The tobacco industry has a long history of attempting to influence science in order to cast doubt on evidence showing the harms of its products and to argue against the need for regulation of those products. In the 1950s when science began to establish a causal link between smoking and cancer, the industry mobilised to cast doubt on that evidence. In the 1980s and 1990s, when it became clear that second-hand smoke was harmful, the industry funded and created science that attempted to obscure that harm.¹ More recently, the tobacco industry has funded research in to newer tobacco and nicotine products and concerns have once again been raised that the industry is manipulating science for its own benefit.

Industry strategies for influencing science

Researchers from the Tobacco Control Research Group at the University of Bath have developed a typology and model – the Science for Profit Model – to explain how and why the tobacco industry (along with other harmful industries) attempts to influence science.² The authors conclude that strategies for influencing science are used to “purposefully-create misinformation, doubt, and ignorance”, to “obscure the harms of industry products and practices” and to “oppose regulation that could threaten corporate profits”.²

Below is an overview of this research, illustrating the ways in which the industry (and third parties used by the industry) uses science to further its aims. The following strategies and examples are drawn from the Science for Profit Model.

• To find out about these strategies in more depth, see the research paper on the Science for Profit Model.²

The Science for Profit Model

The Science for Profit Model²

Strategy A – Influence how science is conducted and published to skew evidence in industry’s favour

The tobacco industry has used various strategies to influence which research is – and isn’t – undertaken and published, in order to counteract independent scientific research which might show industry products and practices in an unfavourable light.

These strategies include funding research by third parties to deflect attention from industry harms. One example is research that looked for alternative causes of cancer (including hormones and nutrition) to distract attention from the link between smoking and cancer. This was conducted through the Tobacco Industry Research Committee from the 1950s onwards.³ Another example is research that focused on issues of “indoor air” (such as dirty air filters) to deflect attention from the harms of passive smoking, conducted through the Center for Indoor Air Research in the 1980s. Since 2017, research funded by PMI through the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World (FSFW) has similarly distracted attention from industry harms, including by redirecting blame towards the public health community and the media, implying that they are responsible for a slowing in the decline of smoking rates.⁴

Other strategies include undertaking “risky” research secretly, so that it can be hidden or abandoned if results harm the industry’s interests,² and manipulating study design or statistical analyses to ensure favourable findings. Another is to ‘cherry-pick’ (select the most favourable) papers to include in literature reviews to obscure parts of the evidence base.²

To see how study design affected PMI-funded science on plain packaging of cigarettes visit the Ashok Kaul and Michael Wolf pages.

In order to influence what research is published, the industry has created its own journals, such as the “Tobacco and Health” research journal which was distributed to health professionals.⁵² More recently, it has published in journals with editorial staff who have links to the industry, and used ‘pre-print’ platforms to self-publish its own non-peer-reviewed science.⁴⁶

• For more examples of how the tobacco industry influences the conduct and publication of science visit Influencing Science Case Studies

Strategy B – Influence how science is interpreted to undermine unfavourable science and create a distorted picture of the evidence base

The industry also works to distort how science and scientists are seen by the public and experts.

In the 1990s, tobacco companies launched the “Sound Science” and “Good Epidemiology” public relations campaigns. These demanded unrealistic levels of evidence in epidemiological studies examining harms caused by industry products, and were designed to prevent policy action on passive smoking.²

For decades, the industry has attacked and misrepresented science and scientists that may harm its commercial agenda. For example, in the 1990s, it criticised a US Environmental Protection Agency risk assessment which concluded that second-hand smoke was carcinogenic.² Nearly thirty years later the director of the Centre for Research Excellence: Indigenous Sovereignty and Smoking (COREISS), an FSFW grantee, used a similar argument, despite overwhelming evidence that second-hand smoke is a health risk:

“scientific studies have not proven that exposure to cigarette smoke in the car causes disease”.⁴⁷

In the 1990’s Philip Morris developed plans for what it called “Project Sunrise” – a project in which the company proposed the monitoring of individuals and organisations working in tobacco control, framing some as “extreme” and others as “moderate” in order to divide the community.⁸ Some of the many attacks on individuals working in tobacco control are documented on Martin Cullip, FOI: Stirling University and FOI: University of Bath.

• For more examples of how the tobacco industry influences the interpretation of science, visit the Influencing Science Case Studies page.

Strategy C – Influence the reach of science to create an “echo chamber” for industry’s scientific messaging

The industry disseminates messages that support its scientific stance. A common approach is to contract third party “friendly” voices to amplify scientific messages and distance these messages from industry. These messengers include front groups, designed to look like unbiased sources, organisations such as think tanks and professional associations, and “expert” individuals.²

In the 1980s, the ‘Whitecoat Project’ was Philip Morris’s secret plan to recruit ostensibly independent scientists to disseminate scientific narratives which would help it to “restore the social acceptability of smoking”.² Read more about the project on the Influencing Science: The Whitecoat Project page.

Organisations funded by FSFW have promoted industry-friendly scientific narratives on e-cigarettes and COVID-19, and endorsed science calling for weaker regulation of the industry’s products.⁴

In order to maximise press coverage of industry-favourable scientific messaging, the industry funds media outlets to disseminate its science, cite its staff, and report on its scientific events, including conferences.⁹¹⁰ One example is Filter magazine – to find out more visit the page on The Influence Foundation.

• For more examples of how the tobacco industry uses third parties to spread its scientific messages, visit the Influencing Science Case Studies page.

Strategy D – Create industry-friendly policymaking environments which shape the use of science in its favour

Tobacco companies have worked to embed their own standards of evidence in policymaking, and bring about policy reforms that increase reliance on the tobacco industry’s own science.²

In the 1990s, the tobacco industry attempted to shape risk assessment of its own products, and influence European Union (EU) regulatory mechanisms in relation to the assessment of data from epidemiological and animal studies, for example. Although they did not succeed, this would have meant that the criteria used for determining scientific ‘proof’ would have been drawn up by industry itself.²

British American Tobacco promoted regulatory reform in the EU, to make it harder to implement public health policies which conflicted with its commercial interests. This ‘Better Regulation’ or ‘Smart Regulation’ appeared to be about good governance and transparency but “in fact mandated industry’s right to be heard early in scientific debates about their products and practices.”² Read more on this topic on the EU Better Regulation page.

Strategy E – Manufacture trust in industry and its scientific messaging

The industry has worked to promote its involvement in science in order to manufacture an image of scientific credibility. Many academic institutions and journals no longer collaborate with the industry directly, due to its history of scientific deception, and so the industry uses third party organisations to push for ‘renormalisation’ of its business.¹¹¹² For instance, since it was set up in 2017, FSFW has worked to frame the industry’s involvement in science and policy as the ‘solution’ and its exclusion as counterproductive, despite industry having created the problem.⁴

At other times the industry does not disclose its involvement in science when it believes this will lend the science more credibility. Sometimes it creates third party organisations that appear to be independent, to conduct its research (e.g. Philip Morris setting up the Institute for Biological Research in Germany).¹³ At other times it uses public relations consultancies and law firms to recruit scientists.²

• For a more extensive overview of industry allies and front groups see the Industry People and Allies topic as well as the Allies Database produced by Stopping Tobacco Organizations and Products (STOP)

Desired outcome of influencing science

The desired outcome for the tobacco industry has been to create doubt about the harms of its products, or about the necessity – or efficacy of – tobacco control legislation. It has framed use of its newer products as the only realistic solution to the tobacco epidemic, and aimed to legitimise its role as a stakeholder in science and policymaking.²

These outcomes weaken policy that would reduce industry profits, prevent litigation against the industry, and maximise consumption of its products. In short, the industry’s involvement in science does not primarily advance knowledge or improve the health of populations, but maximises profits.²

Influencing Science Case Studies

For more detailed historical and contemporary examples of how tobacco companies influence science visit Influencing Science Case Studies.

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Influencing Science Case Studies
• Influencing Science: Philip Morris Changing the Conclusions of Research
• Influencing Science: Ghost Writing
• Influencing Science: Imperial Tobacco Canada
• Influencing Science: The Whitecoat Project
• Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products
• Industry Approaches to Science on Newer Products
• COVID-19
• Tobacco Company Investments in Pharmaceutical & NRT Products
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World
• Tobacco Industry Research Committee
• Forest
• Duke University
• Tobacco Industry Research Committee
• Tobacco Institute
• Hill & Knowlton
• Ruder Finn

See the list of pages in the category Influencing Science

TCRG Research

The Science for Profit Model—How and why corporations influence science and the use of science in policy and practice, T. Legg, J. Hatchard and A.B. Gilmore, Plos One, 2021, 16(6):e0253272, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0253272

Document analysis of the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World’s scientific outputs and activities: a case study in contemporary tobacco industry agnogenesis, T. Legg, B.  Clift, A.B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2023, doi: 10.1136/tc-2022-057667

Paying lip service to publication ethics: scientific publishing practices and the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World, T. Legg, M. Legendre, A. B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control 2021;30:e65-e72, doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2020-056003

Seeking to be seen as legitimate members of the scientific community? An analysis of British American Tobacco and Philip Morris International’s involvement in scientific events, B. K. Matthes, A. Fabbri, S. Dance, L. Laurence, K. Silver, A. B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2023, doi: 10.1136/tc-2022-057809

Tobacco industry messaging around harm: Narrative framing in PMI and BAT press releases and annual reports 2011 to 2021, I. Fitzpatrick, S. Dance, K. Silver, M. Violini, T. Hird, Front. Public Health, 2022, 10:958354, doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.958354

References

The post Influencing Science appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Image source: Storm Crypt/CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 DEED

Key Points

• The Philippines is an island nation in Southeast Asia consisting of over 7,000 individual islands. It is part of the World Health Organization’s Western Pacific Region.
• Its population was 115.6 million as of 2022. The previous year, adult tobacco use prevalence was 19.5%.
• The Philippines ratified the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in 2005. It has not signed the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.
• PMFTC Inc. – a joint venture between Philip Morris International and the Fortune Tobacco Corporation, the tobacco business of local conglomerate LT Group – has the largest share of the Philippine cigarette market. Japan Tobacco International accounts for most other sales.
• Recent tobacco industry tactics in the Philippines include attempting to influence the committee responsible for overseeing tobacco control in the country; corporate social responsibility, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic; and establishing relationships with public officials, including at the very top of government.

The Philippines has made some progress on tobacco control, especially since the introduction of the reforms known as the Sin Taxes in 2013. These both greatly simplified tax structures and significantly increased excise on tobacco and alcohol products, with a substantial share of the new revenue being channelled into universal healthcare.¹⁴ Tobacco use prevalence, which stood at 29.7% in 2009, had fallen to 23.8% by 2015, and again to 19.5% by 2021.¹⁵¹⁶ However, rising incomes and subsequent smaller increases in tobacco taxes have made cigarettes more affordable, slowing further progress.¹⁷ Other challenges include an illicit tobacco market larger than the global average;¹⁸ the growing popularity of newer nicotine and tobacco products (particularly e-cigarettes) amongst young people;¹⁹ and ongoing tobacco industry presence on the inter-agency committee responsible for implementing tobacco control regulation in the country.²⁰ Philippine domestic law continues to fall short of what is required by the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) across a number of areas.²¹

Tobacco Use in the Philippines

In 2022, the population of the Philippines was 115.6 million.²² According to the 2021 Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS), tobacco use prevalence amongst Filipino adults was 19.5%.¹⁶ Prevalence is much higher amongst males (nearly 35%) than females (just over 4%).¹⁶ Amongst adolescents aged between 13 and 15, 12.5% were using some form of tobacco in 2019.²³ Again, prevalence for males (over 18%) is higher than for females (nearly 7%).²³

In the 2021 GATS, just over 2% of Filipino adults reported current use of e-cigarettes (3.6% males; 0.5% females).¹⁶ However, use of e-cigarettes is considerably higher amongst youth. In the 2019 Global Youth Tobacco Survey, the corresponding figure was over 14% – higher than for conventional cigarettes (10%).²³ More than 20% of boys aged between 13 and 15 reported using e-cigarettes, compared to 7.5% of girls.²³ Smokeless tobacco use in the Philippines also appears to be greater amongst the young: in 2019, 3% of young people reported current smokeless tobacco use, compared to 1.5% of adults in 2021.²³¹⁶

There were an estimated 95,600 deaths attributable to tobacco use in 2019, accounting for nearly 15% of all mortality in the Philippines that year.²⁴ According to a 2018 study, the economic burden of tobacco use in the Philippines in 2012 was just under PHP₱270 billion (US$15.1 billion according to the purchasing power parity exchange rate) – equivalent to 2.5% of national GDP. This includes both direct costs resulting from tobacco use (e.g., hospitalisations and medication) as well as indirect costs (reduced productivity due to disability and mortality). The same study found that diseases attributable to tobacco use accounted for nearly 5% of total health expenditure.²⁵

Tobacco in the Philippines

Market share and leading brands

PMFTC Inc. (PMFTC) dominates the Philippine cigarette market, with a market share of around 61% in 2022.²⁶ PMFTC is a joint venture between Philip Morris International (PMI) and the Fortune Tobacco Corporation, the tobacco business of local conglomerate LT Group.²⁷

Japan Tobacco International (JTI) has a market share of 38%, thanks to its 2017 acquisition of local company Mighty Corporation.²⁶²⁸ Together, PMFTC and JTI account for virtually all of the licit cigarette sales in the country.²⁶

PMI’s flagship brand Marlboro is the most popular brand of cigarette, with a share of nearly 33% in 2022. In second place is another PMFTC brand, Fortune International, with a share of nearly 17%. JTI’s Winston is third, with a market share of around 14%. All other brands have market shares of less than 10%.²⁹

• For more information on the tobacco industry in the Philippines, please see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

At nearly 23%, the Philippines has one of the largest market shares for menthol cigarettes in the world.³⁰³¹ Menthol cigarettes have been marketed in the Philippines since at least the 1970s, including in campaigns targeting young women.³² In more recent times, the menthol market share has increased year on year since 2014. Similarly, though the market for flavour capsule cigarettes is much smaller than for menthol, it has also been growing steadily, with yearly increases since 2015.³⁰ These products are often more attractive to youth and young adults than conventional cigarettes; menthol in particular is associated with increased smoking initiation.³¹

• For more information, please see the page on Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco in LMICs.

Tobacco farming and child labour

Since the early 1960s, tobacco production in the Philippines has remained roughly stable, at between 40,000 and 70,000 tonnes a year. However, between 1981 and 1993 it increased to between 74,000 and 118,000 tonnes. Conversely, between 2006 and 2009 it dipped below 40,000, to a low of 32,000 tonnes in 2008.³³

Figure 1: Tobacco production, 1961 to 2021.³³ Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization/Our World in Data | CC BY

Research has demonstrated that tobacco growing is not a profitable enterprise for most farmers. Despite this, farmers continue to grow tobacco due to a belief in its profitability and the reliability of the tobacco market; its perceived resilience to bad weather compared to other crops; and, in particular, access to credit.³⁴ Filipino farmers interviewed for a study published in 2019 stated that tobacco farming allowed them to take out loans to which they would not have had access had they been growing other crops. Loans were also used to cover non-agricultural expenses such as school fees, buying food, and paying off other loans.³⁴

As part of the Sin Tax reforms, 15% of the revenue collected from tobacco taxes is allocated to tobacco-growing communities to promote economically viable alternatives.³⁵ However, this remains a challenge. Farmers have cited lack of capital, difficulties accessing credit, an absence of technical support and a perceived lack of markets for other crops as reasons for not transitioning away from tobacco.³⁴

Tobacco is also one of 13 commodities produced in the Philippines which feature on the U.S. Department of Labor’s 2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.³⁶ However, comprehensive and up-to-date information on child labour in Philippine tobacco farming is not available.

Tobacco and the economy

The Philippines is a net importer of raw tobacco, importing about US$243 million of raw tobacco in 2022, compared to exports of around US$184 million.³⁷³⁸ However, the country is a net exporter of cigarettes, with exports in the same year of over US$232 million, compared to about US$22.6 million in imports.³⁹⁴⁰

Illicit trade

Illicit tobacco was estimated to form around 16% of the market in the Philippines in 2018.¹⁸ Though this is above the likely global average of 11 to 12%, it has changed little since 1998.¹⁸⁴¹ Though industry-funded studies found significant increases in the Philippine illicit tobacco trade following the introduction of the Sin Taxes in 2013, there is no independent evidence to support this.¹⁸

Tobacco and the environment

The WHO reports that curing in tobacco agriculture is a leading cause of demand for wood from native forests in the Philippines.⁴²

Farmers cultivating the native batek variety of tobacco in the southern Philippines have been documented as using several toxic agrochemicals to control pests. These include some listed as hazardous by the WHO, such as cypermethrin and methomyl.⁴³

It has been estimated that between 30 and 50 billion cigarette butts are littered every year in the Philippines – 12.5 million on the resort island of Boracay alone.⁴⁴ Boracay was closed for six months in 2018 for environmental rehabilitation, resulting in billions in lost revenues for both government and the private sector.⁴⁴⁴⁵

• For more information on the tobacco industry’s environmental impact, please see Tobacco and the Environment and the long read on Plastics, the Environment and the Tobacco Industry.

Roadmap to Tobacco Control

The Philippines ratified the WHO FCTC in 2005 and the treaty entered into force later that year.⁴⁶⁴⁷ WHO FCTC ratification was a catalyst for strengthening tobacco control laws in the country and reducing industry influence on policy.⁴⁷ However, the Philippines is not a party to the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.⁴⁸

The Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003 (RA 9211) is the country’s main tobacco control law, covering areas such as smoking in public places; tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; and sales restrictions. Subsequent legislation built on the 2003 law, introducing further regulation on issues such as designated smoking areas, advertising and the packaging and labelling of tobacco products.⁴⁹

However, given that RA 9211 was enacted just three months before the Philippines signed the WHO FCTC, Filipino tobacco control advocates have argued that the law was both timed and designed to pre-empt the Convention. This has resulted in tobacco control regulations which, nearly 20 years later, still fall some way short of WHO FCTC requirements.²⁰⁵⁰ Designated smoking areas are still permitted in indoor offices and workplaces; restaurants; and cafés, pubs and bars. Restrictions on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship remain incomplete. And at 50.6% of the retail value of the most popular brand of cigarettes, tobacco taxation is significantly below the 75% threshold recommended by the WHO.²¹

The tobacco industry, led by the Philippine Tobacco Institute (PTI), has also used RA 9211 as justification for delaying the introduction of more WHO FCTC-compliant measures (such as graphic health warnings), arguing that such measures contravene existing Philippine law.⁵⁰⁵¹

In August 2020, the joint House Committees on Trade and Industry and on Health approved a bill regulating manufacture, sale and use of e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products (HTPs).⁵² This bill reversed an earlier decision to raise the purchase age from 18 to 21 and restrict flavourings to tobacco and plain menthol. It also shifted responsibility for regulation of these products from the Food and Drug Administration to the Department of Trade and Industry. Eight days after the bill was approved, the first of four stores dedicated to PMI’s flagship HTP IQOS opened for business.⁵³

This bill was a precursor to the Vaporized Nicotine and Non-Nicotine Products Regulation Act, which eventually became law in July 2022. E-cigarettes in hundreds of different flavours reportedly flooded the Philippine market in the months following the passage of the law.⁵⁴ Leading Filipino tobacco control advocates argue that the law has undermined recent gains in tobacco control.⁵³

For more details, please see the following websites:

• Legislation by country/Jurisdiction – Philippines, Tobacco Control Laws, Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids
• Philippines, WHO FCTC Implementation Database, WHO FCTC Secretariat
• Country profile – Philippines, World Health Organization, WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2023

Tobacco Industry Interference in the Philippines

Recent tobacco industry tactics in the Philippines include attempting to influence the committee responsible for overseeing tobacco control in the country; corporate social responsibility, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic; and attempts to influence policy, including by establishing relationships at the very top of government.

Conflict of interest

The Philippines’ main tobacco control law, RA 9211, requires the government to implement a “balanced policy”, given that:

“It is the policy of the State to protect the populace from hazardous products and promote the right to health and instill health consciousness among them. It is also the policy of the State, consistent with the Constitutional ideal to promote the general welfare, to safeguard the interests of the workers and other stakeholders in the tobacco industry.”⁵⁵

However, the first principle of the implementation guidelines for Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC states that “There is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco industry’s interests and public health policy interests.”⁵⁶ Any requirement for “balance” can only therefore hinder progress on tobacco control and undermine public health.

This may be seen in the composition of the Interagency Committee on Tobacco (IAC-T), a multisectoral body established by RA 9211 responsible for overseeing implementation of the legislation.⁵⁵ One seat on the IAC-T is reserved for the National Tobacco Administration (NTA) – a government agency that sits within the Department of Agriculture – which has a mandate to “Promote the balanced and integrated growth and development of the tobacco industry to help make agriculture a solid base for industrialization.”⁵⁷

Another seat is reserved for a representative of the tobacco industry, specifically the Philippine Tobacco Institute (PTI), an association whose members over the years have included PMFTC and JTI, among others.^55585960 The PTI has a long history of undermining tobacco control measures, including successfully managing to reduce the size of graphic health warnings on tobacco products, opposing tobacco tax reforms and litigating over tobacco control regulations against public bodies such as the City of Balanga and the Department of Health.⁵⁹⁶¹⁶²

Tobacco control advocates have called repeatedly for the removal of the PTI from the IAC-T, citing conflict of interest and alleging that it uses its position to actively weaken tobacco control policies.⁵⁹⁶³⁶⁴ The WHO has supported this position, stating that the composition of the Philippine IAC-T “is blatantly in conflict with WHO FCTC Article 5.3”, which requires parties to protect their public health policies against the commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry.⁶⁵

Corporate social responsibility

As of 2023, there was still no ban on tobacco industry corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the Philippines.²¹ The tobacco industry has taken advantage of this shortcoming to try to enhance its reputation and influence both policy makers and the general public.

From 2017 to 2021, PMI spent nearly US$38 million on CSR in the Philippines. Nearly US$31 million of this total was spent in 2020 and 2021 alone.⁶⁶ Much of this funding is channelled through the Jaime V. Ongpin Foundation (JVOFI), a development NGO and partner of “Embrace”, PMFTC’s CSR programme.⁶⁶⁶⁷ During 2020, in the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, JVOFI distributed ambulances, ventilators, PCR machines for COVID-19 testing, personal protective equipment, food supplies and rapid test kits throughout the country.⁶⁷

PMI was far from the only tobacco industry player carrying out this kind of work: by mid-April 2020, the LT Group – PMI’s partner in joint venture PMFTC – had spent PHP₱200 million (around US$4 million) on COVID-19 assistance.⁶⁷ The LT Group implements such initiatives in the Philippines via its CSR arm, the Tan Yan Kee Foundation.⁶⁸ Also in April 2020, Japan Tobacco International (JTI) donated 20,000 face masks to hospitals in the province of Batangas, where its manufacturing facilities are located.⁶⁷

An investigation published by the media and business intelligence organisation Eco-Business in 2021 revealed that a number of congressional representatives were involved in the distribution of COVID-19 relief donated by the tobacco industry and its associates.⁵³ These donations also coincided with several debates in Congress which addressed regulation for newer nicotine and tobacco products (see section “Roadmap to Tobacco Control”).⁵³⁵⁰

Both PMI and JTI also lobbied the Philippine Ministry of Finance for permission to continue their operations as normal during lockdown, though cigarettes were not considered to be an essential item.⁶⁷ In an April 2020 press release, JTI argued that lockdown restrictions were forcing smokers to buy illicit tobacco; were resulting in lower tax revenues for government; and were harming retailers, especially small and family-run businesses.⁶⁹ Restrictions on the transport and delivery of tobacco products were subsequently lifted.⁷⁰

This shows how industry arguments around the illicit trade were accepted by Filipino policy makers, allowing tobacco companies to operate even during an outbreak of a lethal respiratory disease to which smokers are more vulnerable.⁷¹

• For more on tobacco industry activity during the pandemic, please see the COVID-19 Tobacco Tactics page and the COVID-19 monitoring database.

Unnecessary interaction with high level officials

Hailing from the Ilocos region, where tobacco is a major cash crop, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has met with PMI at least twice since becoming president in June 2022.⁵⁴⁷² The most recent of these meetings was a lunch he and First Lady Liza Araneta-Marcos hosted for PMI executives – including CEO Jacek Olczak – at the Malacañang Palace in November 2022, the first time a company CEO has been received at the Philippine presidential palace. Also present were PMFTC president Denis Gorkun and LT Group CEO Lucio Tan III.⁵⁴

PMFTC’s director for global communications stated that the aim of the meeting was to outline the company’s plan “to expand our economic footprint in the Philippines.”⁵⁴ PMI is reportedly investing US$150 million in the expansion of a manufacturing plant in Tanauan, Batangas. The new wing of the factory is to be used for the production of BLENDS, tobacco sticks used exclusively in PMI’s BONDS, a more affordable version of its flagship HTP IQOS.⁵⁴

In 2012, the then Senator Marcos was photographed during a Senate debate on the Sin Taxes speaking to a lawyer representing PMFTC.⁷³⁷⁴

Relevant Links

• The Toll of Tobacco in the Philippines, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, 2023
• Tobacco Industry Interference Index 2022: The Philippine Report on the Implementation of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, HealthJustice, 2023
• Global Adult Tobacco Survey, Fact Sheet, Philippines 2021, Republic of the Philippines Department of Health, Philippine Statistics Authority, WHO Philippines et al
• Global Youth Tobacco Survey, Fact Sheet, Philippines 2019, Republic of the Philippines Department of Health, Epidemiology Bureau, WHO Western Pacific Region et al
• Tobacco Industry Monitor – Philippines, Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance, 2024

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco in LMICs

References

The post Philippines Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

“Sustain Controversy”

PM’s secret method of recruiting so-called independent scientists for the project is laid out in various documents. One is BAT scientist Dr Sharon Boyce, who attended a “special meeting” on London in 1988:⁷⁷

The Philip Morris philosophy of ETS was presented. This appeared to revolve around the selection, in all possible countries, of a group of scientists either to critically review the scientific literature on ETS to sustain controversy, or to carry out research on ETS. In each country a group of scientists would be carefully selected, and organised, by a national coordinating scientist.⁷⁷

“No previous connections with tobacco companies”

The scientists:

“should, ideally, according to Philip Morris, be European scientists who have had no previous connections with tobacco companies and who have no previous record on the primary health issue which might … lead to problems of attribution. The mechanism by which they identify their consultants is as follows: they ask a couple of scientists in each country … to produce a list of potential consultants. The scientists are then contacted by these coordinators or by the lawyers and asked if they are interested in problems of Indoor Air Quality: tobacco is not mentioned at this stage. CV’s are obtained and obvious “anti-smokers” or those with “unsuitable backgrounds” are filtered out…”⁷⁷

Philip Morris then expect the group of scientists to operate within the confines of decisions taken by PM scientists to determine the general direction of research, which apparently would then be ‘filtered’ by lawyers to eliminate areas of sensitivity.⁷⁷

Boyse’s notes include a list of 18 scientists, mostly at British universities, who were suggested as possible consultants.⁷⁷

“Instead of Second-Hand Smoke, What about Pet Birds as a Cause of Cancer?”

By 1990, Covington and Burling boasted of its successes of the Whitecoat project.⁷⁸ “One consultant is an adviser to a particularly relevant committee of the House of Commons”.⁷⁸ Another was recruited as an editor of the Lancet.⁷⁸ A third was “providing medical advice to Middle eastern Governments”.⁷⁸ One other consultant conducted “research into factors other than passive smoking that cause lung cancer – keeping pet birds”.⁷⁸⁷⁹

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Influencing Science
• Philip Morris International

References

The post Influencing Science: The Whitecoat Project appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

• This page is based on contemporaneous reports in The Montreal Gazette.⁸⁰⁸¹ All the direct quotes are from these newspaper articles.For further information, including documents released during the court case, see the Canadian Tobacco Industry Collection in the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents library and the litigation section of the Tobacco Laws website.

Background

The three corporations brought to trial were: Imperial Tobacco Canada,⁸² Rothmans Benson & Hedges, owned by Philip Morris International (PMI), and Japan Tobacco International subsidiary JTI McDonald. The class action suit was brought by people who contracted cancer or emphysema as a result of smoking, or were addicted to smoking. The case revolved around whether the tobacco companies met their duty to inform customers about the dangers of smoking.

Michel Descôteaux was the first witness in the trial. He began working for Imperial Tobacco in 1963 and for 20 years was its only spokesperson.⁸¹In 1976, Descôteaux was public relations director for one of Canada’s biggest tobacco companies – Imperial Tobacco Canada. The company asked the 29-year-old to come up with some ideas to help the industry, which was increasingly under fire about the damage its products caused and Descôteaux wrote a memo to Imperial’s vice-president at the time, Tony Kalhok, responding to these concerns:⁸⁰

“People who smoke themselves to a premature death may be good customers in the short run but they certainly contribute to the scary statistics and provide wonderful ammunition for tobacco adversaries.”⁸⁰

Until he retired in 2002, Descôteaux was “one of the architects of its policy to discredit the overwhelming scientific evidence that smoking is addictive and causes cancer and other diseases.”⁸⁰

Workplace Smoking Ban

In the 1980s, Alcan Aluminum Ltd. supplied Imperial with its aluminium packaging. When Alcan became one of the first companies to institute a workplace ban on smoking in 1980, Imperial Tobacco launched a campaign to convince the manufacturer to reverse its ban.⁸⁰

Imperial Tobacco president and chairman Paul Paré wrote to the president of Alcan “expressing his disapproval of the ban, complaining he had not been informed about it and suggesting it might have a negative impact on relations between the two companies. “I merely register my disappointment at seeing it in place and my difficulty of reconciling it with our long-standing corporate relationships””.⁸⁰

Creating Doubt

Imperial then “marshalled the forces of its public affairs department to convince Alcan to retreat from its ban.” Department director Michel Descôteaux met with a senior Alcan official and warned him that “depriving workers of the right to smoke on the job could lead to increased stress in the workplace and a rise in the number of workplace accidents.”  Descôteaux also sent Alcan officials research papers written by tobacco industry scientists which denied that there was proof of a link between cancer and smoking.

Denying Link Between Smoking and Health

In the 1976 memo, quoted above, Descôteaux said that the “position I suggest [Imperial Tobacco Canada] adopt is that we are innocent until proven guilty.”⁸⁰

In response to the increasing number of studies indicating that cigarettes were dangerous to people’s health, Descoteax said that Imperial should denounce these with vigor and try to discredit them as much as possible” and should develop products “that would provide the same satisfaction as today’s cigarettes without ‘enslaving’ consumers.”⁸⁰

Refusing to Warn Pregnant Employees to Follow Medical Advice

In another memo Descôteaux wrote that more women were smoking because of the women’s liberation movement:

“Perhaps it will be more difficult to convince women that they should stop smoking, enough to make every one of us some of the most ardent feminists!”⁸⁰

Descôteaux went on to recommend that the company not follow advice from British American Tobacco (Imperial’s major stockholder) which said that employees should follow doctors’ advice not to smoke while pregnant. He wrote that employees should be told :

“in the absence of definitive answers to this question, many doctors advice (sic) their pregnant patients to modify their smoking habits during pregnancy as a sensible part of prenatal behaviour.”

He also said that advising employees to follow the advice of doctors “could open the door to claims for warnings on cigarette packages.”⁸¹

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Influencing Science
• British American Tobacco

References

The post Influencing Science: Imperial Tobacco Canada appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

A review on sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) was published in 2001,⁸⁴ and acknowledged funding from Philip Morris (PM). The University of California concluded that tobacco industry documents relating to this review showed the extent of corporate influence on its content and conclusions.

There are adverse impacts on maternal and child health from prenatal and postnatal exposure to tobacco smoke.⁸³ The causal link between Secondhand Smoke (SHS) and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) was first noted by the US Environmental Protection Agency, and both prenatal and postnatal exposure were listed as independent risk factors for SIDS in a 2004 report by the US Surgeon General.⁸³ Nevertheless:

“The tobacco industry has used scientific consultants to attack the evidence that SHS causes disease, most often lung cancer.”⁸³

The leadership of Philip Morris were concerned that public knowledge of the health risks of second-hand would lead to an increase in tobacco regulation, such as creating more smoke-free areas in public. PM executives responded by commissioning “independent” consultants to write review articles for publication in the medical literature.⁸³

According to Tong et al, the first PM-funded article to be published was a literature review by consultant Peter Lee and co-author Allison Thornton. Focussed on smoking and SIDS, this stated that:

“the association between parental smoking and SIDS could have been attributable to failures in the research procedures.(…)” ⁸³

In 1997, PM commissioned another consultant, Frank Sullivan, to write a review of all possible risk factors for SIDS, with co-author Susan Barlow. The first draft concluded, as had the US Surgeon General, that prenatal and postnatal SHS exposure were both independent risk factors for SIDS.⁸³ However:

“After receiving comments and meeting with PM scientific executives, Sullivan changed his original conclusions.”⁸³

Sullivan’s final review concluded that there was an impact for infants whose mothers smoked during pregnancy, but that postnatal effects of SHS were “less well established”.⁸³

According to Tong et. Al:

“Changes in the draft to support this new conclusion included descriptions of Peter Lee’s industry-funded review, a 1999 negative but underpowered study of SIDS risk and urinary cotinine levels, and criticisms of the conclusions of the National Cancer Institute report that SHS was causally associated with SIDS”⁸³

In April 2001 UK journal Paediatric and Perinatal Epidemiology published the Sullivan review with a disclosure statement:

“that acknowledged financial support from PM but did not acknowledge contributions from PM executives in the preparation of the review. By 2004, the Sullivan SIDS review had been cited at least 19 times in the medical literature.”⁸³

According to the University of California, these findings suggest that accepting tobacco industry funds can disrupt the integrity of the scientific process.⁸³

Tobacco Tactics resources

• Influencing Science
• Philip Morris International
• Philip Morris

References

The post Influencing Science: Phillip Morris Changing the Conclusions of Research appeared first on TobaccoTactics.