Media Strategy Archives - TobaccoTactics https://tobaccotactics.org/topics/media-strategy/ The essential source for rigorous research on the tobacco industry Fri, 02 Jun 2023 12:15:47 +0000 en-GB hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.4.3 https://tobaccotactics.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/tt-logo-redrawn-gray.svg Media Strategy Archives - TobaccoTactics https://tobaccotactics.org/topics/media-strategy/ 32 32 Nick Tennant https://tobaccotactics.org/article/nick-tennant/ Tue, 10 Mar 2020 14:22:25 +0000

Nick Tennant worked for the public relations company PR21, on a contract for the Tobacco Alliance. The contract was awarded to PR21 by Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association in December 2000. Tennant was part of the team that pitched for the work and was responsible for media relations.

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Nick Tennant worked for the public relations company PR21, on a contract for the Tobacco Alliance.
The contract was awarded to PR21 by Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association in December 2000.
Tennant was part of the team that pitched for the work and was responsible for media relations.1

References

  1. TMA, Tobacco Alliance Account, 19 December 2000, accessed 30 January 2012

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PR21 https://tobaccotactics.org/article/pr21/ Tue, 10 Mar 2020 14:22:24 +0000 PR21 was a public relations company in the UK that worked for the tobacco industry. The firm was launched in London in October 2000 by Edelman, one of the world’s largest PR companies. The company’s London arm was shut down in March 2004 after losing both major clients and senior staff. The company’s US arm […]

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PR21 was a public relations company in the UK that worked for the tobacco industry.
The firm was launched in London in October 2000 by Edelman, one of the world’s largest PR companies.23
The company’s London arm was shut down in March 2004 after losing both major clients and senior staff.4 The company’s US arm later changed its name to Zeno Group.5

Work for the Tobacco Industry

The Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association (TMA) awarded the PR contract for the Tobacco Alliance to PR21 in December 2000.
Details of its pitch are on the Tobacco Retailers Alliance page. The team included:

The company started the work on 15 January 2001. Its parent company Edelman had previously had the contract.6
Hopkins and Brice attended meetings of the TMA’s ‘Campaign Group.7

References

  1. TMA, Tobacco Alliance Account, 19 December 2000, accessed 30 January 2012
  2. Edelman, Edelman and Zeno Group Announce Expansion in Technology, 17 November 2011, accessed 30 January 2012
  3. STOP PRESS: Kaye launches rebranded Rowland as PR 21, PR Week, 8 September 2000, accessed 30 January 2012
  4. Tom Williams, ‘PR21 finally pulls plug on London operation’, PR Week, 5 March 2004, accessed 30 January 2012
  5. PR Week,‘News in brief’, 15 October 2004, accessed 30 January 2012
  6. TMA, Tobacco Alliance Account, 19 December 2000, accessed 30 January 2012
  7. TMA, Campaign Group Meeting on 11th January 2001, 11 January 2001, accessed 30 January 2012

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Tobacco Industry Research Committee https://tobaccotactics.org/article/tobacco-industry-research-committee/ Fri, 07 Feb 2020 10:30:34 +0000 The Tobacco Industry Research Committee was founded in December 1953 in response to evidence linking tobacco smoking to serious illness such as lung cancer and heart disease. Image 1 https://content.tobaccotactics.org/legacy/attachments/15048-ACOSH-BigTobacco-r2FINAL.pdf Australian Council on Smoking & Health Parody of the 1953 NYC meeting between the tobacco industry and PR group Hill & Knowlton On 14 December […]

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The Tobacco Industry Research Committee was founded in December 1953 in response to evidence linking tobacco smoking to serious illness such as lung cancer and heart disease.8

Image 1 https://content.tobaccotactics.org/legacy/attachments/15048-ACOSH-BigTobacco-r2FINAL.pdf Australian Council on Smoking & Health Parody of the 1953 NYC meeting between the tobacco industry and PR group Hill & Knowlton

On 14 December 1953, organised by Paul M. Hahn president of the American Tobacco Company, the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the biggest tobacco companies in America met with public relations (PR) company Hill & Knowlton at the Plaza Hotel in New York City to plan how they were going to respond to the scientific research that showed that there was a link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. 910 As a result of this meeting the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) was established. The committee was run by PR firm Hill & Knowlton on behalf of the tobacco industry and was housed one floor below Hill & Knowlton’s offices within the Empire State Building in New York City.
In January 1954, one of the committee’s first acts was to publish the “Frank Statement” (Image 2). This act marked the start of the industry’s prolific use of doubt as an effective tactic to prevent smokers from quitting and to protect themselves from litigation. The Frank Statement was published in 448 newspapers throughout the United States with an estimated reach of approximately 43 million people nationwide. In addition the Frank Statement was widely reported on both the radio and the television.
The 1954 statement11 claimed:

1. That medical research of recent years indicates many possible causes of lung cancer.

2. That there is no agreement among the authorities regarding what the cause is.

3. That there is no proof that cigarette smoking is one of the causes.

4. That statistics purporting to link cigarette smoking with the disease could apply with equal force to any one of many other aspects of modern life. Indeed the validity of the statistics themselves is questioned by numerous scientists

Image 2 http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qxp91e00/pdf The Frank Statement, 1954

The statement also described what the TIRC were going to do to address the concerns that smoking causes cancer:

1. We are pledging aid and assistance to the research effort into all phases of tobacco use and health. This joint financial aid will of course be in addition to what is already being contributed by individual companies.

2. For this purpose we are establishing a joint industry group consisting initially of the undersigned. This group will be known as TOBACCO INDUSTRY RESEARCH COMMITTEE.

3. In charge of the research activities of the Committee will be a scientist of unimpeachable integrity and national repute. In addition there will be an Advisory Board of scientists disinterested in the cigarette industry. A group of distinguished men from medicine, science and education will be invited to serve on this Board. These scientists will advise the Committee on its research activities.

Despite the claims of the Frank Statement and the TIRC mission statement which stated the aim of the TIRC was ‘’to aid and assist research into tobacco use and health, and particularly into the alleged relationship between the use of tobacco and lung cancer, and to make available to the public factual information on this subject’’ the TIRC rarely conducted or supported any research which might reveal a link between smoking and cancer. In 1959, Clarence Cook Little, the scientific director of the TIRC listed the TIRC research areas.

1. Heredity

2. Infection

3. Nutrition

4. Hormones

5. Nervous strain or tension

6. Environmental factors

The amount of money spent on research was publically promoted to show the public that despite spending vast sums of money on research there still wasn’t conclusive evidence about the link between smoking and cancer. Over a period of approximately 40 years the industry disclosed that it had funded research by the TIRC to the tune of over $300 million. The TIRC disclosed monies spent as this was important PR, showing that the industry was investing millions to make sure that tobacco was safe for consumers.
In chapter 16 of his book titled Golden Holocaust, science historian Robert Proctor from Stanford University in the United States, details the long history of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee, from its conception by the tobacco industry under the advice of Hill & Knowlton, the scientists recruited, the research produced, the selective outputs publicised up until its eventual dissolution as a term of the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998.
In March 1964 the TIRC was renamed the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR).
As part of the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998, the TIRC/CTR, the Tobacco Institute and the (CIAR) were ordered to be disbanded. 12 The latter was responsible for casting doubt on the scientific evidence regarding the significant health impacts of second-hand smoke.

Quotes about the Tobacco Industry Research Committee

By as early as 1958, both the public health community and the tobacco industry itself expressed views that it was obvious that the TIRC was little more than a PR activity.
According to the American Cancer Society in 1958, the whole point of the TIRC was:

‘’to deny repeatedly’’ and ‘’mislead’’ and ‘’to convince the trusting tobacco-consuming public of the industry’s eleemosynary, ‘lasting interest in people’s health’ ‘’13

A similar view is presented by the tobacco industry and it’s associates as documented in private documents that can be found in the tobacco documents library:

‘’the constantly reiterated ‘not proven’ statements in the face of mounting contrary evidence has thoroughly discredited the TIRC, and the SAB Advisory Board of TIRC is supporting almost without exception project that are not related directly to smoking and lung cancer’’ (Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, 1958)14

’’Most of the TIRC research has been diffuse and of a broad, basic nature not designed to specifically test the anti-cigarette theory.’’ (Covington & Burling, 1963) 15

In a 1998 law suit ‘’United States Vs Philip Morris’’ Judge Gladys Kessler stated that the TIRC was:

‘’a sophisticated public relations vehicle based on the premise of conducting independent scientific research – to deny the harms of smoking and reassure the public.’’ 16

References

  1. TMA, Tobacco Alliance Account, 19 December 2000, accessed 30 January 2012
  2. Edelman, Edelman and Zeno Group Announce Expansion in Technology, 17 November 2011, accessed 30 January 2012
  3. STOP PRESS: Kaye launches rebranded Rowland as PR 21, PR Week, 8 September 2000, accessed 30 January 2012
  4. Tom Williams, ‘PR21 finally pulls plug on London operation’, PR Week, 5 March 2004, accessed 30 January 2012
  5. PR Week,‘News in brief’, 15 October 2004, accessed 30 January 2012
  6. TMA, Tobacco Alliance Account, 19 December 2000, accessed 30 January 2012
  7. TMA, Campaign Group Meeting on 11th January 2001, 11 January 2001, accessed 30 January 2012
  8. A. M. Brandt, Inventing conflicts of interest: A history of tobacco industry tactics, American Journal of Public Health, 2012, 102(1), 63-71
  9. Australian Council on Smoking & Health, Big Tobacco: A story of lies, fraud & deceit, 2011, accessed November 2012
  10. R.N. Proctor, Golden Holocaust: Origins of the cigarette catastrophe and the case for abolition. 2011. Berkeley: University of California Press
  11. Tobacco Industry Research Committee, A Frank Statement January 1954, accessed November 2012
  12. Council for Tobacco Research, The Council for tobacco research – USA, Inc. plan of corporate dissolution and distribution of assets with resolutions adopting plan, 20 October 1998, accessed November 2012
  13. American Cancer Society, CA – Bulletin of Cancer Progress, March-April 1958, p71
  14. State of Minnesota Vs Philip Morris and others File no.C1-94-8565, 26 January 1998, accessed November 2012
  15. Covington & Burling, Confidential report prepared by TI outside counsel reflecting TI outside counsel’s advice and thoughts regarding industry strategy, January 1963, accessed November 2012
  16. United States District Court: Civil Action Number 99-2496 (GK), 1998, accessed November 2012

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Reason Foundation https://tobaccotactics.org/article/reason-foundation/ Fri, 07 Feb 2020 10:29:08 +0000 Background The Reason Foundation is an American think tank which describes its mission as “advancing a free society by developing, applying, and promoting libertarian principles, including individual liberty, free markets, and the rule of law”. It’s states that it aims to “change the way people think about issues, and promote policies that allow and encourage […]

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Background

The Reason Foundation is an American think tank which describes its mission as “advancing a free society by developing, applying, and promoting libertarian principles, including individual liberty, free markets, and the rule of law”. It’s states that it aims to “change the way people think about issues, and promote policies that allow and encourage individuals and voluntary institutions to flourish”. It also identifies itself as an institution that engages in policy research.17

Relationship with the Tobacco Industry

Tobacco industry funding

The Reason Foundation has accepted funding from Altria since 2011.181920

It reported receiving contributions worth close to US$14 million in its 2021 financial statements, however, no funders were named.21

Historical industry funding

  • The 1981/1982 Annual Report of the Reason Foundation listed Brown & Williamson Tobacco, a subsidiary of British American Tobacco, as a “Contributor”.22
  • Philip Morris USA’s 1993 contribution report disclosed contributing $10,000 to the Reason Foundation in 1993, and $40,000 in the previous year as “General Support”.23
  • Philip Morris USA also reported contributions of $20,000 in 2000, with a similar sum proposed for the following year.24

Communicating Pro-Tobacco Messages

The think tank has a number of different communication channels, namely, Reason magazine, a blog and a TV channel. Each of these channels has promoted anti-regulation messages in relation to tobacco tax measures, plain packaging, regulations to control e-cigarette use and menthol bans.25

There has also been repeated criticism of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and its approach to harm reduction.262728

Interference at COP

The FCTC Conference of the Parties (COP) is the governing body which keeps the implementation of the FCTC under review.29

COP7

In September 2016, a few weeks before COP7, Julian Morris, the Reason Foundation’s Vice President of Research, authored a policy brief in which he argued that the World Health Organization’s (WHO) opposition to tobacco harm reduction was a threat to public health. He accused the FCTC of being a threat to good governance and transparency, because the two preceding COPs in 2012 and 2014 did not allow the participation of the “affected”, namely, tobacco users, vendors, and farmers. According to Morris, the WHO ought to be in favour of e-cigarettes and harm reduction.30

COP9

In February 2021, the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Vaping, set up an inquiry into COP 9 “to collect evidence and issue a report on the FCTC’s Conference of Parties 9”.31 Guy Bentley, director of Consumer Freedom at the Reason Foundation,32 made a submission to the inquiry which supported the use of “reduced-risk nicotine products” and criticised the FCTC for a lack of focus on harm reduction strategies.33

It also argued that “As a consequence of sidelining harm reduction strategies and limiting input for evidence and guidance, the FCTC has failed to achieve its aim of reducing tobacco use”, and that there was a lack of diversity in voices heard around harm reduction.33

Tobacco Tax

The Reason Foundation has regularly argued against tobacco tax increases in the United States (US), using common industry arguments.

In 2021, it spoke out against proposed federal tobacco and nicotine product tax increases, stating that “high taxes don’t push most smokers to quit” and that the changes would unfairly impact low and middle-income Americans. It also argued that tax increases could fuel tobacco smuggling, threaten community safety, and lead to job losses among retailers.3435

Prior to this, the Reason Foundation strongly opposed proposed tobacco tax increases in three states in the US in 2016, arguing that the government was making money at the expense of smokers.363738 It engaged in a similar campaign in 2014, claiming that in Canada, increased tobacco tax led to an increase in the illicit tobacco trade.39

Newer nicotine and tobacco products

The Reason Foundation has argued that increased regulations around the sale and use of e-cigarettes would harm public health.404142 It has also opposed tax increases on e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products (HTPs), arguing that they would be highly regressive and have a devastating impact on public health.43

The Reason Foundation has published articles supporting the use of HTPs, including PMI’s IQOS.4445 It has also stated “This harm-reduction approach offers a win-win whereby businesses and jobs are created and thrive by making it as enjoyable as possible for people to quit smoking”.46

Menthol and flavoured tobacco products

The Reason Foundation has regularly opposed banning the use of menthol as a characterizing flavour in cigarettes in the US, again using common industry arguments.

In July 2022, it submitted a public comment to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) arguing that the proposed US-wide ban47 “will not present significant public health benefits” and “prohibition will result in a host of unintended consequences, including increased tobacco smuggling, burdens on law enforcement, and more frequent interactions between law enforcement and minority communities”.25

It has also published several articles opposing the ban, regularly using the arguments that it would create an illicit market that would disproportionally effect black people,4849 and that the federal government was denying their “moral agency”.50

In February 2023, Reason Foundation policy analyst, Jacob James Rich, published a non peer-reviewed analysis of cigarette sales in Massachusetts, following the state’s ban on the sale of flavoured tobacco products, including menthol cigarettes, in 2020.5152 This paper stated that as a result of the law, an increase in cigarettes sales was seen in the states boarding Massachusetts, outweighing the sales decline of menthol cigarettes in Massachusetts. However, research has shown that most neighbouring states did not see increases in overall tobacco sales;53 any increases that were seen, were not statistically significant;54 and the decline in cigarette sales in Massachusetts greatly outweighed any increase in bordering states.5556

An associated commentary article published by the Reason Foundation also stated that the ban “primarily sent buyers to other states and illicit markets, so other cities and states should consider the real-world impacts of implementing similar prohibitions”. However, evidence of an increase in illicit trade is not provided.57 Academic research shows that menthol bans are effective public health measures, and there is little evidence that they increase illicit trade.

The Reason Foundation has spoken out against other US state flavoured tobacco product bans, including those proposed in Denver,58 Colorado59 and New York.60

Plain Packaging

The Reason Foundation has spoken out against plain packaging, claiming that the policy would not stop smokers from smoking.61

Staff with tobacco industry links

The Reason Foundation provides a list of its staff on its website.62 The following staff member has a history of tobacco industry engagement:

  • Jacob Sullum, Senior Editor of Reason Magazine, has been a member of the Foundation since the late 1980s. He published many books, articles and reports favourable to the tobacco industry and was featured in a tobacco industry-led campaign against second hand smoking regulations.636465666768
  • Guy Bentley, Director of Consumer Freedom, and Editor of the Reason Foundation’s Harm Reduction Newsletter, previously contributed to a report on “sin taxes” by the Adam Smith Institute (ASI).32 ASI has a history of accepting funding from the tobacco industry.

TobaccoTactics Resources

Relevant Link

References

  1. TMA, Tobacco Alliance Account, 19 December 2000, accessed 30 January 2012
  2. Edelman, Edelman and Zeno Group Announce Expansion in Technology, 17 November 2011, accessed 30 January 2012
  3. STOP PRESS: Kaye launches rebranded Rowland as PR 21, PR Week, 8 September 2000, accessed 30 January 2012
  4. Tom Williams, ‘PR21 finally pulls plug on London operation’, PR Week, 5 March 2004, accessed 30 January 2012
  5. PR Week,‘News in brief’, 15 October 2004, accessed 30 January 2012
  6. TMA, Tobacco Alliance Account, 19 December 2000, accessed 30 January 2012
  7. TMA, Campaign Group Meeting on 11th January 2001, 11 January 2001, accessed 30 January 2012
  8. A. M. Brandt, Inventing conflicts of interest: A history of tobacco industry tactics, American Journal of Public Health, 2012, 102(1), 63-71
  9. Australian Council on Smoking & Health, Big Tobacco: A story of lies, fraud & deceit, 2011, accessed November 2012
  10. R.N. Proctor, Golden Holocaust: Origins of the cigarette catastrophe and the case for abolition. 2011. Berkeley: University of California Press
  11. Tobacco Industry Research Committee, A Frank Statement January 1954, accessed November 2012
  12. Council for Tobacco Research, The Council for tobacco research – USA, Inc. plan of corporate dissolution and distribution of assets with resolutions adopting plan, 20 October 1998, accessed November 2012
  13. American Cancer Society, CA – Bulletin of Cancer Progress, March-April 1958, p71
  14. State of Minnesota Vs Philip Morris and others File no.C1-94-8565, 26 January 1998, accessed November 2012
  15. Covington & Burling, Confidential report prepared by TI outside counsel reflecting TI outside counsel’s advice and thoughts regarding industry strategy, January 1963, accessed November 2012
  16. United States District Court: Civil Action Number 99-2496 (GK), 1998, accessed November 2012
  17. Reason Foundation, About Us, undated, accessed September 2022
  18. Altria, Altria Grantees List 2011,website, undated, accessed April 2023
  19. Altria, Altria Grantees List 2021, website, undated, accessed September 2022
  20. Altria, Altria Grantees List 2022, website, undated, accessed April 2023
  21. The Reason Foundation, Financial statements for the year ended September 30, 2021, 2021, accessed October 2022
  22. T. Gage, , R. Sheaffer, R. Kidwell et al. The Reason Foundation: Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981/82, Tobacco Institute Records; RPCI Tobacco Institute and Council for Tobacco Research Records. Truth Tobacco Industry Documents, Bates no: TI12770195-TI12770218, accessed December 2016
  23. Unknown, 1993 Corporate Contributions Report for PM USA/NYO, Truth Tobacco Industry Documents, Bates no: 930000, accessed December 2016
  24. Unknown, Public Policy Grants Proposed 2001 Budget, Philip Morris Records, Truth Tobacco Industry Documents, Bates no: 20010000, accessed December 2016
  25. abReason Foundation, submission to Dr. Robert Califf, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, Docket No. FDA-2021-N-1349 Tobacco Product Standard for Menthol in Cigarettes, July 2022, accessed October 2022
  26. G. Bentley/Reason Foundation, Four reasons to reject a federal tobacco tax increase, commentary, October 2021, accessed October 2022
  27. Reason Foundation, The FDA’s New and Improved Cigarette Warning Labels, Video, August 2021, accessed October 2022
  28. Reason Foundation, Welcome to the nicotine prohibition era, magazine, May 2022, accessed October 2022
  29. WHO FCTC, Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, undated, accessed February 2017
  30. J. Morris/Reason Foundation, Reason Foundation Policy Brief No. 136 – The WHO’s Opposition to Tobacco Harm Reduction: A Threat to Public Health?, website, 2016, accessed December 2016
  31. All Party Parliamentary Group for Vaping, COP INQUIRY, website homepage, archived 27 November 2020, accessed February 2020
  32. abReason Foundation, Guy Bentley, website, undated, accessed July 2019
  33. abAPPG for Vaping (E-Cigarettes), COP Enquiry website: Submissions, undated, accessed March 2021
  34. G. Bentley/Reason Foundation, Congress considers tobacco tax increase, website, October 2021, accessed November 2021
  35. G.Bentley, Four reasons to reject a federal tobacco tax increase, Reason Foundation, October 2021, accessed July 2022
  36. B. Fojtik/Reason Foundation, North Dakota’s Cigarette Tax Measure Looks Like a Blank Check for Government Spending, website, 2016, accessed December 2016
  37. B. Fojtik/Reason Foundation, Cigarette Taxes and Spending Requirements for Anti-Tobacco Programs Don’t Belong In Colorado’s State Constitution, Reason Foundation, 2016, accessed December 2016
  38. B. Fojtik/Reason Foundation, California Shouldn’t Create Constitutional Workarounds to Target Smokers With Tax Increases, Reason Foundation, 2016, accessed December 2016
  39. K. Furtick, C. Malcolm, A. Randazzo/Reason Foundation, Reason Foundation Policy Brief No. 113 – The Effect of Cigarette Tax Rates on Illicit Trade: Lessons Learned in Canada, website, 2014, accessed December 2016
  40. J. Sullum/Reason Foundation, California Bill to Restrict E-Cigarettes Would Harm Public Health, website, 2015, accessed December 2016
  41. J. Morris, A.U. Khan/Reason Foundation, The Vapour Revolution: How Bottom-Up Innovation Is Saving Lives and Prospects for India, Reason Foundation, August 2016, accessed December 2016
  42. Reason Foundation, Harm Reduction Newsletter, website, archived September 2021, accessed October 2022
  43. G.Bentley/ Reason Foundation, House Democrats’ tax on e-cigarettes would lead to millions more smokers, Reason Foundation, November 2021, accessed February 2022
  44. G.Bentley/Reason Foundation, Nicotine and Harm Reduction Newsletter – May 2019, Reason Foundation, May 2019, Septmeber 2020
  45. G.Bentley/Reason Foundation, FDA Says IQOS Tobacco Products Reduce Exposure to Harmful Chemicals Found In Cigarette Smoke, Reason Foundation, July 2020, accessed August 2020
  46. G.Bentley/Reason Foundation, Heat-Not-Burn Tobacco: The Next Wave Of A Harm-Reduction Revolution, Reason Foundation, March 2017, accessed December 2020
  47. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Proposes Rules Prohibiting Menthol Cigarettes and Flavored Cigars to Prevent Youth Initiation, Significantly Reduce Tobacco-Related Disease and Death, press release, 28 April 2022, accessed May 2022
  48. G. Bentley/Reason Foundation, 10 Reasons Why the FDA Should Not Ban Menthol Cigarettes, Reason Foundation, commentary, April 2021, archived May 2022, accessed October 2022
  49. M. Minton/Reason Foundation, The FDA’s deadly menthol miscalculation, Reason Foundation, commentary, August 2022, accessed October 2022
  50. J.Sullum/Reason Foundation, The FDA’s Menthol Cigarette Ban Is a ‘Racial Justice’ Issue, but Not in the Way Its Supporters Mean, Reason magazine, 28 April 2022, accessed April 2023
  51. J.J. Rich, Estimates of Cross-Border Menthol Cigarette Sales Following the Comprehensive Tobacco Flavor Ban in Massachusetts, medRxiv, Preprint, 27 April 2022, doi: 10.1101/2022.04.24.22274236
  52. Reason Foundation, Reason Foundation Experts: Jacob James Rich, website, accessed May 2023
  53. M. Kingsley, H. McGinnes, G. Song et al, Impact of Massachusetts’ Statewide Sales Restriction on Flavored and Menthol Tobacco Products on Tobacco Sales in Massachusetts and Surrounding States, June 2020, Am J Public Health, August 2022; 112(8): pp 1147–1150. doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2022.306879
  54. FRM. Ali, BA. King, EL.Seaman, et al, Impact of Massachusetts law prohibiting flavored tobacco products sales on cross-border cigarette sales. September 2022. PLoS ONE 17(9): e0274022. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0274022
  55. S. Asare, A. Majmundar, J. Lee Westmaas , Spatial Analysis of Changes in Cigarette Sales in Massachusetts and Bordering States Following the Massachusetts Menthol Flavor Ban. JAMA Network Open, September 2022; 1;5(9):e2232103. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2022.32103
  56. Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, Impact of restricting the sale of flavoured tobacco products: the Massachusetts experience, 4 April 2023, accessed April 2023
  57. JJ. Rich, J.Campbell/Reason Foundation, Commentary: The effect of menthol bans on cigarette sales: Evidence from Massachusetts, Reason Foundation, February 2023, accessed April 2023
  58. G. Bentley/Reason Foundation, Denver shouldn’t ban flavored tobacco products, Reason Foundation, December 2021, accessed February 2022
  59. G. Bentley/Reason Foundation, Colorado should rethink potential tobacco prohibitions, Reason Foundation, March 2022, accessed March 2022
  60. G. Bentley/Reason Foundation, New York shouldn’t ban flavored tobacco products, Reason Foundation, February 2023, accessed March 2023
  61. J. Morris/ Reason Foundation, Reason Foundation Policy Brief No. 117 – Smoking, Plain Packaging and Public Health, Reason Foundation, 2014, accessed December 2016, archived April 2023
  62. Reason Foundation, Staff Index, undated, accessed September 2022
  63. Reason Foundation, Reason Foundation Experts: Jacob Sullum, accessed December 2016
  64. S.W. Moskowitz, J.H. Robinson. RJ Reynolds Records, WEBSITE. 1999 August 17; 1999 August 18, Truth Tobacco Industry Documents, Bates no: 531907107-531907111, December 2016
  65. T. Borelli. 1995 October 11. Sullum, Philip Morris Records, Truth Tobacco Industry Documents, Bates no: 2048852841B, accessed December 2016
  66. D. Colby. Philip Morris Records, Ads Jacob Sullum /Media Critic. 1995 October 17, Truth Tobacco Industry Documents, Bates no: 2048852778, accessed December 2016
  67. D.J. Theroux. RJ Reynolds Records. Independent institute. Our phone call, 2000 October 23, Truth Tobacco Industry Documents, Bates no: 532132812-532132814, December 2016
  68. Philip Morris, T. Borelli. Philip Morris Records. Unknown. 1994 August 31, Truth Tobacco Industry Documents, Bates no: 2072494406, December 2016

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Will O’Reilly https://tobaccotactics.org/article/will-o-reilly/ Wed, 05 Feb 2020 22:19:28 +0000 Background In the UK, the tobacco industry has employed a tactic of using ex-Police officers to front its campaigns against the Point of Sale Display Ban and against plain packaging. This is a classic use of the third party technique. Working for PMI Image 1: PMI’s media messengers, PMI leaked powerpoint slide 2013 Since late […]

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Background

In the UK, the tobacco industry has employed a tactic of using ex-Police officers to front its campaigns against the Point of Sale Display Ban and against plain packaging. This is a classic use of the third party technique.

Working for PMI

Image 1: PMI’s media messengers, PMI leaked powerpoint slide 2013

Since late 2011, Will O’Reilly, former Detective Chief Inspector with the Metropolitan Police, has been appearing in the press as a so-called “expert” working for Philip Morris International (PMI) tackling tobacco smuggling. O’Reilly is a director, along with his wife, of a company called WOR Consultancy Limited. 69
Sometimes press articles mention that O’Reilly is working for the tobacco company,70 but at other times they do not.7172

“Media Messenger”

In 2013, leaked internal tobacco industry documents, including powerpoints, revealed the extent of PMI’s anti-plain packaging campaign in the UK during the previous year. See also:

Under the headline, “Media messengers” were the initials “WOR.” Given that Will O’Reilly’s company is WOR Consultancy Limited, it shows that the ex-Policeman is an integral part of the company’s anti-plain packaging public relations campaign. (Image 1)

Active In Scotland

O’Reilly has not just been active in England. After the Scottish government announced in September 2013 that it would proceed with plain packaging, O’Reilly started appearing in many Scottish media outlets scaremongering about tobacco smuggling.7374 75 7677
For more see:

Investigations in Australia and Ireland

In his submission to the UK Government’s Independent Review into Plain Packaging undertaken by Sir Cyril Chantler, O’Reilly wrote:

Since 2011 my role as a consultant for Philip Morris International has been to conduct extensive research into the illicit trade in tobacco products and to act as a spokesperson on the subject. I have studied the illicit trade across the UK including separate projects in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland … More recently I travelled to Australia to gain an insight of the situation there since the introduction of standardised packaging or plain packaging (PP) for tobacco products.78

Other Ex-Policemen with links to the Tobacco Industry

  • Peter Sheridan – Former Assistant Chief Constable and Head of Organised Crime and Murder Investigation;
  • Roy Ramm – Former Commander of Specialist Operations at New Scotland Yard.

TobaccoTactics Resources

TCRG Research

The following study provides details on how the tobacco industry has manipulated media coverage of the illicit tobacco trade in the UK and over-estimated the size of the illicit market:

Visit Tobacco Control Research Group: Peer-Reviewed Research for a full list of our journal articles of tobacco industry influence on public health policies.

References

  1. TMA, Tobacco Alliance Account, 19 December 2000, accessed 30 January 2012
  2. Edelman, Edelman and Zeno Group Announce Expansion in Technology, 17 November 2011, accessed 30 January 2012
  3. STOP PRESS: Kaye launches rebranded Rowland as PR 21, PR Week, 8 September 2000, accessed 30 January 2012
  4. Tom Williams, ‘PR21 finally pulls plug on London operation’, PR Week, 5 March 2004, accessed 30 January 2012
  5. PR Week,‘News in brief’, 15 October 2004, accessed 30 January 2012
  6. TMA, Tobacco Alliance Account, 19 December 2000, accessed 30 January 2012
  7. TMA, Campaign Group Meeting on 11th January 2001, 11 January 2001, accessed 30 January 2012
  8. A. M. Brandt, Inventing conflicts of interest: A history of tobacco industry tactics, American Journal of Public Health, 2012, 102(1), 63-71
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