Relationship to the tobacco industry

Between July 2017 and April 2019, ADIT received funding from Philip Morris International (PMI) as part of PMI IMPACT, for the so-called “Rogue trade project”, dedicated to the “Development of a pan-European awareness platform, based on digital communication tools, to inform European businesses about the illegal trade of tobacco products and other mass consumption goods.”³

The project notably led to the creation of Eurobsit (European Observatory on Illicit Trade), a website dedicated to illicit trade.⁴

ADIT and PMI IMPACT also co-sponsored a conference on smuggling, counterfeiting, and terrorism financing, organized by Fondation Robert Schuman on 11 April 2018.⁵ The Association de Lutte Contre le Commerce Illicite (ALCCI, the association against illicit trade) was a sponsor for the event.⁵ ALCCI was founded by PMI Expert Council member Alain Juillet.⁶ EU commissioner Pierre Moscovici and other EU officials cancelled their participation following the publication of media articles on PMI funding the conference.⁷ Attendees included senior officials from Europol, the European Parliament, the European External Action Service, the European Union Intellectual Property Office, French and Belgian governments, and the OECD, in addition to other PMI IMPACT grantees (including from INTA and the Siracusa International Institute) and Alvise Giustiniani, Vice-President of illicit trade strategy and prevention at PMI.⁵

An investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) revealed further information about the links between ADIT and the tobacco industry.⁸ It points to an ADIT report from 2016 (shortly before the beginning of the PMI-IMPACT funded project in July 2017), which was co-authored by two members of the PMI IMPACT Expert Council.⁸

TobaccoTactics Resources

• PMI IMPACT
• List of Successful PMI IMPACT Applicants
• Organisations linked to PMI IMPACT
• Illicit Tobacco Trade

References

The post ADIT appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Burson Cohn & Wolfe (BCW) is a public relations (PR) company that was established in 2018 by a merger between two PR agencies owned by WPP; Burson-Marsteller and Cohn & Wolfe. This merger reportedly made BCW one of the largest global communications agencies in the world.⁹

WPP is a PR and advertising conglomerate, and the parent company of several companies that have longstanding links to the tobacco industry.

In 2024, WPP announced a merger between BCW and another of its communication company’s, Hill & Knowlton, to form ‘Burson’.¹⁰ According to the statement, Burson was due to be operational from July 2024, and would have more than 6,000 employees worldwide. It also stated that Hill & Knowlton would still “operate within Burson serving a select group of clients globally through strategic communications, advisory and public affairs services”.¹⁰

Relationship with the tobacco industry

Providing services to Imperial Brands

A transparency register published by the Public Affairs Board of the Public Relations and Communications Association (PRCA), a British PR association, shows that BCW started working for Imperial Brands between December 2019 and February 2020.^111213141516

Channelled loan from PMI to Australian organisation to lobby for vaping deregulation

BCW worked with the Australian Retailers Association (ARA) between August 2019 and July 2020 to support ARAs newly established lobby group, the Australian Retail Vaping Industry Association (ARVIA).¹⁷

The Australian Financial Review reported that, in February 2020, BCW contracted ARA to lobby for the deregulation of e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products (HTPs) in Australia. It was reported that the funds for the contract had been channelled from Philip Morris International (PMI).¹⁷

There was an option for ARA to renew the contract 6 months later, however when ARA appointed a new CEO in August 2020, ARA cancelled the renewal and shut down ARVIA.¹⁷¹⁸

In February 2021, BCW stated that it worked with PMI from August 2019 until July 2020, but that “PMI is no longer our client and we ended our work with them last year”.¹⁷

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• WPP
• Lobby Groups
• Philip Morris International
• Imperial Brands

References

The post Burson Cohn & Wolfe appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

The tobacco industry has a long history of attempting to influence science in order to cast doubt on evidence showing the harms of its products and to argue against the need for regulation of those products. In the 1950s when science began to establish a causal link between smoking and cancer, the industry mobilised to cast doubt on that evidence. In the 1980s and 1990s, when it became clear that second-hand smoke was harmful, the industry funded and created science that attempted to obscure that harm.¹⁹ More recently, the tobacco industry has funded research in to newer tobacco and nicotine products and concerns have once again been raised that the industry is manipulating science for its own benefit.

Industry strategies for influencing science

Researchers from the Tobacco Control Research Group at the University of Bath have developed a typology and model – the Science for Profit Model – to explain how and why the tobacco industry (along with other harmful industries) attempts to influence science.²⁰ The authors conclude that strategies for influencing science are used to “purposefully-create misinformation, doubt, and ignorance”, to “obscure the harms of industry products and practices” and to “oppose regulation that could threaten corporate profits”.²⁰

Below is an overview of this research, illustrating the ways in which the industry (and third parties used by the industry) uses science to further its aims. The following strategies and examples are drawn from the Science for Profit Model.

• To find out about these strategies in more depth, see the research paper on the Science for Profit Model.²⁰

The Science for Profit Model

The Science for Profit Model²⁰

Strategy A – Influence how science is conducted and published to skew evidence in industry’s favour

The tobacco industry has used various strategies to influence which research is – and isn’t – undertaken and published, in order to counteract independent scientific research which might show industry products and practices in an unfavourable light.

These strategies include funding research by third parties to deflect attention from industry harms. One example is research that looked for alternative causes of cancer (including hormones and nutrition) to distract attention from the link between smoking and cancer. This was conducted through the Tobacco Industry Research Committee from the 1950s onwards.²¹ Another example is research that focused on issues of “indoor air” (such as dirty air filters) to deflect attention from the harms of passive smoking, conducted through the Center for Indoor Air Research in the 1980s. Since 2017, research funded by PMI through the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World (FSFW) has similarly distracted attention from industry harms, including by redirecting blame towards the public health community and the media, implying that they are responsible for a slowing in the decline of smoking rates.²²

Other strategies include undertaking “risky” research secretly, so that it can be hidden or abandoned if results harm the industry’s interests,²⁰ and manipulating study design or statistical analyses to ensure favourable findings. Another is to ‘cherry-pick’ (select the most favourable) papers to include in literature reviews to obscure parts of the evidence base.²⁰

To see how study design affected PMI-funded science on plain packaging of cigarettes visit the Ashok Kaul and Michael Wolf pages.

In order to influence what research is published, the industry has created its own journals, such as the “Tobacco and Health” research journal which was distributed to health professionals.²³²⁰ More recently, it has published in journals with editorial staff who have links to the industry, and used ‘pre-print’ platforms to self-publish its own non-peer-reviewed science.²²²⁴

• For more examples of how the tobacco industry influences the conduct and publication of science visit Influencing Science Case Studies

Strategy B – Influence how science is interpreted to undermine unfavourable science and create a distorted picture of the evidence base

The industry also works to distort how science and scientists are seen by the public and experts.

In the 1990s, tobacco companies launched the “Sound Science” and “Good Epidemiology” public relations campaigns. These demanded unrealistic levels of evidence in epidemiological studies examining harms caused by industry products, and were designed to prevent policy action on passive smoking.²⁰

For decades, the industry has attacked and misrepresented science and scientists that may harm its commercial agenda. For example, in the 1990s, it criticised a US Environmental Protection Agency risk assessment which concluded that second-hand smoke was carcinogenic.²⁰ Nearly thirty years later the director of the Centre for Research Excellence: Indigenous Sovereignty and Smoking (COREISS), an FSFW grantee, used a similar argument, despite overwhelming evidence that second-hand smoke is a health risk:

“scientific studies have not proven that exposure to cigarette smoke in the car causes disease”.²²²⁵

In the 1990’s Philip Morris developed plans for what it called “Project Sunrise” – a project in which the company proposed the monitoring of individuals and organisations working in tobacco control, framing some as “extreme” and others as “moderate” in order to divide the community.²⁶ Some of the many attacks on individuals working in tobacco control are documented on Martin Cullip, FOI: Stirling University and FOI: University of Bath.

• For more examples of how the tobacco industry influences the interpretation of science, visit the Influencing Science Case Studies page.

Strategy C – Influence the reach of science to create an “echo chamber” for industry’s scientific messaging

The industry disseminates messages that support its scientific stance. A common approach is to contract third party “friendly” voices to amplify scientific messages and distance these messages from industry. These messengers include front groups, designed to look like unbiased sources, organisations such as think tanks and professional associations, and “expert” individuals.²⁰

In the 1980s, the ‘Whitecoat Project’ was Philip Morris’s secret plan to recruit ostensibly independent scientists to disseminate scientific narratives which would help it to “restore the social acceptability of smoking”.²⁰ Read more about the project on the Influencing Science: The Whitecoat Project page.

Organisations funded by FSFW have promoted industry-friendly scientific narratives on e-cigarettes and COVID-19, and endorsed science calling for weaker regulation of the industry’s products.²²

In order to maximise press coverage of industry-favourable scientific messaging, the industry funds media outlets to disseminate its science, cite its staff, and report on its scientific events, including conferences.²⁷²⁸ One example is Filter magazine – to find out more visit the page on The Influence Foundation.

• For more examples of how the tobacco industry uses third parties to spread its scientific messages, visit the Influencing Science Case Studies page.

Strategy D – Create industry-friendly policymaking environments which shape the use of science in its favour

Tobacco companies have worked to embed their own standards of evidence in policymaking, and bring about policy reforms that increase reliance on the tobacco industry’s own science.²⁰

In the 1990s, the tobacco industry attempted to shape risk assessment of its own products, and influence European Union (EU) regulatory mechanisms in relation to the assessment of data from epidemiological and animal studies, for example. Although they did not succeed, this would have meant that the criteria used for determining scientific ‘proof’ would have been drawn up by industry itself.²⁰

British American Tobacco promoted regulatory reform in the EU, to make it harder to implement public health policies which conflicted with its commercial interests. This ‘Better Regulation’ or ‘Smart Regulation’ appeared to be about good governance and transparency but “in fact mandated industry’s right to be heard early in scientific debates about their products and practices.”²⁰ Read more on this topic on the EU Better Regulation page.

Strategy E – Manufacture trust in industry and its scientific messaging

The industry has worked to promote its involvement in science in order to manufacture an image of scientific credibility. Many academic institutions and journals no longer collaborate with the industry directly, due to its history of scientific deception, and so the industry uses third party organisations to push for ‘renormalisation’ of its business.²⁹³⁰ For instance, since it was set up in 2017, FSFW has worked to frame the industry’s involvement in science and policy as the ‘solution’ and its exclusion as counterproductive, despite industry having created the problem.²²

At other times the industry does not disclose its involvement in science when it believes this will lend the science more credibility. Sometimes it creates third party organisations that appear to be independent, to conduct its research (e.g. Philip Morris setting up the Institute for Biological Research in Germany).³¹ At other times it uses public relations consultancies and law firms to recruit scientists.²⁰

• For a more extensive overview of industry allies and front groups see the Industry People and Allies topic as well as the Allies Database produced by Stopping Tobacco Organizations and Products (STOP)

Desired outcome of influencing science

The desired outcome for the tobacco industry has been to create doubt about the harms of its products, or about the necessity – or efficacy of – tobacco control legislation. It has framed use of its newer products as the only realistic solution to the tobacco epidemic, and aimed to legitimise its role as a stakeholder in science and policymaking.²⁰

These outcomes weaken policy that would reduce industry profits, prevent litigation against the industry, and maximise consumption of its products. In short, the industry’s involvement in science does not primarily advance knowledge or improve the health of populations, but maximises profits.²⁰

Influencing Science Case Studies

For more detailed historical and contemporary examples of how tobacco companies influence science visit Influencing Science Case Studies.

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Influencing Science Case Studies
• Influencing Science: Philip Morris Changing the Conclusions of Research
• Influencing Science: Ghost Writing
• Influencing Science: Imperial Tobacco Canada
• Influencing Science: The Whitecoat Project
• Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products
• Industry Approaches to Science on Newer Products
• COVID-19
• Tobacco Company Investments in Pharmaceutical & NRT Products
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World
• Tobacco Industry Research Committee
• Forest
• Duke University
• Tobacco Industry Research Committee
• Tobacco Institute
• Hill & Knowlton
• Ruder Finn

See the list of pages in the category Influencing Science

TCRG Research

The Science for Profit Model—How and why corporations influence science and the use of science in policy and practice, T. Legg, J. Hatchard and A.B. Gilmore, Plos One, 2021, 16(6):e0253272, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0253272

Document analysis of the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World’s scientific outputs and activities: a case study in contemporary tobacco industry agnogenesis, T. Legg, B.  Clift, A.B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2023, doi: 10.1136/tc-2022-057667

Paying lip service to publication ethics: scientific publishing practices and the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World, T. Legg, M. Legendre, A. B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control 2021;30:e65-e72, doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2020-056003

Seeking to be seen as legitimate members of the scientific community? An analysis of British American Tobacco and Philip Morris International’s involvement in scientific events, B. K. Matthes, A. Fabbri, S. Dance, L. Laurence, K. Silver, A. B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2023, doi: 10.1136/tc-2022-057809

Tobacco industry messaging around harm: Narrative framing in PMI and BAT press releases and annual reports 2011 to 2021, I. Fitzpatrick, S. Dance, K. Silver, M. Violini, T. Hird, Front. Public Health, 2022, 10:958354, doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.958354

References

The post Influencing Science appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Image source: Nathan Hughes Hamilton/CC BY 2.0 DEED

Key Points

• Indonesia is a country in Southeast Asia, part of the World Health Organization’s South-East Asia Region.
• It is the fourth most populous country in the world, with a population in 2022 of 275.5 million.
• Tobacco use prevalence is high, particularly amongst men. 34.5% of all adults were current tobacco users in 2021, including 65.5% of men.
• Indonesia has neither signed nor ratified the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. As a non-party, it is ineligible to join the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.
• The Indonesian tobacco market is dominated by local manufacturers PT Gudang Garam Tbk and PT Djarum, as well as Philip Morris International.
• Recent tobacco industry tactics in Indonesia include the use of third parties; the targeting of youth with tobacco marketing, both at point of sale and online, as well as via event sponsorship; and sponsorship of popular sports such as badminton and football.

According to the authors of a 2023 paper, “Indonesia has a high smoking prevalence that has not diminished significantly since 1990”. This has been driven by male smoking rates which remain amongst the highest in the world.³²³³ It is the only country in Asia to have neither signed nor ratified the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC),³⁴ and nor is there any comparable national framework for tobacco control.³² Industry interference in policymaking is ongoing, as there is no effective legal mechanism to prevent it.³⁵³⁶ Smoking has long been a part of Indonesian culture, particularly for men, something which tobacco companies have exploited through aggressive marketing tactics that aim to reinforce smoking as a normal or even essential masculine behaviour.³⁶³⁷ This high degree of social acceptability means that the government treats the industry as a legitimate stakeholder.³⁸ One key challenge, therefore, is to de-normalise tobacco use, as part of a comprehensive tobacco control plan.³⁸³⁹

Tobacco Use in Indonesia

The link between smoking and masculinity is deeply embedded within Indonesian culture.³⁹⁴⁰ This has been reinforced by tobacco marketing which associates tobacco products with characteristics traditionally considered masculine, such as strength, heroism and self-control.³⁹⁴⁰

In 2021, tobacco use prevalence amongst adults was 34.5%; 70.2 million adults were current users of tobacco.⁴¹ Nearly two-thirds (65.5%) of Indonesian men reported using tobacco, compared to around 3% of women.⁴¹

In 2019, nearly 20% of students aged from 13 to 15 reported tobacco use.⁴² Around 36% of males in this age group reported current tobacco use compared to 3.5% of females.⁴²

Kreteks – cigarettes consisting of tobacco, cloves and flavourings such as chocolate, dried fruit and coffee – are by far the most popular tobacco product in Indonesia. According to government figures from 2017, kreteks accounted for more than 95% of the cigarettes sold that year.⁴³ The cloves provide a unique flavour and smell, and also contain eugenol, a chemical compound which reduces the harshness of the smoke.⁴⁴ In 2021, close to 30% of all Indonesian adults – around 60 million of the country’s 70 million adult tobacco users – reported smoking kreteks.⁴¹

There were an estimated 246,000 deaths attributable to smoking in 2019, accounting for nearly 15% of all mortality in Indonesia that year.⁴⁵ Research published in 2022 estimated the total cost of smoking to the Indonesian economy in 2019 at between Rp184.36 trillion (US$13 billion) and Rp410.76 trillion (US$29 billion).⁴⁶ The same study found that direct healthcare costs accounted for between Rp17.9 trillion (US$1.3 billion) and Rp27.7 trillion (US$2 billion), most of which is covered by the Social Security Agency for Health, equivalent to 57-59% of total direct expenditure on healthcare.⁴⁶

Tobacco in Indonesia

Market share and leading brands

In 2022, market research company Euromonitor International put the value of the Indonesian tobacco market at over US$34 billion.⁴⁷ It is the second-largest cigarette market in the world.⁴⁸

The market leader in Indonesia is the local kretek manufacturer PT Gudang Garam Tbk (Gudang Garam), with nearly one-third of the market in 2022.⁴⁹⁵⁰

Its closest competitor is Philip Morris International (PMI), with a slightly smaller share.⁴⁹ PMI operates in Indonesia via its subsidiaries PT Philip Morris Indonesia and PT HM Sampoerna Tbk (Sampoerna).⁴⁹⁵¹ At the time of its acquisition by PMI in 2005, Sampoerna was the leading tobacco company in Indonesia.⁵¹⁵²

PT Djarum (Djarum), another local kretek producer, has the third-largest market share, around half that of the two leading companies.⁴⁹⁵³

Like PMI, other transnational tobacco companies have sought to expand into Indonesia by acquiring local companies. In 2009, British American Tobacco (BAT) bought an 85% stake in PT Bentoel Internasional Investama Tbk (Bentoel) – at the time the fourth largest tobacco company in the country.⁵² In 2011, the South Korean company Korea Tobacco & Ginseng (KT&G) – which has a partnership with PMI for its newer nicotine and tobacco products – bought a controlling share of Indonesia’s sixth-largest tobacco company, PT Trisakti Purwosari Makmur.⁵²⁵⁴ Similarly, Japan Tobacco International (JTI) acquired two Gudang Garam subsidiaries, Karyadibya Mahardhika and its distributor, PT Surya Mustika Nusantara, in 2017.⁵² However, BAT, JTI and KT&G each had market shares of less than 2% as of 2022.⁴⁹

In 2022, the top four brands of cigarette in Indonesia were all kreteks. Gudang Garam has around one-third of the market. Djarum, A Mild and Dji Sam Soe (the latter two both PMI/Sampoerna brands) each have around a one-tenth share. Others, including PMI’s premium cigarette Marlboro, have smaller shares.⁵⁵

• For more information on the tobacco industry in Indonesia, see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

Tobacco farming and child labour

Tobacco is grown in Indonesia almost entirely on small, family-run farms, and 90% of production comes from just three provinces: East Java, Central Java, and West Nusa Tenggara.⁵⁶

In 2021, Indonesia reported production of over 237,000 tonnes of raw tobacco, making it the fourth largest producer in the world after China, India and Brazil.⁵⁷ Production has varied since 2010, from a low of less than 127,000 tonnes in 2016 to a high of nearly 270,000 tonnes in 2019. However, the overall trend in recent decades has been upwards, as shown in the graph below:

Figure 1: Tobacco production, 1980 to 2021.⁵⁸ Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization/Our World in Data | CC BY

The area harvested under tobacco crop also increased by over 30% between 2000 and 2020, to nearly 220,000 hectares.⁵⁹

A 2017 report by the World Bank found that poverty was widespread amongst tobacco farmers in Indonesia. Nearly three-quarters of tobacco farmers were poor compared to around one-tenth of the general population.⁶⁰ Most tobacco-farming households received some form of government social assistance, and more than 60% reported food insecurity.⁶⁰

Research published in 2020 found that Indonesian tobacco farmers would be better off economically if they grew other crops or pursued alternative, non-agricultural livelihoods.⁶¹ Tobacco is also vulnerable to adverse weather conditions in comparison to other crops. In 2016, a period of much higher-than-average rainfall, while non-tobacco farmers made a modest income, tobacco farmers’ income was almost zero.⁶¹

Tobacco-farming households had significantly higher labour costs than those growing other crops.⁶² Tobacco farmers also used child labour, both hired and household, more frequently compared to those growing other crops.⁶¹ Similarly, more children from tobacco farms missed school.⁶¹ Farmers reported using child labour because tobacco growing does not usually pay enough to hire adult workers.⁶¹

An investigation by The Guardian in 2018 visited the village of Beleke, on the island of Lombok, where it found almost all children above the age of four doing tobacco work during harvest season.⁶³ This followed a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 2016, which stated that thousands of children work in tobacco farming in Indonesia. HRW found children engaged in dangerous work in four Indonesian provinces, interviewing more than 130. They reported serious health and safety issues, including acute nicotine poisoning as a result of handling tobacco leaves (also known as green tobacco sickness) and contact with pesticides and other chemicals.⁵⁶

HRW’s interviews with tobacco farmers and traders revealed a lack of human rights due diligence in the tobacco supply chain in Indonesia, particularly regarding child labour.⁵⁶ The farmers and traders interviewed supplied large Indonesian and transnational companies including Gudang Garam, Sampoerna, Djarum and Bentoel.⁵⁶

• For more information on the tobacco industry and child labour, please see the pages on CSR: Child Labour and the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco-Growing Foundation (ECLT).

Tobacco and the economy

Given its high level of tobacco consumption, Indonesia has long been a net importer of tobacco leaf, despite also being a major producer.⁶² In 2022, it imported over US$617 million in raw tobacco, compared to around US$266 million in exports.⁶⁴⁶⁵

However, it is a net exporter of cigarettes: over US$913 million in 2022, compared to US$118 million in imports.⁶⁶⁶⁷

In 2020 the WHO reported that the contribution of the tobacco industry to the Indonesian economy was relatively small; tobacco manufacturing generates just 0.6% of total employment, while tobacco farmers represent only 1.6% of the agricultural workforce. Most families involved in tobacco growing and kretek rolling also receive some form of social assistance – meaning that the Indonesian state is essentially subsidising poorly-paid employment in the tobacco industry.⁶⁸

Illicit trade

A study published in 2019, which collected packs of cigarettes from respondents in Indonesia, found that 20% of the 1,440 smokers surveyed reported ever smoking illicit cigarettes. However, among the 1,201 packs researchers collected, only 20 (i.e. 1.6%) had no excise stamp, a fake excise stamp, or no graphic health warning – and hence were potentially illicit. Price appears to be a factor, with people on lower incomes more likely to purchase illicit cigarettes, though consumption of illicit cigarettes was not found to be a long-term behaviour.⁶⁹ However, a 2021 study estimated that the share of illicit cigarette consumption in the country increased from 5% in 2013 to 19% in 2018.⁷⁰

Globally, Free Trade Zones (FTZs) are well known to facilitate the illicit tobacco trade.⁷¹ There are four FTZs in Indonesia, where cigarette production and trade are exempted from excise duties, making the price much lower. Cigarettes leak from these FTZs, becoming illicit in the process, as the packs bear no excise stamps.⁷² In August 2023, Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission announced that a senior official from the Bintan Free Trade and Port Zone had been arrested on charges of data manipulation and receiving bribes from cigarette companies, to allow greater flows of duty-free cigarettes through the zone.⁷³

Internal industry documents suggest that historically, BAT has been involved in illicit trade in Indonesia and the broader region.⁷⁴ A 1994 internal BAT document points to Indonesia – along with Malaysia – as a conduit of illicit products to the Philippines.⁷⁵ A BAT-commissioned study from the 1980s also documented Indonesian consumers’ preference for its smuggled products.⁷⁶

As part of the third round of the Philip Morris International initiative PMI IMPACT, PMI is funding the Institute for Development of Economics and Finance, an Indonesian think tank, to “examine the market for NTHRPs [nicotine and tobacco harm reduction products] and how to prevent illicit trade in this growing sector, with research to include surveys and limited group discussions”.⁷⁷

• For more information on PMI IMPACT, please see the following pages: PMI IMPACT, List of Successful PMI IMPACT Applicants and Organisations linked to PMI IMPACT.

Tobacco and the environment

Indonesia is the world’s second-biggest contributor to marine plastic pollution after China, responsible for 1.29 million tonnes of debris entering the ocean annually.⁷⁸ Of this waste, cigarette butts are the most commonly-littered item.⁷⁹ The Global Center for Good Governance in Tobacco Control has estimated the cost of tobacco-related marine pollution and waste management in Indonesia at Rp49 trillion (US$3.1 billion) per year.⁸⁰

• For more information, please see the page on Tobacco and the Environment and the long read on Plastics, the Environment and the Tobacco Industry.

Roadmap to Tobacco Control

Indonesia is not a party to the WHO FCTC, and is therefore ineligible to join the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. As of 2023, there appears to be little political will either to ratify the WHO FCTC or to create a comparable national framework for tobacco control. This has led to a fragmented approach across different government departments and prevented the development of coherent tobacco control policies.³²

However, Indonesia has committed to an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) five-year plan on health, under which it has pledged to reaffirm collective positions against industry interference and for implementation of control measures, for both tobacco and alcohol.⁸¹

In 2009, the passage of Law No. 36 authorised the Ministry of Health to introduce tobacco control regulation, including on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (TAPS); smoke-free spaces; and packaging and labelling of tobacco products.⁸² This was followed in 2012 by Indonesia’s principal tobacco control law, Government Regulation 109 (PP 109/2012).⁸² These laws prohibit smoking on public transport, and in educational facilities and places of worship, though other types of enclosed public spaces, including workplaces, restaurants and government facilities, may provide smoking areas.⁸³⁸⁴ More stringent regulations at the subnational level are permitted.⁸³ As of June 2023, 456 (around 86%) of Indonesia’s 520 cities and districts had adopted smoke-free policies, though implementation remains a challenge.⁸⁵

Indonesia is one of the few countries that still permits tobacco advertising on television, though it may not be broadcast until after 9:30pm.⁸³⁸² While Law No. 36 and PP 109/2012 also introduced graphic health warnings (GHWs) on tobacco packaging and banned misleading terms such as “light” and “low-tar”, the law was not retroactive for tobacco products that already had these words in their branding, and other misleading features – such as colours, numbers and symbols – are still permitted.⁸³⁸²

As of 2024, various other limitations remain. There are no restrictions on internet sales or the sale of individual cigarettes (single sticks); there is no national law regulating the sale, use, advertising, promotion, sponsorship, packaging or labelling of e-cigarettes; and tobacco industry corporate social responsibility (CSR) is still permitted.⁸²⁸⁴ Cigarettes in Indonesia also remain relatively cheap. In 2022, the price of the bestselling brand of cigarettes was just over US$2.⁸⁴

In 2018, President Widodo issued a decree containing a list of government regulations to be revised, which included PP 109/2012.⁸⁶ Tobacco control advocates have seen this as an opportunity to push for stronger regulations, such as larger GHWs, higher excise taxes on cigarettes and a comprehensive ban on TAPS.⁸⁶ However, this process has stalled, amidst conflict between different government ministries and opposition from farmers’ associations and other groups (see section “Use of third parties”).⁸⁶ As of March 2024, the revision of PP 109/2012 had yet to advance.

For more details, please see the following websites:

• Legislation by Country/Jurisdiction – Indonesia, Tobacco Control Laws, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
• Country profile – Indonesia, World Health Organization, WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2023

Interference in Indonesia by Tobacco Industry and Allies

Tobacco industry tactics in Indonesia include the use of third parties; the targeting of youth with tobacco marketing, both at point of sale and online, as well as via event sponsorship; and sponsorship of popular sports such as badminton and football.

Use of third parties

The tobacco industry has long used third parties and front groups to advance its interests, as a means of achieving greater credibility and overcoming public mistrust.

The Indonesian Tobacco Farmers’ Association (Asosiasi Petani Tembakau Indonesia, APTI), a lobby group, opposes the WHO FCTC, and has urged the Indonesian government not to ratify the treaty.⁸⁷ It has also frequently lobbied against increases in excise taxes on tobacco products. In 2019, APTI held a rally in front of the Ministry of Finance, to demand the repeal of an increase in excise and the retail price of cigarettes, and the revision of a regulation requiring at least 50% of the Tobacco Excise Revenue Sharing Fund to be allocated to health purposes.⁸⁸

APTI has also opposed the proposed revision to Indonesia’s main tobacco control law, PP 109/2012. In 2022, in Temanggung, a major tobacco-growing region in Central Java, APTI representatives were seen at a public event displaying banners asking the local government for support in opposing the proposal.⁸⁹ APTI also sent official letters to President Widodo opposing the revision, stating that it would negatively affect the livelihoods of people working in the tobacco sector, particularly farmers.⁸⁶

Another lobby group which has opposed of any revision of PP 109/2012 is the Indonesian Tobacco Community Alliance (Aliansi Masyarakat Tembakau Indonesia, AMTI), a coalition of tobacco industry stakeholders – including cigarette manufacturers – established in 2010.⁹⁰ It reportedly has close links to the PMI subsidiary Sampoerna.⁹¹⁹² AMTI has sought to portray tobacco control as an agenda imposed on Indonesia by foreign actors who do not understand the local context – a common tobacco industry tactic in the country.⁹³⁹⁴

Both APTI and AMTI are affiliates of the International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA), a global front group funded and run by the ‘Big Four’ transnational tobacco companies (TTCs), as well as two major leaf merchants.⁹⁵⁹⁶⁹⁷ Though ITGA claims to defend the interests of tobacco farmers and their communities around the world, it uses tobacco farmers as a means of opposing tobacco control regulations and protecting the interests of the TTCs.⁹⁷

Controversial marketing strategies: targeting youth

The tobacco industry has long seen young people as a vital target market; tobacco use generally starts in adolescence. In Indonesia, the mean age of smoking initiation amongst males is 18.3 years, while smoking prevalence amongst Indonesian adolescents (aged 10 to 18) increased from 7% in 2013 to 9% in 2018.⁹⁸⁹⁹

In Indonesia, there is a high concentration of tobacco retailers, high exposure to point-of-sale advertising and no restriction on the display of cigarette packs in retail outlets – all of which are associated with increased tobacco use amongst adolescents.^8499100 In addition, many retailers are located close to schools; enforcement of the ban on sales to minors is very weak; while sales of single sticks, which make smoking more accessible to young people, are still permitted.^10099101 Retailers therefore have an important role in recruiting new, young smokers, and maintaining growth of the market.⁹⁹

Indonesia’s incomplete TAPS regulations have also allowed the tobacco industry to switch to less regulated forms of advertising such as event sponsorship and internet marketing, often targeting young people.¹⁰²

For example, the popular music festival SoundrenAline, which has been running in Indonesia since 2002, was founded by Sampoerna.¹⁰³ Following a visit to SoundrenAline 2016, researchers reported that Sampoerna branding and the slogan “Go Ahead” were found throughout the festival site. Sampoerna A brand cigarettes were widely sold, including by cigarette girls and boys – a form of direct one-on-one marketing.¹⁰²¹⁰⁴ Cigarettes that were not a Sampoerna brand were confiscated at the entrance.¹⁰² As of 2022, Sampoerna was still the sponsor of the event and owner of the registered trademark for “SoundrenAline”.¹⁰³

With over 111 million users, Indonesia has one of the world’s largest Instagram audiences, over half of whom are aged between 13 and 24.¹⁰⁵ According to the Tobacco Enforcement and Reporting Movement (TERM), as of 2023, around 70% of online tobacco marketing in Indonesia took place on Instagram.¹⁰⁶¹⁰⁷ Most of this marketing is indirect and community based. Rather than display their products directly, the tobacco companies build online communities of followers with a common interest such as music, travel or sport, as a means of improving brand visibility and indirectly promoting their products.¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁶

Controversial marketing strategies: sponsorship of popular sports

Tobacco industry sponsorship of sport is as old as professional athletic competition itself.¹⁰⁸ It aims to create links between pre-existing associations people may have with sports (such as fun, excitement, strength, etc.) with tobacco branding and products; promote an image of tobacco use as normal and healthy; and appeal to young people.¹⁰⁹

In Indonesia, TAPS has historically been very widespread in popular sports.¹¹⁰ Badminton, for instance, which the New York Times has described as part of Indonesia’s “national identity”, has long been a vehicle for tobacco industry sponsorship.¹¹¹ From 2006, Djarum was the corporate sponsor of the national badminton trials for children and adolescents aged from 5 to 18.¹¹² The trials were shown on national television, and participants were required to wear clothing which displayed the Djarum logo.⁹⁹¹¹²

Ten civil society organisations reported Djarum to the National Commission on Child Protection, arguing that the sponsorship violated Indonesia’s child protection law.¹¹² In 2019, Djarum agreed to remove its logos from the badminton trials.¹¹³¹¹⁴ It also withdrew its sponsorship from future trials, which critics argued would undermine development of young talent. However, in 2021 the state-owned telecommunications firm Telkom replaced Djarum as sponsor.¹¹²

Djarum owns the PB Djarum badminton club in Kudus, Central Java, which has a youth academy, as well as a club in Jakarta.^111106115 The company also continues to market itself and its products indirectly via Djarum-associated social media accounts which focus on badminton-related content.¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁶

An investigation into tobacco marketing on social media in Indonesia, India and Mexico around the 2022 FIFA World Cup found that 92% of the football-themed tobacco marketing originated from Indonesia, with 81% being produced by Djarum alone.¹¹⁰

Both Gudang Garam and Djarum, via their respective brands Intersoccer and Super Soccer, sponsored live World Cup viewing parties. Super Soccer, which describes itself as the “home of soccer fans in Indonesia”, promotes its activities on social media to hundreds of thousands of followers.¹¹⁰ It developed a “Soccerphoria” event series and campaign specifically for the World Cup, which were heavily promoted across its accounts. As well as the live viewing parties, these events involved mural painting, branded clothes, and limited-edition World Cup cigarette packs designed by local artists.¹¹⁰

In 2019, Djarum bought the Italian Serie B club Como 1907, via its subsidiaries SENT Entertainment Ltd and Mola TV. Mola, a television streaming service, has broadcast a reality TV series following 24 young footballers trying to succeed at Como 1907.

• For more on this topic please see the pages on Football Sponsorship and Social Media.

Relevant Links

• Indonesia factsheet, Tobacco Atlas
• Indonesia Tax Scorecard, Tobacconomics
• Dashboard Kawasan Tanpa Rokok [Smoke-Free Area Dashboard], Indonesia Ministry of Health
• Situation reports: Indonesia, Tobacco Enforcement and Reporting Movement, Vital Strategies
• Indonesia, Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance
• Front Groups Indonesia, Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco in LMICs
• Greenwashing
• Gudang Garam and sports endorsement
• Lobby Groups
• Tobacco Industry Tactics

References

The post Indonesia Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Image source: Storm Crypt/CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 DEED

Key Points

• The Philippines is an island nation in Southeast Asia consisting of over 7,000 individual islands. It is part of the World Health Organization’s Western Pacific Region.
• Its population was 115.6 million as of 2022. The previous year, adult tobacco use prevalence was 19.5%.
• The Philippines ratified the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in 2005. It has not signed the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.
• PMFTC Inc. – a joint venture between Philip Morris International and the Fortune Tobacco Corporation, the tobacco business of local conglomerate LT Group – has the largest share of the Philippine cigarette market. Japan Tobacco International accounts for most other sales.
• Recent tobacco industry tactics in the Philippines include attempting to influence the committee responsible for overseeing tobacco control in the country; corporate social responsibility, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic; and establishing relationships with public officials, including at the very top of government.

The Philippines has made some progress on tobacco control, especially since the introduction of the reforms known as the Sin Taxes in 2013. These both greatly simplified tax structures and significantly increased excise on tobacco and alcohol products, with a substantial share of the new revenue being channelled into universal healthcare.¹¹⁶ Tobacco use prevalence, which stood at 29.7% in 2009, had fallen to 23.8% by 2015, and again to 19.5% by 2021.¹¹⁷⁴¹ However, rising incomes and subsequent smaller increases in tobacco taxes have made cigarettes more affordable, slowing further progress.¹¹⁸ Other challenges include an illicit tobacco market larger than the global average;¹¹⁹ the growing popularity of newer nicotine and tobacco products (particularly e-cigarettes) amongst young people;¹²⁰ and ongoing tobacco industry presence on the inter-agency committee responsible for implementing tobacco control regulation in the country.¹²¹ Philippine domestic law continues to fall short of what is required by the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) across a number of areas.⁸⁴

Tobacco Use in the Philippines

In 2022, the population of the Philippines was 115.6 million.¹²² According to the 2021 Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS), tobacco use prevalence amongst Filipino adults was 19.5%.⁴¹ Prevalence is much higher amongst males (nearly 35%) than females (just over 4%).⁴¹ Amongst adolescents aged between 13 and 15, 12.5% were using some form of tobacco in 2019.⁴² Again, prevalence for males (over 18%) is higher than for females (nearly 7%).⁴²

In the 2021 GATS, just over 2% of Filipino adults reported current use of e-cigarettes (3.6% males; 0.5% females).⁴¹ However, use of e-cigarettes is considerably higher amongst youth. In the 2019 Global Youth Tobacco Survey, the corresponding figure was over 14% – higher than for conventional cigarettes (10%).⁴² More than 20% of boys aged between 13 and 15 reported using e-cigarettes, compared to 7.5% of girls.⁴² Smokeless tobacco use in the Philippines also appears to be greater amongst the young: in 2019, 3% of young people reported current smokeless tobacco use, compared to 1.5% of adults in 2021.⁴²⁴¹

There were an estimated 95,600 deaths attributable to tobacco use in 2019, accounting for nearly 15% of all mortality in the Philippines that year.¹²³ According to a 2018 study, the economic burden of tobacco use in the Philippines in 2012 was just under PHP₱270 billion (US$15.1 billion according to the purchasing power parity exchange rate) – equivalent to 2.5% of national GDP. This includes both direct costs resulting from tobacco use (e.g., hospitalisations and medication) as well as indirect costs (reduced productivity due to disability and mortality). The same study found that diseases attributable to tobacco use accounted for nearly 5% of total health expenditure.¹²⁴

Tobacco in the Philippines

Market share and leading brands

PMFTC Inc. (PMFTC) dominates the Philippine cigarette market, with a market share of around 61% in 2022.⁴⁹ PMFTC is a joint venture between Philip Morris International (PMI) and the Fortune Tobacco Corporation, the tobacco business of local conglomerate LT Group.¹²⁵

Japan Tobacco International (JTI) has a market share of 38%, thanks to its 2017 acquisition of local company Mighty Corporation.⁴⁹¹²⁶ Together, PMFTC and JTI account for virtually all of the licit cigarette sales in the country.⁴⁹

PMI’s flagship brand Marlboro is the most popular brand of cigarette, with a share of nearly 33% in 2022. In second place is another PMFTC brand, Fortune International, with a share of nearly 17%. JTI’s Winston is third, with a market share of around 14%. All other brands have market shares of less than 10%.¹²⁷

• For more information on the tobacco industry in the Philippines, please see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

At nearly 23%, the Philippines has one of the largest market shares for menthol cigarettes in the world.¹²⁸¹²⁹ Menthol cigarettes have been marketed in the Philippines since at least the 1970s, including in campaigns targeting young women.¹³⁰ In more recent times, the menthol market share has increased year on year since 2014. Similarly, though the market for flavour capsule cigarettes is much smaller than for menthol, it has also been growing steadily, with yearly increases since 2015.¹²⁸ These products are often more attractive to youth and young adults than conventional cigarettes; menthol in particular is associated with increased smoking initiation.¹²⁹

• For more information, please see the page on Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco in LMICs.

Tobacco farming and child labour

Since the early 1960s, tobacco production in the Philippines has remained roughly stable, at between 40,000 and 70,000 tonnes a year. However, between 1981 and 1993 it increased to between 74,000 and 118,000 tonnes. Conversely, between 2006 and 2009 it dipped below 40,000, to a low of 32,000 tonnes in 2008.¹³¹

Figure 1: Tobacco production, 1961 to 2021.¹³¹ Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization/Our World in Data | CC BY

Research has demonstrated that tobacco growing is not a profitable enterprise for most farmers. Despite this, farmers continue to grow tobacco due to a belief in its profitability and the reliability of the tobacco market; its perceived resilience to bad weather compared to other crops; and, in particular, access to credit.¹³² Filipino farmers interviewed for a study published in 2019 stated that tobacco farming allowed them to take out loans to which they would not have had access had they been growing other crops. Loans were also used to cover non-agricultural expenses such as school fees, buying food, and paying off other loans.¹³²

As part of the Sin Tax reforms, 15% of the revenue collected from tobacco taxes is allocated to tobacco-growing communities to promote economically viable alternatives.¹³³ However, this remains a challenge. Farmers have cited lack of capital, difficulties accessing credit, an absence of technical support and a perceived lack of markets for other crops as reasons for not transitioning away from tobacco.¹³²

Tobacco is also one of 13 commodities produced in the Philippines which feature on the U.S. Department of Labor’s 2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.¹³⁴ However, comprehensive and up-to-date information on child labour in Philippine tobacco farming is not available.

Tobacco and the economy

The Philippines is a net importer of raw tobacco, importing about US$243 million of raw tobacco in 2022, compared to exports of around US$184 million.¹³⁵¹³⁶ However, the country is a net exporter of cigarettes, with exports in the same year of over US$232 million, compared to about US$22.6 million in imports.¹³⁷¹³⁸

Illicit trade

Illicit tobacco was estimated to form around 16% of the market in the Philippines in 2018.¹¹⁹ Though this is above the likely global average of 11 to 12%, it has changed little since 1998.¹¹⁹¹³⁹ Though industry-funded studies found significant increases in the Philippine illicit tobacco trade following the introduction of the Sin Taxes in 2013, there is no independent evidence to support this.¹¹⁹

Tobacco and the environment

The WHO reports that curing in tobacco agriculture is a leading cause of demand for wood from native forests in the Philippines.¹⁴⁰

Farmers cultivating the native batek variety of tobacco in the southern Philippines have been documented as using several toxic agrochemicals to control pests. These include some listed as hazardous by the WHO, such as cypermethrin and methomyl.¹⁴¹

It has been estimated that between 30 and 50 billion cigarette butts are littered every year in the Philippines – 12.5 million on the resort island of Boracay alone.¹⁴² Boracay was closed for six months in 2018 for environmental rehabilitation, resulting in billions in lost revenues for both government and the private sector.¹⁴²¹⁴³

• For more information on the tobacco industry’s environmental impact, please see Tobacco and the Environment and the long read on Plastics, the Environment and the Tobacco Industry.

Roadmap to Tobacco Control

The Philippines ratified the WHO FCTC in 2005 and the treaty entered into force later that year.¹⁴⁴¹⁴⁵ WHO FCTC ratification was a catalyst for strengthening tobacco control laws in the country and reducing industry influence on policy.¹⁴⁵ However, the Philippines is not a party to the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.¹⁴⁶

The Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003 (RA 9211) is the country’s main tobacco control law, covering areas such as smoking in public places; tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; and sales restrictions. Subsequent legislation built on the 2003 law, introducing further regulation on issues such as designated smoking areas, advertising and the packaging and labelling of tobacco products.¹⁴⁷

However, given that RA 9211 was enacted just three months before the Philippines signed the WHO FCTC, Filipino tobacco control advocates have argued that the law was both timed and designed to pre-empt the Convention. This has resulted in tobacco control regulations which, nearly 20 years later, still fall some way short of WHO FCTC requirements.¹²¹¹⁴⁸ Designated smoking areas are still permitted in indoor offices and workplaces; restaurants; and cafés, pubs and bars. Restrictions on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship remain incomplete. And at 50.6% of the retail value of the most popular brand of cigarettes, tobacco taxation is significantly below the 75% threshold recommended by the WHO.⁸⁴

The tobacco industry, led by the Philippine Tobacco Institute (PTI), has also used RA 9211 as justification for delaying the introduction of more WHO FCTC-compliant measures (such as graphic health warnings), arguing that such measures contravene existing Philippine law.¹⁴⁸¹⁴⁹

In August 2020, the joint House Committees on Trade and Industry and on Health approved a bill regulating manufacture, sale and use of e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products (HTPs).¹⁵⁰ This bill reversed an earlier decision to raise the purchase age from 18 to 21 and restrict flavourings to tobacco and plain menthol. It also shifted responsibility for regulation of these products from the Food and Drug Administration to the Department of Trade and Industry. Eight days after the bill was approved, the first of four stores dedicated to PMI’s flagship HTP IQOS opened for business.¹⁵¹

This bill was a precursor to the Vaporized Nicotine and Non-Nicotine Products Regulation Act, which eventually became law in July 2022. E-cigarettes in hundreds of different flavours reportedly flooded the Philippine market in the months following the passage of the law.¹⁵² Leading Filipino tobacco control advocates argue that the law has undermined recent gains in tobacco control.¹⁵¹

For more details, please see the following websites:

• Legislation by country/Jurisdiction – Philippines, Tobacco Control Laws, Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids
• Philippines, WHO FCTC Implementation Database, WHO FCTC Secretariat
• Country profile – Philippines, World Health Organization, WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2023

Tobacco Industry Interference in the Philippines

Recent tobacco industry tactics in the Philippines include attempting to influence the committee responsible for overseeing tobacco control in the country; corporate social responsibility, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic; and attempts to influence policy, including by establishing relationships at the very top of government.

Conflict of interest

The Philippines’ main tobacco control law, RA 9211, requires the government to implement a “balanced policy”, given that:

“It is the policy of the State to protect the populace from hazardous products and promote the right to health and instill health consciousness among them. It is also the policy of the State, consistent with the Constitutional ideal to promote the general welfare, to safeguard the interests of the workers and other stakeholders in the tobacco industry.”¹⁵³

However, the first principle of the implementation guidelines for Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC states that “There is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco industry’s interests and public health policy interests.”¹⁵⁴ Any requirement for “balance” can only therefore hinder progress on tobacco control and undermine public health.

This may be seen in the composition of the Interagency Committee on Tobacco (IAC-T), a multisectoral body established by RA 9211 responsible for overseeing implementation of the legislation.¹⁵³ One seat on the IAC-T is reserved for the National Tobacco Administration (NTA) – a government agency that sits within the Department of Agriculture – which has a mandate to “Promote the balanced and integrated growth and development of the tobacco industry to help make agriculture a solid base for industrialization.”¹⁵⁵

Another seat is reserved for a representative of the tobacco industry, specifically the Philippine Tobacco Institute (PTI), an association whose members over the years have included PMFTC and JTI, among others.^153156157158 The PTI has a long history of undermining tobacco control measures, including successfully managing to reduce the size of graphic health warnings on tobacco products, opposing tobacco tax reforms and litigating over tobacco control regulations against public bodies such as the City of Balanga and the Department of Health.^157159160

Tobacco control advocates have called repeatedly for the removal of the PTI from the IAC-T, citing conflict of interest and alleging that it uses its position to actively weaken tobacco control policies.^157161162 The WHO has supported this position, stating that the composition of the Philippine IAC-T “is blatantly in conflict with WHO FCTC Article 5.3”, which requires parties to protect their public health policies against the commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry.¹⁶³

Corporate social responsibility

As of 2023, there was still no ban on tobacco industry corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the Philippines.⁸⁴ The tobacco industry has taken advantage of this shortcoming to try to enhance its reputation and influence both policy makers and the general public.

From 2017 to 2021, PMI spent nearly US$38 million on CSR in the Philippines. Nearly US$31 million of this total was spent in 2020 and 2021 alone.¹⁶⁴ Much of this funding is channelled through the Jaime V. Ongpin Foundation (JVOFI), a development NGO and partner of “Embrace”, PMFTC’s CSR programme.¹⁶⁴¹⁶⁵ During 2020, in the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, JVOFI distributed ambulances, ventilators, PCR machines for COVID-19 testing, personal protective equipment, food supplies and rapid test kits throughout the country.¹⁶⁵

PMI was far from the only tobacco industry player carrying out this kind of work: by mid-April 2020, the LT Group – PMI’s partner in joint venture PMFTC – had spent PHP₱200 million (around US$4 million) on COVID-19 assistance.¹⁶⁵ The LT Group implements such initiatives in the Philippines via its CSR arm, the Tan Yan Kee Foundation.¹⁶⁶ Also in April 2020, Japan Tobacco International (JTI) donated 20,000 face masks to hospitals in the province of Batangas, where its manufacturing facilities are located.¹⁶⁵

An investigation published by the media and business intelligence organisation Eco-Business in 2021 revealed that a number of congressional representatives were involved in the distribution of COVID-19 relief donated by the tobacco industry and its associates.¹⁵¹ These donations also coincided with several debates in Congress which addressed regulation for newer nicotine and tobacco products (see section “Roadmap to Tobacco Control”).¹⁵¹¹⁴⁸

Both PMI and JTI also lobbied the Philippine Ministry of Finance for permission to continue their operations as normal during lockdown, though cigarettes were not considered to be an essential item.¹⁶⁵ In an April 2020 press release, JTI argued that lockdown restrictions were forcing smokers to buy illicit tobacco; were resulting in lower tax revenues for government; and were harming retailers, especially small and family-run businesses.¹⁶⁷ Restrictions on the transport and delivery of tobacco products were subsequently lifted.¹⁶⁸

This shows how industry arguments around the illicit trade were accepted by Filipino policy makers, allowing tobacco companies to operate even during an outbreak of a lethal respiratory disease to which smokers are more vulnerable.¹⁶⁹

• For more on tobacco industry activity during the pandemic, please see the COVID-19 Tobacco Tactics page and the COVID-19 monitoring database.

Unnecessary interaction with high level officials

Hailing from the Ilocos region, where tobacco is a major cash crop, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has met with PMI at least twice since becoming president in June 2022.¹⁵²¹⁷⁰ The most recent of these meetings was a lunch he and First Lady Liza Araneta-Marcos hosted for PMI executives – including CEO Jacek Olczak – at the Malacañang Palace in November 2022, the first time a company CEO has been received at the Philippine presidential palace. Also present were PMFTC president Denis Gorkun and LT Group CEO Lucio Tan III.¹⁵²

PMFTC’s director for global communications stated that the aim of the meeting was to outline the company’s plan “to expand our economic footprint in the Philippines.”¹⁵² PMI is reportedly investing US$150 million in the expansion of a manufacturing plant in Tanauan, Batangas. The new wing of the factory is to be used for the production of BLENDS, tobacco sticks used exclusively in PMI’s BONDS, a more affordable version of its flagship HTP IQOS.¹⁵²

In 2012, the then Senator Marcos was photographed during a Senate debate on the Sin Taxes speaking to a lawyer representing PMFTC.¹⁷¹¹⁷²

Relevant Links

• The Toll of Tobacco in the Philippines, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, 2023
• Tobacco Industry Interference Index 2022: The Philippine Report on the Implementation of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, HealthJustice, 2023
• Global Adult Tobacco Survey, Fact Sheet, Philippines 2021, Republic of the Philippines Department of Health, Philippine Statistics Authority, WHO Philippines et al
• Global Youth Tobacco Survey, Fact Sheet, Philippines 2019, Republic of the Philippines Department of Health, Epidemiology Bureau, WHO Western Pacific Region et al
• Tobacco Industry Monitor – Philippines, Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance, 2024

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco in LMICs

References

The post Philippines Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.