Image source: SavoryCrowdad/CC BY-SA 4.0

Key Points

• India is a country located in South Asia, part of the World Health Organization’s South-East Asia Region.
• It had a population in 2022 of 1.42 billion. Amongst those aged 15+, tobacco use prevalence is 28.6%.
• Smoking prevalence in India is 10.7%. However, the most popular form of tobacco in India is smokeless tobacco, with use prevalence of 21.4%.
• India ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in 2004, and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products in 2018.
• The Indian cigarette market is dominated by four companies, which together accounted for 98% of sales in 2022. ITC Limited holds by far the largest market share, at over 73%.
• The tobacco industry has deployed a wide range of tactics in India in recent years, including mobilisation of front groups and third parties; litigation against tobacco control measures such as graphic health warnings; and corporate social responsibility, including in partnership with government.

Since the early 2000s, India has made significant progress in tobacco control, introducing a comprehensive tobacco control law in 2004, reducing the affordability of tobacco products, and introducing graphic health warnings (GHWs) consistent with best practice worldwide.¹² However, major challenges persist. The wide range of tobacco products available in India makes regulation and enforcement particularly complicated. The Indian state is also a major shareholder of ITC Limited, which has by far the largest share of the Indian market. This means that the government has an interest in socio-economic issues – such as ensuring the welfare of farmers and manual labourers working in the Indian tobacco industry, and protection of exports – as well as in public health.³

India remains the world’s second largest consumer, producer and exporter of tobacco.⁴⁵

Tobacco Use in India

In 2022, the population of India was 1.42 billion.⁶ In the 2016-17 Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS), approximately 29% of the population aged 15+ reported current tobacco use – over 42% of males, and over 14% of females.²⁷ This means that in absolute numbers, there were almost 267 million tobacco users in India aged 15 and over.⁴ In the 2019 Global Youth Tobacco Survey (GYTS), amongst adolescents aged from 13 to 15, 8.5% reported using some form of tobacco – nearly 10% of males, and over 7% of females.²⁸

Amongst India’s smokers, the most popular product was not factory-made cigarettes but bidis: cigarettes rolled by hand in a dried leaf of the tendu tree. 7.7% of Indian adults reported smoking bidis, compared to 4% who smoked cigarettes.⁷

However, the most popular tobacco product in India overall is smokeless tobacco (SLT). More than 21% of Indians aged 15 and over reported being SLT users, compared to less than 11% who smoked, whether cigarettes, bidis, or both.²⁷ SLT use is also significant amongst women and girls: nearly 13% of females aged 15 and over were SLT users, compared to 2% who smoked.²⁷ The majority of female tobacco users in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are SLT users in India and Bangladesh.⁹ However, amongst adolescent tobacco users, smoking is more common than SLT use. Over 7% of adolescents reported current smoking, compared to just over 4% who were SLT users.²⁸

India has the second highest number of oral cancer cases globally, accounting for a third of the total.¹⁰ More than 90% of India’s oral cancer cases are caused by tobacco use and of these, more than half are caused by SLT.¹¹ The poor and less educated are worst affected, with much higher SLT use prevalence amongst these sections of the population.¹¹ There were also over a million deaths attributable to smoking in 2019, accounting for nearly 11% of all mortality in India that year.¹²

A 2020 study put the economic cost of all illness and death attributable to tobacco use between 2017 and 2018 for those over 35 years of age at US$27.5 billion.¹³ Smoking accounted for 74% of this cost; smokeless tobacco 26%.¹³ Direct medical costs alone amounted to 5.3% of all health expenditure.¹³ However, the excise tax revenue from tobacco the previous year was just 12.2% of its economic cost.¹³ In simple terms, the economic burden of tobacco use is more than eight times the value of revenue the Indian government receives in excise from tobacco products.¹³ This economic burden accounts for over 1% of India’s GDP.¹³

Tobacco in India

Market share and leading brands

The Indian cigarette market is dominated by four companies:  ITC Limited, Godfrey Phillips India Limited (GPI), VST Industries Ltd., and Philip Morris International (PMI), which together accounted for 98% of sales in 2022.¹⁴

India banned foreign direct investment in tobacco manufacturing in 2010, which means that the transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) can only access the Indian market via shareholdings and licensing agreements with local producers.¹⁵¹⁶

ITC Limited

ITC Limited (formerly India Tobacco Company Limited), dominates the Indian tobacco market, with a share of over 73% in 2022.¹⁴ Its largest shareholder is British American Tobacco (BAT), which held just under 30% of shares until March 2024.¹⁷¹⁸ The Indian state is also a major shareholder, via various state-owned insurance corporations and investment portfolios.¹⁸ Its products include India’s three bestselling brands of cigarettes: Gold Flake, Wills and Scissors.¹⁹

In a presentation to investors in June 2023, BAT CEO Tadeu Marroco stressed the importance of the company retaining at least a 25% shareholding in ITC, given that this provides BAT with seats on the ITC board and the right to veto company resolutions.²⁰ Marroco also highlighted the potential of the vast Indian market in terms of newer nicotine and tobacco products, particularly oral products such as nicotine pouches.²⁰ In March 2024, BAT reduced its holdings in ITC to 25.5%.²¹For more details see ITC Limited.

Godfrey Phillips India Limited (GPI)

GPI had a market share of almost 10% in 2022, the second largest after ITC.¹⁴ PMI is the second-largest shareholder with a stake of just over 25%.²² Major brands include Four Square, Cavenders and Tipper.¹⁹

VST Industries Ltd

VST, formerly Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company, had a market share of over 9% in 2022, the third largest.¹⁴ With a stake of over 32%, BAT is its largest shareholder.²³ Its major brands include Total, Charms and Charminar.¹⁹

TTCs’ licensing agreements

PMI has a licensing agreement with GPI, under which GPI manufactures and sells the brands Marlboro and Red & White in India, though PMI retains brand ownership internationally.¹⁴¹⁹²⁴ This gives PMI a 5.4% market share from a global ownership perspective.¹⁴ Similarly, ITC manufactures and sells the brands Berkeley and Benson & Hedges in India, though Japan Tobacco International and British American Tobacco are the global owners, respectively.¹⁴¹⁹ Both companies have a market share of less than 2%.¹⁴

• For more information on the tobacco industry in India, please see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

Smokeless tobacco and bidis

The Indian smokeless tobacco industry is based largely on small scale, rural production, for which accurate data is not available.²⁵ Local manufacturers account for significant segments of the market in several regions of India.²⁵ Similarly, bidi production depends largely on small home-based manufacturing operations and accurate data is not available.²⁵

At the national level, the biggest companies in the chewing tobacco/gutkha (see section “Undermining the gutkha ban”) market are believed to be Dhariwal Industries, Dharampal Satyapal (DS Group) and Som Sugandh Industries, which together accounted for around a quarter of sales in 2010.²⁵ There is also interest from the big cigarette companies in smokeless tobacco; Godfrey Phillips launched its own range of chewing products in 2010.²⁶ A 2021 paper found that 93% of SLT products bought in India were non-compliant with packaging regulations: either they did not have graphic health warnings, or the warnings were too small.²⁷

Tobacco farming

India is the world’s second biggest tobacco producer after China, producing over 766,000 tonnes of leaf in 2020.²⁸ This accounts for 9% of all global production.⁵ Though tobacco production in India has increased significantly in recent decades – from 438,500 tonnes in 1980 – it has fallen slightly from a high of 830,000 tonnes in 2011.²⁹

Child labour

Indian bidis feature on the U.S. Department of Labor’s 2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.³⁰ While information on child labour in the bidi industry is not widely available, a study published in 2009 found that more than 1.7 million children worked rolling bidis in India.³¹ This disproportionately affects girls, who are often drawn into the industry to support their families. Bidi rollers may work 10 to 14-hour days to produce over 1,000 bidis, in what a BBC report from 2012 described as “slave-like working conditions”.³¹

Tobacco and the economy

India is the world’s second largest exporter of tobacco leaf, after Brazil.⁵ According to UN Comtrade, India exported nearly US$816 million in raw tobacco in 2022, compared to nearly $21 million in imports.³²³³ Export figures for 2021-2022 from the Indian Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF) – a trust established by the Indian Department of Commerce – were slightly higher, at US$842 million.⁵

India exports tobacco to more than 115 countries around the world, the biggest recipient of which is Belgium, which accounts for around 18% of India’s total tobacco exports. Other major export destinations for Indian tobacco include the United Arab Emirates, Singapore and the United States.⁵

India is also a major net exporter of cigarettes. According to UN Comtrade, it exported over US$100 million in cigarettes in 2022, compared to nearly $26 million in imports.³⁴³⁵

According to IBEF, the tobacco industry in India employs about 36 million people in farming, processing, manufacturing and export activities.⁵

Illicit trade

The Tobacco Institute of India, an industry body established by ITC, GPI and VST in 1992, puts the scale of the illicit tobacco trade at a quarter of the market.³⁶ However, independent studies put that figure much lower, at around 3% to 6%.³⁷ This makes illicit trade in India relatively small by global standards.³⁸ A 2018 study, which found that 2.73% of the empty cigarette packs collected in India were illicit, noted significant differences across the country.³⁹ Areas with greater illicit trade penetration are often targeted by studies funded by the tobacco industry to exaggerate overall levels of illicit trade.⁴⁰

Studies have also cast doubt on industry claims that tobacco tax increases have led to expansion of illicit trade. For example, according to ITC, tax increases during the period 2012 to 2017 resulted in rapid growth of illicit trade, making India the fourth largest illicit market globally.⁴¹ However, a study published in 2020 by experts from the WHO and the Indian government put the illicit cigarette trade at 6% of the market in 2016-17 – an increase of just 0.9% from 2009-10.³⁸

Similarly, a joint report published in 2017 by the accountancy firm KPMG and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) argued that illicit trade – driven in part by higher taxes on cigarettes – was providing funds for terrorism and organized crime.⁴² However, both ITC and GPI are members of FICCI, which has a history of opposing tobacco control measures in India (see Influencing policy: graphic health warnings). Similarly, KPMG has strong ties with the tobacco industry going back decades, and its work on illicit trade has been strongly criticised elsewhere. Critics argue that KPMG’s research has exaggerated the scale of illicit trade and has been used to oppose tobacco control regulations such as plain packaging.

• For more information, please see STOP’s database of Tobacco Industry Allies.

Tobacco and the environment

A 2018 study estimated that in order to produce 100 billion cigarettes, nearly 67,500 tonnes of CO₂ equivalent were emitted in India in 2010 – the equivalent of 14,544 petrol-powered vehicles driven for a year.⁴³⁴⁴ The industry has also been a major cause of deforestation: it is estimated that 680 square kilometres of scrub forest were destroyed and degraded for tobacco curing and the manufacture of cigarettes and other smoking consumables between 1962 and 2002.⁴⁵

A 2022 study estimated that 170,000 tonnes of waste is produced by the packaging of tobacco products annually in India, two-thirds of which correspond to smokeless tobacco (SLT) products.⁴⁶ Analysis of segregated waste revealed that 73,500 tonnes of plastic, 6,100 tonnes of foil and 1,350 tonnes of used filters are discharged annually into the environment.⁴⁶ Cleaning up this waste costs Indian taxpayers roughly US$766 million every year.⁴⁷

• For more information on the tobacco industry in India, please see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

Roadmap to Tobacco Control

India was the eighth country to ratify the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) in 2004.⁴⁸ It ratified the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products in 2018.⁴⁹⁵⁰

The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act (COTPA), passed in 2003, is the main comprehensive tobacco control law in India. Amongst other provisions, it banned smoking in most public places, prohibited the advertising of cigarettes and other tobacco products, and banned sales to anyone under the age of 18.⁵¹ Since then, a number of rules have been introduced to aid implementation of COTPA and provide definitions.¹ In 2007-08, the government launched the National Tobacco Control Programme (NTCP), which aimed to reinforce COTPA and facilitate implementation of the tobacco control strategies contained within the WHO FCTC.⁵²

In 2020, an amendment to COTPA was drafted by the Ministry of Health.⁵³ Aiming to further strengthen the original legislation and boost compliance with WHO FCTC, it will abolish designated smoking areas, prohibit the sale of individual cigarettes (single sticks), and raise the legal age required for purchase of tobacco products from 18 to 21.⁵³⁵⁴ However, as of September 2023, this amendment has yet to become law.

Citing concerns about the health impacts of vaping on young people, the Indian government introduced a ban on electronic cigarettes in 2019. The law prohibits the production, manufacture, import, export, transport, sale, distribution, storage and advertisement of e-cigarettes.¹⁵⁵ Though their use remains rare in India as of 2023, the law closes off a huge potential market for e-cigarette companies.⁵⁶

For more details, please see the following websites:

• Legislation by country – India, Tobacco Control Laws, Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids
• India, WHO FCTC Implementation Database, WHO FCTC Secretariat
• Country profile – India, World Health Organization, WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2021

Tobacco Industry Interference in India

Tobacco industry tactics in India include mobilisation of front groups and third parties; litigation against tobacco control measures, such as graphic health warnings; and corporate social responsibility, including in partnership with government.

Delaying rollout of larger graphic health warnings

In October 2014, the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare announced its intention to increase the area covered by graphic health warnings (GHWs) on tobacco products, from 40% to 85%.⁵⁷ GHWs are a well-established, evidence-based and cost-effective measure of reducing tobacco use.⁵⁸ They may also be particularly effective in India, given both the country’s linguistic diversity and its literacy rate (as of 2018, over a quarter of the population was unable to read or write).⁵⁹⁶⁰

The tobacco industry deployed various tactics in an attempt to block this legislation. These included mobilising third parties and front groups, spreading misleading information, and submitting more than 30 legal challenges in state-level courts throughout India.⁶¹⁶²

Third parties and front groups which mobilised against the legislation included the following:

• The All India Bidi Federation
• The Tobacco Institute of India
• The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII)
• The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)
• The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM)
• The Federation of All India Farmer Associations (FAIFA)
• The Retailers Association of India (RAI)
• The International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA)

These groups wrote letters to and met with policy makers, launched campaigns in the media against the proposal, and filed legal challenges.⁶¹⁶²

For example, FAIFA bought full-page advertisements in leading national newspapers, claiming that larger GHWs would be detrimental to the livelihoods of tobacco farmers and fuel the illicit trade.⁶¹⁶³ FAIFA, CII and FICCI all wrote letters to the Minister of Health, J.P. Nadda, echoing these arguments.⁶⁴⁶⁵ The Tobacco Institute of India filed a legal challenge against the government in the High Court of Karnataka.⁶⁶ Finally, ASSOCHAM addressed a communiqué to the government, stating that the GHWs would endanger the livelihoods of more than 45 million people and lead to a flood of illicit imports.⁶⁷

These industry strategies succeeded in delaying the rollout of the 85% GHWs for a year, from April 2015 until April 2016.⁶⁸ However, the legal challenges continued even after implementation. In 2017, the High Court of Karnataka ruled that India should revert to the pre-2016 40% warnings. This decision was overruled in 2018 by the Indian Supreme Court and the 85% warnings have remained in force ever since.⁶²

The eventual introduction of the 85% GHWs saw India jump from 136^th to third position in the global ranking for size of health warnings on tobacco products.⁶⁹

Undermining the gutkha ban

Gutkha, one of India’s most popular smokeless tobacco (SLT) products, is a mix of crushed Areca nut (a well-known risk factor for several cancers even when consumed without tobacco), with tobacco, catechu, paraffin, slaked lime and flavourings.⁷⁰⁷¹ Highly addictive and very cheap, gutkha is popular amongst women and young people.⁷²

Since 2012, there have been state-level bans throughout the country in an attempt to reduce its prevalence, but it remains widely available.⁷³⁷⁴ Producers have found ways to circumvent the bans, such as by packaging and selling the constituent ingredients of gutkha separately.⁷⁴⁷⁵

In the state of Tamil Nadu, gutkha remained widely available despite being banned in 2013.⁷⁶⁷⁷ In 2016, officials from India’s Income Tax Department discovered details of a series of suspected bribes worth nearly US$6 million made by leading manufacturer MDM to public officials, allegedly to facilitate the storage, transport and sale of gutkha.⁶¹⁷⁶⁷⁸

Alleged recipients of bribes included a government minister, police officers and senior civil servants.⁷⁹ In November 2022, after four years of investigations in three states, India’s Central Bureau of Investigation filed charges against 21 individuals.⁷⁹⁷⁶

Corporate social responsibility: partnerships with government

Tobacco companies often use corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives to enhance their public image and corporate reputation.

In the implementation guidelines for Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC, the WHO states that these activities fall within its definition of tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship – and should therefore not be endorsed by Parties to the treaty.⁸⁰ However, in India, under the Companies Act 2013, all large corporations are required to spend at least 2% of their average net profit in the previous three years on CSR.⁸¹ This helps to legitimise tobacco industry CSR, as companies argue they are only fulfilling their legal duties.³In its sustainability reporting, ITC states that its CSR initiatives fall within the scope of the 2013 legislation.⁸²

ITC has contributed frequently to government programmes and has worked with government institutions.³ For example, in 2017, ITC contributed to a fund set up by the Indian government to attract funding from corporations and private donors for the provision of sanitation and clean drinking water; and to the Clean Ganga Fund, established by the government to rehabilitate the River Ganges.⁸² In his speech to shareholders at the 2017 AGM, the then ITC CEO cited several public-private partnerships with state governments in India on water management projects, stating that they aligned with a national programme which aimed to expand irrigation coverage and improve efficiency of water use.⁸³⁸⁴

This type of public-private CSR was particularly widespread during the COVID-19 pandemic. In total, between March and June 2020, the Indian tobacco industry contributed around US$36.7 million in donations to various government funds, both at federal and state level.⁸¹ The industry also partnered with other stakeholders, including NGOs, other private sector actors and even popular Bollywood singers. ITC was the biggest cash and in-kind contributor.⁸¹⁸⁵

Corporate trademarks were widely visible during these CSR activities, and the initiatives were publicised in leading newspapers and by senior politicians.⁸¹⁸⁶⁸⁷

• For more on tobacco industry activity during the pandemic, please see the COVID-19 Tobacco Tactics page and the COVID-19 monitoring database.

Relevant Links

• Global Adult Tobacco Survey GATS 2 India 2016-17, Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Mumbai and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India
• Report on Tobacco Industry Interference in India – Case Studies, S. Goel, S. Sekhar Kar, Resource Centre for Tobacco Control
• Interference by Big Tobacco and Affiliates in Tobacco Control in South Asia, Institute of Public Health Bengaluru and the International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease
• Crooked Nine: Nine Ways the Tobacco Industry Undermines Health Policy, Vital Strategies
• National Report: The Environmental Burden of Tobacco Products Wastes in India. Tobacco Use Makes You Ugly, Your Habitat Uglier, SPH AIIMS Jodhpur, ICMR-NICPR, The Union

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM)
• Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)
• ITC Limited

TCRG Research

• Advancing whole-of-government approaches to tobacco control: Article 5.3 and the challenge of policy coordination in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India and Uganda. R.A. Barry, S.M. Abdullah, A. Chugh, S. Hirpa, P. Kumar, D. Male, R. Ralston, T. Wagner-Rizvi, J. Collin, Tobacco Control 2022;31:s46-s52.
• Institutional tensions, corporate social responsibility and district-level governance of tobacco industry interference: analysing challenges in local implementation of Article 5.3 measures in Karnataka, India. P. Kumar, R.A. Barry, M.M. Kulkarni, V.G. Kamath, R. Ralston, J. Collin, Tobacco Control 2022;31:s26-s32.
• Developing more detailed taxonomies of tobacco industry political activity in low-income and middle-income countries: qualitative evidence from eight countries, B.K. Matthes, K. Lauber, M. Zatoński, L. Robertson, A.B. Gilmore, BMJ Global Health 2021;6:e004096.

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to TCRG publications.

References

The post India Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Background

Neil McKeganey founded the Centre for Drug Misuse Research at the University of Glasgow in 1994 to carry out research on Scotland’s drug problem. Its projects were funded by UK research councils and the UK government, among others. In 2011, the Centre became entirely independent of the University⁸⁸ and was renamed the Centre for Substance Use Research (CSUR) in November 2015.⁸⁹

In 2016, the University confirmed it was not in any way affiliated with the CSUR and McKeganey no longer held any position there, honorary or otherwise.⁹⁰

On its website, until early 2021, the CSUR describes itself as “a specialist agency undertaking research within the substance use field within the U.K., E.U., and the U.S.”⁹¹ As of June 2021, it stated:

Centre for Substance Use Research Ltd is a “multi-disciplinary research agency providing behavioural science support to companies submitting applications for PMTA, MRTP and TPD approval.”⁹²

PMTA, Pre-Market Tobacco Applications, and MRTP, Modified Risk Tobacco Product applications, are specific to the US,⁹³ and the TPD, Tobacco Products Directive, to the European Union.

Staff

The website states that “The team within CSUR comprises post-doctoral researchers in behavioural science, experts in marketing, cyber security, and media.”⁹⁴

Neil McKeganey is Director of CSUR (also referred to as CSURES as of February 2021).⁹⁴

Christopher Russell, previously Deputy Director of CSUR,⁹⁵ was listed as a Special Advisor of CSUR in 2023.⁹⁶ He has been a director of Russell Burnett Research and Consultancy Ltd since 2019,⁹⁷ which has “received funding from e‑cigarette/tobacco product manufacturers” to conduct research relating to nicotine and tobacco products.⁹⁸

McKeganey and Russell have been listed as speakers at tobacco industry events including the Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum (GTNF)^99100101 and the Tobacco Science Research Conference.¹⁰²

Russell was also listed as a speaker at the 2023 ‘New Approaches’ conference, held at the Harvard Club of New York City, in the same week as the United Nations General Assembly. ¹⁰³

For a list of staff see the CSUR website.

Relationship with the Tobacco Industry

Image 1: CSUR funding (Source: CSUR website, accessed June 2021)

CSUR has undertaken work for tobacco companies including Philip Morris International (PMI), British American Tobacco (BAT), Nicoventures, a subsidiary of BAT, Imperial Brands and Fontem Ventures, a subsidiary of Imperial (see Image 1).

CSUR also works with JUUL Labs, in which Altria has a share, and has received funding from the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World (see below for details).¹⁰⁴ CSUR has published multiple academic papers which declare support from either tobacco companies or tobacco company subsidiaries.¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁶

Opposed Plain Packaging in the UK

In 2014, McKeganey helped BAT oppose the introduction of Plain Packaging in the UK. McKeganey prepared a 82 page report for BAT which was included in BAT’s submission to the UK’s second public consultation on plain packaging in 2014.¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁸ In the report, McKeganey supports BAT’s view that there is no evidence to suggest that plain packaging will reduce smoking prevalence, and that packaging is not “a factor that influences people’s decisions to start, stop, or re-start smoking”.¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁸

In May 2016, dismissing the legal challenges to the UK’s plain packaging legislation brought by the big four tobacco companies, the High Court of Justice’s ruling criticised McKeganey’s findings and the methodology they were based on:¹⁰⁸

“What I find unacceptable is the preparation of a report which by its total refusal to engage with any of this contramaterial simply conveys the impression that it does not exist and that the best way to refute it is to ignore it. Yet, at the same time and inconsistently, Professor McKeganey accepts that the principles of transparency and openness are “foundational tablets of the scientific enterprise”. Had Professor McKeganey confronted head-on the contrary evidence, including that from the tobacco companies, then it is hard to see how he could have advanced the opinions that he did; at the very least he would have been compelled to provide a proper rationale for why his opinion could be sustained in the light of this inconsistent evidence.”

Work with JUUL Labs

More recently, McKeganey and CSUR have been working for e-cigarette company JUUL Labs. Altria has held a 35% share in JUUL since December 2018. A number of outputs written with CSUR are published on the JUUL Labs website.¹⁰⁹ Others are listed on the CSUR website.¹⁰⁵ Some have been co-authored by PinneyAssociates, which also works with JUUL Labs and tobacco companies.¹⁰⁹

In March 2019, JUUL Labs promoted a study by CSUR (funded by JUUL) which found that the JUUL e-cigarettes “dramatically” cut adult smokers’ cigarettes consumption.¹¹⁰ This paper was published in the Journal of Pulmonary and Respiratory Medicine, which has been described as a “predatory journal”.¹¹¹¹¹²

In 2021, CSUR contributed a paper to a special issue of the American Journal of Health Behavior, sponsored by JUUL Labs.¹¹³¹¹⁴ The paper was co-authored with JUUL Labs and PinneyAssociates. There was criticism of the journal, which defended the publication of the special issue.¹¹⁵

Received Funding from the Foundation for A Smoke-Free World

The Foundation for A Smoke-Free World (FSFW), which is wholly funded by Philip Morris International, awarded two grants to CSUR in May 2018 totalling US$189,004. One grant for US$96,063 was provided to “develop a centre of excellence in behaviour research related to smoking cessation”, another for US$92,941 was provided for research on the “determinants and impact of switching to reduced risk products”.¹¹⁶

In 2022 CSUR received another grant from FSFW of US$154,564 to “Develop a protocol for an intervention trial to assess the long-term health effects of switching from combustibles to tobacco harm reduction products among Type 2 diabetic smokers in Bangladesh”.¹¹⁷

Advocacy and research organisation PROGGA, expressed concerns around the study, stating “The timing of this campaign is particularly concerning, as the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare is currently working on amending the tobacco control law, which could potentially ban e-cigarettes and vaping altogether”.¹¹⁸

“Flagship” Studies

Annual Study on E-cigarette Use

CSUR’s website stated that in 2021 it would be conducting the first of an annual study of “Real-World ENDS Use”, stating that:

“What has been missing in this [ENDS, or e-cigarette research] are studies assessing the relative impact of different brands and types of ENDS devices. In 2021 CSURES [sic] will undertake research assessing 9 of the top ENDS devices on sale in the U.K. comparing the relative rates with which these devices are enabling adult smokers in the US and U.K. to quit and reduce their cigarette consumption”.¹¹⁹

Tobacco Products Prevalence Study

In 2021, CSUR launched a study on prevalence and patterns of use of different e-cigarette brands and products in the US.¹²⁰ Its website stated that the study aimed “to estimate the prevalence and patterns of use of 20 ENDS brands and over 200 ENDS devices sold in the United States. This research is designed to provide ENDS manufacturers with population-level use data on their products for submission to FDA in seeking PMTA approval.”¹²⁰

In 2023, the study was expanded to include heated tobacco products and nicotine pouches.¹²¹ Brands monitored in the study include those owned by JTI, Altria, BAT and Imperial Brands.

Paper on single-use e-cigarettes

CSUR received funding from BIDI (Kaival Brands), towards the publication of a paper on the prevalence of the use of single use, or ‘disposable’ e-cigarettes in the US.¹²² The paper was cited by Bidi Vapour in a press release published in July 2023, which stated that its ‘disposable’ products were “not implicated in the recent growth in the use of disposable e-cigarettes by U.S. youth”.¹²³ PMI began marketing Kaival’s single use e-cigarette, outside of the US, in July 2022, as VEEBA, later renamed VEEV NOW.¹²⁴

• For details see E-cigarettes: Tobacco Company Interests in Single Use Products

TobaccoTactics Resources

• JUUL Labs
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World Centres of Excellence
• PinneyAssociates

Relevant Links

• CSUR website

References

The post Centre for Substance Use Research (CSUR) appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

EY (Ernst & Young) is, along with Deloitte, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), one of the so-called “Big Four” who dominate the financial auditing market. It was founded in 1989 when Ernst & Whinney merged with Arthur Young.¹²⁵ Ernst & Young (also known as EY) is a network of 492 member companies and affiliates worldwide,¹²⁶ and its headquarters are in London.¹²⁷

The company, whose slogan is “Building a Better Working World”, employed more than 284,000 people in 2019 and had global revenues of US$36.4 billion.¹²⁸

Carmine Di Sibio is the Global Chairman and CEO, and heads a 16-strong executive team which includes global heads of functions and services as well as representatives from three geographic areas: the Americas; Europe, Middle East, India and Africa; and Asia-Pacific.¹²⁹

It has more than 200,000 clients, including most of the world’s largest companies.¹³⁰

Relationship with the Tobacco Industry

Even prior to the merger of Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young, Ernst and Young’s founding companies had a long history of working for tobacco companies, stretching as far back as 1932.¹³¹

The company’s long standing relationship with the tobacco industry ranges from auditing accounts to producing reports used by tobacco companies to lobby against greater regulation¹³² and taxation.¹³³

In 2010, the company stated that it worked with “10 of the 12 tobacco companies listed in the Forbes 2000”.¹³⁴

Continuing ties to tobacco

Ernst & Young continues to work for major tobacco firms such as British American Tobacco (BAT),¹³⁵ and Imperial Brands (previously Imperial Tobacco).¹³⁶

Ernst & Young has also written two reports on the e-cigarette market for Nicoventures, maker of Vype and a BAT subsidiary, since 2016.¹³⁷

Auditor for, and grantee of, the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World

Ernst & Young is the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World’s auditor.¹³⁸¹³⁹. The Foundation describes itself as an independent scientific organisation but is solely funded by Philip Morris International.

In 2018, Ernst & Young’s strategy consultancy EY-Parthenon was commissioned to produce a report for the Foundation, which said: “Less than a quarter of smokers stay off cigarettes for more than a year with current cessation products’’.¹⁴⁰

Health campaigners attacked the report, accusing it of not increasing scientific knowledge and an exercise in “market research for PMI.”¹⁴¹

In 2019, the Foundation gave a grant of US$1,145,028 to Ernst and Young AG, which is based in Switzerland, for two projects looking at the effectiveness of “ANDS” (alternative nicotine delivery systems) and smoker characteristics linked to cessation success. That grant had been spent by November 2020.¹³⁸¹⁴² In 2020 the Centre for Health Research and Education (CHRE), another FSFW grantee, was also granted funding for the same project, according to the FSFW website.¹⁴³

Making the case for tobacco

Over the years, Ernst & Young has worked for the tobacco industry in various capacities, including advising on how the industry can effectively promote its agenda and producing commissioned reports that favour industry arguments.

Rebutting tobacco control economic arguments

An Economic Impact Assessment Template Routemap produced by Ernst & Young for BAT stated that economic impact studies have helped “to oppose proposed restrictions on the operations of the industry and in presenting the positive benefits of the industry to parliamentary commissions and the wider public”.¹⁴⁴. The document provided evidence for BAT to respond to critics of its economic impact. The Routemap, it cited job creation as one example of how the tobacco industry “produces strong positive improvements in social and economic well-being and the quality of life”.¹⁴⁴

The document advised against using a cost/benefit approach, something which is “usually carried out by adversaries to show that the costs of tobacco outweigh the benefits”. One of the “pitfalls” of such an approach is “the lack of agreement as to what are the costs” and benefits to smokers and society of smoking and subsequently as to how to measure the various effects”.¹⁴⁴

Lobbying advice for tobacco officials

Ernst & Young has advised British American Tobacco how to be more effective in its lobbying. In the late 1990s, in a document marked “private and confidential”, the firm warned BAT: “You  need to be mindful of the position of officials who are often wary of accepting invitations to lunch or social occasions for fear it may compromise their position”.¹⁴⁵

The company stressed the importance of BAT’s reputation and said by lobbying “across meeting tables rather than restaurant tables it prevents British American Tobacco from allegations of bad practice or trying to gain favour with hospitality”.¹⁴⁵

Although Ernst & Young urged caution over “mixing business with pleasure” it added there may be “no reason why discrete lobbying cannot be undertaken if you happen to come across a key contact in a social circumstance”.¹⁴⁵ For more on this tactic see the special analysis on lobbying decision makers.

Tobacco study described as “below standard”

In a report for BAT in 2010, Ernst & Young claimed that the true level of illicit tobacco consumption in New Zealand was three times higher than previously thought.¹⁴⁶ The report went on to claim that an increase in tobacco tax could result in more people turning to illicit tobacco and up to US$20 million in lost revenue to the government each year.

However the warnings were rebutted in a report by the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, commissioned by ASH NZ. This report said: “Our review leaves us with no confidence in Ernst & Young’s assessment of the impacts of changing the relative levels of excise duty”. ¹⁴⁷

It described the company’s assessment as “fundamentally flawed by unrealistic scenarios and incorrect results even for these scenarios” and “of no value in informing debate on policy measures to reduce tobacco consumption”.¹⁴⁷

The report concluded: “We consider Ernst & Young’s report to fall well below the standards required for a piece of economic evidence”.¹⁴⁷

Arguing against plain packaging

In 2014, ahead of the Australian Government’s review of a decision to bring in plain packaging in 2012, an Ernst & Young report for BAT claimed there was “no evidence that plain packaging has reduced total consumption”.¹⁴⁸ It suggested instead that the government policy may have led to an increase in cigarette consumption. This reflected common industry arguments against plain packaging which independent research had shown to be an effective tobacco control policy.

Tobacco tax role criticised

Health experts criticised the New Zealand Ministry of Health for selecting Ernst & Young to review its tobacco taxation policy in 2018 “despite EY’s work locally and internationally for tobacco companies”.¹⁴⁹

They added: “This decision may breach the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), at least in spirit”.¹⁴⁹

Chequered past

Ernst & Young has been at the centre of a number of major controversies over the past decade.

• In 2013, it agreed to pay US$123 million in a settlement with criminal prosecutors in the US, relating to tax avoidance schemes.¹⁵⁰
• Two years later, Ernst and Young paid US$10 million to settle allegations that it failed to raise concerns before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.¹⁵¹
• In 2016, the firm agreed to pay US$9.3 million to settle claims by the US Securities & Exchange Commission that two of its auditors formed “inappropriately close” relationships with staff at the companies they were auditing.¹⁵²
• In April 2020 a High Court judge in London ordered Ernst & Young to pay US$11 million (£9m) to a whistleblower who was forced out of the firm after refusing to cover up a discovery of suspected gold smuggling at a client of the company’s Dubai branch in 2013.¹⁵³

Relevant Links

• Ernst & Young website

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Big Four Global Accounting Firms
• Deloitte
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World Grantees
• KPMG
• PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)

References

The post EY appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Philip Morris International (PMI) is the largest tobacco company in the world (excluding the Chinese National Tobacco Corporation).¹⁵⁴ The company is headquartered in New York in the United States (US), but also based operationally in Lausanne, Switzerland and Hong Kong. According to the Associated Press, Altria decided to separate Philip Morris USA and its international operations in order to “clear the international tobacco business from the legal and regulatory constraints facing its domestic counterpart, Philip Morris USA”.¹⁵⁵

In 2018, PMI and its subsidiaries sold its products in over 180 markets, selling cigarettes, other tobacco products and newer nicotine and tobacco products. The company reported in 2019 that it held 28.4% of the global market for cigarette and heated tobacco products (HTPS) excluding the US and China.¹⁵⁶ The company owned six of the top 15 international cigarette brands in 2018. Its global cigarette brands are Marlboro (the world’s bestselling international brand), Merit, Parliament, Virginian S, L&M, Philip Morris, Bond Street, Chesterfield, Lark, Muratti, Next and Red & White. The company reported owning a market share of at least 15% or over in 100 countries in 2018, although in the UK PMI held only fourth position for cigarette market share behind Imperial Tobacco, Japan Tobacco International (JTI) and British American Tobacco (BAT).¹⁵⁷

According to Euromonitor International, PMI’s global share of the cigarette market (by retail volume) was under 14% in 2018, and fell to 12% in 2020 (figures rounded). ¹⁵⁸

On 27 August 2019, global news outlets reported that PMI and Altria were considering a merger to reunite the brands that had split in 2007.^159160161 However the merger was called off the next month, in response to news that the FDA was considering a ban on flavoured e-cigarettes.¹⁶²¹⁶³ On March 21, 2018, PMI acquired Tabacalera Costarricense, S.A. and Mediola y Compañía, S.A. for USD$95 million, which sell Derby, Marlboro and L&M cigarettes in Costa Rica.¹⁵⁶

Employees or Board Members: Past and Present

Jacek Olczak was appointed the Chief Executive Officer of PMI in May 2021.¹⁶⁴ Previously he was the company’s Chief Operating Officer. He succeeded André Calantzopoulos who was appointed Executive Chairman of the Board. The previous chairman Louis C. Camilleri, stepped down in Decemer 2020. A full list of the company’s leadership team can be accessed at PMI’s website. Other persons that currently work for, or have previously been employed with, the company:

Massimo Andolina | Chris Argent | Drago Azinovic | Emmanuel Babeau | Werner Barth | Charles Bendotti | Frank de Rooij | Frederic de Wilde | Suzanne Rich Folsom | Stacey Kennedy | Martin King | Michael Kunst | Andreas Kurali | Bin Li | Marco Mariotti | Mario Massroli | Deepak Mishra | Silke Muenster | John O’Mullane | Paul Riley | Marian Salzman | Gregoire Verdeaux | Michael Voegele | Stefano Volpetti | Jerry Whitson |  Martin J. Barrington | David Bernick | Bertrand Bonvin | Harold Brown | Patrick Brunel | Mathis Cabiallavetta | Louis C. Camilleri | Andrew Cave | Herman Cheung | Kevin Click | Marc S. Firestone | John Dudley Fishburn | Jon Huenemann | Even Hurwitz | Jennifer Li | Graham Mackay | Sergio Marchionne | Kate Marley | Kalpana Morparia | Jim Mortensen | Lucio A. Noto | Matteo Pellegrini | Robert B. Polet | Ashok Rammohan | Carlos Slim Helú | Julie Soderlund | Hermann Waldemer | Stephen M. Wolf | Miroslaw Zielinski

Affiliations

Memberships

In 2019, PMI declared membership of the following organisations on the European Transparency Register:¹⁶⁵

The American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union | American European Community Association (AECA) | American Chamber of Commerce of Lithuania | Ass. Industrial Portuguesa (AIP) | Business Europe | Centromarca | CEOE | Czech Association Branded Goods | Czech Foodstuff Chamber | Economiesuisse | Estonian Chamber of Commerce | European Communities Trademark Association (ECTA) | European Policy Centre (EPC) | Kangaroo Group | Latvian Chamber of Commerce | Latvian Traders Association | Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists | MARQUES | Spanish Tobacco Roundtable | VBO-FBE

PMI had previously listed memberships of: International Trademark Association (INTA) | The Trans-Atlantic Business Council (TABC) | | European Risk Forum | European Smokeless Tobacco Council (ESTOC) | British Chamber of Commerce | Public Affairs Council | APRAM | LES France | AmCham Germany | Bund fur Lebensmittelrecht & Lebensmittelkunde | Europaischer Wirtschaftssenat (EWS) | Wirtschaftsbeirat der Union e.V. | American Chamber of Commerce of Estonia | American Lithuanian Business Council | Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists | Investors’ Forum | AmCham Spain | Unindustria (Confindustria) | Consumer Packaging Alliance | British Brands Group | Foodstuff Chamber The company is also a donor to the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing Foundation (ECLT), alongside BAT, Imperial Brands, JTI and Swedish Match, among others.¹⁶⁶

In May 2015, ECLT and the International Labour Organization (ILO) entered into an agreement to develop global guidance on occupational health and safety with regards to child labour in the tobacco industry.¹⁶⁷ PMI was a member of the Confederation of European Community Cigarette Manufacturers (CECCM), but left in 2006 following a dispute with other members.¹⁶⁸

Consultancies

PMI has worked with numerous Public Relations (PR) and law consultancies:

• In 2020 and 2021 PMI released white papers and held events on public trust in science in partnership with the Industry Transformation Coalition.
• In January 2020, PMI released a white paper entitled “Unsmoke Your Mind: Pragmatic Answers to Tough Questions for a Smoke-Free Future”. The company enlisted the consulting firm Povaddo, which works across public affairs, strategy and research,¹⁶⁹ to conduct an opinion-based survey of smokers across 14 countries.¹⁷⁰ The report was heavily criticised in The Lancet medical journal (see below)¹⁷¹ who pointed out that its findings were based on a “self-funded online survey”.¹⁷¹ In July 2020, PMI published another white paper called “In Support of the Primacy of Science”, which was also based on online surveys conducted by Povaddo, on the public’s views on science.¹⁷²¹⁷³ In March 2021 PMI released the results of a third online survey, conducted by Povaddo in 20 countries, on public attitudes to newer nicotine and tobacco products and collaboration between governments and tobacco companies.¹⁷⁴ Povaddo has conducted previous research for PMI.¹⁷⁵
• In December 2019, researchers and academic institutions received invitations from the consulting firm, Handshake, to commission research on behalf of PMI on how companies navigate corporate transformation.¹⁷⁶
• In 2016, Philip Morris UK was a client of London-based PR and communications company Instinctif Partners.
• That same year, media also linked Brussels-based PR company Pantarhei Advisors to Philip Morris.
• In 2014, UK-based Media Intelligence Partners was PMI’s media contact during Sir Cyril Chantler’s plain packaging review.
• In 2014, German PR company Communications & Network Consulting AG (CNC) listed Philip Morris as a client on the EU Transparency Register.
• In that same year, Luxembourg-based Felula SA, a one-person consultancy run by Serge Estgen, listed PMI as its client on the EU Transparency Register.
• In 2013, Edinburgh-based Halogen Communications supported PMI’s opposition to Scotland’s plans to introduce Plain Packaging.
• In 2012 and 2013, PMI worked with London-based PR and media company Pepper Public Affairs on PMI’s Anti-Plain Packaging Media Campaign.
• In 2012, the UK branch of Crosby Textor Group, helped PMI oppose Plain packaging in the UK.
• Law firm Clifford Chance has a history of lobbying for PMI in the UK and European Union (EU). In 2009, the firm submitted anonymous Freedom of Information requests to a UK university on behalf of the tobacco company, and in 2011 and 2012 Clifford Chance’s Michel Petite lobbied on the EU Tobacco Products Directive.
• From 2009 to 2011 PR company Gardant Communications worked for Philip Morris UK. In 2009, the PR company supported Philip Morris’ PR Campaign Against the Display Ban and was involved in Philip Morris’ Regulatory Litigation Action Plan Against the Display Ban.
• APCO Associates‘ collaboration with PMI goes back to the 1990s when it helped the company set up the European Science and Environment Forum. More recently, it was involved in Philip Morris’ PR Campaign Against the Display Ban.
• London-based PR company INHouse Communications also played a part in Philip Morris’ PR Campaign Against the Display Ban.
• Ogilvy Group‘s collaboration with Philip Morris goes back to the 1950s when it ran one of its advertising campaigns.
• José María Aznar, the former Spanish Prime Minister (see below)

Controversial Marketing Strategies

Since its controversial “Be Marlboro: Targeting the World’s Biggest Brand at Youth” campaign in 2014, PMI have been accused on multiple occasions of targeting their products at young people. On its website, PMI says that it is “committed to doing our part to help prevent children from smoking or using nicotine products”. ¹⁷⁷ It further states that its “marketing complies with all applicable laws and regulations, and we have robust internal policies and procedures in place so that all our marketing and advertising activities are directed only toward adult smokers”.¹⁷⁷ Despite these assurances, PMI has been accused of, and fined for, running marketing campaigns that target young people. For more information see Be Marlboro: Targeting the World’s Biggest Brand at Youth. PMI has increasingly used social media to market its newer products, including e-cigarettes (also known as electronic nicotine delivery systems, or ENDS) and heated tobacco products.

• For more information on PMI’s newer, including IQOS, visit Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products: Philip Morris International and Heated Tobacco Products: Philip Morris International.

In December 2023 The Times newspaper highlighted PMI’s role in third party campaigns promoting e-cigarettes in the UK.¹⁷⁸ For more information visit the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World page.

Complicity in Tobacco Smuggling

PMI portrays itself publicly as a victim of illicit tobacco trade, with the company reporting that tobacco smuggling results in “considerable financial losses” and “damage” to manufacturers’ brands.¹⁷⁹ To help tackle illicit trade, PMI launched a funding initiative called PMI IMPACT in 2016, worth US$100m and aimed at bringing together “organisations that fight illegal trade and related crimes, enabling them to implement solutions”.¹⁸⁰¹⁸¹ In its first call for proposals in 2016, PMI asked for “projects that have an impact on illegal trade and related crimes in the European Union…”¹⁸² The second call, made in 2017, expanded the areas of focus to include the Middle East, North Africa, South and Central America and South and Southeast Asia.¹⁸³ For more information, visit our page on PMI IMPACT. In contrast to the company’s public persona of being part of the smuggling solution, evidence shows that the company was, in fact, part of the problem. In 2000, the European Commission (backed by a majority of EU member states) started court proceedings in the US Courts against PMI and other tobacco companies for its complicity in tobacco smuggling. The Commission claimed that the tobacco companies “boosted their profits in the past by deliberately oversupplying some countries so that their product could be smuggled into the EU”, costing the EU millions of euros in lost tax and customs revenue.¹⁸⁴¹⁸⁵ PMI and the Commission settled their dispute in 2004, when the company agreed to pay the Commission £675m to fund anti-smuggling activities.¹⁸⁶ The two Parties signed an Anti-Counterfeit and Anti-Contraband Cooperation Agreement,¹⁸⁷ referred to by the company as Project Star. As part of this agreement, PMI commissioned KPMG to measure annually the size of the legal, contraband and counterfeit markets for tobacco products in each EU Member States. Project Star’s methodology and data have been strongly criticised for lack of transparency, overestimating illicit cigarette levels in some European countries, and serving PMI’s interests over those of the EU and its member states.¹⁸⁸

Tactics to Subvert Tobacco Control Campaigns and Policies

PMI has strongly opposed tobacco control legislation and regulations across the world, including plain packaging in Australia and the UK, the EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD), and tobacco control decrees in Uruguay. The company has used a variety of strategies and tactics to influence tobacco control policies and subvert existing regulations.

Funding Pro-Tobacco Research and Discrediting Independent Evidence

In response to plain packaging proposals in the UK, PMI funded research, expert opinion and public relations activities which supported its position. One of the people that PMI funded for this purpose was Will O’Reilly, a former Detective Chief Inspector with the London Metropolitan Police. O’Reilly was appointed as a PMI consultant in 2011,¹⁸⁹ conducting undercover test purchases of illicit tobacco and publicising his findings in UK regional press.¹⁹⁰ One of PMI’s arguments to oppose plain packaging was that the public health measure would lead to an increase in illicit tobacco, including counterfeited plain packs. For background on, and a critique of, this argument, go to Countering Industry Arguments Against Plain Packaging: It will Lead to Increased Smuggling. O’Reilly’s test purchases appear to have enabled PMI to secure significant press coverage of its data on illicit tobacco.¹⁹¹ In March 2019, Euromonitor International, a market research organisation, received funding through two PMI initiatives: the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World and PMI IMPACT.^192193194 Examples of other organisations and individuals that have received funding from PMI to produce research or expert opinions or critiques of independent evidence, in order to oppose tobacco control legislation are: Deloitte | KPMG | Transcrime | Roy Morgan Research | Ashok Kaul | Michael Wolf | Populus | Centre for Economics and Business Research¹⁹⁵¹⁹⁶ | Compass Lexecon¹⁹⁷ | Rupert Darwall¹⁹⁸ | James Heckman¹⁹⁹ | Lord Hoffman²⁰⁰ | Alfred Kuss²⁰¹ | Lalive ²⁰² | LECG^203204205 | London Economics | Povaddo¹⁷⁵| SKIM Consumer Research²⁰⁶

• To see a list of all organisations funded through PMI’s Foundation for a Smoke-Free World (FSFW), visit our pages on the FSFW’s Centres of Excellence and grantees.
• For more information on the tobacco industry’s use of research to undermine legitimate independent evidence see: Plain Packaging in the UK: Tobacco Industry Funded Research, Expert Opinion and Public Relations.

Using Freedom of Information Requests to Acquire Public Health Research Data

Freedom of Information (FOI) requests are one strategy that the tobacco industry uses to undermine tobacco control legislation, often covertly using third parties.²⁰⁷ In 2009, and again in 2011, PMI sent Freedom of Information requests to Stirling University (UK) requesting access to a wide range of data from its research on teenage smoking. PMI alleged that it wanted “to understand more about the research project conducted by the University of Stirling on plain packaging for cigarettes”.²⁰⁸ The FOI requests were eventually dropped. For more information on these FOI requests, and an explanation on how these requests impacted the University of Stirling, go to our page FOI: Stirling University.

Fabricating Support through Front Groups

PMI has used front groups to oppose tobacco control measures. Front Groups are organisations that purport to serve a public interest, while actually serving the interests of another party (in this case the tobacco industry), and often obscuring the connection between them. In Australia, leaked private documents revealed that the supposed anti-plain packaging retailer grass roots movement, the Alliance of Australian Retailers was set up by tobacco companies and that the Director of Corporate Affairs Philip Morris Australia, Chris Argent, played a critical role in its day-to-day operations.^209210211

• For more information on this front group, and Philip Morris Australia’s involvement, visit the Alliance of Australian Retailers page.
• For more information on front groups funded and/or organised by PMI and other tobacco companies, see the list on the Expose Tobacco website.

Lobbying of Decision Makers

Article 5.3 of the The World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) explicitly aims to reduce industry influence in public health policymaking by obliging parties to protect their health policies from tobacco industry interests and interference.²¹² Yet tobacco industry representatives, and third-parties regularly attempt to influence public health policymaking in the industry’s favour. This section details some of these incidents involving PMI and the response of the governments and the global health community.

EU

PMI reported that it spent between €1,250,000 and €1,499,999 in 2019 lobbying EU institutions, employing only 2 fulltime equivalent staff in its Brussels office.¹⁶⁵ If this data is correct, it suggests that PMI relied heavily on external lobbying firms. A 2013 leaked internal PMI document revealed that the company had 161 lobbyists working to undermine the revision of the EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD).²¹³ The objective of PMI’s campaign was to either “push” (i.e. amend) or “delay” the TPD proposal, and “block” any so-called “extreme policy options” like the proposed point of sales display ban and plain packaging.²¹⁴

• For more information on PMI’s campaign to undermine the TPD, go to EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision and PMI Mobilised Support from Retailers.

UK

The leaked internal PMI documents from 2013 also revealed the extent of a multi-faceted campaign against Plain Packaging in the UK, including a detailed media campaign using dozens of third parties (both individuals and organisations) to promote its arguments against the policy. The documents also included a detailed political analysis of potential routes of influence for the tobacco company (Image 1).¹⁸⁹

One third party appointed in November 2011 to help PMI oppose the plain packaging proposal was the Crosby Textor Group. This appointment led to a conflict of interest scandal, given that Lynton Crosby co-Director of the Crosby Textor Group, was also the political election strategist for the UK’s Conservative Party, which was in power in the UK. David Cameron, then Prime Minister, insisted that Crosby never lobbied him about plain packaging. ²¹⁵²¹⁶ Despite a lack of evidence that Crosby lobbied the Prime Minister and Health Minister on plain packaging, documents released under FOI legislation, obtained by the University of Bath Tobacco Control Research Group, show that Crosby lobbied the UK Government on plain packaging via Lord Marland, the then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Intellectual Property, to oppose plain packaging. For more information on this lobbying scandal, go to Lynton Crosby’s page.

• For more detail on PMI’s attempts to undermine plain packaging proposals in the UK, visit: PMI Mobilised Support from Retailers | PMI’s Anti-Plain Packaging Lobbying Campaign | PMI’s Anti-Plain Packaging Media Campaign | PMI’s “Illicit Trade” Anti-Plain Packaging Campaign
• For information on the tobacco industry’s tactics to undermine this tobacco control measures, visit our pages on: Plain Packaging in the UK: Tobacco Company Opposition | Plain Packaging in the UK: Tobacco Industry Funded Research, Expert Opinion and Public Relations | Plain Packaging in the UK: Tobacco Industry Built Alliances | Plain Packaging in the UK: Tobacco Industry Funded Third Party Campaigns
• PMI also opposed the tobacco product display ban gradually introduced in the UK from 2012. More information on PMI’s tactics to stop this measure, see: Philip Morris’ PR Campaign Against the Display Ban

Australia

Australia has one of the least hospitable regulatory environments for the tobacco industry, having passed regulations banning advertising since 1976, a point of sale ban in 2011, and a plain packaging law in 2012. It also has regulation in place to prevent the sale of nicotine products, including e-cigarettes and HTPs.²¹⁷

The industry has not, however, given up on attempting to market its products and lobby decision makers across the country. In a 2019 article, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that Tammy Chan, Managing Director of PMI Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific wrote letters to health organisations urging them to enter into a “dialogue” on PMI’s “smoke-free” vision in the lead up to a parliamentary select committee meeting on the impact of e-cigarettes on “personal choice”.²¹⁸

In March 2019, PMI was accused of “subliminal advertising” in its sponsorship of the Ferrari Formula One team during the Australian Gran Prix in Melbourne. PMI has been accused of attempting to evade advertising bans by sponsoring motorsports teams.

• For more information see Motorsport Sponsorship

Latin America

José María Aznar, the former Prime Minister of Spain, has been widely reported by media outlets as having taken up a position as a lobbyist for PMI in Latin America.^219220221222

• For more information on his meetings with public officials in Chile and Peru, as well as his history of association with the tobacco industry while in office, see our page on José María Aznar.

Intimidating Governments with Litigation or Threat of Litigation

PMI has legally challenged tobacco control regulations across the globe, including:

• Comprehensive No Smoking Ordinance (2010 and 2016) and Tobacco-Free Generation Ordinance (2016) in Balanga, Philippines. A front group for the world’s biggest tobacco companies, including PMI, called the Philippine Tobacco institute (PTI) sued the city of Balanga in August 2017 over the Comprehensive No Smoking Ordinance, which it argued was “arbitrary and oppressive” and cost PMI USD$420,000 a month in lost sales. In July 2018, regional courts ruled in PTI’s favour, noting that although the city’s tobacco control efforts were “commendable”, they were also unconstitutional. PTI launched another lawsuit in May 2018 to challenge the constitutionality of the city’s Tobacco-Free Generation Ordinance.²¹⁸
• The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Packaging and Labelling) Second Amendment Rules, 2018 text and pictorial health warnings law in India. PMI affiliate Godfrey Phillips India sought a stay of implementation of new legislation requiring health warnings to increase to cover 85% of the surface of cigarette packaging, from the High Court of Karnataka in Bangalore, India. The Court rejected the request for stay in August 2018. The legality of the Rules themselves was at the time pending in the Supreme Court.²²⁴
• The May 20, 2016 Decree plain packaging law in France. In December 2016, the Conseil d’Etat (the Council of State, the highest administrative jurisdiction in France) dismissed a six-part legal challenge jointly brought against the plain packaging law by JTI, Philip Morris France, BAT France, a tobacco paper manufacturer and The National Confederation of Tobacco Retailers of France (Confédération Nationale des Buralistes de France).²²⁵
• In 2013, the mayor of Popayán, a city in southwestern Colombia, issued a decree prohibiting tobacco sales within 500 metres of schools, libraries and health institutions. Following heavy lobbying from Coltabaco, a Philip Morris affiliate, the radius was decreased to 200 metres. Coltabaco sued Popayán in March 2015, arguing that a mayoral decree was insufficient to effect legitimate regulation. Coltabaco won its lawsuit in September 2015.²²⁶
• The Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products Regulations 2015 (UK). Following the passage of the legislation in March 2015, PMI and others launched a legal action, which it lost in May 2016 (the day before the legislation was due to come into force).²²⁷²²⁸
• The 2014 EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). PMI and BAT attempted to invalidate the TPD as a whole, or various provisions within it, but this legal challenge was dismissed in the European Court of Justice in May 2016.²²⁹ More details can be found on the page TPD: Legal Challenges.
• The Ministry of Public Health Notice of Rules, Procedures, and Conditions for the Display of Images, Warning Statements, and Contact Channels for Smoking Cessation on Cigarette Labels of 2013 (Thailand). In July 2013, Philip Morris Thailand and Japan Tobacco International (JTI) Thailand requested a temporary injunction against an increase of picture and text health warnings from 55 to 85 percent of the front and back of cigarette warnings. Though their request was initially granted in August 2013 in the Central Administrative Court of Thailand, the injunction was reversed in May 2014 by the Supreme Administrative Court following appeal by the government. PMI and JTI ultimately withdrew their legal challenge.²³⁰
• Following heavy criticism of its “Be Marboro” campaign worldwide (see below), Germany banned PMI from displaying “Be Marlboro” advertising in the country. A German court overturned the ban in 2015, stating that the wording of the advertisements did not explicitly target younger than legal age smokers.²³¹
• National Systems of Health Oversight RDC No. 14/2012 Brazil. The Brazil Health Regulatory Agency’s (ANVISA) resolution No. 14 banned tobacco additives and flavours. The National Confederation of Industry (Confederação Nacional da Indústria) challenged the ban as an unconstitutional use of regulatory power. In February 2018, the highest court in Brazil, the Supreme Federal Tribunal, upheld the 2012 ban and reaffirmed the right of ANVISA to regulate tobacco products.²³²
• The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Australia). PMI fiercely opposed the legislation, fearing that it might set a global precedent. The company fought this legislation unsuccessfully on three fronts:
  • World Trade Organization (WTO) challenge: In 2014, PMI supported a request by the Dominican Republic government before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, alleging that Australia’s plain packaging laws breach the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).²³³ Similar requests were submitted by Ukraine, Cuba, Indonesia and Honduras, and furthermore, a record number of more than 40 WTO members joined the dispute as third parties.²³⁴
  • Constitutional challenge: In March 2012, PMI supported a claim made by British American Tobacco (BAT) in December 2011 before the Australian High Court that plain packaging was in breach of the Australian constitution.²³⁵ On 15 August 2012, the Hight Court ruled that plain packaging was not in breach with the Australian constitution as there had been no acquisition of property as alleged by the tobacco companies.²³⁴
  • Bilateral Investment challenge: In 2011, PMI started legal proceedings against the Australian government for allegedly violating the terms of The Australia – Hong Kong Bilateral Investment Treaty.²³⁶ In December 2015, The Permanent Court of Arbitration issued a unanimous decision that it had no jurisdiction to hear the claim. For more information on all three claims go to Australia: Challenging Legislation.
• Executive Decree No. 611 passed on 3 June 2010 in Panamá. Philip Morris Panamá joined onto a claim of unconstitutionality brought by British American Tobacco (BAT) against a ban on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (TAPS) and tobacco product display at the point of sale. BAT Panama claimed the ban violated freedom of expression and property rights, among others. The Supreme Court ruled in May 2014 against BAT, noting that, among other things, freedom of expression could be restricted in order to protect public health.²³⁷
• 2010 Amendment to the 1973 Act relating to the Prevention of the Harmful Effects of Tobacco (the Tobacco Control Act) in Norway. The Norwegian display ban on tobacco products came into effect on 1 January 2010 after an amendment was passed by the government in favour of the prohibition of visible tobacco products, smoking accessories and vending machines of tobacco products. PMI unsuccessfully challenged the ban as imposing a barrier to trade; the Oslo District court ruled in favour of the display ban in September 2012.²³⁸
• Ordinance 514, dated 18 August 2008, and Decree 287/009 dated 15 June 2009 (Uruguay). PMI unsuccessfully challenged the Uruguayan Tobacco Control Act which included a mandate for 80% health warnings on tobacco packets. The case was decided in favour of public health in 2017.²³⁹ PMI brought its claim under the Switzerland-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty at the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. The tribunal ruled in favour of Uruguay in July 2016.²⁴⁰

Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products

As the harms from conventional products have become better understood, and tobacco control measures have been put in place, the cigarette market – from which tobacco companies make most of their profits – has started to shrink. To secure the industry’s longer-term future, transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have invested in, developed and marketed various newer nicotine and tobacco products.²⁴¹  

In January 2017, PMI issued a press release which stated that the company intended to move its business away from conventional tobacco products entirely (see Image 2).²⁴² The company’s much publicised vision for a “smoke-free” future is one in which PMI plays a central role in “[providing] better alternatives to smoking for those who don’t quit”.¹⁵⁶ Integral to this vision was the release of IQOS in 2014. By 2016, PMI was the market leader in heated tobacco products (HTPs), accounting for over 99% of the global HTP market.²²³ By 2018, PMI’s share of the global HTP market had fallen to around 80%.²²³²⁴³ PMI reported that by the end of 2019, IQOS was available in 52 markets, including the United States (US), and a number of lower income countries.²⁴⁴

• For more information on IQOS and PMI’s newer products see Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products: Philip Morris International and Heated Tobacco Products: Philip Morris International.
• See also PMI’s Promotion of IQOS Using the FDA’s 2020 Modified Risk Tobacco Product (MRTP) Order

In April 2019, a life insurance company Reviti was launched. Registered in the UK at Companies House, Reviti is a wholly owned subsidiary of PMI.²⁴⁵²⁴⁶ The London-based company specialises in offering policies to smokers, with discounts for those who reduce or switch to PMI’s newer products.²⁴⁷

In May 2022, PMI made an offer of US$16 billion deal to acquire Swedish Match, a manufacturer of snus and nicotine pouches, as well as chewing tobacco, snuff and cigars.²⁴⁸²⁴⁹ Swedish Match had planned to sell its cigar business but these plans were put on hold in March 2022.²⁵⁰ PMI CEO Jacek Olczak said of the deal: “An important aspect of this proposed combination is the opportunity in the U.S., which is the world’s largest market for smoke-free products.”²⁵¹PMI is also hoping to significantly increase its market share of newer nicotine products in Europe and Asia.²⁵² 

As of 28 November 2022, PMI had acquired over 90% of Swedish Match, gaining control of the company and enabling it to buy the remaining shares and take Swedish Match off the stock market.²⁵³²⁵⁴

• For details see Swedish Match

Tobacco companies, including PMI, also invest in therapeutic products, such as nicotine lozenges, gum and inhalers. More information can be found on this page: Tobacco Company Investments in Pharmaceutical & NRT Products

“Smoke-Free” Campaigns

PMI has run various “smoke-free” campaigns promoting its newer products, including “Hold My Light” (UK); “Unsmoke Your World” (global); “It’s Time” (targeting policy makers); and “Futuro sin Humo” (in Mexico).

• For details see: Philip Morris International: “Smoke-Free” campaigns

Participation in Global Platforms to Rehabilitate Image

PMI has attempted to gain access to many high-level international events as a means of “rehabilitating its image and securing influence over global institutions and policy elites”. Since January 2019, PMI presence has been documented at:²²³

January 2019

• World Economic Forum (WEF; Davos, Switzerland): PMI launched its first “white paper” to coincide with WEF. Though it was not an invited guest, PMI held a side-event co-hosted by the Wall Street Journal, and sponsored the Davos Playbook, Politico’s daily newsletter distributed to attendees.

June 2019

• (Group of 20) G20 Summit (Osaka, Japan): PMI took out a two-page advertisement in The Japan Times promoting its corporate transformation and reiterating the need for dialogue between decision-makers and industry.
• Cannes Lions International Film Festival of Creativity (Cannes, France): PMI attended Cannes to talk about newer tobacco products and potentially recruit celebrity activists to its cause.²⁵⁵ In addition, PMI had its own schedule of events, hosted by actress Rose McGowan and rapper Wycliff Jean. It also spoke in the festival’s Good Track stream alongside organisations including Greenpeace and UN Women. The decision to include PMI on the Good Track was heavily criticised in the light of “the ethics of proclaiming a smoke-free philosophy while continuing to sell billions of cigarettes a year”.²⁵⁶²⁵⁷

October 2019

• United Nations General Assembly (UNGA; New York City, USA): Though barred from participating directly in the UNGA, PMI hosted a parallel event at Concordia, a high-level event to foster partnerships between businesses, governments and UN agencies. In attendance were officials from the UN’s World Food Program, the UN Foundation and the World Bank as well as PMI’s Vice President of Global Partnerships and Cooperation, who spoke at the event. Bob Eccles, a paid PMI advisor, spoke at the UNGA during a side event on Exclusion and Engagement in Sustainable Investing.

TobaccoTactics Resources

• PMI Mobilised Support from Retailers
• PMI’s Anti-Plain Packaging Lobbying Campaign
• PMI’s Anti-PP Media Campaign
• PMI’s “Illicit Trade” Anti-Plain Packaging Campaign
• PMI IMPACT
• Philip Morris vs the Government of Uruguay
• Philip Morris’ PR Campaign Against the Display Ban
• Philip Morris’ Regulatory Litigation Action Plan Against the Display Ban
• Philip Morris’ Marlboro Brand Architecture
• Codentify
• Motorsport Sponsorship
• Digital Coding & Tracking Association (DCTA)
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World: How it Frames Itself for a detailed analysis of the ways in which the Foundation portrays itself and those who oppose the Foundation, plus the counter evidence to these portrayals
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World People
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World Grantees
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World Centres of Excellence
• Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products: Philip Morris International
• Heated Tobacco Products: Philip Morris International

Relevant Links

• Read the STOP report: Addiction At Any Cost: The Truth About Philip Morris International
• Philip Morris International company website
• Cancer Council Australia’s Critiques of KPMG Australia illicit tobacco trade reports
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World website
• PMI Impact website

TCRG Research

• The Philip Morris-funded Foundation for a Smoke-Free World: tax return sheds light on funding activities, T. Legg, S. Peeters, P. Chamberlain, A. Gilmore, The Lancet, 2019, 393(10190):2487-2488
• The revision of the 2014 European tobacco products directive: an analysis of the tobacco industry’s attempts to ‘break the health silo’, S. Peeters, H. Costa, D Stuckler, M. McKee, A. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2016, 25(1):108-117
• ‘It will harm business and increase illicit trade’: an evaluation of the relevance, quality and transparency of evidence submitted by transnational tobacco companies to the UK consultation on standardised packaging 2012, K. Evans-Reeves, J. Hatchard, A. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2015, 24(e2):e168-e177
• Illicit trade, tobacco industry-funded studies and policy influence in the EU and UK, G, Fooks, S. Peeters, K. Evans-Reeves, Tobacco Control, 2014, 23(1):81-83
• Transnational tobacco company interests in smokeless tobacco in Europe: Analysis of internal industry documents and contemporary industry materials, S. Peeters, A. Gilmore, PLoS Medicine, 2013, 10(9):1001506
• Towards a greater understanding of the illicit tobacco trade in Europe: a review of the PMI funded ‘Project Star’ report, A. Gilmore, A. Rowell, S. Gallus, A. Lugo, L. Joossens, M. Sims, 2013, Tobacco Control, doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2013-051240

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to the Bath TCRG’s list of publications.

References

The post Philip Morris International appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Tobacco Industry Use of Evidence to Oppose Policy

The tobacco industry’s attempts to deny the evidence, even when evidence exists, is a tactic aimed at influencing public opinion. Placing this argument in the public domain creates a level of doubt which permeates even when credible evidence is presented to the contrary. This tactic has been used to oppose earlier policies (such as advertising bans and smoke-free legislation) which were strongly associated with positive health outcomes and reductions in health inequalities.^{264265266267268269270271 272273}
Insisting on real world evidence before regulating, as the tobacco industry has argued in the case of plain packaging,²⁶³ would effectively place a block on all new laws likely to promote public health and welfare, irrespective of advances in scientific knowledge.
In opposing plain packaging, the tobacco industry has used the principles and processes (public consultations and impact assessments) of Better Regulation to support its argument that there is insufficient evidence to support the implementation of the policy.²⁷⁴ Better Regulation was lobbied for by the industry and requires risks, costs and benefits to be weighed against one another before new regulatory burdens are placed on businesses. ^275276277

Flawed Tobacco Industry Evidence

Australia – Critique of Tobacco Industry Graphic Health Warnings Research

A report by Deloitte (2011), commissioned by BAT, suggested that health warnings on cigarette packets had not been successful in reducing cigarette consumption and therefore plain packaging was unlikely to be effective.²⁷⁸ However, Cancer Council Victoria (Australia) reviewed the analyses forming the basis of this conclusion and found the methodology weak in several respects.²⁷⁹ For instance, Deloitte made an error in their analysis by starting it in 1990, whereas health warnings were introduced in 1987. In addition to this error, the data used were not actually consumption data but rather duty paid shipment volumes. It has been reported that duty paid does not necessarily amount to consumption because in some years cigarettes are over-produced and surplus is often kept in storage until needed.²⁸⁰ Looking only at BAT brands, Deloitte concluded that volumes did not decline any more steeply than normal. However, when data on all duty paid tobacco products was assessed, Cancer Council Victoria reported that excise and customs duty declined more than would be predicted following the introduction of health warnings.²⁷⁹

UK – Critiques of Industry Evidence that Plain Packaging Will Not Work

Peer-reviewed research has shown how global tobacco companies commissioned, cited and critiqued evidence as part of a campaign to prevent the introduction of plain packaging for their products in the UK.^263281282283
Tobacco companies used this strategy to argue that plain packaging “won’t work”. Evidence to support this claim was promoted through the media and in submissions to government.
This strategy was examined in a series of peer-reviewed research papers, which highlighted the misleading nature of tobacco companies’ evidence on plain packaging, emphasising that:

• Tobacco companies cited evidence that did not directly consider plain packaging to argue that regulation “won’t work”;²⁶³
• Evidential critiques commissioned by tobacco companies used misleading techniques to discredit public health research on plain packaging;²⁸¹
• Quoted statistics on illicit tobacco were over-estimated to exaggerate the risks of the policy.²⁸²²⁸³

The Importance of Branding and Packaging to the Tobacco Industry

Despite the tobacco industry’s claims that plain packaging will not work because packaging is not important to marketing, internal industry documents show how important tobacco branding is, with innovations (packaging and product) leading to a 10% increase in market share for BAT in 2011.²⁸⁴ Internal industry documents reveal a long held understanding by the tobacco industry that cigarette packets and tobacco pouches represent mobile advertisements. One Rothmans document from 1982, for example, stated that the company was:

“very aware that every customer carries the Rothmans logo, on the package, with him or her all the time. That package comes out many times a day, and every time it is seen makes a personal comment about the person who carries and shows it.”²⁸⁵

In 1994, Philip Morris said:

“In the absence of any other marketing messages, our packaging — comprised of the trademark, our design, color sic and information — is the sole communicator of our brand essence. Put another way — when you don’t have anything else — our packaging is our marketing.”²⁸⁶

The tobacco industry claims that cigarette packaging has no bearing on people’s smoking behaviour, however advertising works for every other industry. The tobacco industry has long argued that tobacco advertising is aimed at building brand loyalty, not trying to persuade young people to smoke or smokers to continue and not quit. However, others within the advertising industry have disputed this categorically.
Advertising executive Emerson Foote, former Chairman of the Board of McCann-Erickson, which handled $20 million in tobacco account sales, argued that:

“The cigarette industry has been artfully maintaining that cigarette advertising has nothing to do with total sales. This is complete and utter nonsense. I am always amused by the suggestion that advertising, a function that has been shown to increase consumption of virtually every other product, somehow miraculously fails to work for tobacco products.”²⁸⁷

In 2004, BAT acknowledged packaging innovations as the reason for the increased success of their Dunhill brand: “In Australia and Taiwan, the continued success of the new packaging led to increased volumes of 7 per cent and 20 per cent respectively”.²⁸⁸

Global – Pre-Implementation Evidence For Plain Packaging

Prior to the implementation of plain packaging in Australia a large volume of peer-reviewed research supported the measure. The research showed that when branding is removed from tobacco packaging, health warnings are more salient²⁸⁹²⁹⁰ packs appear less attractive and of a lower quality, and there is less confusion about the relative harm from different brands, e.g. Marlboro gold packs are viewed as less harmful than Marlboro red packs.²⁷⁹²⁸⁹ Furthermore, a number of studies evaluated in a systematic review for the UK Department of Health found that cigarette packaging influences children and is an important consideration in children’s smoking behaviour.²⁸⁹ A few examples of studies included in the systematic review are:

• A study of school children in Canada and the US found that the majority of children, when asked, would prefer to take home a branded rather than a plain cigarette pack as the plain pack was “ugly” and “boring”.^291292293
• A Scottish study found that amongst 10-17 year olds, plain cigarette packs were seen by the majority as “unattractive”, “uncool” and “a pack you would not like to be seen with”.²⁹⁴

Prior to the implementation of the policy in the UK and Ireland, two plain packaging evidence reviews by both the UK (the Chantler Review), and Irish Governments (the Hammond Review) concluded that that this population-scale measure is likely to be effective in reducing youth uptake of smoking. For example, in the UK, Sir Cyril Chantler’s review concluded that:

“Having reviewed the evidence it is in my view highly likely that standardised packaging would serve to reduce the rate of children taking up smoking and implausible that it would increase the consumption of tobacco. I am persuaded that branded packaging plays an important role in encouraging young people to smoke and in consolidating the habit irrespective of the intentions of the industry. Although I have not seen evidence that allows me to quantify the size of the likely impact of standardised packaging, I am satisfied that the body of evidence shows that standardised packaging, in conjunction with the current tobacco control regime, is very likely to lead to a modest but important reduction over time on the uptake and prevalence of smoking and thus have a positive impact on public health.”²⁹⁵

While the Hammond Review, commissioned by the Irish Government, concluded:

“The evidence indicates that tobacco packaging is a critically important form of tobacco promotion, particularly in jurisdictions with comprehensive advertising and marketing restrictions, such as Ireland. The evidence indicates that plain packaging reduces false beliefs about the risks of smoking, increases the efficacy of health warnings, reduces consumer appeal among youth and young adults, and may promote smoking cessation among established smokers.
Overall, there is very strong evidence that plain packaging would be effective in regards to four of Ireland’s specific policy objectives:

• Prevent non-smokers including children and young people from starting to smoke;
• Encourage, motivate and support current smokers to quit;
• Reduce recidivism rates among those who have quit;
• Limit the societal impacts of smoking and protect society, especially those under 18 years, from the marketing practices of the tobacco industry.”²⁹⁶

Australia – Early Evidence that Plain Packaging Works

Following the introduction of plain packaging in Australia in December 2012, calls to Quitline increased,²⁹⁷ individual pack display decreased,²⁹⁸ cigarette sales fell 3.4%,²⁹⁹ there was no increase in transaction times, no defection to larger stores to make tobacco purchases, and no impact on the illicit trade.^300301302
These early policy outcomes contradicted the claims made by tobacco companies in the UK, and complement the Tobacco Control Research Group’s research, which has raised serious questions about the trustworthiness and scientific value of tobacco companies’ arguments that plain packaging “won’t work”.

Australia – Evidence from the Post-Implementation Tobacco Plain Packaging Evaluation

In order to monitor the outcomes of the 2011 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act, in 2012 the Australian Department of Health commissioned a National Monthly Tobacco Plain Packaging Tracking Survey of the early effects of plain packaging on adolescents. Findings were reported in several studies published in a special issue of Tobacco Control. A Post-Implementation Review of Tobacco Plain Packaging was also published in 2016.

Results of Australia’s National Monthly Tobacco Plain Packaging Tracking Survey

Four hundred smokers and recent quitters were surveyed every four weeks between April 2012 and March 2014, with a follow up survey in May 2014. Post-implementation plain packaging legislation:

• Reduced appeal of packs³⁰³;
• Increased health warning effectiveness;
• Corrected some misperceptions of harms;
• Increased rates of quitting cognitions and quit attempts.³⁰⁴

Evaluation of the Effects of Plain Packaging on Australian Adolescents

A 2013 evaluation survey examined the impact of plain tobacco packaging and enhanced graphic health warnings on adolescents’ perceptions of pack images, brand differences and on their cognitive processing. Comparisons of results from 2011 and 2013 showed that:

• The appeal of cigarette packs and brands to Australian adolescents decreased significantly;³⁰⁵;
• Acknowledgement of negative health effects of smoking among Australian adolescents remained high; but, apart from bladder cancer, new requirements for packaging and health warnings did not increase adolescents cognitive processing of warning information;³⁰⁶.

Post-Implementation Review of Tobacco Plain Packaging in Australia

In 2016, in the Post-Implementation Review of Tobacco Plain Packaging, the Australian Department of Health linked the introduction of tobacco plain packaging with a reduction in daily smoking prevalence:

“The 2013 NDSHS collected data from nearly 24,000 people across Australia from 31 July to 1 December 2013, (notably, after the introduction of the tobacco plain packaging measure and mostly before the first of a series of four 12.5% tobacco excise increases on 1 December 2013). The results of the 2013 NDSHS show that daily smoking prevalence among Australians aged 14 years and over has fallen significantly from 15.1% in 2010 to 12.8% in 2013, a drop of 15%. This included declines in all Australian states and territories (except Tasmania).”³⁰⁷

Tobacco Industry Response to the Australian Post-Implementation Review (PIR)

Philip Morris Limited (PMI) made a submission to the PIR consultation³⁰⁷ which raised concerns about the PIR process.³⁰⁸ The submission sought to widen the scope of the Review beyond the impacts on smoking prevalence and the denormalising effects of plain packaging. It asserted that a ‘compliant’ PIR would need to include a ‘cost-benefit analysis’ of the policy which includes consideration of any impact on the illicit tobacco trade and on the structure of the tobacco market. The PMI submission cited a KPMG report on illicit tobacco in Australia.³⁰⁹ Earlier reports from this source has previously been rejected by the Australian Borders and Customs Agency and peer-reviewed research, which maintains there has been no impact on the illicit trade.^301302310
Similarly replicating previous tactics, Japan Tobacco International (JTI)’s press release following the release of Australia’s PIR³¹¹ questioned the credibility of the analysis.³¹²

Countering Industry Arguments Against Plain Packaging

• It Breaches Intellectual Property Rights
• It will Lead to Increased Smuggling
• The Nanny State is going Too Far
• It will Cost Small Businesses

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Plain Packaging
• EU Better Regulation
• 2012 Consultation

TCRG Research

• Evidence on Plain Packaging
• Peer-Reviewed Research

References

The post Countering Industry Arguments Against Plain Packaging: No Evidence Plain Packaging Will Work appeared first on TobaccoTactics.