger stores to make tobacco purchases, and no impact on the illicit trade.^293294295
These early policy outcomes contradicted the claims made by tobacco companies in the UK, and complement the Tobacco Control Research Group’s research, which has raised serious questions about the trustworthiness and scientific value of tobacco companies’ arguments that plain packaging “won’t work”.

Australia – Evidence from the Post-Implementation Tobacco Plain Packaging Evaluation

In order to monitor the outcomes of the 2011 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act, in 2012 the Australian Department of Health commissioned a National Monthly Tobacco Plain Packaging Tracking Survey of the early effects of plain packaging on adolescents. Findings were reported in several studies published in a special issue of Tobacco Control. A Post-Implementation Review of Tobacco Plain Packaging was also published in 2016.

Results of Australia’s National Monthly Tobacco Plain Packaging Tracking Survey

Four hundred smokers and recent quitters were surveyed every four weeks between April 2012 and March 2014, with a follow up survey in May 2014. Post-implementation plain packaging legislation:

• Reduced appeal of packs²⁹⁶;
• Increased health warning effectiveness;
• Corrected some misperceptions of harms;
• Increased rates of quitting cognitions and quit attempts.²⁹⁷

Evaluation of the Effects of Plain Packaging on Australian Adolescents

A 2013 evaluation survey examined the impact of plain tobacco packaging and enhanced graphic health warnings on adolescents’ perceptions of pack images, brand differences and on their cognitive processing. Comparisons of results from 2011 and 2013 showed that:

• The appeal of cigarette packs and brands to Australian adolescents decreased significantly;²⁹⁸;
• Acknowledgement of negative health effects of smoking among Australian adolescents remained high; but, apart from bladder cancer, new requirements for packaging and health warnings did not increase adolescents cognitive processing of warning information;²⁹⁹.

Post-Implementation Review of Tobacco Plain Packaging in Australia

In 2016, in the Post-Implementation Review of Tobacco Plain Packaging, the Australian Department of Health linked the introduction of tobacco plain packaging with a reduction in daily smoking prevalence:

“The 2013 NDSHS collected data from nearly 24,000 people across Australia from 31 July to 1 December 2013, (notably, after the introduction of the tobacco plain packaging measure and mostly before the first of a series of four 12.5% tobacco excise increases on 1 December 2013). The results of the 2013 NDSHS show that daily smoking prevalence among Australians aged 14 years and over has fallen significantly from 15.1% in 2010 to 12.8% in 2013, a drop of 15%. This included declines in all Australian states and territories (except Tasmania).”³⁰⁰

Tobacco Industry Response to the Australian Post-Implementation Review (PIR)

Philip Morris Limited (PMI) made a submission to the PIR consultation³⁰⁰ which raised concerns about the PIR process.³⁰¹ The submission sought to widen the scope of the Review beyond the impacts on smoking prevalence and the denormalising effects of plain packaging. It asserted that a ‘compliant’ PIR would need to include a ‘cost-benefit analysis’ of the policy which includes consideration of any impact on the illicit tobacco trade and on the structure of the tobacco market. The PMI submission cited a KPMG report on illicit tobacco in Australia.³⁰² Earlier reports from this source has previously been rejected by the Australian Borders and Customs Agency and peer-reviewed research, which maintains there has been no impact on the illicit trade.^294295303
Similarly replicating previous tactics, Japan Tobacco International (JTI)’s press release following the release of Australia’s PIR³⁰⁴ questioned the credibility of the analysis.³⁰⁵

Countering Industry Arguments Against Plain Packaging

• It Breaches Intellectual Property Rights
• It will Lead to Increased Smuggling
• The Nanny State is going Too Far
• It will Cost Small Businesses

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Plain Packaging
• EU Better Regulation
• 2012 Consultation

TCRG Research

• Evidence on Plain Packaging
• Peer-Reviewed Research

References

The post Countering Industry Arguments Against Plain Packaging: No Evidence Plain Packaging Will Work appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Big Brother Watch describes itself as a “cross-party, non-party, independent non-profit organisation leading the protection of privacy and civil liberties in the UK”. It states that it uses both advocacy and campaigns and independent research and investigations to “inform policy and public debate”.³⁰⁸ It was founded in 2009 by Matthew Elliot, who also founded The TaxPayers’ Alliance.³⁰⁹

Pro-Tobacco Activities

Against the Point of Sale Display Ban

In November 2010, Mahendra Jadeja, the former president of the Federation of Independent Retailers (NFRN) (formerly known as National Federation of Retail Newsagents), attacked the Point of Sale Display Ban on the Big Brother Website, arguing it would “bring about a growth in the illicit cigarette market” and would force “many shops” to the wall “simply because the excessive cost of changing the shop gantries.” ³¹⁰

Risks of Second-Hand Smoke “A Complete Fabrication”

In January 2011, the chair of Freedom2Choose, Dave Atherton wrote a guest blog for Big Brother Watch. He argued that his “area of expertise are the restrictions of smoking”. He then argued that The Tobacco Display Ban would have “no impact on youth smoking.” With regard to the “supposed harm of passive smoking (PS)”, he argued that “best it is exaggerated and at worst is a Labour Party dossier of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, complete fabrication.”³¹¹

The Letter to the Daily Telegraph

On 9 March 2011, Daniel Hamilton, then the Director of Big Brother Watch was one of 11 signatories of a Letter to the Editor to the Daily Telegraph attacking the Government’s position on tobacco control and arguing against further restrictions.

“Tax Doesn’t Reduce Consumption”

Two weeks later, in response to the 2011 Budget, Daniel Hamilton attacked the increase on cigarettes and tobacco. “Drinking beer and smoking cigarettes is a matter of basic personal choice. People should have a right to enjoy these perfectly legal products without the nanny state seeking to tax their personal preferences out of existence. “People’s response to ‘sin taxes’ is, generally, to sigh and pay them – the result isn’t to drive down consumption, but to increase the government’s tax take.”³¹²

No Longer Involved in the Tobacco Debate

In May 2012, when asked to clarify whether Big Brother Watch was or previously had received tobacco industry funding, Nick Pickles replied: “We’re not involved in the tobacco/health/plain packaging debate and have not made any public statements on the issue for at least six months. I joined as Director in September 2011. We do not intend to do so for the foreseeable future.³¹³
In January 2018, Big Brother Watch published a press release in response to the news that medical records were given to US firms connected to the tobacco industry by Public Health England. Silkie Carlo, Director of Big Brother Watch, was quoted in the release as saying that it was “appalling” and “unacceptable” that sensitive patient data was given to “a non-medical, corporate outfit paid by the tobacco industry – the very cause of many of those patients’ disease”. Big Brother Watch also supported calls for an inquiry into the issue by the Health Select Committee.³¹⁴

Personnel

As of January 2020, the Big Brother Watch website lists two staff and five board members.³⁰⁸

• Silkie Carlo – Director
• Griff Ferris – Legal and Policy Officer
• Lord Paul Strasburger – Chair of Board
• Al Ghaff – Board Member
• Dinah Rose QC – Board Member
• Mark Littlewood – Board Member
• Tim Knox – Board Member

Former Staff

• Matthew Elliott – Former Chief Executive
• Nick Pickles – Former Director
• Daniel Hamilton – Former Director
• Alex Deane – Former Director

References

The post Big Brother Watch appeared first on TobaccoTactics.