Created in 1952, Unitab is the European association of tobacco growers. As of 2014, the following national tobacco growers associations were listed as members:

• Belgium: Fédération Nationale des Planteurs de Tabac
• France: Fédération Nationaledes Producteurs de Tabac
• Germany: Bundesverband Deutscher Tabakpflanzer eV
• Greece: Confédération Panhellénique des Unions de Coopératives Agricoles
• Hungary: Magyar Dohanytermelok Orszagos Szovetsege
• Italy: Unione Italiana del Tabacco
• Poland: Polski Zwiazek Plantatorow Tytoniu et Krajowego Zwiakku Plantatorow Tytoniu
• Portugal: Associacão dos Produtores de Tabaco
• Spain:Federacion Nacional de Cultivadores de Tabaco
• Switzerland: Swiss Tabac

Links to the Tobacco Industry

Financially Supported by the Tobacco Industry

Unitab is funded by members’ fees. In addition, Unitab’s website states (as of 2014) that “most of UNITAB’s external actions are financed, additionally, by external incomes (gifts and subsidies), showing the corporate logos of British American Tobacco Italia, Imperial Tobacco, Japan Tobacco International (JTI), and Philip Morris Italy¹ (See Image 1).

 

Image 1 Unitab’s financial sponsors, from Unitab’s website, November 2014

Co-founder of Tobacco House

Unitab was one of the co-founders of Tobacco House,²³ a pan-European lobbying collaboration set up in 1999 by actors across the entire tobacco supply chain, including tobacco manufacturers (notably Philip Morris), whose objective it was “To restore the legitimacy and credibility of the entire tobacco sector and become a reasonable and constructive partner of the European Institutions…”⁴

Tobacco House was involved in lobbying against the original 2001 TPD.⁵

Part of Philip Morris International’s “3rd Party Coalition”

Leaked internal documents from Philip Morris International (PMI) have revealed that Unitab’s TPD lobbying activities were part of a larger, comprehensive and well-financed PMI campaign to block certain policy options that were particularly threatening to the tobacco industry.⁶ As part of its campaign, PMI mobilised what it referred to as a “3rd party coalition⁷ of seemingly independent interest groups that could add weight and credibility to pro-tobacco arguments. Importantly, PMI considered this third party involvement “key to success” in their efforts to undermine the TPD.⁸

Unitab, together with EFFAT and Fetratab, were earmarked by PMI to garner political support for pro-tobacco views from non-health Commissioners and Commission departments.⁹ Image 2 shows a slide from a leaked PMI presentation outlining the involvement of this three-party coalition as part of the company’s strategy to oppose the TPD. It was intended that the collation would seek meetings in the second half of 2011 with the Cabinet of EU President Barroso, and Cabinets of EU Commissioners across several jurisdictions, e.g. Trade (Hahn) , Employment Social Affairs and Inclusion (Andor), Agriculture (Cioloş), and Health (Dalli).⁸

Image 2. Unitab’s presence in PMI’s ‘Ingredients Platform’ to oppose the TPD, presentation slide snipped from PMI TPD Core Team meeting presentation 14 September 2011, Leaked in 2013

Lobbying Against the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

In November 2009, François Vedel, the Secretary General of UNITAB , wrote to the European Commission President José Manuel Barroso to warn that the “upcoming FCTC Conference on Tobacco Control of the Parties (November 15-20, 2010) represents a threat to the Europe 2020 Strategy goals.”

Vedel argued that because the Convention proposed to “prohibit or restrict the use of additives in cigarettes”, this would “lead to the abandonment of tobacco growing in the EU, without any improvement whatsoever of the public health, while alternative solutions exist to meet public health protection objectives without destroying employment on rural areas.”

The letter warned that if the EU Tobacco Products Directive was revised, “the sustainability of several regions and of hundreds of thousands of workers will be put in danger.” ¹⁰

Vedel also noted that several MEPs, including Paolo de Castro, supported this stance.

Lobbying against the EU Tobacco Products Directive

Unitab also lobbied fiercely against the EU Tobacco Products Directive(TPD), a piece of legislation that regulates the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco in the EU, and came into force in May 2014 following a 5-year long review marred with controversy and delay.⁶ In 2011, Vedel was quoted as saying that tighter tobacco rules would benefit the mafia:

“If I was in the mafia I would be investing in this business because some of the best-known brands will have limited access to the markets new rules are introduced and the smokers will simply use contraband.”¹¹

• See EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision and TPD: Tobacco Control Measures for more information on this legislation.

Of the various tobacco control measures proposed in the TPD, Unitab appears to have most strongly objected to the ingredients ban and plain packaging (which was later omitted from the TPD proposal),⁶ and to a lesser degree the EU snus sales ban.

Arguments against the TPD Echo Industry Arguments

The main arguments Unitab used to oppose the TPD mirrored classic arguments Transnational Tobacco Companies (TTCs) have used to oppose unwanted regulation for decades. These included:

• Plain packaging will increase illicit tobacco trade;¹²¹³
• Plain packaging will result in lower EU prices for leaf tobacco, leading to significant job losses;¹²¹³
• Packaging simplification will result in automatisation of the processing industry, leading to further job losses;¹³
• Plain packaging will result in competition no longer being on the level of brands (i.e. the tobacco manufacturers), but shift to the tobacco processing industry;¹⁴
• There is a need to add sugar without losing the flavour of European tobacco. An ingredients’ ban would result in the end of European tobacco and an increase in imported tobacco;¹²¹⁴ 
• Lifting the ban of snus will provide an additional outlet for European tobacco.¹²

Lobbying Non-Health Departments of the Commission: Agriculture, Trade, Budgets and Finance

Documents released under freedom of information (FOI) legislation confirm that Unitab, in collaboration with EFFAT and Fetratab and separately, lobbied non-health Commissioners and their Cabinets as early as March 2010 (when the revised TPD was in the early drafting stages):

• In March 2010, following the appointment of the Barroso II Commission, the coalition of Unitab, EFFAT and Fetratab approached the new Commissioner for Agriculture (Dacian Cioloş), expressing their hope that the Commissioner would agree to meet with them to listen to tobacco growers’ concerns, although the TPD was not mentioned specifically. ¹⁵. A meeting with the Commissioner’s Cabinet was arranged for 27 April 2010, although no minutes have been released.¹⁶
• In November 2010, ahead of the public consultation on the TPD review, Unitab wrote a letter to President Barroso and several non-health EU Commissioners, enclosing a report by Nomisma that claims that the proposed TPD measures would have a negative socio-economic impact on EU tobacco growing regions.¹⁷¹⁸¹⁹
• In April 2011, Unitab hosted a diner/debate on the future of small tobacco-growing farms, targeted at European Commission staff, Members of European Parliament, and representatives of the Permanent Representations to the EU. A member of the Cabinet of the Commissioner for Agriculture was invited, but there is no record to suggest they accepted. ²⁰
• Consistent with PMI’s strategy (Image 2), Unitab, EFFAT, and Fetratab met with senior staff of the Commission’s DG Trade on 8 September 2011 to express their opposition to the ingredients ban and plain packaging.¹⁴ In regard to the former, they voiced their concern about a ban on sugar as additive, but “they could however agree to the ban of menthol and candy ingredients/cigarettes”.
• In the same month, PR company C& I (Communications and Institutions) arranged a meeting between Unitab and its partners with the Cabinet of the Agriculture Commissioner,²¹ who reported that “The representatives of the tobacco business repeated their usual requests and arguments” on plain packaging, the ingredients ban, and the snus sales ban.¹²
• In June 2012, Unitab unsuccessfully tried to invite the Commissioner for Agriculture to attend Unitab’s 33th Conference which was to be held in October that year.²²²³
• In October 2012, ahead of the adoption of the TPD proposal by the College of Commissioners, the coalition wrote to Commissioner for Regional Policy, Johannes Hahn, stressing the “potential negative social and employment implications” of the proposed TPD, claiming that it “would result into a heavy cost that would hit hard precisely some of the most vulnerable EU regions”,¹³ and claiming that these consequences have not been included in the TPD’s Impact Assessment.
• In October 2013, in response to the TPD vote in the Parliament earlier that month, Unitab, EFFAT and Fetratab wrote to the Wine Alcohol and Tobacco Unit in the Commission’s department responsible for Agriculture (DG AGRI), to challenge the Parliament’s decision to have a positive list of authorised additives to be developed by the Commission. ²⁴

EU Transparency Register

Unitab has been listed on the EU Transparency register since April 2012. It disclosed that its 2013 EU lobbying budget was between €50,000- €100.000million.²⁵

In view of Unitab’s active role in opposing TPD measures, this figure seems conservative and may not include all lobbying costs Unitab incurred. For example, a report by Corporate Europe Observatory shows that Unitab’s 2011 disclosed lobbying budget of €75,000 failed to include €800,000 it had paid PR firm C&I to lobby on its behalf.²⁶

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Plain Packaging
• Third Party Techniques
• EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision
• EFFAT
• Fetratab
• Industry Interference and the 2001 EU Tobacco Products Directive
• A list of all pages relevant to the Tobacco Products Directive

References

The post UNITAB appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Members

Every major worldwide tobacco company and tobacco industry affiliated organisation is a member. CORESTA’s membership was 24 when it was first set up, growing to 117 by 1976 and now stand at 180 full members.
Full members are organisations (companies, institutes, laboratories, other tobacco related associations) having R&D activities related to tobacco, whether in the plant field (agronomy, breeding, phytopathology) or in the fields of manufacturing, chemistry, metrology, or materials (cigarette paper and filters).²⁷
The current 180 full members originate from 44 countries. Their geographical spread is as follows:

• Europe 56%
• Asia 16%
• USA/Canada 18%
• Latin America 6%
• Africa 3%
• Oceania 1%

Activities

CORESTA organises yearly meetings in which scientific papers are presented, along with reports and the results of studies and surveys.²⁷

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Neil Sherwood

References

The post CORESTA appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

The annual event was rebranded in 2015, to “reflect our industry’s expanding perspectives”.²⁹

The GTNF should not be confused with the Global Forum on Nicotine (GFN).

Background

Originally the Global Tobacco Networking Forum

The Global Tobacco Networking Forum was first held in 2008 in Rio de Janeiro, and was organized by Tobacco Reporter magazine, which billed the event as “quite simply the greatest interactive tobacco industry idea exchange on earth”.³⁰

David O’Reilly from British American Tobacco was the co-founder and first Chair of the GTNF advisory board.³¹

Owners and Organisers

In January 2019, SpecComm International and its assets which included the GTNF were acquired by the US-based organisation Tobacco Merchants Association (TMA).³² Under the acquisition deal, TMA created a new division called The GTNF Trust which operates and manages the GTNF Conference.³³³⁴³⁵

Code of Conduct

Originally, the GTNF had a code of conduct which contained clauses forbidding discussions or presentations being recorded, or information about the content of sessions being published. The code of conduct said:³⁰

• Absolutely no part of any forum, panel discussion or workshop should be audio- or video-taped or reproduced, in whole or in part, in any document, documentary or record of any GTNF-related event, whether for personal or professional use.
• Written note-taking should be limited to basic ideas and points, and no ideas, concepts or direct quote should be attributed, either directly or indirectly, to any specific participant or observer.
• No material should be published, in whole or in part, based on any sessions or discussions held during the GTNF (although any papers, publications or books already in the public domain or handed out during the event may be republished with prior permission of the author and in accordance with all international laws of copyright).
• No GTNF participants should be quoted or paraphrased outside of the GTNF.
• No unofficial photographs should be taken of anyone participating in, or any presentations made within, any GTNF event.
• If a participant wants to pursue any details or concepts arising from any of the sessions, they are invited to take advantage of appropriate opportunities to introduce themselves and speak with fellow delegates during breaks or meals.
• Tobacco Reporter reserves the right to deny access to GTNF 2012 to anyone not prepared to adhere to these rules of engagement, or to anyone deemed by Tobacco Reporter to be in violation of these rules at any time without explanation or prior warning.

In 2015, the Code of Conduct was replaced by Chatham House Rules, which stated that participants were free to use the information received but that “neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any participant, may be revealed”.³⁶

Funded by Delegate Fees and Tobacco Companies

To attend, delegates pay conference fees, which in 2022 amounted to US$ 4,500,which included accommodation, entry to GTNF plenaries and sessions, networking breakfasts, and welcome and networking receptions. Alternatively, delegates could pay fees of US$399 to attend virtually.³⁷ Delegates must be a representative of the tobacco or e-cigarette/nicotine industry, or be a related stakeholder.³⁷

Since its beginning in 2008, the event has also been sponsored by big tobacco companies. In 2023, sponsors listed on GTNFs website included Imperial Brands, Philip Morris International, British American Tobacco, Altria and Reynolds American (RAI).³⁸

Speakers

For a comprehensive list of GTNF speakers, go to the specific pages of each annual GTNF events (below under TobaccoTactics Resources).

A selection of speakers:
Patrick Basham Erik Bloomquist Simon Clark Sinclair Davidson Jamie Dettmer Katherine Graham Angela Harbutt Delon Human Mark Littlewood John Luik Des Naughton Paul Neumann Christopher Ogden David O’Reilly Riccardo Polosa Carl V Phillips Michiel Reerink Brad Rodu Christopher Snowdon Spiked Jeff Stier Kingsley Wheaton

At the 2017 GTNF, Derek Yach, former Head of the World Health Organization’s Tobacco Free Initiative, launched a new foundation funded by Philip Morris International and aimed at “accelerating an end to smoking”. To read more about this organisation, go to the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World.

IN FOCUS events

In 2021, the GTNF Trust launched its ‘IN FOCUS’ event series which runs separately from the main GTNF event. The online half-day conference takes place every spring.³⁹

In 2021 and 2023, the events had a theme of ‘Tobacco Harm Reduction’.⁴⁰

In 2023, organisers gave the upcoming COP10 – the two-yearly meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) – as a reason for choosing this theme. The website stated that the 2023 IN FOCUS event “brought together thought leaders and commentators from across the world to give us their views and debate the way ahead”.³⁹

Keynote speakers included:

• James Murphy, Director of Research and Science at British American Tobacco
• Riccardo Polosa
• Delon Human
• Derek Yach, former President of the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World
• Mary Glindon, MP and Vice Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Vaping.³⁹

See Harm Reduction for more on how the industry uses this concept to further its commercial goals and undermine public health.

In 2022, the theme was ‘Sustainability’.⁴¹

See the long read Unsustainable: Big Tobacco’s use of the UN SDGs and Greenwashing.

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2023
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2022
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2021
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2020
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2019
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2018
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2017
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2016
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2015
• Global Tobacco Networking Forum 2014
• Global Tobacco Networking Forum 2013
• Global Tobacco Networking Forum 2012
• Global Tobacco Networking Forum 2010
• British American Tobacco
• David O’Reilly
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World

References

The post Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Tobacco Industry Members

TMA members include:

• British American Tobacco (BAT)
• Gallaher (a member company of Japan Tobacco International (JTI))
• Imperial Tobacco⁴³

Lobbying Against Regulation of Smoking

Main Argument: The Risk of Smuggling and Counterfeiting

The TMA has used smuggling and counterfeiting as its main argument to combat the regulation of tobacco and smoking. In early 2012, for instance, the TMA blamed smuggling on high tobacco taxes, stating that “the UK’s high tobacco tax policy has provided economic incentives for criminals to meet the demand that exists for cheap tobacco products,” adding that “a disorderly market in smuggled tobacco products has been created that is uncontrolled, untaxed and unaccountable.”⁴⁴
The TMA has continued to use the same arguments to fight against the point of sale display ban and proposals for the introduction of plain packaging.

Against Plain Packaging

The Association made a statement as soon as the UK government announced its initial consultation on plain packaging in 2012:

“The TMA is strongly opposed to the principle of plain packaging…We do not believe any plans for plain packaging are based on any compelling evidence or sound public policy. Plain packs would likely lead to yet further increases in the illicit trade in tobacco products by making them much easier for a counterfeiter to copy than existing branded packs. It would become even more difficult for a consumer to differentiate between genuine and counterfeit products. If illicit trade is to be effectively combated, the intellectual property rights of legitimate brands must be properly protected and enforced.”⁴⁵

During the four month consultation period in 2012, the Tobacco Retailers Alliance (TRA) (funded by the TMA) ran a postcard campaign encouraging its members to say ‘No’ to Plain Packaging. In 2013, BAT acknowledged it had used the TMA to funnel financial support for this TRA postcard campaign.⁴⁶ For more info, see BAT Funded Lobbying Against Plain Packaging.
Similarly, on 26 June 2014, the same day the UK Government announced its second consultation on plain packaging, Director General of the TMA Giles Roca publicised the following statement:

“The tobacco industry supports proportionate legislation and works hard to stop under-age sales. Indeed, the industry stands ready to work with Government and health profession on measures to reduce children’s access to tobacco. However, introducing ineffective tools such as plain packaging is not the answer. We now know that plain packaging has proven not to work, with evidence from Australia showing it has resulted in an increase in illicit trade. There is also clear evidence that organised criminality would seek to take advantage of plain packaging by making it easier to bring illicit tobacco into the UK which is likely to result in more not less instances of under-age smoking.

“We therefore welcome this consultation as a further opportunity to set out the true facts and evidence around the weaknesses of plain packaging. Given the Government’s commitment to evidence-based policy making, we would urge it to consider all the facts in their entirety, before moving forward on such a decision.”⁴⁷

Days before this statement was released, the Australian Government’s Department of Health released data that falsified the industry’s claims that plain packaging legislation in Australia was not working.⁴⁸ See the TobaccoTactics page on Countering Industry Arguments against Plain Packaging for more detailed evidence.
Following the UK Government’s January 2015 announcement that there would be a Parliamentary vote on the policy ahead of the May 2015 General Election, the TMA said:

“We are very disappointed with the government’s decision. The evidence from Australia clearly shows that plain packaging doesn’t work, so why are they looking to move ahead with it? We hope that when it comes to the vote, MPs will realise that this is simply a flawed policy and vote no to plain packaging. Dogma has got in the way of sensible, evidence-based policy making.”⁴⁹

BAT and JTI Use TMA Factsheet as ‘Evidence’ in the Consultation on Plain Packaging

In its submission to the government’s Consultation on Plain Packaging, BAT cited the TMA’s claim that “counterfeits account for 13% of the illicit market, having grown from 1% in 2004.” ⁵⁰ These numbers come from a PowerPoint presentation made by TMA’s Security Liaison Manager. BAT fails to mention that 13% is an estimate, based on a TMA Empty Pack Survey (EPS) whereby discarded packs were collected and their legitimacy assessed .⁵¹
One of the other big companies, Japan Tobacco International (JTI), built an economic argument against plain packaging quoting statistics from a TMA fact sheet:

“Plain packaging will undermine any future investment and innovation by the tobacco sector in packaging, and this will have severely detrimental economic impacts on numerous service industries, including pack designers (discussed further in the paragraph below), pack manufacturers and printing and ink suppliers. To put this in context, a 2012 report estimates 66,000 jobs among suppliers, wholesalers, distributors and retailers were dependent on the UK tobacco industry.”⁵²

Omitted from the JTI reference was the detail that the factsheet itself, ‘The Tobacco Industry in the UK’, was put together for the TMA by Cogent SSC.⁵³

Against the Revision of the EU Tobacco Products Directive

The EU TPD regulates the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products in the Member states of the EU. This includes the use of health warnings on packets, the prohibition of descriptions such as ‘mild’ or ‘light’, the maximum tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide yields, and the prohibition of the sale of tobacco for oral use (the latter applying to countries other than Sweden).⁵⁴ The TMA expressed its “categorical opposition” to plain packaging in 2011 in its response to the public consultation on the possible revision of the EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision (TPD) in December 2010.⁵⁵ At the time, the current directive had last been updated in 2001 and, amongst other policy options, the consultation asked for responses to a proposal for plain packaging.⁵⁶

Against Display Bans

The TMA is also against point of sale display bans of tobacco, labelling such regulation unwanted, unjustified and unnecessary. It has said:

“a ban is unjustified as there is no credible evidence to support the government’s stated objective that a ban would reduce youth smoking. A display ban is unwanted as it would have serious unintended consequences, such as increasing illicit trade and severely impacting on small businesses. A display ban is unnecessary. The TMA agrees with the government that under-aged persons should not smoke and that they should not have access to tobacco products.”⁵⁷

Lobbying via the Tobacco Retailers Alliance

One of the organisations the TMA uses to lobby is the Tobacco Retailers Alliance, a “coalition of 26,000 independent shopkeepers who all sell tobacco products” according to its website. The TMA funds the TRA so that it can “offer to all independent retailers who sell tobacco a free membership”.⁵⁸
The TMA and the TRA are indeed very closely linked. Documents in the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library provide some historical detail of the financial relationship between the two organisations. For example, In the financial year 2000/1 the TMA budgeted to spend £180,000 on the group, but forecasted that the actual spend would be £190,000.⁵⁹ Just like TMA, the TRA “campaigns on issues of relevance to both their businesses and to the industry”.
For counter arguments to these industry points of view, see:

• Countering Industry Arguments Against Plain Packaging: It will Lead to Increased Smuggling
• Countering Industry Arguments Against Plain Packaging: It will Cost Small Businesses

Opposed tobacco endgame 

The TMA reportedly lobbied against proposed tobacco endgame policies in the UK.⁶⁰ For details see Tobacco Industry Interference with Endgame Policies. 

TMA and Smuggling

A Blind Eye to Tobacco Companies’ Involvement in Smuggling

In 2000, when British tobacco companies such as Gallaher and Imperial were facilitating the smuggling of billions of cigarettes, the TMA continued to argue that “Excessive taxation is the root cause of this trade and smuggling now accounts for nearly a third of cigarette consumption”.⁶¹

“Difficulties Representing the Industry”

Minutes of a TMA strategy meeting on smuggling and counterfeit, held at the time of record-level facilitation of smuggling into the UK by companies such as Imperial and Gallaher, recorded the TMA representative complaining of the “difficulties of representing the industry because of the activities of individual members”. At stake was the “credibility of the industry”. An executive from Gallaher told the meeting that the TMA “must be the public voice of member companies” and its “3 priorities are tax, tax and tax”. The document also shows that the TMA was working closely with the Tobacco Workers’ Alliance.⁶²

“Emerging from the Dark Ages of Denial”

Other notes show that Rosemary Brook, who was assisting the TMA with public relations (PR), was in a “difficult position in that she can’t say what the companies are doing to address smuggling and their alleged complicity”. Another participant, Mike Belcher from Rothmans, noted that the companies were “emerging from ‘the dark ages of denial’ over smuggling, with Philip Morris leading the way.”⁶³

Working with the Tobacco Alliance

Minutes of a TMA strategy meeting in February 2001 shows that the TMA discussed using the Tobacco Alliance (which was funded by the TMA) as a front organisation to lead the industry’s campaign on smuggling and counterfeit. The Alliance, represented by the public relations company PR21, was later renamed the Tobacco Retailers Alliance.
The document says that even though “independent retailers going down the pan”, the Alliance and the TMA planned a “grass roots campaign” on smuggling to “galvanise retailers” and create “lots of background noise”. The plan was to “work up” and “tool up” the retailers, and persuade them to “engage with chambers of commerce and MPs”. One proposed event was a workshop, where the industry would “manipulate the positivity” created by the debate.⁶⁴

Lobbying

Working with Several Lobbying and PR Firms

The agenda for a meeting of the TMA’s Campaign Group, dated 5 January 2001, reveals that it worked with a large number of PR companies. The agenda was sent to the following tobacco company representatives⁶⁵

• Martin Summers, British American Tobacco
• Toni Roberts, British American Tobacco
• Jeff Jeffery, Gallaher
• Liz Buckingham, Imperial Tobacco
• Sean Murray, Philip Morris Ltd
• Mike Belcher, Rothmans (UK) Ltd

It was also sent to:

• Rosemary Brook, of PR company Brook Wilkinson
• Arthur Butler, a lobbyist who worked for Imperial Tobacco
• Oliver Griffiths, of PR company Corporate Responsibility Consulting
• Peter Middleton, of PR company PLCM Consultants
• John Russell, of PR company Russell & Hart
• Nick Gibbon, from Vigilant Communication (a PR company working for Gallaher)
• Jonathan Hopkins, from PR company PR21
• Joe Brice, from PR21
• Andy Robbins, CMA

Welsh Lobbyists

The TMA also used to employ a Cardiff-based company Bute Communications to lobby Welsh MPs and members of the Welsh Assembly. Bute was set up by Alun Davies, now Deputy Minister for Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and European Programmes at the Welsh Assembly.^{66 67}

Third Party Advocacy Budget

The TMA employed the PR company Beer Davies in the 1990s.⁶⁸
TMA public affairs group minutes in March 1994 say: “In the short term, activities will centre on the Barron Bill, but other options to be finalised included regional media tours for Clive and myself, as well as one/two journalist seminars on tobacco-related issues.” The company was duly asked to organise a “media blitz” around the ‘Barron Bill’, a proposed ban on tobacco advertising. They were also asked to “organise a series of interviews, separately from TMA, resourced from the Third Party Advocacy Budget”.⁶⁹

Lobbying Local Authorities During UK Plain Packaging Debate Period

The TMA attempted, unsuccessfully, to engage with local authorities in the UK. Local authorities refused to allow the TMA to engage with them as many have signed the Local Government Declaration on Tobacco Control (LGDTC). The LGDTC is a statement signed voluntarily by councils which affirms existing national and international commitments, particularly the specifications in Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control which states:

“In setting and implementing their public health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law.” ⁷⁰

Not to be deterred in its attempt to gain access to local authority discussions about illicit tobacco, the TMA commissioned a legal opinion which was then used to lobby local authorities as an argument for engagement. Director General of the TMA, Giles Roca sent letters to local councils enclosing the legal opinion.
Roca argued:

“The tobacco industry in the UK has traditionally had a productive and constructive relationship with local government working in partnership to tackle issues such as counterfeit and illicit tobacco, under age sales and the issue of litter from tobacco products. As you will be aware, these are areas where local government have statutory responsibilities…”

“I am now writing to you regarding the Local Government Declaration on Tobacco Control (LGDTC) to which a number of councils are signatories and its interpretation by some in local government. You may be aware that the Declaration is an entirely voluntary code that is loosely drafted on Article 5.3 of the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.”

“However, we are concerned that some local authorities have, citing the LGDTC, sought to sever all links with the industry, even where there have been clear examples of worthwhile and effective joint working in the past, believing that this measure prohibits any dealings with the tobacco industry whatsoever.”

“This is incorrect. The TMA has now taken Counsel’s Opinion about what duties the LGDTC do or do not place on local authorities…Article 5.3 and the LGDTC do not in any way recommend or require local authorities to sever links with the tobacco industry or to cease partnership working.”⁷¹

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Alun Davies
• All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on illicit trade

References

The post Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Members

TIP members are:⁷⁴

• British American Tobacco (Holdings) Ltd
• Imperial Tobacco Ltd
• Japan Tobacco International S.A
• Philip Morris International Management S.A
• European Cigar Manufacturers Association
• European Smoking Tobacco Association
• European Smokeless Tobacco Council
• Groupement des Industries Europeennes du Tabac

TIP spent less than €50,000 on EU lobbying in 2010.⁷⁵

Confederation of European Community Cigarette Manufacturers support

CECCM is an observer member of the Tobacco Industry Platform and provides secretarial services for it. TIP’s address is the same as CECCM’s.⁷⁶

External Resources

References

The post Tobacco Industry Platform appeared first on TobaccoTactics.