The tobacco industry has a long history of attempting to influence science in order to cast doubt on evidence showing the harms of its products and to argue against the need for regulation of those products. In the 1950s when science began to establish a causal link between smoking and cancer, the industry mobilised to cast doubt on that evidence. In the 1980s and 1990s, when it became clear that second-hand smoke was harmful, the industry funded and created science that attempted to obscure that harm.¹ More recently, the tobacco industry has funded research in to newer tobacco and nicotine products and concerns have once again been raised that the industry is manipulating science for its own benefit.

Industry strategies for influencing science

Researchers from the Tobacco Control Research Group at the University of Bath have developed a typology and model – the Science for Profit Model – to explain how and why the tobacco industry (along with other harmful industries) attempts to influence science.² The authors conclude that strategies for influencing science are used to “purposefully-create misinformation, doubt, and ignorance”, to “obscure the harms of industry products and practices” and to “oppose regulation that could threaten corporate profits”.²

Below is an overview of this research, illustrating the ways in which the industry (and third parties used by the industry) uses science to further its aims. The following strategies and examples are drawn from the Science for Profit Model.

• To find out about these strategies in more depth, see the research paper on the Science for Profit Model.²

The Science for Profit Model

The Science for Profit Model²

Strategy A – Influence how science is conducted and published to skew evidence in industry’s favour

The tobacco industry has used various strategies to influence which research is – and isn’t – undertaken and published, in order to counteract independent scientific research which might show industry products and practices in an unfavourable light.

These strategies include funding research by third parties to deflect attention from industry harms. One example is research that looked for alternative causes of cancer (including hormones and nutrition) to distract attention from the link between smoking and cancer. This was conducted through the Tobacco Industry Research Committee from the 1950s onwards.³ Another example is research that focused on issues of “indoor air” (such as dirty air filters) to deflect attention from the harms of passive smoking, conducted through the Center for Indoor Air Research in the 1980s. Since 2017, research funded by PMI through the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World (FSFW) has similarly distracted attention from industry harms, including by redirecting blame towards the public health community and the media, implying that they are responsible for a slowing in the decline of smoking rates.⁴

Other strategies include undertaking “risky” research secretly, so that it can be hidden or abandoned if results harm the industry’s interests,² and manipulating study design or statistical analyses to ensure favourable findings. Another is to ‘cherry-pick’ (select the most favourable) papers to include in literature reviews to obscure parts of the evidence base.²

To see how study design affected PMI-funded science on plain packaging of cigarettes visit the Ashok Kaul and Michael Wolf pages.

In order to influence what research is published, the industry has created its own journals, such as the “Tobacco and Health” research journal which was distributed to health professionals.⁵² More recently, it has published in journals with editorial staff who have links to the industry, and used ‘pre-print’ platforms to self-publish its own non-peer-reviewed science.⁴⁶

• For more examples of how the tobacco industry influences the conduct and publication of science visit Influencing Science Case Studies

Strategy B – Influence how science is interpreted to undermine unfavourable science and create a distorted picture of the evidence base

The industry also works to distort how science and scientists are seen by the public and experts.

In the 1990s, tobacco companies launched the “Sound Science” and “Good Epidemiology” public relations campaigns. These demanded unrealistic levels of evidence in epidemiological studies examining harms caused by industry products, and were designed to prevent policy action on passive smoking.²

For decades, the industry has attacked and misrepresented science and scientists that may harm its commercial agenda. For example, in the 1990s, it criticised a US Environmental Protection Agency risk assessment which concluded that second-hand smoke was carcinogenic.² Nearly thirty years later the director of the Centre for Research Excellence: Indigenous Sovereignty and Smoking (COREISS), an FSFW grantee, used a similar argument, despite overwhelming evidence that second-hand smoke is a health risk:

“scientific studies have not proven that exposure to cigarette smoke in the car causes disease”.⁴⁷

In the 1990’s Philip Morris developed plans for what it called “Project Sunrise” – a project in which the company proposed the monitoring of individuals and organisations working in tobacco control, framing some as “extreme” and others as “moderate” in order to divide the community.⁸ Some of the many attacks on individuals working in tobacco control are documented on Martin Cullip, FOI: Stirling University and FOI: University of Bath.

• For more examples of how the tobacco industry influences the interpretation of science, visit the Influencing Science Case Studies page.

Strategy C – Influence the reach of science to create an “echo chamber” for industry’s scientific messaging

The industry disseminates messages that support its scientific stance. A common approach is to contract third party “friendly” voices to amplify scientific messages and distance these messages from industry. These messengers include front groups, designed to look like unbiased sources, organisations such as think tanks and professional associations, and “expert” individuals.²

In the 1980s, the ‘Whitecoat Project’ was Philip Morris’s secret plan to recruit ostensibly independent scientists to disseminate scientific narratives which would help it to “restore the social acceptability of smoking”.² Read more about the project on the Influencing Science: The Whitecoat Project page.

Organisations funded by FSFW have promoted industry-friendly scientific narratives on e-cigarettes and COVID-19, and endorsed science calling for weaker regulation of the industry’s products.⁴

In order to maximise press coverage of industry-favourable scientific messaging, the industry funds media outlets to disseminate its science, cite its staff, and report on its scientific events, including conferences.⁹¹⁰ One example is Filter magazine – to find out more visit the page on The Influence Foundation.

• For more examples of how the tobacco industry uses third parties to spread its scientific messages, visit the Influencing Science Case Studies page.

Strategy D – Create industry-friendly policymaking environments which shape the use of science in its favour

Tobacco companies have worked to embed their own standards of evidence in policymaking, and bring about policy reforms that increase reliance on the tobacco industry’s own science.²

In the 1990s, the tobacco industry attempted to shape risk assessment of its own products, and influence European Union (EU) regulatory mechanisms in relation to the assessment of data from epidemiological and animal studies, for example. Although they did not succeed, this would have meant that the criteria used for determining scientific ‘proof’ would have been drawn up by industry itself.²

British American Tobacco promoted regulatory reform in the EU, to make it harder to implement public health policies which conflicted with its commercial interests. This ‘Better Regulation’ or ‘Smart Regulation’ appeared to be about good governance and transparency but “in fact mandated industry’s right to be heard early in scientific debates about their products and practices.”² Read more on this topic on the EU Better Regulation page.

Strategy E – Manufacture trust in industry and its scientific messaging

The industry has worked to promote its involvement in science in order to manufacture an image of scientific credibility. Many academic institutions and journals no longer collaborate with the industry directly, due to its history of scientific deception, and so the industry uses third party organisations to push for ‘renormalisation’ of its business.¹¹¹² For instance, since it was set up in 2017, FSFW has worked to frame the industry’s involvement in science and policy as the ‘solution’ and its exclusion as counterproductive, despite industry having created the problem.⁴

At other times the industry does not disclose its involvement in science when it believes this will lend the science more credibility. Sometimes it creates third party organisations that appear to be independent, to conduct its research (e.g. Philip Morris setting up the Institute for Biological Research in Germany).¹³ At other times it uses public relations consultancies and law firms to recruit scientists.²

• For a more extensive overview of industry allies and front groups see the Industry People and Allies topic as well as the Allies Database produced by Stopping Tobacco Organizations and Products (STOP)

Desired outcome of influencing science

The desired outcome for the tobacco industry has been to create doubt about the harms of its products, or about the necessity – or efficacy of – tobacco control legislation. It has framed use of its newer products as the only realistic solution to the tobacco epidemic, and aimed to legitimise its role as a stakeholder in science and policymaking.²

These outcomes weaken policy that would reduce industry profits, prevent litigation against the industry, and maximise consumption of its products. In short, the industry’s involvement in science does not primarily advance knowledge or improve the health of populations, but maximises profits.²

Influencing Science Case Studies

For more detailed historical and contemporary examples of how tobacco companies influence science visit Influencing Science Case Studies.

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Influencing Science Case Studies
• Influencing Science: Philip Morris Changing the Conclusions of Research
• Influencing Science: Ghost Writing
• Influencing Science: Imperial Tobacco Canada
• Influencing Science: The Whitecoat Project
• Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products
• Industry Approaches to Science on Newer Products
• COVID-19
• Tobacco Company Investments in Pharmaceutical & NRT Products
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World
• Tobacco Industry Research Committee
• Forest
• Duke University
• Tobacco Industry Research Committee
• Tobacco Institute
• Hill & Knowlton
• Ruder Finn

See the list of pages in the category Influencing Science

TCRG Research

The Science for Profit Model—How and why corporations influence science and the use of science in policy and practice, T. Legg, J. Hatchard and A.B. Gilmore, Plos One, 2021, 16(6):e0253272, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0253272

Document analysis of the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World’s scientific outputs and activities: a case study in contemporary tobacco industry agnogenesis, T. Legg, B.  Clift, A.B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2023, doi: 10.1136/tc-2022-057667

Paying lip service to publication ethics: scientific publishing practices and the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World, T. Legg, M. Legendre, A. B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control 2021;30:e65-e72, doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2020-056003

Seeking to be seen as legitimate members of the scientific community? An analysis of British American Tobacco and Philip Morris International’s involvement in scientific events, B. K. Matthes, A. Fabbri, S. Dance, L. Laurence, K. Silver, A. B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2023, doi: 10.1136/tc-2022-057809

Tobacco industry messaging around harm: Narrative framing in PMI and BAT press releases and annual reports 2011 to 2021, I. Fitzpatrick, S. Dance, K. Silver, M. Violini, T. Hird, Front. Public Health, 2022, 10:958354, doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.958354

References

The post Influencing Science appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) is an international treaty that aims to reduce the demand and supply of tobacco. It entered into force in February 2005, and as of 2023, there are 183 Parties to the treaty.¹⁴

Article 3 of the WHO FCTC establishes that “the objective of this Convention and its protocols is to protect present and future generations from the devastating health, social, environmental and economic consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke by providing a framework for tobacco control measures to be implemented by the Parties at the national, regional and international levels in order to reduce continually and substantially the prevalence of tobacco use and exposure to tobacco smoke”.¹⁵

What is the endgame?

The tobacco ‘endgame’ is the concept of moving beyond a focus on tobacco control, towards implementing policies and strategies that could phase out tobacco products entirely.¹⁶ According to Cancer Research UK, among others, this would require systemic changes, including:

“initiatives designed to change/eliminate permanently the structural, political and social dynamics that sustain the tobacco epidemic, in order to achieve within a specific time an endpoint for the tobacco epidemic.” ¹⁷¹⁸

This could involve the reduction of prevalence of smoking to – or very close to – zero.

Policy Options

Research conducted into potential endgame strategies has identified plausible new policies for reducing smoking to minimal levels. These include:

• A tobacco-free generation policy, which precludes the sale and supply of tobacco to individuals born after a certain year¹⁹²⁰
• A ‘sinking-lid’ strategy, which involves establishing steadily decreasing quotas on the sales or imports of tobacco products¹⁹²⁰²¹
• Substantially reducing the number of tobacco product retailers, which could include restricting retailer density, location, type, or licensing, or restricting tobacco sales to government run outlets^19202223
• Mandating low-nicotine levels in tobacco products¹⁹²⁴
• Banning the sale of one or more tobacco products²³¹⁹
• Shifting control of the supply and distribution of tobacco products away from tobacco companies¹⁶²⁵

Implementation of endgame policies

National goals and policies

The first countries to propose tobacco endgame goals, and start developing legislation to achieve these targets, were Finland,²⁶²⁷ New Zealand,²⁸ Ireland,²⁹ Scotland,³⁰ Sweden³¹ Canada,³²³³ and Malaysia.³⁴ Other countries that have more recently adopted endgame goals include the Netherlands,³⁵³⁶ Australia,³⁷ and the UK.³⁸ Typically, the goal is to have a smoking prevalence of less than 5% of the population.

As of 2023, the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids (CTFK) policy database shows that 13 countries have banned the sale of waterpipe tobacco products, and 19 countries have banned the sale of smokeless tobacco products.³⁹ A review carried out in 2020 showed that 40 countries had active or pending flavoured tobacco product policies that ranged from banning flavoured tobacco, to banning flavour descriptors and images on packaging.²³⁴⁰ No countries have yet implemented mandatory denicotinisation, substantial retailer reductions or the sinking lid strategy at a national level.

In 2010, Bhutan was the first country to ban the sale, manufacture and distribution of tobacco products.⁴¹ However, the legislation was reversed in 2021 due to concerns that increased tobacco smuggling could result in cross-border transmission of COVID-19.⁴¹

Subnational policies

Several US cities have also implemented endgame strategies. Brookline, Massachusetts introduced a generational tobacco ban in 2021 which prohibited the sale of tobacco products and e-cigarettes to anyone born after 1 January 2000.⁴²⁴³ Despite litigation brought by retailers in Brookline, which argued that the policy was pre-empted by state law, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the generational ban in 2024.⁴⁴ Some cities in California have prohibited the sale of tobacco and nicotine products within their jurisdictions,⁴⁵ and others have restricted the number or types of retailers permitted to sell tobacco products.⁴⁶

In 2016, Balanga City in the Philippines banned the sale and use of all tobacco and nicotine products to those born after 1 January 2000. It also expanded the coverage of an existing smoking ban in the city’s University Town to cover a wider radius. However, both measures were overturned in 2018 after the tobacco industry pursued litigation.⁴⁷⁴⁸

Tobacco industry interference

As of 2023, Malaysia, New Zealand and the UK are the only countries that have announced plans to adopt a generational endgame policy. New Zealand also proposed introducing mandated denicotinisation and substantial retailer reduction.

Tobacco industry interference to prevent, delay or undermine the legislation has been observed in each of these countries, and is detailed below.

Malaysia

Proposed legislation

In 2022, Malaysia proposed the ‘Control of Tobacco Products and Smoking Bill 2022’ which aimed to phase out tobacco products and e-cigarettes by introducing a generational endgame policy, prohibiting their use and sale to everyone born on or after 1 January 2007.⁴⁹

However, when the latest version of the bill was tabled in 2023, the generational ban clause was omitted for all products.⁵⁰

Interference from industry and associated organisations

Prior to the bill being tabled, several organisations lobbied against the inclusion of e-cigarettes in the generational endgame policy.⁵¹⁵²⁵³ One of these organisations, the Malaysian Vapers Alliance (MVA), is a member of the World Vapers’ Alliance,⁵⁴ which has received funding from the Consumer Choice Center and BAT. The MVA urged the government to exclude e-cigarettes from the generational ban, and stated that it had conducted a survey of 5000 adult vape users, 96.6% of which did not agree with the ban.⁵⁵

When the generational endgame clause was removed from the bill, Malaysia’s former health minister stated that this was due to strong lobbying from tobacco companies.⁵⁰ According to local advocates the bill had seen an “unprecedented level of industry interference, some of which have been done in clear violation of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control”.⁵⁶

It is not clear what actions were taken by the tobacco industry to oppose the bill, however industry interference in government activities in Malaysia is high, and has continued to rise in recent years.⁵⁷⁵⁸

New Zealand

Proposed legislation

In December 2022, as part of its ‘Smokefree Aotearoa 2025 Action Plan’,⁵⁹ New Zealand passed the ‘Smokefree Environments and Regulated Products’ Amendment Act’ into law, which would have implemented several tobacco endgame policies.⁶⁰ The legislation included three key approaches: a ban on tobacco products being sold to anyone born on or after 1 January 2009, a significant reduction in the amount of nicotine permitted in tobacco products (an 0.8mg/g nicotine limit, compared to 15-16mg/g present in full strength cigarettes), and a huge reduction in the number of retailers allowed to sell tobacco products across the country (from 6000 to 600).⁶⁰⁶¹

The legislation was due to be implemented progressively starting with the reduction in retailer numbers from July 2024, however in November 2023, as part of an agreement between parties forming a new coalition government, it was announced that all three endgame proposals would be repealed. The new finance minister stated that the additional tobacco tax revenues resulting from repealing the smokefree legislation would be used to finance tax cuts promised during the election campaign.⁶²⁶³ The repeal was later confirmed in February 2024.⁶⁴ It was reported that health officials had urged the coalition government to maintain elements of the bill and suggested compromises such as introducing a purchase age of 25, however the Associate Health Minister, Casey Costello, rejected this.⁶⁵

In February 2024, public health experts published a briefing pointing to channels of potential tobacco industry influence on the new coalition government.⁶⁶ The briefing highlighted past connections between coalition politicians and tobacco companies or industry linked organisations, and noted that the arguments used by the coalition government against tobacco endgame policies aligned with those used by tobacco companies.⁶⁶⁶⁷ It also called for all government members to declare any past and current industry connections.⁶⁶⁶⁸

Interference from industry and associated organisations

In 2021, following the release of the Smokefree Aotearoa 2025 Action Plan, Imperial Brands, BAT and JTI all submitted responses to the government consultation opposing the major endgame policies.⁶⁹ Industry linked organisations and individuals also submitted responses opposing the legislation. These included submissions from Centre for Research Excellence: Indigenous Sovereignty and Smoking (COREISS),⁷⁰ which is funded by the Foundation for a Smoke Free World, and The New Zealand Initiative,⁷¹ a think tank whose members include BAT and Imperial Brands.⁷²

In June 2021, BAT reportedly facilitated a protest amongst convenience store owners to contest the proposed tobacco product restrictions.⁷³ BAT supplied the dairy owners with postcards which opposed the measures, including the comment “If nicotine is slashed, filters banned and price goes up, many people will go to the black market – these will badly hurt my business, increase risk of robbery to personal safety and could force store to close.” Thousands of these postcards were reportedly delivered to the New Zealand Parliament.⁷³

In August 2023, the ‘Save our Stores’ campaign, another seemingly grassroots initiative supported by convenience store owners,⁷⁴ called for users to sign a petition urging the government to repeal the latest Smokefree 2025 laws. The campaign website stated that it was “supported by” BAT New Zealand and Imperial Brands New Zealand. The campaign website argued that “A ban on normal strength cigarettes will just mean the illicit trade in tobacco products will boom and be controlled by criminal networks”. It also stated that the legislation would destroy small businesses, and that taking away the tax revenue raised by tobacco sales would “hurt families who are already struggling to make ends meet”.⁷⁵ These narratives were repeated in a series of Facebook adverts published as part of the campaign between August and November 2023, with one advert also stating “tobacco taxes pay for 35,000 police officers”.⁷⁶

This kind of astroturfing is a well-documented industry tactic.

UK

Proposed legislation

In October 2023, the UK Prime Minister announced plans to introduce a generational endgame policy. The new legislation would prohibit the sale of tobacco products to anyone born after 1 January 2009. All tobacco products, cigarette papers, waterpipe tobacco and herbal smoking products were included in the proposal.³⁸⁷⁷ Later that month, the Westminster government opened a four nations consultation on the tobacco endgame policy, as well as on potential measures to curb the rise in youth e-cigarette use.⁷⁸

The consultation closed on 6 December 2023.⁷⁹ In response to the submissions, the Westminster government confirmed its plans to introduce a generational tobacco ban, ban disposable e-cigarettes and bring forward new powers which would allow the government to restrict e-cigarette flavours, packaging and retail display.⁸⁰ The Scottish and Welsh governments stated that they would also be introducing the new legislation.⁸¹⁸²

Interference from industry and associated organisations

After the generational policy was announced, tobacco control researchers outlined arguments that they anticipated the industry would use to in an attempt prevent or undermine the UK legislation, based on previously used tactics. These included invoking libertarianism and arguments around personal freedom; claiming that the policy would be unworkable and impossible to police; and that it would have unintended consequences, such as increasing cigarette smuggling.⁸³

In December 2023, there were reports that the tobacco industry was lobbying the government to increase the age of smoking to 21, instead of introducing the new generational endgame legislation.⁸⁴ An industry source quoted by The i newspaper stated that the generational ban was “unenforceable, and the inevitability of such a ban leading to a black market run by dangerous criminal gangs, there’s a large number of libertarian Tory MPs that do not like the idea the government is limiting people’s free choice…if the Prime Minister does cancel the plan, then [the industry] won’t object to him raising the smoking age to 21”.⁸⁴ The illicit tobacco trade has often been used by tobacco companies to promote key misleading narratives that advance their own business goals.  See also Arguments and Language.

The i also revealed that the tobacco industry had been “inundating MPs with lobbying material in a bid to persuade them to oppose the changes”. It also reported that a letter was sent to MPs, seemingly from constituents, but in fact drafted by employees of tobacco companies, which called the generational ban “ridiculous” and “impractical, illiberal and untested”.⁸⁴ Andrea Leadsom MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State in the Department of Health and Social Care, warned that the industry was working behind the scenes to block the policy.⁸⁵

Tobacco company lobbying

Tobacco companies lobbied the UK Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) directly, using many of the same arguments, although only Philip Morris International (PMI) went as far as to issue a legal threat.

In November 2023, PMI sent a pre-action protocol (PAP) letter to the DHSC.⁸⁶⁸⁷ The PAP letter argued that the consultation was predetermined and that it failed to give adequate reasons regarding the inclusion of heated tobacco products (HTPs). It also argued that  the consultation period was not long enough did not allow the submission of sufficient additional evidence.⁸⁶ In a preliminary response (December 2023), the government stated that it was already possible for organisations to upload supporting documents, but to make this clearer, this instruction had been added to the consultation landing page.⁸⁸

The government’s full response a week later stated that the legal challenge was “misguided and wholly without merit” and would be “an unjustified attempt to delay or derail important legislative change”.⁸⁹ With regard to HTPs, it stated that some of PMI’s claims were “highly subjective and lack supporting independent evidence”. The response concluded that:

“The Government does not intend to enter into any negotiations with the tobacco industry…and will not as you propose “discuss, on an urgent basis, the potential removal of HTP from the scope of the proposed legislation”…the proposed claim has no merit and your client is urged to reconsider its intention to pursue the claim”.⁸⁹

The Telegraph newspaper reported that PMI later withdrew the threat, stating “We notified the government of procedural flaws in the consultation process. They subsequently amended the consultation procedure to allow substantive responses and answered other enquiries. As such, we withdrew the claim on 15^th January”.⁸⁷ PMI told the newspaper  that it agreed with the UK’s smoke-free 2030 plans, but did “not believe that reduced-risk smoke-free products—including heated tobacco—should be included alongside combustible cigarettes in any potential legislation”.⁸⁷ In December 2023, PMI reportedly held roundtable events with UK MPs in to lobby for its heated tobacco products (HTPs) to be exempt from future smoking bans.⁸⁴

In November 2023, a law firm acting on behalf of British American Tobacco (BAT) contacted the DHSC, arguing that  the proposals would “materially impact the rights of our clients and others”. It also argued that there was not enough information “regarding the impacts and costs and benefits of the proposals to permit intelligent consideration”, and – as had PMI – stated that consultation period was not long enough, and did not allow the submission of sufficient supporting evidence.⁹⁰ BAT were reported to be sponsoring a roundtable due to be hosted by MP Graham Brady on behalf of the Centre for Policy Studies in December 2023 to “discuss the Government’s smokefree ambitions, what policies could support the goal, and what a Conservative approach to public health should look like.”⁸⁴⁹¹ BAT stated that the proposed legislation would be difficult to enforce, and risked creating a new category of “under-age adults”.⁹² It also published briefing in response to the consultation, which outlined its stance on e-cigarette restrictions.⁹³

Imperial Brands and the Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association also reportedly engaged with MPs and government officials regarding the proposals, with a spokesperson for Imperial Brands stating “We understand the Government’s desire for new tobacco control measures, because of the health risks associated with smoking. But, like any prohibition, the proposal to ban the legal sale of cigarettes over time threatens significant unintended consequences.”⁸⁴

In December 2023, Imperial also wrote to the DHSC, arguing that the consultation was “materially deficient and unfair in several important respects”. As with PMI and BAT, Imperial stated that the consultation period was not long enough, and did not allow the submission of sufficient supporting evidence. It also argued that the evidence base for the proposal should be shared.⁹⁴ Imperial published a summary of its response to the government consultation. It said it opposed the generational ban, as it would be “unworkable and unenforceable, and would see an explosion of illicit trade in tobacco”. It also argued that it would not reduce smoking rates.⁹⁵ Imperial’s UK head of corporate and legal affairs stated in the retail press in January 2024 that it was having “direct conversations with government” and talking to MPs “to make them aware of illicit trade that is already a problem in their constituencies” including highlighting “loss of revenue for the average retailer”. Imperial also stated that it did not support e-cigarette restrictions including plain packaging, device standardisation, or flavour bans.⁹⁶

In November 2023, Japan Tobacco International (JTI) carried out a survey of 1000 convenience retailers in the UK, and reported concerns that a smoking ban would harm business, increase illicit trade, make ID checks more complicated for retailer staff and impact staff training around underage sales.⁹⁷⁹⁸ A JTI feature in Talking Retail, ‘The Generational Ban: Explained’, described the ban as “an experimental policy not supported by evidence”, and encouraged retailers to respond to the government consultation.⁹⁹

Lobbying by industry-linked organisations

The Institute of Economic Affairs, a British think tank with a history of tobacco industry funding, published a briefing paper in November 2023 titled ‘Prohibition 2.0: Critiquing the Generational Tobacco Ban’.¹⁰⁰ The report echoed the industry narrative that a smoking ban would drive illicit trade and “bolster criminal gangs”. It also stated that a ban would “lead to a grey market in sales between friends” and that it “infantilises one cohort of adults, discriminates on the basis of age and raises issues of intergenerational unfairness.”¹⁰⁰ The report disregarded figures published in a review commissioned by the UK’s Department of Health in 2022 relating to the cost of smoking to the NHS, and stated “The reality is that smokers pay far more in tobacco duty than they cost the state in healthcare, while nonsmokers cost the state more, on average, in both healthcare and social security payments”.¹⁰⁰ Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) published an analysis in December 2023 which found that smoking costs England £49.2 billion each year in lost productivity and service costs, plus an additional £25.9 billion lost quality adjusted life years due to premature death from smoking – far outweighing the money brought in from tobacco taxes.¹⁰¹

The Consumer Choice Center (CCC), a US lobby group with a history of tobacco industry funding and links to the Atlas Network, launched a campaign titled ‘No2Prohibition’ which urged the public to contact their MP to oppose the new legislation.¹⁰² The campaign used the argument that the legislation would result in an increase in illicit trade and stated “Discriminating against adult consumers, depending on what year they were born, is unheard of and would set a dangerous precedent for future regulations. What’s next? Alcohol? Sugar? Fat? We can only imagine”.¹⁰² The campaign included a series of social media adverts centred on messages of freedom of choice and prohibition.¹⁰³ These ads were removed by Meta as they did not include verified “paid for by” disclaimers.¹⁰³

Forest, a British based Smokers’ rights group with a history of tobacco industry funding, stated that it had urged the government not to introduce a generational ban, ahead of the government consultation deadline in December 2023. It also commissioned a consultancy to carry out a survey, which it states found that “58% of respondents think that if a person can vote, drive a car, buy alcohol, or possess a credit card at 18, they should also be allowed to purchase tobacco”.¹⁰⁴

The Association of Convenience Stores (ACS) is an organisation that represents local stores in the UK. Its “Premier Club” members include BAT, JTI, PMI, Imperial Brands and JUUL.¹⁰⁵ ACS stated in December that it had responded to the government consultation, and in its submission “set out a number of concerns about the practical implications of the [generational endgame] policy”. It also stated that it did not support a ban on disposable e-cigarettes.¹⁰⁶

The Scottish Grocers Federation (SGF), a trade association for convenience stores with tobacco company members, published an article opposing several possible new retail regulations, which included the generational tobacco policy and restrictions on the sale and visibility of e-cigarettes, stating that it would harm retail businesses.¹⁰⁷ Regarding the disposable e-cigarette ban, the SGF Chief Executive warned against “unintended consequences such as an increase in illicit trade” and said that it would “engage with both governments to ensure the best outcome for retailers and their communities”.¹⁰⁸ SGF also protested its exclusion from the government’s response to the consultation, due to SGF’s connections with the tobacco industry.¹⁰⁹

The World Vapers Alliance (WVA), which has links to BAT, criticised the generational smoking ban. It argued that the UK should instead be “doubling down on its harm reduction strategy”.¹¹⁰ WVA also urged the public to respond to the government consultation to oppose e-cigarette flavour restrictions, the disposable e-cigarette ban and inclusion of heated tobacco products in the generational smoking ban.¹¹¹ After the consultation closed, WVA published a press release which urged the government to reconsider its stance on banning disposable e-cigarettes.¹¹²

The UK Vaping Industry Association (UKVIA) published a press release opposing the e-cigarette regulations, stating “the tobacco industry and illicit markets will be the only winners from bans on disposables and flavoured vapes”.¹¹³ (UKVIA stated in September 2023 that all of its tobacco company memberships had ended. For details see the UKVIA page).

Relevant Links

• Sunset Plans: Progress on Tobacco Endgame Around the World, ASH (US) website
• Tobacco endgames, ASH Scotland website

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Tobacco Industry Tactics
• Illicit tobacco trade
• Price and Tax
• Menthol and Flavoured Tobacco

Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) Research

Sunak’s smoke-free generation: spare a thought for the tobacco industry, G. Hartwell, A.B. Gilmore, M.C.I . van Schalkwyk, M. McKee, BMJ, 2023; 383 :p2922 doi:10.1136/bmj.p2922

References

The post Tobacco Industry Interference with Endgame Policies appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

The GTNF 2021 was a hybrid event that took place virtually, and in London for in-person delegates, from 21-23 September 2021.¹¹⁸

The following speakers, panellists and moderators were listed on the GTNF website:^119120121

• Tony Abboud- Vapor Technology Association
• Jasjit S. Ahluwalia- Brown University’s Schools of Public Health and Medicine
• Chris Aikens- RELX International
• Gizelle Baker- Philip Morris International (PMI)
• Patrick Basham- Democracy Institute
• Clive Bates- Counterfactual Consulting
• Marina Bellini- British American Tobacco (BAT)
• Karen Blakeley
• Erik Bloomquist
• Stefan Bomhard- Imperial Brands
• Shane Britten- Crime Stoppers International
• Nveed Chaudhary- Broughton Nicotine Services
• Samrat Chowdhery
• Simon Clarke– Forest
• Carlista Moore Conde- British American Tobacco (BAT)
• Martin Cullip
• Brittani Cushman- Turning Point Brands Inc.
• Ming Deng- Yunnan University
• Razvan Dina- Directorate of Preventing and Countering Illegal Migration and Cross-border Crime within the General Inspectorate of Romanian Border Police
• Brian E. Erkkila- Swedish Match
• Karl Fagerström- Fagerström Consulting
• Konstantinos Farsalinos- Onassis Cardiac Surgery Center
• Jonathan Fell- Ash Park Capital
• Billy Gifford– Altria
• Roya Ghafele- OxFirst
• Ambassador James K. Glassman– Glassman Advisory
• Will Godfrey- Filter and The Influence Foundation
• Sharon Goodall- British American Tobacco (BAT)
• Frank Han- Shenzhen SMOORE Technology Co. Ltd.
• Angela Harbutt- Institute of Economic Affairs
• Matthew Holman – US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
• Qingyuan Hu- China National Tobacco Quality Supervision and Test Centre
• Delon Human– Health Diplomats
• Lawrence Hutter- Alvarez & Marsal
• Pam Kaufman- Morgan Stanley
• Mark Kehaya- AMV Holdings LLC
• Annie Kleykamp- University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry and ACTTION
• Lawrence Kutner
• Mark Littlewood- Institute of Economic Affairs
• Rosemary Leonard
• David Levy- Georgetown University
• Paige Magness- Altria Client Services
• Sergio Miranda- Surete de Quebec
• Mirta Molinari- Foundation for a Smoke-Free World
• Ian Monteith- Japan Tobacco International (JTI)
• Joe Murillo- JUUL Labs
• Amy Netherton- Flavor Revolution
• Flora Okereke- British American Tobacco (BAT)
• Cheryl K. Olson
• David O’Reilly- British American Tobacco (BAT)
• Laura Leigh Oyler- Turning Point Brands
• Sudhanshu Patwardhan- Centre for Health Research and Education
• Riccardo Polosa– University of Catania and Center of Excellence for the Acceleration of Harm Reduction (CoEHAR)
• Michiel Reerink- Alliance One International GmbH
• Matt Ridley- U.K. House of Lords
• Brad Rodu– University of Louisville
• Elaine Round- RAI Services Company (BAT)
• Jill Rutter- Kings College London
• Mohamadi Sarkar- Altria Client Services
• Zhiqiang Shi- Shenzhen SMOORE Technology Co. Ltd.
• Christopher Snowdon- Institute of Economic Affairs
• David Sweanor- University of Ottawa
• Nermeen Varawalla- Atlantic Healthcare
• Pieter Vorster- Idwala Research
• Eve Wang- Shenzhen SMOORE Technology Co. Ltd.
• Yilong Wen- Relx Technology
• Kingsley Wheaton- British American Tobacco (BAT)
• Bryan White- JUUL Labs
• Rupert Wilson- Strategic Business Consulting
• Derek Yach- Foundation for a Smoke-Free World

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2020
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2019
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2018
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2017
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2016
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2015
• Global Tobacco Networking Forum 2014
• Global Tobacco Networking Forum 2013
• Global Tobacco Networking Forum 2012
• Global Tobacco Networking Forum 2010

References

The post Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2021 appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Background

It was previously known as Bund für Lebensmittelrecht und Lebensmittelkunde (BLL), the German Federation for Food Law and Food Sciences.¹²⁹

As of 2023, members include around 70 associations, 250 companies, and 150 corporate and individual members.¹³⁰

LMVD describes itself as “opinion-forming platform, service provider and consultant” for its members.¹²⁷ It undertakes lobbying activities in both Germany and the European Union (EU).¹³¹¹²⁸

Links to the tobacco industry

Tobacco industry members

LMVD is financed exclusively from its membership fees, however no figures are disclosed.¹³²

Members include:

• Philip Morris GmbH, a subsidiary of Philip Morris International (PMI).¹³³¹³⁴
• The Association of the German Smoking Tobacco Industry (VdR). This association represents the interests of manufacturers and EU distributors of tobacco, as well as importers of cigars and cigarillos based in Germany.¹³⁵ Patrick Engels, Chairman of VdR, sits on LMVD’s board of trustees.¹³⁶

Although not listed as a member on LMVD’s website, as of February 2023, the Federal Association of the Tobacco Industry and Novel Products (BVTE) listed its membership of LMVD in the German lobbying register in September 2022.¹³⁷ BVTE states that it “represents and promotes the interests of the entire value chain across all smoking and vaping products as well as tobacco and nicotine products for oral use”.¹³⁸ BVTE’s members include British American Tobacco, Imperial Brands, Japan Tobacco International, and Swedish Match (now owned by PMI).¹³⁹

Activities

LMVD has regularly criticised and lobbied against the introduction of new tobacco control policies.

Against bans on tobacco advertising

In October 2000, LMVD released a statement expressing its support of a recent ruling in the European Court of Justice that blocked a directive to ban tobacco advertising and sponsorship,¹⁴⁰ stating “[LMVD] is again strictly against such advertising bans… A total ban on advertising legitimate products on the market is contrary to European legal systems… advertising bans cannot reduce the proportion of smokers in the population at all. Consumer information and education is a more appropriate way to enable consumers to make informed purchasing decisions”[translation].¹⁴⁰

Lobbied against revisions to the EU Tobacco Products Directive

The Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) regulates the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products in the EU. In 2014, the EU completed the first revision of the TPD (2014/40/EU), which became applicable in the EU Member States in May 2016. Regulations included a ban on the use of characterising flavours, an increase in size of graphic health warnings, and a ban on tobacco advertising.

LMVD lobbied against the revision of the TPD on several occasions.

In December 2012, LMVD publicly opposed the proposed revisions to packaging regulations,¹⁴¹ stating that:

“These are requirements that are not compatible with either the fundamental rights of consumers or those of companies. Almost standardized packaging, 75 percent of which contains warnings and leaves little space for brand names and product information, ignores consumers’ right to information and freedom of choice”[translation].¹⁴²

In February 2013, LMVD submitted a statement to the Government arguing against the draft directive. The statement noted that PMI would also be providing comments:¹⁴³¹⁴⁴

“…we thank you for the opportunity to comment on the above draft. For the rest, we refer to the statements of the trade associations and the company Philip Morris who will contact you directly with their comments”.[translation]

PMI is known to have spent millions of euros on an elaborate lobbying campaign against revisions to the TPD, involving more than 160 lobbyists.

In the statement, LMVD argued against the ban on characterising flavours, and stated that introducing plain packaging and increasing the size of graphic health warnings violated EU law.

LMVD also stated that the draft directive could affect a large number of small and medium enterprises, subjecting them to “administrative and financial hurdles that are disproportionate to adequate regulation for the purpose of comprehensive health protection”[translation].¹⁴⁴

LMVD released another statement in July 2013 claiming that “With the proposed general ban on additives, the EU Commission is demonizing the use of flavourings without any scientific basis”.¹⁴⁵

It argued that scientific test criteria must be developed before the regulation of characterising flavours in tobacco products, and that its tobacco industry members would like to be involved in this process.¹⁴⁵

The World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) highlights the need to protect public health policies from the tobacco industry.

In November 2015, LMVD made a further submission to the government that was heavily critical of the changes, this time also citing concerns about the introduction of an advertising ban:¹⁴⁶

“A total ban on information and advertising for lawful products contradicts our economic system and the basic law”[translation].

• For an overview of the EU TPD Revision process and the tobacco industry’s response, see: EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision

Opposed tobacco advertising ban in Germany

In 2016, LMVD criticised a draft law that proposed a ban on all outdoor advertising of tobacco products and e-cigarettes, a regulation which was not included in the 2014 TPD revision.  In a press release LMVD stated “[LMVD] considers total bans on the advertising of legal products to adults to be a deep cut in society’s concept of freedom”.¹⁴⁷

In 2019, it also took part in government discussions regarding the possible extension of tobacco advertising bans.¹⁴⁸

Lobbying on heated tobacco

In March 2022, LMVD opposed an amendment to the TPD which proposed the withdrawal of certain regulatory exemptions for heated tobacco products.¹⁴⁹

LMVD claimed that including the same health warnings on HTP packaging that appear on other tobacco products would constitute misinformation to the customer. It also argued that the EU commission did not have the authority to create new product categories or change existing definitions.¹⁵⁰¹⁵¹

Tobacco Tactics Resources:

• EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision
• Third Party Techniques

References

The post Lebensmittelverband Deutschland (Food Federation Germany) appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

The Business Association of Georgia (BAG) was established in 2009, with a stated mission of improving the business environment in Georgia by “uniting the members, in close cooperation with the authorities, international and local partners”.¹⁵⁶

As of 2022, members of BAG include around 100 holding companies, that represent over 600 businesses of varying sizes.¹⁵⁶

Relationship with the tobacco industry

Membership

Philip Morris Georgia, a subsidy of Philip Morris International (PMI), became a member of BAG in 2017.¹⁵⁷

Japan Tobacco International (JTI) became a member in 2021.¹⁵⁷¹⁵⁸

COVID-19 donation

In 2020, Philip Morris Georgia made a donation of GEL 100,000 (UK£35,500) to a COVID-19 support fund established by BAG.¹⁵⁹

• See the COVID-19 page for information on tobacco industry corporate social responsibility and targeted donations during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Activities

Lobbying to oppose regulations on heated tobacco products

A ban on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship was introduced in Georgia in May 2018, and an outdoor display ban in September 2018.¹⁶⁰

In September 2018, BAG submitted a legislative proposal to the Healthcare Committee of the Parliament requesting that heated tobacco products (HTPs) and other newer nicotine and tobacco products be subject to fewer regulations than conventional tobacco products.¹⁶¹¹⁶² BAG also submitted the proposal to the Office of Business Ombudsman of Georgia.¹⁶²¹⁶⁰ The Ombudsman’s office, which reportedly often has meetings and consultations with tobacco industry representatives,¹⁶⁰ subsequently wrote a letter to Parliament supporting the proposal.¹⁶³ However, the proposal was ultimately dismissed by Parliament.¹⁶⁰¹⁶¹

In January 2020, BAG submitted another legislative proposal requesting fewer regulations for HTPs.^160164165 During this time, BAG also published media reports which cited PMI’s HTP IQOS, as the reason for the request being made.¹⁶⁶

The proposal stated:

“The essence of our proposal is that new tobacco products and heating tobacco, devices and accessories intended for their consumption should not be subject to the prohibitions provided by the current legislation relating to Internet and/or mail order retailing, direct personal communications, and informational materials”[translation].¹⁶⁷

The proposal was again dismissed by Parliament in February 2020.¹⁶⁰

In July 2020, when the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authorised the marketing of IQOS,¹⁶⁸ Legal Director of BAG, Nika Nanuashvili,¹⁶⁹ criticised the Parliament of Georgia’s decisions not to accept BAG’s previous legislative proposals.¹⁷⁰

In 2021, Nanuashvili contributed to a media report in which he echoed previous statements around product regulation. He also commented that smuggling rates of traditional tobacco products are high, citing the high cost of tobacco as the cause.¹⁷¹

Plain packaging

Georgia mandated a law to introduce plain packaging to tobacco products, including HTPs, in May 2017. However, its implementation has been postponed on several occasions,¹⁷² with regulations now due to enter into force in 2024.¹⁷³

In 2021 BAG submitted another legislative proposal regarding regulations for newer products.¹⁷⁴ Adding to previous submissions, this proposal argued against the introduction of plain packaging for HTPs. It also recommended that, for all tobacco products, new packaging regulations be postponed to 2025, and stated “Standardized packaging has failed in all markets where it has been implemented and failed to achieve its intended goals”[translation].¹⁷⁵

The proposal also stated:

“since 2017, the reform of the legislation regulating tobacco products began in the country, and on this painful path, the most difficult, radical regulations were selected… Georgia’s legislation, which is significantly stricter than EU countries, especially in terms of marketing and standardized packaging, will inevitably lead to further narrowing of organized businesses in the relevant market and indirect encouragement of illegal imports”[translation].¹⁷⁵

However, the proposal was again refused by Parliament.¹⁷⁶

After rejection of the proposal, Nanuashvili stated in a media report that plain packaging would have a negative impact on the sale of lesser-known brands and argued that plain packaging could result in an increase in illicit trade.¹⁷⁷

See also Industry Arguments Against Plain Packaging

Relevant Link

• Business Association of Georgia website

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Third party technique
• A list of pages in the Georgia category

References

The post Business Association of Georgia appeared first on TobaccoTactics.