Image source: Storm Crypt/CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 DEED

Key Points

• The Philippines is an island nation in Southeast Asia consisting of over 7,000 individual islands. It is part of the World Health Organization’s Western Pacific Region.
• Its population was 115.6 million as of 2022. The previous year, adult tobacco use prevalence was 19.5%.
• The Philippines ratified the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in 2005. It has not signed the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.
• PMFTC Inc. – a joint venture between Philip Morris International and the Fortune Tobacco Corporation, the tobacco business of local conglomerate LT Group – has the largest share of the Philippine cigarette market. Japan Tobacco International accounts for most other sales.
• Recent tobacco industry tactics in the Philippines include attempting to influence the committee responsible for overseeing tobacco control in the country; corporate social responsibility, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic; and establishing relationships with public officials, including at the very top of government.

The Philippines has made some progress on tobacco control, especially since the introduction of the reforms known as the Sin Taxes in 2013. These both greatly simplified tax structures and significantly increased excise on tobacco and alcohol products, with a substantial share of the new revenue being channelled into universal healthcare.¹ Tobacco use prevalence, which stood at 29.7% in 2009, had fallen to 23.8% by 2015, and again to 19.5% by 2021.²³ However, rising incomes and subsequent smaller increases in tobacco taxes have made cigarettes more affordable, slowing further progress.⁴ Other challenges include an illicit tobacco market larger than the global average;⁵ the growing popularity of newer nicotine and tobacco products (particularly e-cigarettes) amongst young people;⁶ and ongoing tobacco industry presence on the inter-agency committee responsible for implementing tobacco control regulation in the country.⁷ Philippine domestic law continues to fall short of what is required by the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) across a number of areas.⁸

Tobacco Use in the Philippines

In 2022, the population of the Philippines was 115.6 million.⁹ According to the 2021 Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS), tobacco use prevalence amongst Filipino adults was 19.5%.³ Prevalence is much higher amongst males (nearly 35%) than females (just over 4%).³ Amongst adolescents aged between 13 and 15, 12.5% were using some form of tobacco in 2019.¹⁰ Again, prevalence for males (over 18%) is higher than for females (nearly 7%).¹⁰

In the 2021 GATS, just over 2% of Filipino adults reported current use of e-cigarettes (3.6% males; 0.5% females).³ However, use of e-cigarettes is considerably higher amongst youth. In the 2019 Global Youth Tobacco Survey, the corresponding figure was over 14% – higher than for conventional cigarettes (10%).¹⁰ More than 20% of boys aged between 13 and 15 reported using e-cigarettes, compared to 7.5% of girls.¹⁰ Smokeless tobacco use in the Philippines also appears to be greater amongst the young: in 2019, 3% of young people reported current smokeless tobacco use, compared to 1.5% of adults in 2021.¹⁰³

There were an estimated 95,600 deaths attributable to tobacco use in 2019, accounting for nearly 15% of all mortality in the Philippines that year.¹¹ According to a 2018 study, the economic burden of tobacco use in the Philippines in 2012 was just under PHP₱270 billion (US$15.1 billion according to the purchasing power parity exchange rate) – equivalent to 2.5% of national GDP. This includes both direct costs resulting from tobacco use (e.g., hospitalisations and medication) as well as indirect costs (reduced productivity due to disability and mortality). The same study found that diseases attributable to tobacco use accounted for nearly 5% of total health expenditure.¹²

Tobacco in the Philippines

Market share and leading brands

PMFTC Inc. (PMFTC) dominates the Philippine cigarette market, with a market share of around 61% in 2022.¹³ PMFTC is a joint venture between Philip Morris International (PMI) and the Fortune Tobacco Corporation, the tobacco business of local conglomerate LT Group.¹⁴

Japan Tobacco International (JTI) has a market share of 38%, thanks to its 2017 acquisition of local company Mighty Corporation.¹³¹⁵ Together, PMFTC and JTI account for virtually all of the licit cigarette sales in the country.¹³

PMI’s flagship brand Marlboro is the most popular brand of cigarette, with a share of nearly 33% in 2022. In second place is another PMFTC brand, Fortune International, with a share of nearly 17%. JTI’s Winston is third, with a market share of around 14%. All other brands have market shares of less than 10%.¹⁶

• For more information on the tobacco industry in the Philippines, please see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

At nearly 23%, the Philippines has one of the largest market shares for menthol cigarettes in the world.¹⁷¹⁸ Menthol cigarettes have been marketed in the Philippines since at least the 1970s, including in campaigns targeting young women.¹⁹ In more recent times, the menthol market share has increased year on year since 2014. Similarly, though the market for flavour capsule cigarettes is much smaller than for menthol, it has also been growing steadily, with yearly increases since 2015.¹⁷ These products are often more attractive to youth and young adults than conventional cigarettes; menthol in particular is associated with increased smoking initiation.¹⁸

• For more information, please see the page on Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco in LMICs.

Tobacco farming and child labour

Since the early 1960s, tobacco production in the Philippines has remained roughly stable, at between 40,000 and 70,000 tonnes a year. However, between 1981 and 1993 it increased to between 74,000 and 118,000 tonnes. Conversely, between 2006 and 2009 it dipped below 40,000, to a low of 32,000 tonnes in 2008.²⁰

Figure 1: Tobacco production, 1961 to 2021.²⁰ Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization/Our World in Data | CC BY

Research has demonstrated that tobacco growing is not a profitable enterprise for most farmers. Despite this, farmers continue to grow tobacco due to a belief in its profitability and the reliability of the tobacco market; its perceived resilience to bad weather compared to other crops; and, in particular, access to credit.²¹ Filipino farmers interviewed for a study published in 2019 stated that tobacco farming allowed them to take out loans to which they would not have had access had they been growing other crops. Loans were also used to cover non-agricultural expenses such as school fees, buying food, and paying off other loans.²¹

As part of the Sin Tax reforms, 15% of the revenue collected from tobacco taxes is allocated to tobacco-growing communities to promote economically viable alternatives.²² However, this remains a challenge. Farmers have cited lack of capital, difficulties accessing credit, an absence of technical support and a perceived lack of markets for other crops as reasons for not transitioning away from tobacco.²¹

Tobacco is also one of 13 commodities produced in the Philippines which feature on the U.S. Department of Labor’s 2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.²³ However, comprehensive and up-to-date information on child labour in Philippine tobacco farming is not available.

Tobacco and the economy

The Philippines is a net importer of raw tobacco, importing about US$243 million of raw tobacco in 2022, compared to exports of around US$184 million.²⁴²⁵ However, the country is a net exporter of cigarettes, with exports in the same year of over US$232 million, compared to about US$22.6 million in imports.²⁶²⁷

Illicit trade

Illicit tobacco was estimated to form around 16% of the market in the Philippines in 2018.⁵ Though this is above the likely global average of 11 to 12%, it has changed little since 1998.⁵²⁸ Though industry-funded studies found significant increases in the Philippine illicit tobacco trade following the introduction of the Sin Taxes in 2013, there is no independent evidence to support this.⁵

Tobacco and the environment

The WHO reports that curing in tobacco agriculture is a leading cause of demand for wood from native forests in the Philippines.²⁹

Farmers cultivating the native batek variety of tobacco in the southern Philippines have been documented as using several toxic agrochemicals to control pests. These include some listed as hazardous by the WHO, such as cypermethrin and methomyl.³⁰

It has been estimated that between 30 and 50 billion cigarette butts are littered every year in the Philippines – 12.5 million on the resort island of Boracay alone.³¹ Boracay was closed for six months in 2018 for environmental rehabilitation, resulting in billions in lost revenues for both government and the private sector.³¹³²

• For more information on the tobacco industry’s environmental impact, please see Tobacco and the Environment and the long read on Plastics, the Environment and the Tobacco Industry.

Roadmap to Tobacco Control

The Philippines ratified the WHO FCTC in 2005 and the treaty entered into force later that year.³³³⁴ WHO FCTC ratification was a catalyst for strengthening tobacco control laws in the country and reducing industry influence on policy.³⁴ However, the Philippines is not a party to the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.³⁵

The Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003 (RA 9211) is the country’s main tobacco control law, covering areas such as smoking in public places; tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; and sales restrictions. Subsequent legislation built on the 2003 law, introducing further regulation on issues such as designated smoking areas, advertising and the packaging and labelling of tobacco products.³⁶

However, given that RA 9211 was enacted just three months before the Philippines signed the WHO FCTC, Filipino tobacco control advocates have argued that the law was both timed and designed to pre-empt the Convention. This has resulted in tobacco control regulations which, nearly 20 years later, still fall some way short of WHO FCTC requirements.⁷³⁷ Designated smoking areas are still permitted in indoor offices and workplaces; restaurants; and cafés, pubs and bars. Restrictions on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship remain incomplete. And at 50.6% of the retail value of the most popular brand of cigarettes, tobacco taxation is significantly below the 75% threshold recommended by the WHO.⁸

The tobacco industry, led by the Philippine Tobacco Institute (PTI), has also used RA 9211 as justification for delaying the introduction of more WHO FCTC-compliant measures (such as graphic health warnings), arguing that such measures contravene existing Philippine law.³⁷³⁸

In August 2020, the joint House Committees on Trade and Industry and on Health approved a bill regulating manufacture, sale and use of e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products (HTPs).³⁹ This bill reversed an earlier decision to raise the purchase age from 18 to 21 and restrict flavourings to tobacco and plain menthol. It also shifted responsibility for regulation of these products from the Food and Drug Administration to the Department of Trade and Industry. Eight days after the bill was approved, the first of four stores dedicated to PMI’s flagship HTP IQOS opened for business.⁴⁰

This bill was a precursor to the Vaporized Nicotine and Non-Nicotine Products Regulation Act, which eventually became law in July 2022. E-cigarettes in hundreds of different flavours reportedly flooded the Philippine market in the months following the passage of the law.⁴¹ Leading Filipino tobacco control advocates argue that the law has undermined recent gains in tobacco control.⁴⁰

For more details, please see the following websites:

• Legislation by country/Jurisdiction – Philippines, Tobacco Control Laws, Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids
• Philippines, WHO FCTC Implementation Database, WHO FCTC Secretariat
• Country profile – Philippines, World Health Organization, WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2023

Tobacco Industry Interference in the Philippines

Recent tobacco industry tactics in the Philippines include attempting to influence the committee responsible for overseeing tobacco control in the country; corporate social responsibility, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic; and attempts to influence policy, including by establishing relationships at the very top of government.

Conflict of interest

The Philippines’ main tobacco control law, RA 9211, requires the government to implement a “balanced policy”, given that:

“It is the policy of the State to protect the populace from hazardous products and promote the right to health and instill health consciousness among them. It is also the policy of the State, consistent with the Constitutional ideal to promote the general welfare, to safeguard the interests of the workers and other stakeholders in the tobacco industry.”⁴²

However, the first principle of the implementation guidelines for Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC states that “There is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco industry’s interests and public health policy interests.”⁴³ Any requirement for “balance” can only therefore hinder progress on tobacco control and undermine public health.

This may be seen in the composition of the Interagency Committee on Tobacco (IAC-T), a multisectoral body established by RA 9211 responsible for overseeing implementation of the legislation.⁴² One seat on the IAC-T is reserved for the National Tobacco Administration (NTA) – a government agency that sits within the Department of Agriculture – which has a mandate to “Promote the balanced and integrated growth and development of the tobacco industry to help make agriculture a solid base for industrialization.”⁴⁴

Another seat is reserved for a representative of the tobacco industry, specifically the Philippine Tobacco Institute (PTI), an association whose members over the years have included PMFTC and JTI, among others.^42454647 The PTI has a long history of undermining tobacco control measures, including successfully managing to reduce the size of graphic health warnings on tobacco products, opposing tobacco tax reforms and litigating over tobacco control regulations against public bodies such as the City of Balanga and the Department of Health.⁴⁶⁴⁸⁴⁹

Tobacco control advocates have called repeatedly for the removal of the PTI from the IAC-T, citing conflict of interest and alleging that it uses its position to actively weaken tobacco control policies.⁴⁶⁵⁰⁵¹ The WHO has supported this position, stating that the composition of the Philippine IAC-T “is blatantly in conflict with WHO FCTC Article 5.3”, which requires parties to protect their public health policies against the commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry.⁵²

Corporate social responsibility

As of 2023, there was still no ban on tobacco industry corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the Philippines.⁸ The tobacco industry has taken advantage of this shortcoming to try to enhance its reputation and influence both policy makers and the general public.

From 2017 to 2021, PMI spent nearly US$38 million on CSR in the Philippines. Nearly US$31 million of this total was spent in 2020 and 2021 alone.⁵³ Much of this funding is channelled through the Jaime V. Ongpin Foundation (JVOFI), a development NGO and partner of “Embrace”, PMFTC’s CSR programme.⁵³⁵⁴ During 2020, in the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, JVOFI distributed ambulances, ventilators, PCR machines for COVID-19 testing, personal protective equipment, food supplies and rapid test kits throughout the country.⁵⁴

PMI was far from the only tobacco industry player carrying out this kind of work: by mid-April 2020, the LT Group – PMI’s partner in joint venture PMFTC – had spent PHP₱200 million (around US$4 million) on COVID-19 assistance.⁵⁴ The LT Group implements such initiatives in the Philippines via its CSR arm, the Tan Yan Kee Foundation.⁵⁵ Also in April 2020, Japan Tobacco International (JTI) donated 20,000 face masks to hospitals in the province of Batangas, where its manufacturing facilities are located.⁵⁴

An investigation published by the media and business intelligence organisation Eco-Business in 2021 revealed that a number of congressional representatives were involved in the distribution of COVID-19 relief donated by the tobacco industry and its associates.⁴⁰ These donations also coincided with several debates in Congress which addressed regulation for newer nicotine and tobacco products (see section “Roadmap to Tobacco Control”).⁴⁰³⁷

Both PMI and JTI also lobbied the Philippine Ministry of Finance for permission to continue their operations as normal during lockdown, though cigarettes were not considered to be an essential item.⁵⁴ In an April 2020 press release, JTI argued that lockdown restrictions were forcing smokers to buy illicit tobacco; were resulting in lower tax revenues for government; and were harming retailers, especially small and family-run businesses.⁵⁶ Restrictions on the transport and delivery of tobacco products were subsequently lifted.⁵⁷

This shows how industry arguments around the illicit trade were accepted by Filipino policy makers, allowing tobacco companies to operate even during an outbreak of a lethal respiratory disease to which smokers are more vulnerable.⁵⁸

• For more on tobacco industry activity during the pandemic, please see the COVID-19 Tobacco Tactics page and the COVID-19 monitoring database.

Unnecessary interaction with high level officials

Hailing from the Ilocos region, where tobacco is a major cash crop, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has met with PMI at least twice since becoming president in June 2022.⁴¹⁵⁹ The most recent of these meetings was a lunch he and First Lady Liza Araneta-Marcos hosted for PMI executives – including CEO Jacek Olczak – at the Malacañang Palace in November 2022, the first time a company CEO has been received at the Philippine presidential palace. Also present were PMFTC president Denis Gorkun and LT Group CEO Lucio Tan III.⁴¹

PMFTC’s director for global communications stated that the aim of the meeting was to outline the company’s plan “to expand our economic footprint in the Philippines.”⁴¹ PMI is reportedly investing US$150 million in the expansion of a manufacturing plant in Tanauan, Batangas. The new wing of the factory is to be used for the production of BLENDS, tobacco sticks used exclusively in PMI’s BONDS, a more affordable version of its flagship HTP IQOS.⁴¹

In 2012, the then Senator Marcos was photographed during a Senate debate on the Sin Taxes speaking to a lawyer representing PMFTC.⁶⁰⁶¹

Relevant Links

• The Toll of Tobacco in the Philippines, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, 2023
• Tobacco Industry Interference Index 2022: The Philippine Report on the Implementation of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, HealthJustice, 2023
• Global Adult Tobacco Survey, Fact Sheet, Philippines 2021, Republic of the Philippines Department of Health, Philippine Statistics Authority, WHO Philippines et al
• Global Youth Tobacco Survey, Fact Sheet, Philippines 2019, Republic of the Philippines Department of Health, Epidemiology Bureau, WHO Western Pacific Region et al
• Tobacco Industry Monitor – Philippines, Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance, 2024

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco in LMICs

References

The post Philippines Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) is an international treaty that aims to reduce the demand and supply of tobacco. It entered into force in February 2005, and as of 2023, there are 183 Parties to the treaty.⁶²

Article 3 of the WHO FCTC establishes that “the objective of this Convention and its protocols is to protect present and future generations from the devastating health, social, environmental and economic consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke by providing a framework for tobacco control measures to be implemented by the Parties at the national, regional and international levels in order to reduce continually and substantially the prevalence of tobacco use and exposure to tobacco smoke”.⁶³

What is the endgame?

The tobacco ‘endgame’ is the concept of moving beyond a focus on tobacco control, towards implementing policies and strategies that could phase out tobacco products entirely.⁶⁴ According to Cancer Research UK, among others, this would require systemic changes, including:

“initiatives designed to change/eliminate permanently the structural, political and social dynamics that sustain the tobacco epidemic, in order to achieve within a specific time an endpoint for the tobacco epidemic.” ⁶⁵⁶⁶

This could involve the reduction of prevalence of smoking to – or very close to – zero.

Policy Options

Research conducted into potential endgame strategies has identified plausible new policies for reducing smoking to minimal levels. These include:

• A tobacco-free generation policy, which precludes the sale and supply of tobacco to individuals born after a certain year⁶⁷⁶⁸
• A ‘sinking-lid’ strategy, which involves establishing steadily decreasing quotas on the sales or imports of tobacco products⁶⁷⁶⁸⁶⁹
• Substantially reducing the number of tobacco product retailers, which could include restricting retailer density, location, type, or licensing, or restricting tobacco sales to government run outlets^67687071
• Mandating low-nicotine levels in tobacco products⁶⁷⁷²
• Banning the sale of one or more tobacco products⁷¹⁶⁷
• Shifting control of the supply and distribution of tobacco products away from tobacco companies⁶⁴⁷³

Implementation of endgame policies

National goals and policies

The first countries to propose tobacco endgame goals, and start developing legislation to achieve these targets, were Finland,⁷⁴⁷⁵ New Zealand,⁷⁶ Ireland,⁷⁷ Scotland,⁷⁸ Sweden⁷⁹ Canada,⁸⁰⁸¹ and Malaysia.⁸² Other countries that have more recently adopted endgame goals include the Netherlands,⁸³⁸⁴ Australia,⁸⁵ and the UK.⁸⁶ Typically, the goal is to have a smoking prevalence of less than 5% of the population.

As of 2023, the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids (CTFK) policy database shows that 13 countries have banned the sale of waterpipe tobacco products, and 19 countries have banned the sale of smokeless tobacco products.⁸⁷ A review carried out in 2020 showed that 40 countries had active or pending flavoured tobacco product policies that ranged from banning flavoured tobacco, to banning flavour descriptors and images on packaging.⁷¹⁸⁸ No countries have yet implemented mandatory denicotinisation, substantial retailer reductions or the sinking lid strategy at a national level.

In 2010, Bhutan was the first country to ban the sale, manufacture and distribution of tobacco products.⁸⁹ However, the legislation was reversed in 2021 due to concerns that increased tobacco smuggling could result in cross-border transmission of COVID-19.⁸⁹

Subnational policies

Several US cities have also implemented endgame strategies. Brookline, Massachusetts introduced a generational tobacco ban in 2021 which prohibited the sale of tobacco products and e-cigarettes to anyone born after 1 January 2000.⁹⁰⁹¹ Despite litigation brought by retailers in Brookline, which argued that the policy was pre-empted by state law, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the generational ban in 2024.⁹² Some cities in California have prohibited the sale of tobacco and nicotine products within their jurisdictions,⁹³ and others have restricted the number or types of retailers permitted to sell tobacco products.⁹⁴

In 2016, Balanga City in the Philippines banned the sale and use of all tobacco and nicotine products to those born after 1 January 2000. It also expanded the coverage of an existing smoking ban in the city’s University Town to cover a wider radius. However, both measures were overturned in 2018 after the tobacco industry pursued litigation.⁹⁵⁹⁶

Tobacco industry interference

As of 2023, Malaysia, New Zealand and the UK are the only countries that have announced plans to adopt a generational endgame policy. New Zealand also proposed introducing mandated denicotinisation and substantial retailer reduction.

Tobacco industry interference to prevent, delay or undermine the legislation has been observed in each of these countries, and is detailed below.

Malaysia

Proposed legislation

In 2022, Malaysia proposed the ‘Control of Tobacco Products and Smoking Bill 2022’ which aimed to phase out tobacco products and e-cigarettes by introducing a generational endgame policy, prohibiting their use and sale to everyone born on or after 1 January 2007.⁹⁷

However, when the latest version of the bill was tabled in 2023, the generational ban clause was omitted for all products.⁹⁸

Interference from industry and associated organisations

Prior to the bill being tabled, several organisations lobbied against the inclusion of e-cigarettes in the generational endgame policy.^99100101 One of these organisations, the Malaysian Vapers Alliance (MVA), is a member of the World Vapers’ Alliance,¹⁰² which has received funding from the Consumer Choice Center and BAT. The MVA urged the government to exclude e-cigarettes from the generational ban, and stated that it had conducted a survey of 5000 adult vape users, 96.6% of which did not agree with the ban.¹⁰³

When the generational endgame clause was removed from the bill, Malaysia’s former health minister stated that this was due to strong lobbying from tobacco companies.⁹⁸ According to local advocates the bill had seen an “unprecedented level of industry interference, some of which have been done in clear violation of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control”.¹⁰⁴

It is not clear what actions were taken by the tobacco industry to oppose the bill, however industry interference in government activities in Malaysia is high, and has continued to rise in recent years.¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁶

New Zealand

Proposed legislation

In December 2022, as part of its ‘Smokefree Aotearoa 2025 Action Plan’,¹⁰⁷ New Zealand passed the ‘Smokefree Environments and Regulated Products’ Amendment Act’ into law, which would have implemented several tobacco endgame policies.¹⁰⁸ The legislation included three key approaches: a ban on tobacco products being sold to anyone born on or after 1 January 2009, a significant reduction in the amount of nicotine permitted in tobacco products (an 0.8mg/g nicotine limit, compared to 15-16mg/g present in full strength cigarettes), and a huge reduction in the number of retailers allowed to sell tobacco products across the country (from 6000 to 600).¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁹

The legislation was due to be implemented progressively starting with the reduction in retailer numbers from July 2024, however in November 2023, as part of an agreement between parties forming a new coalition government, it was announced that all three endgame proposals would be repealed. The new finance minister stated that the additional tobacco tax revenues resulting from repealing the smokefree legislation would be used to finance tax cuts promised during the election campaign.¹¹⁰¹¹¹ The repeal was later confirmed in February 2024.¹¹² It was reported that health officials had urged the coalition government to maintain elements of the bill and suggested compromises such as introducing a purchase age of 25, however the Associate Health Minister, Casey Costello, rejected this.¹¹³

In February 2024, public health experts published a briefing pointing to channels of potential tobacco industry influence on the new coalition government.¹¹⁴ The briefing highlighted past connections between coalition politicians and tobacco companies or industry linked organisations, and noted that the arguments used by the coalition government against tobacco endgame policies aligned with those used by tobacco companies.¹¹⁴¹¹⁵ It also called for all government members to declare any past and current industry connections.¹¹⁴¹¹⁶

Interference from industry and associated organisations

In 2021, following the release of the Smokefree Aotearoa 2025 Action Plan, Imperial Brands, BAT and JTI all submitted responses to the government consultation opposing the major endgame policies.¹¹⁷ Industry linked organisations and individuals also submitted responses opposing the legislation. These included submissions from Centre for Research Excellence: Indigenous Sovereignty and Smoking (COREISS),¹¹⁸ which is funded by the Foundation for a Smoke Free World, and The New Zealand Initiative,¹¹⁹ a think tank whose members include BAT and Imperial Brands.¹²⁰

In June 2021, BAT reportedly facilitated a protest amongst convenience store owners to contest the proposed tobacco product restrictions.¹²¹ BAT supplied the dairy owners with postcards which opposed the measures, including the comment “If nicotine is slashed, filters banned and price goes up, many people will go to the black market – these will badly hurt my business, increase risk of robbery to personal safety and could force store to close.” Thousands of these postcards were reportedly delivered to the New Zealand Parliament.¹²¹

In August 2023, the ‘Save our Stores’ campaign, another seemingly grassroots initiative supported by convenience store owners,¹²² called for users to sign a petition urging the government to repeal the latest Smokefree 2025 laws. The campaign website stated that it was “supported by” BAT New Zealand and Imperial Brands New Zealand. The campaign website argued that “A ban on normal strength cigarettes will just mean the illicit trade in tobacco products will boom and be controlled by criminal networks”. It also stated that the legislation would destroy small businesses, and that taking away the tax revenue raised by tobacco sales would “hurt families who are already struggling to make ends meet”.¹²³ These narratives were repeated in a series of Facebook adverts published as part of the campaign between August and November 2023, with one advert also stating “tobacco taxes pay for 35,000 police officers”.¹²⁴

This kind of astroturfing is a well-documented industry tactic.

UK

Proposed legislation

In October 2023, the UK Prime Minister announced plans to introduce a generational endgame policy. The new legislation would prohibit the sale of tobacco products to anyone born after 1 January 2009. All tobacco products, cigarette papers, waterpipe tobacco and herbal smoking products were included in the proposal.⁸⁶¹²⁵ Later that month, the Westminster government opened a four nations consultation on the tobacco endgame policy, as well as on potential measures to curb the rise in youth e-cigarette use.¹²⁶

The consultation closed on 6 December 2023.¹²⁷ In response to the submissions, the Westminster government confirmed its plans to introduce a generational tobacco ban, ban disposable e-cigarettes and bring forward new powers which would allow the government to restrict e-cigarette flavours, packaging and retail display.¹²⁸ The Scottish and Welsh governments stated that they would also be introducing the new legislation.¹²⁹¹³⁰

Interference from industry and associated organisations

After the generational policy was announced, tobacco control researchers outlined arguments that they anticipated the industry would use to in an attempt prevent or undermine the UK legislation, based on previously used tactics. These included invoking libertarianism and arguments around personal freedom; claiming that the policy would be unworkable and impossible to police; and that it would have unintended consequences, such as increasing cigarette smuggling.¹³¹

In December 2023, there were reports that the tobacco industry was lobbying the government to increase the age of smoking to 21, instead of introducing the new generational endgame legislation.¹³² An industry source quoted by The i newspaper stated that the generational ban was “unenforceable, and the inevitability of such a ban leading to a black market run by dangerous criminal gangs, there’s a large number of libertarian Tory MPs that do not like the idea the government is limiting people’s free choice…if the Prime Minister does cancel the plan, then [the industry] won’t object to him raising the smoking age to 21”.¹³² The illicit tobacco trade has often been used by tobacco companies to promote key misleading narratives that advance their own business goals.  See also Arguments and Language.

The i also revealed that the tobacco industry had been “inundating MPs with lobbying material in a bid to persuade them to oppose the changes”. It also reported that a letter was sent to MPs, seemingly from constituents, but in fact drafted by employees of tobacco companies, which called the generational ban “ridiculous” and “impractical, illiberal and untested”.¹³² Andrea Leadsom MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State in the Department of Health and Social Care, warned that the industry was working behind the scenes to block the policy.¹³³

Tobacco company lobbying

Tobacco companies lobbied the UK Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) directly, using many of the same arguments, although only Philip Morris International (PMI) went as far as to issue a legal threat.

In November 2023, PMI sent a pre-action protocol (PAP) letter to the DHSC.¹³⁴¹³⁵ The PAP letter argued that the consultation was predetermined and that it failed to give adequate reasons regarding the inclusion of heated tobacco products (HTPs). It also argued that  the consultation period was not long enough did not allow the submission of sufficient additional evidence.¹³⁴ In a preliminary response (December 2023), the government stated that it was already possible for organisations to upload supporting documents, but to make this clearer, this instruction had been added to the consultation landing page.¹³⁶

The government’s full response a week later stated that the legal challenge was “misguided and wholly without merit” and would be “an unjustified attempt to delay or derail important legislative change”.¹³⁷ With regard to HTPs, it stated that some of PMI’s claims were “highly subjective and lack supporting independent evidence”. The response concluded that:

“The Government does not intend to enter into any negotiations with the tobacco industry…and will not as you propose “discuss, on an urgent basis, the potential removal of HTP from the scope of the proposed legislation”…the proposed claim has no merit and your client is urged to reconsider its intention to pursue the claim”.¹³⁷

The Telegraph newspaper reported that PMI later withdrew the threat, stating “We notified the government of procedural flaws in the consultation process. They subsequently amended the consultation procedure to allow substantive responses and answered other enquiries. As such, we withdrew the claim on 15^th January”.¹³⁵ PMI told the newspaper  that it agreed with the UK’s smoke-free 2030 plans, but did “not believe that reduced-risk smoke-free products—including heated tobacco—should be included alongside combustible cigarettes in any potential legislation”.¹³⁵ In December 2023, PMI reportedly held roundtable events with UK MPs in to lobby for its heated tobacco products (HTPs) to be exempt from future smoking bans.¹³²

In November 2023, a law firm acting on behalf of British American Tobacco (BAT) contacted the DHSC, arguing that  the proposals would “materially impact the rights of our clients and others”. It also argued that there was not enough information “regarding the impacts and costs and benefits of the proposals to permit intelligent consideration”, and – as had PMI – stated that consultation period was not long enough, and did not allow the submission of sufficient supporting evidence.¹³⁸ BAT were reported to be sponsoring a roundtable due to be hosted by MP Graham Brady on behalf of the Centre for Policy Studies in December 2023 to “discuss the Government’s smokefree ambitions, what policies could support the goal, and what a Conservative approach to public health should look like.”¹³²¹³⁹ BAT stated that the proposed legislation would be difficult to enforce, and risked creating a new category of “under-age adults”.¹⁴⁰ It also published briefing in response to the consultation, which outlined its stance on e-cigarette restrictions.¹⁴¹

Imperial Brands and the Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association also reportedly engaged with MPs and government officials regarding the proposals, with a spokesperson for Imperial Brands stating “We understand the Government’s desire for new tobacco control measures, because of the health risks associated with smoking. But, like any prohibition, the proposal to ban the legal sale of cigarettes over time threatens significant unintended consequences.”¹³²

In December 2023, Imperial also wrote to the DHSC, arguing that the consultation was “materially deficient and unfair in several important respects”. As with PMI and BAT, Imperial stated that the consultation period was not long enough, and did not allow the submission of sufficient supporting evidence. It also argued that the evidence base for the proposal should be shared.¹⁴² Imperial published a summary of its response to the government consultation. It said it opposed the generational ban, as it would be “unworkable and unenforceable, and would see an explosion of illicit trade in tobacco”. It also argued that it would not reduce smoking rates.¹⁴³ Imperial’s UK head of corporate and legal affairs stated in the retail press in January 2024 that it was having “direct conversations with government” and talking to MPs “to make them aware of illicit trade that is already a problem in their constituencies” including highlighting “loss of revenue for the average retailer”. Imperial also stated that it did not support e-cigarette restrictions including plain packaging, device standardisation, or flavour bans.¹⁴⁴

In November 2023, Japan Tobacco International (JTI) carried out a survey of 1000 convenience retailers in the UK, and reported concerns that a smoking ban would harm business, increase illicit trade, make ID checks more complicated for retailer staff and impact staff training around underage sales.¹⁴⁵¹⁴⁶ A JTI feature in Talking Retail, ‘The Generational Ban: Explained’, described the ban as “an experimental policy not supported by evidence”, and encouraged retailers to respond to the government consultation.¹⁴⁷

Lobbying by industry-linked organisations

The Institute of Economic Affairs, a British think tank with a history of tobacco industry funding, published a briefing paper in November 2023 titled ‘Prohibition 2.0: Critiquing the Generational Tobacco Ban’.¹⁴⁸ The report echoed the industry narrative that a smoking ban would drive illicit trade and “bolster criminal gangs”. It also stated that a ban would “lead to a grey market in sales between friends” and that it “infantilises one cohort of adults, discriminates on the basis of age and raises issues of intergenerational unfairness.”¹⁴⁸ The report disregarded figures published in a review commissioned by the UK’s Department of Health in 2022 relating to the cost of smoking to the NHS, and stated “The reality is that smokers pay far more in tobacco duty than they cost the state in healthcare, while nonsmokers cost the state more, on average, in both healthcare and social security payments”.¹⁴⁸ Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) published an analysis in December 2023 which found that smoking costs England £49.2 billion each year in lost productivity and service costs, plus an additional £25.9 billion lost quality adjusted life years due to premature death from smoking – far outweighing the money brought in from tobacco taxes.¹⁴⁹

The Consumer Choice Center (CCC), a US lobby group with a history of tobacco industry funding and links to the Atlas Network, launched a campaign titled ‘No2Prohibition’ which urged the public to contact their MP to oppose the new legislation.¹⁵⁰ The campaign used the argument that the legislation would result in an increase in illicit trade and stated “Discriminating against adult consumers, depending on what year they were born, is unheard of and would set a dangerous precedent for future regulations. What’s next? Alcohol? Sugar? Fat? We can only imagine”.¹⁵⁰ The campaign included a series of social media adverts centred on messages of freedom of choice and prohibition.¹⁵¹ These ads were removed by Meta as they did not include verified “paid for by” disclaimers.¹⁵¹

Forest, a British based Smokers’ rights group with a history of tobacco industry funding, stated that it had urged the government not to introduce a generational ban, ahead of the government consultation deadline in December 2023. It also commissioned a consultancy to carry out a survey, which it states found that “58% of respondents think that if a person can vote, drive a car, buy alcohol, or possess a credit card at 18, they should also be allowed to purchase tobacco”.¹⁵²

The Association of Convenience Stores (ACS) is an organisation that represents local stores in the UK. Its “Premier Club” members include BAT, JTI, PMI, Imperial Brands and JUUL.¹⁵³ ACS stated in December that it had responded to the government consultation, and in its submission “set out a number of concerns about the practical implications of the [generational endgame] policy”. It also stated that it did not support a ban on disposable e-cigarettes.¹⁵⁴

The Scottish Grocers Federation (SGF), a trade association for convenience stores with tobacco company members, published an article opposing several possible new retail regulations, which included the generational tobacco policy and restrictions on the sale and visibility of e-cigarettes, stating that it would harm retail businesses.¹⁵⁵ Regarding the disposable e-cigarette ban, the SGF Chief Executive warned against “unintended consequences such as an increase in illicit trade” and said that it would “engage with both governments to ensure the best outcome for retailers and their communities”.¹⁵⁶ SGF also protested its exclusion from the government’s response to the consultation, due to SGF’s connections with the tobacco industry.¹⁵⁷

The World Vapers Alliance (WVA), which has links to BAT, criticised the generational smoking ban. It argued that the UK should instead be “doubling down on its harm reduction strategy”.¹⁵⁸ WVA also urged the public to respond to the government consultation to oppose e-cigarette flavour restrictions, the disposable e-cigarette ban and inclusion of heated tobacco products in the generational smoking ban.¹⁵⁹ After the consultation closed, WVA published a press release which urged the government to reconsider its stance on banning disposable e-cigarettes.¹⁶⁰

The UK Vaping Industry Association (UKVIA) published a press release opposing the e-cigarette regulations, stating “the tobacco industry and illicit markets will be the only winners from bans on disposables and flavoured vapes”.¹⁶¹ (UKVIA stated in September 2023 that all of its tobacco company memberships had ended. For details see the UKVIA page).

Relevant Links

• Sunset Plans: Progress on Tobacco Endgame Around the World, ASH (US) website
• Tobacco endgames, ASH Scotland website

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Tobacco Industry Tactics
• Illicit tobacco trade
• Price and Tax
• Menthol and Flavoured Tobacco

Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) Research

Sunak’s smoke-free generation: spare a thought for the tobacco industry, G. Hartwell, A.B. Gilmore, M.C.I . van Schalkwyk, M. McKee, BMJ, 2023; 383 :p2922 doi:10.1136/bmj.p2922

References

The post Tobacco Industry Interference with Endgame Policies appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Image source: eltpics/CC BY-NC 2.0

Key Points

• Viet Nam is a country located in South East Asia, part of the World Health Organization’s regional office for the Western Pacific (WPRO).
• It has a population of 98.2 million, with tobacco use prevalence of 24.9%.
• Viet Nam ratified the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) in 2004. It has not joined the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.
• The Vietnam National Tobacco Corporation (Vinataba), a state-owned company, has the largest share of the national cigarette market, at nearly 58% in 2022.
• Of the transnational tobacco companies (TTCs), British American Tobacco (BAT) has by far the largest share of the market in Viet Nam, with Imperial Brands in second place. Philip Morris International (PMI), Japan Tobacco International (JTI) and others have smaller market shares.
• The tobacco industry has deployed a range of tactics to protect its interests in Viet Nam, including lobbying policy makers, use of third parties, complicity in the illicit trade in tobacco products, and spreading misleading information.

Although Viet Nam has made significant progress on tobacco control in recent years, it continues to face major challenges. Tobacco prevalence amongst men remains very high.⁸ There is ongoing industry influence on policymaking, particularly on issues such as price and tax of tobacco products.¹⁶⁶ The state-owned company Vinataba enjoys special privileges from the Vietnamese state, and has long claimed a position as an affected stakeholder on matters of tobacco control.¹⁶⁷¹⁶⁸ There has also been interaction between the transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) and the Vietnamese state, including during the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the WHO FCTC.¹⁶⁹

Tobacco Use in Viet Nam

In 2022, the population of Viet Nam was 98.2 million.¹⁷⁰ According to a WHO age-standardised prevalence estimate, based on all national survey data between 1990 and 2019, overall prevalence of current tobacco use was just over 25%.⁸ There is a major gender difference, with current male tobacco use at over 48%, compared to just over 2% for females.⁸ Smoking has been an important aspect of social behaviour amongst Vietnamese men for many decades; offering cigarettes is considered to be a show of good manners.¹⁶⁶

As of 2019, less than 3% of adolescents aged 13 to 17 were current tobacco users (i.e. they had either smoked cigarettes or used waterpipe on at least one day of the 30 days prior to the survey).¹⁷¹

In the Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS) 2015, overall prevalence for traditional bamboo waterpipe was 6.7%. This was higher for people aged between 45-64 (8.9%) and those living in rural areas (8.3%).¹⁷² Smoke from Vietnamese waterpipes tends to have very high nicotine content: the tobacco typically used is Nicotiana rustica, known locally as thuốc lào, which can contain up to 9% nicotine compared to 1-3% in standard tobacco leaves.¹⁷³

There were an estimated 97,100 deaths attributable to smoking in 2019.¹⁷⁴ This means that smoking accounted for over 15% of mortality in the country for that year.¹⁷⁴ In 2011, the last year for which figures are available, the cost of tobacco use to the Vietnamese economy was estimated at nearly US$1.2 billion.¹⁷⁵ This was almost 1% of national GDP that year and around US$425 million more than the tax revenue the government received from the industry.¹⁷⁵

A 2022 study suggested that use and awareness of e-cigarettes in Viet Nam is relatively low.¹⁷⁶ However, the Vietnamese market for newer nicotine and tobacco products is expanding. According to market analysis by Statista, in 2022 the e-cigarette market was worth around US$22 million, up from US$7.7 million in 2014, and projected to reach US$24.7 million by 2027.¹⁷⁷ Research conducted in June 2020 indicated that e-cigarettes were being sold mainly by speciality retailers and most of the brands available were Chinese imports. Brands popular in Western countries – such as BAT’s Vuse, Imperial Brands’ Blu and JUUL – were rare.¹⁷⁸

According to Tobacco Control Laws – an archive of global tobacco control legislation maintained by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids – as of May 2023, there were no restrictions on use; advertising, promotion and sponsorship; or packaging and labelling of e-cigarettes.¹⁷⁷¹⁷⁹ This lack of regulation, combined with Viet Nam’s relatively large population and high tobacco prevalence, make it an extremely attractive target for transnationals selling e-cigarettes and other newer nicotine and tobacco products.¹⁷⁹¹⁷⁸

Tobacco in Viet Nam

Market share and leading brands

In 2022, market research company Euromonitor International estimated the Vietnamese tobacco industry to be worth VND₫104,094.9 billion – approximately US$4.4 billion.¹⁸⁰ The state-owned Vietnam National Tobacco Corporation (Vinataba) has the largest market share, accounting for nearly 58% of the cigarette market in 2022.¹³ Vinataba’s range of brands includes Vinataba, Viet Nam’s most popular cigarette.¹⁸¹ Established in 1985, Vinataba has long enjoyed special privileges and recognition from the Vietnamese government.¹⁶⁷ In addition, the government retains the right to appoint Vinataba’s chair and CEO.¹⁶⁸

Transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) producing and distributing tobacco products in Viet Nam are required to establish joint ventures with Vinataba.¹⁶⁸ Amongst the TTCs, British American Tobacco (BAT) has by far the largest market share, accounting for nearly 29% of the cigarette market in 2022.¹³ BAT has more than doubled its share of the market since 2001, and dominates the mid-range and premium market sectors with brands such as Craven A, White Horse and State Express 555.^181182183 Imperial Brands has a market share of 7% with one brand, Bastos. Similarly, Philip Morris International (PMI) has a share of 3% with one brand, Marlboro. The remaining companies account for another 3.5% of the market.¹³¹⁸¹

• For more information on the tobacco industry in Viet Nam, see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

Tobacco farming and child labour

From 2000 to 2020, the area of land dedicated to growing tobacco in Viet Nam fell by nearly 49%.¹⁸⁴ However, crop yield per hectare has more than doubled, meaning that in 2020 Viet Nam produced over 29,000 tonnes of tobacco leaf – around 200 tonnes more than in 2000.¹⁸⁴ Nonetheless, this is a steep drop from 2010, when Viet Nam harvested 56,530 tonnes of tobacco from an area of 31,484 hectares.¹⁸⁴

Viet Nam’s most recent National Child Labour Survey, conducted in 2018, identified more than a million children in a situation of child labour.¹⁸⁵ Of these, more than half were working in the agriculture sector – though the report does not mention tobacco growing specifically.¹⁸⁵ However, Vietnamese tobacco was one of the products identified in 2022 by the U.S. Department of Labor as having been produced by child labour, in violation of international standards.¹⁸⁶

• For information on tobacco industry responses to accusations of complicity in child labour, please see the pages on CSR: Child Labour and the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco-Growing Foundation (ECLT).

Tobacco and the economy

Viet Nam is a net importer of tobacco leaf. According to UN Comtrade, in 2021, it imported US$242 million in unmanufactured tobacco, compared to just over US$9 million in exports.¹⁸⁷¹⁸⁸ Comtrade data also states that Viet Nam is a net exporter of cigarettes: US$182 million in 2020, compared to just over US$63,000 in imports.¹⁸⁹¹⁹⁰

However, these figures differ significantly from customs declarations found on Datamyne, which suggest that Viet Nam is a net importer of cigarettes. According to Datamyne, the value of Vietnamese cigarette imports in 2020 was nearly US$537 million, compared to exports of nearly US$270 million.¹⁹¹ The import and export figures for raw tobacco are also different: according to Datamyne, Viet Nam imported close to US$337 million in raw tobacco in 2021, compared to around US$17.6 million in exports.¹⁹¹

Illicit trade

According to the Vietnamese government, 54.7 million packs of illicit cigarettes were seized between 2013 and 2018.¹⁹² It estimates that the illicit tobacco trade accounts for 15% of the national market.¹⁹² This is roughly consistent with research conducted in late 2017 by the Development and Policies Research Center, which concluded that illicit cigarettes accounted for nearly 14% of total cigarette consumption in Viet Nam.¹⁹³

By far the most popular illicitly traded cigarettes in Viet Nam are the brands Jet and Hero, which together account for around 85% of the illicit market. Both are manufactured by the Indonesian company Sumatra Tobacco Trading Company and then smuggled to Viet Nam.¹⁹⁴¹⁶⁶ Both Jet and Hero sell for significantly higher prices – between 30% and 60% – than the average legal brand of cigarettes in Viet Nam.¹⁶⁶

• For more information on the tobacco industry in Viet Nam, please see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

Roadmap to Tobacco Control

Viet Nam ratified the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) in 2004.¹⁹⁵ However, it has not yet joined the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.

The main tobacco control law in Viet Nam is the Law on Prevention and Control of Tobacco Harm, passed in 2012. It is the country’s first ever comprehensive tobacco control law and a major public health milestone.¹⁹⁶ It established smokefree spaces; increased the size of graphic health warnings on tobacco products; restricted tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; and set up the Tobacco Control Fund, a sustainable source of funding for tobacco control initiatives paid for by a dedicated tax on tobacco.¹⁹⁶¹⁹⁷ More than ten subsequent decisions, decrees and joint circulars have built on this law and further strengthened tobacco control.¹⁹⁸ This includes the National Strategy on Tobacco Harm Prevention and Control, which set specific targets to reduce tobacco use prevalence from 2013 to 2020.¹⁹⁹

For more details, please see the following websites:

• Legislation by country – Viet Nam, Tobacco Control Laws, Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids
• Viet Nam, WHO FCTC Implementation Database, WHO FCTC Secretariat
• Country profile – Viet Nam, World Health Organization, WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2021

Tobacco Industry Interference in Viet Nam

Tobacco industry tactics used in Viet Nam include lobbying policy makers, use of third parties, complicity in the illicit trade in tobacco products, and spreading misleading information.

Influencing policy

For the Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance (SEATCA), the Vietnamese state’s majority ownership of Vinataba clashes with its duty to regulate the tobacco industry.¹⁶⁸ Vinataba has long claimed a position as an affected stakeholder on tobacco regulation, allowing it a seat at the table in discussions on issues such as taxation and illicit trade.¹⁶⁸

There has also been some exchange of personnel between the government and Vinataba, with high-ranking executives at Vinataba appointed to powerful positions in government – particularly at the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) – and vice-versa. Several senior officials left government to subsequently assume roles in Vinataba.²⁰⁰ Vinataba’s General Director (as of August 2023) was formerly deputy director of the Department of Light Industry, which is controlled by the MOIT.²⁰¹ Vinataba’s Secretary of the Party Committee and Chairman of the Member’s Council is a former vice director of the Industrial Policy and Strategy Institute, a government entity.²⁰¹

Vinataba’s influence is most obvious when it comes to price and tax. Cigarettes in Viet Nam are among the cheapest in the world: as of 2020, the price of a 20-pack – even of a premium brand – was less than one U.S. dollar.⁸ In 2021, taxes accounted for under 39% of the retail price of the most popular brand of cigarettes – well short of the 75% recommended by the WHO.⁸ Research by the World Bank has concluded that Viet Nam’s tobacco taxation policies have made cigarettes more affordable. Per capita income in Viet Nam has risen considerably in recent decades, outpacing the increase in the price of cigarettes, and increases in tobacco taxes have not been sufficient to close the gap.¹⁶⁶

In 2017, the Ministry of Finance proposed switching to a mixed excise tax system, with a flat rate of VND₫1,000 – around four U.S. cents – imposed on top of the usual ad valorem tax on the factory price of tobacco products.¹⁶⁶ This would have made little difference to the affordability of cigarettes; health officials had argued for increase of between VND₫2,000 and VND₫5,000.¹⁶⁶ Vinataba, along with the Vietnam Tobacco Association, opposed the move, claiming it would lead to difficulties in tobacco production and business operations and increase the risk of smuggling.¹⁶⁶ At the time of writing, Viet Nam had yet to introduce the mixed tax regime.²⁰²

The industry has also lobbied for the diversion of funding away from the Tobacco Control Fund – which is supposed to be used for public health purposes – and towards combatting illicit trade. Vinataba has made requests of this nature to various ministries and local governments.¹⁶⁸ In 2017, the International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease (The Union) sent a letter to the U.S. Ambassador in Viet Nam, urging him to reconsider the Embassy’s facilitation of meetings between Philip Morris International (PMI) and Vietnamese government ministers, on the grounds that PMI would attempt to raise fears over illicit trade and seek diversion of funds away from the Tobacco Control Fund and towards anti-smuggling measures.²⁰³ SEATCA reported the same year that the MOIT had endorsed a recommendation from the tobacco industry to divert half of the Tobacco Control Fund towards enforcement activities against illicit trade.²⁰⁴

The tobacco industry has also interacted with the Vietnamese delegation to the Conference of the Parties to the WHO FCTC.¹⁶⁹ During COP6, held in Moscow in October 2014, PMI executives met with the Vietnamese delegation. Analysis of the delegation’s interventions by tobacco control groups observing the COP showed that they frequently mirrored positions held by PMI.¹⁶⁹ For example, they argued that higher tobacco taxes would fuel the illicit trade and that the FCTC should be excluded from trade disputes, as well as opposing uniform parameters on legal liability for tobacco companies.¹⁶⁹ Likewise, at COP7, held in Delhi in November 2016, PMI held meetings with members of the Vietnamese delegation away from the conference venue.¹⁶⁹

Use of third parties

In June 2020 the R Street Institute, an American public policy thinktank, sent a letter to the Vietnamese prime minister and deputy prime minister urging them “to consider pragmatic regulations that allow Vietnamese citizens broad access to reduced-risk products.”²⁰⁵ It also argued that inserts in cigarette packets should be permitted in order to market such products to current smokers; that it should be possible to place “relative-risk labels” on these products; and that maximum nicotine levels should be high enough “to achieve nicotine delivery similar to combustible cigarettes”.²⁰⁵

Endorsing the use of e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products (HTPs) as cessation tools, the letter refers specifically to IQOS – PMI’s flagship HTP brand (though PMI has also sold e-cigarettes under the IQOS brand).²⁰⁵ From 2014 until at least 2022, R Street received funding from Altria – the primary asset of which is Philip Morris USA, the largest tobacco company in the United States.^{206207208209210}

In the same month, Factasia also sent a similar letter to the Vietnamese prime minister.²⁰¹ Factasia describes itself as “an independent, not-for-profit, consumer-oriented advocate for rational debate about – and sensible regulation of – the rights of adult citizens throughout the Asia-Pacific region to choose to use tobacco or other nicotine related products.”²¹¹ It acknowledges receiving funding from PMI, as well as the Tobacco Vapor Electronic Cigarette Association (TVECA), an e-cigarette trade association. However, it denies acting as a mouthpiece for the tobacco industry.²¹²

Complicity in smuggling

There is evidence that the tobacco industry has smuggled its own products into Viet Nam. Internal British American Tobacco (BAT) documents from the 1990s show how BAT and its subsidiary smuggled State Express 555 (SE555) cigarettes manufactured in the UK into Viet Nam.²¹³²¹⁴

BAT had been attempting to establish a presence in Viet Nam since the late 1980s, though with considerable difficulty. Negotiations on the terms of a joint venture with Vinataba were extremely slow, while a ban on foreign imports in 1990 meant that BAT would either have to license a Vietnamese company to manufacture its products locally or purchase equity in a local factory.¹⁸²

Smuggling facilitated BAT’s entry into the Vietnamese market in two ways.¹⁸² Firstly, by circumventing the import ban, BAT managed to create brand awareness amongst Vietnamese smokers and obtain a competitive advantage prior to any opening of the market.¹⁸² Secondly, by highlighting loss of tax revenue due to illicit trade, BAT was able to use smuggling as leverage in its negotiations with Vinataba.¹⁸² An internal BAT document from 1993 states “We have the high ground [in negotiations with Vinataba] given the excellent quality of distribution, presence, and value of the GT [i.e. smuggled] product.”²¹⁵

The same BAT document states that “Both versions [i.e. licit and illicit cigarettes] will have a role to play in the further building of the brand and the ‘system’ profitability”.²¹⁵²¹⁶ Indeed, BAT continued to smuggle its own products into Viet Nam even after signing an agreement in 1994 which licensed Vinataba to manufacture SE555 locally.¹⁸² BAT carefully controlled the price of both the licit and illicit SE555, with the smuggled cigarettes fetching higher prices because they were perceived to be of higher quality.²¹³ BAT finally signed a US$40 million joint venture with Vinataba in 2001, for construction of a brand new leaf-processing plant in Dong Nai province.¹⁸²²¹⁷ This was followed by a further agreement in 2006, under which 150 million packs per annum of Pall Mall and Viceroy would be manufactured for the domestic market, as well as another 50 million packs per annum for export.¹⁸² Even then, illicit BAT products did not disappear from the Vietnamese market. As recently as 2017, illicit SE555 were still selling at 169% of the value of the licit version.¹⁹³

Spreading misleading information

Most existing estimates of the illicit tobacco trade in Viet Nam are based on industry data and rely on methods which are opaque, undisclosed or difficult to replicate over time.¹⁶⁶ While the government estimated in 2020 that illicit trade accounted for 15% of the national market, and independent research from 2017 put that figure at 13.72%, tobacco industry estimates are significantly higher.¹⁹²¹⁹³ Japan Tobacco International Vietnam, for example, states that “the rate of smuggled cigarettes is quite high (more than 20%) on the market”.²¹⁸

Oxford Economics (OE) put the share of total illicit consumption at 23.4% in 2017.¹⁶⁶ An economic advisory agency with links to the tobacco industry going back to the early 2010s, OE produced yearly reports on the illicit trade in Asia between 2012 and 2017 which were funded by PMI and based on PMI-approved terms of reference.^{219220221222223224}

These reports have been criticised in the strongest terms by Dr Hana Ross of the University of Cape Town, writing for the Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance (SEATCA):

“The common denominator to all pieces of this study is PMI and its TORs [terms of reference] with all of the multiple parties in the report’s chain of production. This is a way for PMI to control the final results—by controlling the input, the data analysis, as well as publication, distribution, and promotion.”²²⁵

This exaggeration of the scale of illicit trade is a well-documented means of fighting tobacco control measures such as graphic health warnings, plain packaging and increased tobacco taxes. However, there is no evidence to show that tax increases have led to an increase in the illicit trade in Viet Nam; on the contrary, the illicit trade declined even after a 5% increase in the ad valorem tax rate in January 2016.¹⁹³

• For more information see Illicit Tobacco Trade

Relevant Links

• Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS) Viet Nam 2015, GATS Viet Nam Working Group
• Vietnam 2023 Tobacco Industry Interference Index, Global Center for Good Governance in Tobacco Control
• Vietnam 2021 Tobacco Industry Interference Index, Global Center for Good Governance in Tobacco Control
• Asian State-Owned Tobacco Enterprises: Challenges & Opportunities in Implementing WHO FCTC Article 5.3, Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance (SEATCA)
• Vietnam: Overview of tobacco control legislation, use and taxation, World Bank Group
• Evidence Matrix: Vietnam, Tobacconomics
• Inside Philip Morris’ campaign to subvert the global anti-smoking treaty, A. Kalra, P. Bansal, D. Wilson, T. Lasseter, The Philip Morris Files, Reuters

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Western Pacific Region
• Waterpipe
• Price and Tax
• Tobacco Smuggling
• Oxford Economics
• R Street Institute
• Factasia

TCRG Research

• Developing more detailed taxonomies of tobacco industry political activity in low-income and middle-income countries: qualitative evidence from eight countries, B.K. Matthes, K. Lauber, M. Zatoński, L. Robertson, A.B. Gilmore, BMJ Global Health 2021;6:e004096.
• Gaining access to Vietnam’s cigarette market: British American Tobacco’s strategy to enter ‘a huge market which will become enormous’, K. Lee, H.V. Kinh, R. Mackenzie, A.B. Gilmore, N.T. Minh & J. Collin, 2008, In: Global Public Health. 3, 1, p. 1-25.

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to TCRG publications.

References

The post Viet Nam Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

There have been multiple instances of lobbying by ambassadors and other diplomats from the UK, as well as Japan and Switzerland. Much of this lobbying activity has taken place in low and middle-income countries (LMICs).²³¹ These countries are important sources of new customers for tobacco companies as markets in higher income countries where consumption is generally falling.^232233234

Diplomats are also involved in activities which help promote the tobacco industry via local media, such as visiting tobacco farms or factories. Other engagement supports tobacco companies’ product promotions, or corporate social responsibility strategy. These activities help to raise the profile of tobacco companies, enhance their reputations, and support the ‘normalisation’ of the industry.^230235236

Background

Parties to the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) have an obligation to protect public health policies from the “commercial and vested interests of the tobacco industry” and any contact with tobacco industry representatives, or others seeking to further their interests, must be “limited” and “transparent”.²³⁷ The implementation guidelines to Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC recommend that Parties limit interactions with the tobacco industry to those that are absolutely necessary to regulating the industry, and ensure the transparency of those interactions that do occur.²³⁷  The guidelines also recommend parties treat state-owned tobacco companies in the same way as any other tobacco company, including avoiding any “preferential treatment”.²³⁷

In addition, the guidelines state that “… Whenever possible, interactions should be conducted in public, for example through public hearings, public notice of interactions, disclosure of records of such interactions to the public”.²³⁷

However even in countries with a high level of compliance with the WHO FCTC requirements, diplomatic missions rarely achieve this level of transparency. Information on tobacco industry engagement has largely been found through media investigations and Freedom of Information requests (FOIs).

In October 2014, the 6^th Conference of the Parties (COP) decided to urge parties: “to raise awareness and adopt measures to implement Article 5.3 and its implementing Guidelines among all parts of government including diplomatic missions.”²³⁸ Another decision required governments to “take into account their public health objectives in their negotiation of trade and investment agreements”.²³⁹

Nevertheless, diplomats continue to lobby for tobacco companies around the world.²³⁰

Countries whose diplomatic representatives have lobbied on behalf of tobacco companies overseas  include the UK, Germany and Japan, who are all Parties to the WHO FCTC,²⁴⁰ as well as the United States and Switzerland. BAT, PMI and Japan Tobacco all have offices in Geneva, Switzerland, the location of the World Health Organization and other key international bodies.

UK

There are specific guidelines covering the engagement of British (UK) officials working overseas designed to limit contact with tobacco companies, and support compliance with Article 5.3. After the UK Ambassador to Panama lobbied on behalf of British American Tobacco (BAT),²⁴¹ the guidelines were revised in 2013.²⁴² These guidelines state that “Posts must not…Engage with local foreign governments on behalf of the tobacco industry, except in cases where local policies could be considered protectionist or discriminatory”.²⁴²

Engagement and lobbying

Despite having guidelines in place to support compliance with the WHO FCTC, FOI requests and media investigations have revealed that British diplomats continue to interact with the tobacco industry more than is necessary. UK diplomats have lobbied for BAT in Bangladesh,²⁴³²⁴⁴ Hungary,²⁴⁵ and Pakistan.^{241246247248249}

UK officials have also disclosed contact with tobacco companies in Panama and Venezuela,²⁵⁰²⁵¹ Laos,²⁵² Cuba,²⁵³ and Burundi.²⁵⁴

In 2018, UK advocacy organisation Action on Smoking & Health (ASH) called this a “global pattern of engagement” by British officials to defend BAT’s interests.²⁵⁵

• For more details see UK Diplomats Lobbying on Behalf of BAT.

Tobacco industry events

UK government guidelines state that staff must not:

“Attend or otherwise support receptions or high-profile events, especially those where a tobacco company is the sole or main sponsor and/or which are overtly to promote tobacco products or the tobacco industry (such as the official opening of a UK tobacco factory overseas)”.²⁴²

However, UK staff have attended such events, generating considerable local media coverage.

For example, in 2019 the British ambassador to Yemen opened a cigarette factory in a free trade zone in Jordan, celebrating the expansion of the tobacco company Kamaran which is part-owned by BAT.^230256257258

In 2020, staff from the UK high commission in Pakistan attended a promotional event for a BAT product in Pakistan.²⁵⁹

• See UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT for details.

Engaging with industry allies

The links between diplomatic missions and tobacco companies can be more indirect, via funding third party allies of the industry. The UK guidelines state that diplomats should not “endorse projects which are funded directly or indirectly by the tobacco industry”.  However, a 2019 investigation by The Guardian found that the British high commission in Malaysia had given funding to a Kuala Lumpur based think tank (IDEAS) for several years. At the same time the think tank was also receiving money from tobacco companies and was lobbying against plain packaging regulation and tobacco taxes.²⁶⁰  While the UK had already implemented plain packaging regulations, tobacco control was being undermined overseas.

Attending meetings with the tobacco industry

Tobacco companies attend meetings and events organised directly by UK government departments, such as the FCO (now FCDO) or the DIT (now Department for Business and Trade).²⁵⁰  They also attend those held by regional, national or local business organisations such as chambers of commerce.

Responses to FOI requests show that when the attendance of UK government officials at such events is disclosed, there is little detail about the specific purpose or content of these meetings,²⁴³²⁴⁵ It may simply be described as relating to ‘doing business’ in the country.²⁵¹

Business vs public health interests?

The UK guidelines for overseas staff (last updated in 2013) allow for the communication of “basic trade, investment and political information”, although this is not defined.²⁴² One of the activities used to justify interaction by UK diplomats is “resolving business problems that are potentially discriminatory”.^{241243245261262} This has been criticised as running counter to the WHO FCTC guidelines.²³⁰²⁶³

While transparency is required for tobacco industry interactions in 2018, the UK government told Parliament that it “does not catalogue the representations it makes on behalf of companies”.^264265266  Research by the Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) concluded that the stated WHO FCTC goal of “maximum transparency” is not being achieved in the UK.²³⁰²⁵⁸

Japan

In 2021, the Ambassador of Japan to Bangladesh lobbied the government of Bangladesh on behalf of Japan Tobacco International (JTI).  In a letter to the Bangladesh Finance Minister the Ambassador criticised 2019 taxation changes for their impact on JTI. It also complained about the activities of competitors, and licensing demands.²⁶⁷

• For details, including the lobbying letter, see Japanese Diplomats Lobbying for JTI

The Japanese Ambassador to Ethiopia was present at the signing of a deal between the Ethiopian government and JTI in 2016,  when the Ministry of Public Enterprise sold 40% of its National Tobacco Enterprise to the Japanese company.²⁶⁸ Japanese diplomats have also toured tobacco farms and JTI factories in Tanzania and Zambia.²⁶⁹²⁷⁰

Japan Tobacco International is the overseas subsidiary of Japan Tobacco (JT), which is one third-owned by the Japanese government.²⁷¹

Germany

In May 2022, the German ambassador to Beirut visited the offices of Regie, the Lebanese Tobacco and Tobacco Inventory Administration.²³⁰²⁷²

Denmark

The Imani Centre for Policy and Education, a Ghana-based think tank,  received money from the Danish embassy while lobbying against tobacco control.²⁶⁰²⁷³

Switzerland

Switzerland is not Party to the WHO FCTC.

In 2019, Swiss diplomats approached the government of the Republic of Moldova on behalf of Philip Morris International (PMI) seeking an opportunity to discuss new tobacco legislation.^274275276  The proposed legislation included significant tax increases on heated tobacco products, in which PMI has invested.²⁷⁴²⁷⁷

The same year, PMI helped fund an inaugural event for the new Swiss Embassy in Moscow.²⁷⁸²⁷⁹

• For more details see Swiss Diplomats Lobbying for PMI

USA

Although the US is not Party to the WHO FCTC, it has specific laws and guidance that prohibit its diplomats from promoting the sale or export of tobacco, or influencing non-discriminatory restrictions on tobacco marketing.^280281282283 However, US diplomats have enabled meetings between tobacco companies and government representatives.

The US ASEAN Business Council organises delegations of US businesses, including Philip Morris International (PMI), which meet high level officials in the ASEAN region.²⁸⁰  PMI was at the time a vice chair of its Customs & Trade Facilitation Committee and used this opportunity to meet with government officials from the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Vietnam.²⁸⁰²⁸⁴

Why it matters

The examples above illustrate contraventions of the WHO FCTC, an international treaty, and in many cases breaches of national guidelines. As TCRG research points out, all of these activities also undermine the spirit of these laws, by apparently serving the commercial interests of transnational tobacco companies and helping to ‘normalise’ the industry in the eyes of policy makers and the public.²³⁰

The implementation guidelines of Article 5.3 urge Parties to exclude the tobacco industry completely from the public health policy arena.  The guidelines also urge them not to participate in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities which are used by the tobacco industry and as an alternative means to access policy makers, as well as for public relations and product promotion.²³⁰

In August 2019, in direct response to the exposure of lobbying by Swiss diplomats, the WHO released a statement urging governments to comply with Article 5.3 and to “proactively aspire to reduce the number of people starting and continuing smoking, to promote health and preserve future generations”.²⁸⁵

TobaccoTactics Resources

• UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT
• UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT: Bangladesh
• UK Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco: Burundi
• Swiss Diplomats Lobbying for PMI
• Japanese Diplomats Lobbying for JTI
• Third Party Techniques

TCRG Research

A “willingness to be orchestrated”: Why are UK diplomats working with tobacco companies?, R. Alebshehy, K. Silver, P. Chamberlain, Frontiers in Public Health, 17 March 2023, Sec. Public Health Policy, Volume 11 – 2023, doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.977713

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including TCRG research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to the Bath TCRG’s list of publications.

References

The post Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco Companies appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Background

AACS has lobbied alongside tobacco companies and echoed their arguments against public health measures. Legal tobacco sales are viewed as critically important for the Australian convenience industry, making up nearly 40% of total convenience store purchases and 25% of profits in 2021.²⁹⁶²⁹⁷

Nicotine e-cigarettes are not legally sold in retail outlets in Australia, but are available by medical prescription from pharmacies.²⁹⁸

Relationship with the Tobacco Industry

All three major transnational tobacco companies in the Australian market, Philip Morris International (PMI), British American Tobacco Australia (BATA) and Imperial Brands (Imperial), have been AACS members since at least 2018.²⁹⁹ The companies were listed as “Diamond and Emerald Members” on AACS’ website up to September 2022.³⁰⁰ As of 1 October 2022, they no longer appeared on this list.³⁰¹

Membership benefits received by AACS member companies include “Government lobbying on issues impacting the industry”. Diamond members, who contribute $35,776 a year (in 2022), also benefit from “CEO engagement with Corporate Affairs team on industry relevant advocacy matters”.³⁰²

Figures 1 & 2: Diamond/Emerald members included all three major tobacco companies operating in Australia.³⁰⁰

AACS has accepted funding from tobacco companies over at least two decades. Internal documents show BAT co-sponsored its annual AACS Convention trade shows in the early and mid-2000s.³⁰³ Imperial was named as co-sponsor of AACS’s flagship annual convenience sector “State of the Industry Report” from 2014 to 2017.^304305306307 BAT sponsored the report in 2018 and 2019.³⁰⁸³⁰⁹

Board members and leadership team

Tobacco executives have served on the AACS board. They include:

• Jason Erickson, Manager Key Accounts for PMI in 2014³¹⁰³⁰⁴
• Bede Fennell, senior BAT corporate affairs executive in 2005-06.³¹¹³¹² A former NSW Liberal Party branch director and Senator’s political advisor, Fennell later moved to the UK to work as BAT’s International Regulatory Affairs Manager from 2010-2012.³¹³

Two ex-tobacco company executives have formed AACS’s leadership team since 2021:

• Theo Foukarre, Chief Executive Officer. He began his career as a BATA graduate retail trainee at a time when the industry was battling the introduction of tobacco product display bans, and participated in AACS’ study tours in the early 2000s. ³¹⁴³¹⁵
• Ben Meredith, Strategy and Policy Advisor. Meredith held various positions over a 20-year career with PMI. His last role with PMI was Commercial and Partnerships director.³¹⁶

In a trade press interview, Meredith cited a major career highlight while working at PMI as “the mobilisation and creation of a platform for major manufacturers to work together with industry partners on current and future legislative threats, the first in Australia”. Additionally, he was involved with securing $7m of Federal Government investment with the introduction of the Australian Border Force led Illicit Trade Task Force. The consortium has also managed to defeat the proposal of raising the smoking age to 21 in Tasmania three times in the last six years.”³¹⁷

New Strategic Direction

Meredith’s appointment in 2021 coincided with AACS announcing it was embarking on a “game-changing” new strategic direction with an increase of “five times greater” spending in government advocacy and strategic policy.³¹⁷ AACS has since undergone a major website and policy strategy overhaul, describing itself as now “working at the frontline to lead a range of initiatives concerning tobacco and nicotine, alcohol, sugar and general health in order to optimise consumer choice and balance.”³¹⁸ As part of this work, in June 2022 it launched a new ‘ACCESS by AACS’ digital platform to encourage retailers and consumers to lobby for changes to Australia’s e-cigarette sales laws and for packaged alcohol to be legally sold in petrol and convenience stores.³¹⁹

Lobbying Activities

AACS has lobbied alongside tobacco companies against a wide range of public health measures over the past two decades, including point-of-sale and display bans,³²⁰ minimum purchasing age laws,³²¹ restrictive e-cigarette legislation,³²² plain packaging,³²³ and increases in tobacco excise taxes.^{324325322324325}

Plain Packaging

AACS was an original member of the Alliance of Australian Retailers (AAR), a front group set up in 2010 by PMI, Imperial and BAT to fight the Australian government’s pioneering plain packaging laws.³²⁶

AACS was forced to withdraw that same year when the media exposed Big Tobacco’s multimillion dollar backing for AAR to run a political campaign against the government.³²⁷ However, it has continued to lobby against plain packaging laws in the media,³²⁸³²⁹ as well as in Federal and state government submissions. Its arguments typically mirror those of the tobacco companies. In its 2019 submission to the Australian government’s review of the 2011 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act, AACS echoed BAT’s submission that plain packaging had been a failure and should be repealed, arguing that the policy had increased retailer costs and fuelled the illicit tobacco trade with “no discernible impact” on smoking prevalence.³³⁰³³¹

E-cigarette regulation

Under its former CEO Jeff Rogut (2011-2020), ACCS joined the push to legalise retail sales of nicotine e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products for Australian consumers around 2015. Activities included lobbying politicians and writing submissions to related government inquiries; giving evidence at a major Federal parliamentary inquiry into the use and marketing of e-cigarettes in 2017;³³²³³³ and commissioning research and surveys about public support for newer products such as e-cigarettes.³³⁴

Between 2019-2020, AACS was a key member of a now defunct front group the Australian Retail Vaping Industry Association (ARVIA). In February 2021, the Australian Financial Review reported that the ARVIA secretly received hundreds of thousands of dollars from PMI under a contract with PR and lobbying agency Burson Cohn Wolfe.³³⁵ Other members included the Master Grocers Association and the Australian Lotteries and Newsagents Association, both of which also have current or past tobacco company members.³³⁶³³⁷

In 2022, all three retail trade bodies jointly called upon the Australian Government to urgently convene a National Vaping Summit.³³⁸ They claimed that the current regulatory model was fuelling the “ever-rising black market “and allowing children to access vapes illegally”, but did not provide independent evidence to support either statement.³³⁹ In response to questions about its tobacco company members and their efforts to overturn Australian’s e-cigarette laws that prohibit retail sales without a doctor’s prescription, AACS’s Theo Foukarre told the Financial Review in July 2022: “We unashamedly support our members and will always fight for their needs to remain relevant in a competitive market”.³⁴⁰

Minimum tobacco purchasing age

AACS was part of a consortium of retail industry associations that lobbied the Tasmanian government alongside the tobacco companies, including PMI between 2015-2021, and succeeded in defeating a proposed Bill in Tasmania’s parliament to raise the minimum tobacco purchasing age from 18 to 21 years.³⁴¹

It claimed such a measure would “cost jobs” and drive Tasmanians to buy illicit tobacco thus giving “another free kick to the criminal gangs supplying the market”.³⁴² This is an argument often used by the tobacco industry.

Illicit trade

AACS is a regular attendee, alongside PMI, BAT and Imperial, at the twice-yearly Illicit Tobacco Industry Group meetings with government officials. This forum was set up in 2016.³⁴³

AACS has issued press releases³⁴⁴³⁴⁵ and spoken in the media³⁴⁶ regarding the impact of the illicit market on tobacco and e-cigarette trade, and has promoted the tobacco industry-funded KPMG’s annual illicit trade global reports.³⁴⁷ It has described Australia as a lucrative market for smugglers that has increasingly suffered “a huge spike in the illicit tobacco trade, fuelled by the regulatory environment of regular and excessive excise increases on legal tobacco, and spiralling since the introduction of plain packaging”.³⁴⁷³⁴⁸ This is another argument often used by the tobacco industry.

Point of Sale Display Bans

In 2004 the Queensland, South Australian and NSW Governments were considering proposals to ban the display of tobacco products at the retail point of sale. In response, AACS helped form the National Alliance of Tobacco Retailers (NATR), with the objective of lobbying against these “drastic proposals” and to “protect tobacco retailers’ rights to display and sell a legal product to adults”.³²⁰ The NATR, which represented 15,000 convenience stores, petrol stations, newsagents and small retailers nationally, with a combined tobacco product sales total of $8billion³²⁰ urged its members to contribute donations to a special NATR “fighting fund”. ³⁴⁹

Other Memberships

AACS is a member of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, whose members in 2022 included BAT and PMI, and Imperial in 2020-21.³⁵⁰³⁵¹

Relevant Link

• AACS’s website

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Alliance of Australian Retailers
• Plain Packaging in Australia
• Illicit Tobacco Trade

References