The GFN should not be confused with the Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum (GTNF), an annual tobacco industry event.

Background

The event was first held in 2014, with the context of the conference being described by organisers as:

“The arrival of new nicotine delivery systems, along with other lower risk alternatives to smoking, has forced rapid changes in nicotine science, public understanding, and the regulatory landscape. This has implications for many sectors including consumers, researchers, regulators, public health, tobacco control, policy analysts, and industry. The conference was designed to facilitate discussion across sectors”.¹

It has been held annually since 2014, usually in Poland. The 2020 conference took place online due to the COVID-19 pandemic,² while the 2021 conference took place in Liverpool, England.³

Its 2022 conference took place in June, in Warsaw. Organisers described the theme as “Tobacco Harm Reduction – Here for Good”, with topics including “The challenges brought by misinformation, in THR and beyond”, “Grown up conversations about tobacco industry transformation”, and “Is regulation supporting or undermining efforts to tackle smoking”.⁴

The event features a number of discussion panels as well as a film festival and a keynote address called the Michael Russell Oration which “honours someone who has made a substantial and innovative contribution to the science and understanding of safer nicotine products and tobacco harm reduction”.⁴

The forum’s website says that: “The unique inclusive nature of the GFN continues to provide a platform for exchange and debate of often-contentious issues”.⁵ In its terms and conditions, however, participants are told: “The organisers are aware of the need for good research. However, no participant may use attendance at the conference as an opportunity to collect data directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly on participants, or the event without the express permission of the organisers and the informed consent of subjects.”⁶

Relationship with the Tobacco Industry

Tobacco Industry Speakers and Panellists

Supporting and facilitating dialogue with the tobacco industry, the GFN event has provided a platform for the tobacco industry to promote its role in in tobacco harm reduction.⁷

The 2021 and 2022 programmes have followed the pattern established in previous years of the GFN, with fewer representatives from tobacco control organisations and more from industry-linked harm reduction and e-cigarette organisations on its speaker line-up.³⁴

GFN speakers and panellists have included:⁴³⁵⁸⁹⁷

• Clive Bates, founder of consultancy and advocacy practice Counterfactual and attendee of the industry-funded Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum (GTNF) since 2014;
• Martin Cullip, libertarian blogger, who has been honoured by industry front group Forest;
• Jonathan Fell, tobacco industry analyst and founding partner of Ash Park;
• Will Godfrey, founder and editor-in-chief of Filter magazine, a grantee of the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World (FSFW);
• Marc Gunther, reporter, who delivered a keynote speech at GFN22 titled “The Unchecked Power of Philanthropy”;
• Joseph Magero, chairman of Campaign For Safer Alternatives and recipient of the KAC-run Global Tobacco Harm Reduction Scholarship, which is funded by FSFW;
• Mark Oates, Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute and Director of We Vape and the Snus Users Association,¹⁰ described as “consumer groups standing up for the right of individuals to use safer nicotine products”;
• Flora Okereke, Head of Global Regulatory Insights and Foresights at British American Tobacco (BAT);
• Derek Yach, President and founder of the FSFW until October 2021;
• Dr Sudhanshu Patwardhan, Medical Director at the Centre for Health Research and Education (CHRE) who worked for BAT from 2005 until February 2019;
• Amanda Wheeler, president of the American Vapor Manufacturers Association and owner of Jvapes;
• Fiona Patten, Australian politician and leader of the Reason party;
• Robyn Gougelet, Joe Gitchell and Bethea (Annie) Kleykamp from Pinney Associates, which provides consulting services to Juul Labs, BAT and Reynolds American Inc and subsidiaries;⁹³¹¹¹²
• Sarah Cooney, former Head of Scientific Collaboration & Communication at BAT;
• Jeannie Cameron and Sairah Salim-Sartoni from Juul Labs;
• David Cross, trustee on the board of the New Nicotine Alliance;
• Charles Gardner, Director of Health, Science and Technology at FSFW;
• Bengt Wiberg, CEO of Sting Free AB, a brand of nicotine pouches;
• Harry Shapiro, Executive Editor of the Global State of Tobacco Harm Reduction report, run by KAC and funded by FSFW;
• Moira Gilchrist and Thomas Mc Grath, both from Philip Morris International (PMI). In 2017 they used the event to promote PMIs heated tobacco products;¹³⁷¹⁴
• Clarisse Virgino, Philippine representative of the Coalition of Asia Pacific Tobacco Harm Reduction Advocates (CAPHRA),¹⁵ which is a member of the FSFW-funded International Network of Nicotine Consumer Organisations (INNCO)¹⁶ and founded by KAC;¹⁷
• Pini Matzner, Senior Data Analyst at Signal Analytics,¹⁸ which has collaborated with FSFW to create a “Nicotine Ecosystem Intelligence Platform and Smoking Cessation Playbook”;¹⁹⁸
• Patricia Kovacevic, an American consultant who has previously worked at PMI and Lorillard (subsidiary of British American Tobacco (BAT);⁸
• Abrie du Plessis, former tobacco industry employee and lecturer in law at the University of Stellenbosch;
• Shane MacGuill, senior head of tobacco research at Euromonitor,²⁰ which has received FSFW funding²¹ and PMI Impact;²²⁸
• Terry Barnes, Lifestyle Economics Fellow at the Institute of Economic Affairs, a think tank which receives tobacco funding and consistently opposes public health policies;^{23 5}
• Laura Leigh Oyler from Reynolds American Inc (RAI), Oscar Camacho from British American Tobacco (BAT), and Christelle Haziza from PMI were all listed on the 2018 programme⁹;
• David O’Reilly, BAT’s Scientific Director appeared as a panellist in 2017 at a session on “Nicotine Futures: the tobacco industry and public health”;²⁴⁷
• Cecilia Kindstrand-Isaksson, Director Public Affairs at Swedish Match, who in 2017 presented her company’s perspective on harm reduction and strongly criticised EU tobacco regulation that bans snus sales;²⁵⁷
• Jeannie Cameron, JCIC International;⁷
• Delon Human;²⁶
• Peter Lee; ⁷
• John Pritchard from Imperial Tobacco; ¹²

Researchers on the GFN speaker and panellist lists have included:

• Konstantinos Farsalinos, tobacco harm reduction researcher and advocate;
• Gerry Stimson, founder and director of KAC;
• Peter Hajek, Director of the Tobacco Dependence Research Unit at the Wolfson Institute of Preventive Medicine, Queen Mary University of London;
• Cother Hajat, UK based public health physician and epidemiologist;
• Paul Newhouse, Director of the Center for Cognitive Medicine in the Department of Psychiatry at Vanderbilt University Medical Center;
• Riccardo Polosa, founder of the Centre of Excellence for the Acceleration of Harm Reduction (CoEHAR), another FSFW grantee;⁸
• Brad Rodu, Professor of medicine and holds an endowed chair in tobacco harm reduction research at the University of Louisville, Kentucky USA;⁵
• Alaran Aishat Jumoke, Tobacco Harm Reduction grantee under KAC;
• Michelle Minton, senior fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute;
• Marewa Glover, Director of Foundation-funded Centre of Excellence for Indigenous Sovereignty & Smoking (COREISS), which is funded by the FSFW;
• Caitlin Notley, addiction researcher and lecturer at the University of East Anglia;²⁷
• Roberto Sussman, scientist and writer of a technical guidance pamphlet on COVID and vaping circulated by Clive Bates;²⁸
• Kevin Mcgirr, Professor of Community Health Systems at UCSF and recipient of a 2018 FSFW research grant;²⁹
• Sree Sucharitha, professor of Community Medicine at Tagore Medical College and Hospital (India);³⁰
• Chimwemwe Ngoma, Project Manager of THR Malawi, a sub-grantee of Knowledge-Action-Change.

“GFN Fives” were introduced to the GFN 2021 programme as an “innovative replacement for conference posters, GFN Fives are open to all and free to submit. In no more than five minutes, present a slideshow with a recorded voiceover”.³Across 2021 and 2022 GFN programmes, there were four GFN Five submissions from BAT, titled “9 Step Framework to Assess New Category Products”, “Bite-sized Science: Tobacco Heating Products”, “Year Long Study on a Tobacco Heating Product: 6 Month Data” and “Introduction to Tobacco Harm Reduction”, as well as several from JUUL and Imperial employees.³⁴

Tobacco Interests on the Programme Committee

Robyn Gougelet, Senior Associate at consultancy Pinney Associates, was a member of the GFN 2018 and 2019 Programme Committee.³¹³² Gougelet’s tobacco harm reduction consultancy work is exclusively funded by American tobacco company RAI.³³ For more details on its relationship with the tobacco industry, click here.

Links to the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World

There are a number of links between speakers at the GFN and the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World. The Foundation describes itself as “an independent, private foundation formed and operated free from the control or influence of any third party”. However it is funded solely by Philip Morris International and been extensively criticised for its links with the tobacco industry.³⁴ It has provided a number of grants to individuals and organisations. Those connected with GFN include:

• GFN organisers Knowledge Action Change (KAC) under its chief executive Gerry Stimson has received various grants from the Foundation to carry out promotional events and commission reports.
• Dr Rajesh Sharan, who sits on the GFN organising committee, has received funding to set up a Centre of Excellence in India.³¹
• Dr Marewa Glover, who sits on the GFN organising committee, has received funding to set up a Centre of Excellence in New Zealand.³¹
• Chimwemwe Ngoma, who sits on the GFN organising committee, has received funding through THR Malawi, a sub-granteee of Knowledge-Action-Change.³¹
• Ricardo Polosa is one of three members of the University of Catania involved with the GFN. A spin off from the Italian university, headed by Polosa, has received funding from the Foundation to set up a Centre of Excellence.
• Aaron Biebert curates the GFN film festival and his company was commissioned to launch the Foundation.³⁵
• Derek Yach, founder and president of the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World until October 2021, gave the keynote address at the 2015 event.

Scholarship Programme

KAC and the GFN jointly launched a Tobacco Harm Reduction Scholarship Programme in 2018, which was sponsored by the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World.³⁶ The programme has continued every year since, with funding solely from the Foundation.^{3738 39}

KAC state that the sponsorship programme was launched with five aims³⁷:

• Increase research and practice capacity in tobacco harm reduction;
• Expand the evidence-base for new technologies and products, which contribute to reducing smoking and improving both individual and population health;
• Introduce new thinkers, new ideas and new methods to tobacco harm reduction;
• Improve risk communication, through the use of social media and new technologies Disseminate information, particularly to isolated groups and communities;
• Target locations and populations where current activities and resources are limited, especially in low and middle-income countries where the need to build capacity is greatest.

The scholarship Prospectus states:

“Despite there being strong evidence for the effectiveness of a THR [tobacco harm reduction] approach, public understanding of the evidence base and its implications for both policy and personal health choices is limited. This is often not helped by sensationalist and inaccurate reporting in the media…The scholarship programme aims to redress this imbalance”⁴⁰

A number of the scholarship winners have appeared on panels at GFN between 2019 and 2022.⁵⁸³⁴

GFN’s acceptance of funding from the tobacco-industry funded Foundation goes against World Health Organization’s (WHO) recommendation, which urged governments and the public health community not to partner with the Foundation:

“…research and advocacy funded by tobacco companies and their front groups cannot be accepted at face value. When it comes to the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World there are a number of clear conflicts of interest involved with a tobacco company funding a purported health foundation particularly if it promotes sale of tobacco and other products found in that company’s brand portfolio”.⁴¹

The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) Secretariat has also issued a strongly-worded statement against collaboration with the Foundation:

“The Convention Secretariat regards this tobacco industry-funded initiative as a clear attempt to breach the WHO FCTC by interfering in public policy… There is extensive experience of tobacco-industry funded research that was later used to prevent effective tobacco control policies. It is clear that the industry aims to follow the same path in the area of non-traditional tobacco products, which are unregulated in many countries”.⁴²

Links to Tobacco Industry Funded Event, ISoNTech

The GFN declares that it does not accept tobacco industry funding. The conference website states that it: “is funded by registration fees and does not receive any sponsorship from manufacturers, distributors or retailers of nicotine products including pharmaceutical, electronic cigarette and tobacco companies.”⁵

However, since 2017 the GFN has taken place alongside the International Symposium on Nicotine Technology (ISoNTech),⁴³ which is part-funded by tobacco companies. ISoNTech is a parallel event for the tobacco and nicotine industries to showcase their newer nicotine and tobacco products (e.g. e-cigarettes, heated tobacco products, and smokeless tobacco), and promote these products to GFN attendees who can attend ISoNTech for free. Despite ISoNTech and GFN being presented as two separate events, they are both organised by KAC,⁴⁴⁴⁵ and share a joint programme. The 2018 GFN programme suggested that the foyer in which the ISoNTech exhibition stands were located would be used for coffee and lunch breaks as well as poster presentations, giving tobacco companies direct access to attendees.⁹ The 2019 and 2022 GFN programmes provided a time slot for GFN attendees to visit ISoNTech⁴⁵In 2020, It was reported that Benjamin Petrzilka, external affairs manager and company spokesperson of BAT Switzerland SA, was actively promoting the forum and contacting journalists to join it, claiming that this is the only international conference to focus on the role of “reduced risk” nicotine products.⁴⁶

That same close relationship has continued through to 2022. The website for ISoNTech in 2022 said: “Following the success of ISoNTech during #GFN17, #GFN18 and #GFN19, the organisers plan to offer similar opportunities alongside #GFN22. Developers, manufacturers and distributors are invited to demonstrate new products and discuss their design and development”.⁴³

Image 1: ISoNTech floorplan 9 May 2018

ISoNTech is part-funded through exhibition space packages. Image 1 shows the ISoNTech Floorplan from 9 May 2018, which illustrates that the exhibition area was occupied by multinational tobacco corporations, notably PMI, BAT, JTI, and Altria. The size and arrangement of the exhibition stands on the floorplan imply that each tobacco company paid for the £7000 ISoNTech Premium package. Premium packages offered companies a speaker slot on the main stage, a larger exhibition stand, and two registrations to GFN. Other companies with ISoNTech exhibition stands included RJ Reynolds and Swedish Match.⁴⁷ A similar arrangement was advertised in 2022, with ISoNTech’s website promising clients that “the exhibition stand will be displayed throughout GFN22”.⁴³

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Harm Reduction
• Gerry Stimson
• Pinney Associates
• Riccardo Polosa
• Martin Cullip
• Brad Rodu
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World Grantees
• Knowledge-Action-Change

Relevant Links

• Global Forum on Nicotine website

TCRG Research

• Understanding the emergence of the tobacco industry’s use of the term tobacco harm reduction in order to inform public health policy, S. Peeters, A. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2015,24(2):182-189

References

The post Global Forum on Nicotine appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

In April 2014, the European Union (EU) adopted the EU Tobacco Products Directive (2014/40/EU) (TPD), which regulates the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products in the Member States. It took five years for the TPD to be adopted, with a spokesperson of the European Parliament describing the TPD as “the most lobbied dossier in the history of the EU institutions”.⁴⁸

• For information on the tobacco industry’s efforts to undermine the TPD, go to EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision

Legal Challenges

The TPD was challenged in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) by several parties:

• UK-based e-cigarettes company Totally Wicked is challenging the legality of Article 20 which holds provisions on e-cigarettes.⁴⁹
• Philip Morris International (PMI) and British American Tobacco (BAT) brought two separate claims against the TPD, alleging that the TPD is without a valid legal basis, that elements are disproportionate and do not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, and that too much power is delegated to the European Commission.⁵⁰ Although not complainants, Japan Tobacco International (JTI) and Imperial Tobacco are supporting the claims as “interested parties”. Other “interveners” supporting the claim were: Tann UK limited and Tannpapier GmbH, V Mane Fils, Deutsche Benkert GmbH & Co. KG and Benkert UK limited, Joh. Wilh. Von Eicken GmbH.⁵¹ In December 2014 both cases were jointly referred to the ECJ.
• In July 2014, Poland announced its intention to challenge the legality of the TPD’s characterising flavours ban, in particular the ban on menthol cigarettes, claiming that it will be unfairly affected as one of the EU’s biggest consumers and producers of menthol cigarettes.⁵² Poland’s claim was formally supported by Romania.

On 23 December 2015, ECJ’s Advocate General Kokott issued her preliminary Opinions on the cases above, offering the Court judges a legal solution in complete independence. Kokott concluded that the 2014 TPD was valid and lawfully adopted, “in particular the extensive standardization of packaging, the future EU-wide prohibition on menthol cigarettes and the special rules for e-cigarettes”.⁵³
In May 2016, the European Court of Justice ruled that the Tobacco Products Directive, which permits Member States to
implement standardised packaging, was lawful.⁵⁴

Related TobaccoTactics Resources

• EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision
• Industry Interference and the 2001 EU Tobacco Products Directive
• Legal Claims
• Legal Strategy
• TPD: Legal Threats
• TPD: Challenging Legislation
• British American Tobacco vs the Government of Namibia

References

The post TPD: Legal Challenges appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

In April 2014, the European Union (EU) completed the first revision of the TPD. The revised 2014 TPD (2014/40/EU) repealed and replaced the 2001 TPD. It aimed to reduce the differences in approaches to tobacco regulation in the 28 EU Member States, laying down minimum rules for cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco, waterpipe, cigarillos (short and slim cigars), smokeless tobacco (snus), Roll-Your-Own tobacco (RYO), and E-cigarettes. It significantly improved on the original TPD provisions, for example including a ban on ‘characterising’ flavours and an increase of graphic health warnings from 30-40% to 65% on the front and back of the pack.

Article 28 of the 2014 TPD set out a timeline for a further review of the TPD to begin in May 2021. ⁵⁶ The Commission is therefore obliged to review the implementation and impact of the TPD, and draft further amendments according to market developments in newer nicotine and tobacco products, including heated tobacco products. This review coincides with the launch of the European Beating Cancer Plan, which sets a target of reducing tobacco use in the EU to less than 5% by 2040, as well as a commitment to significantly strengthen tobacco control measures in the EU ⁵⁷

• For an overview of industry interference in the TPD before 2014, see: Industry Interference and the 2001 EU Tobacco Products Directive.
• For a detailed overview of the 2014 TPD provisions, see: TPD: Tobacco Control Measures.

Background to the TPD review

The idea of strengthening the TPD was first floated in 2007, and formalised in 2009 when the European Commission (‘the Commission’) began the TPD review. This was in response to new products that had entered the market but were not covered by the 2001 TPD (for example e-cigarettes), and new emerging scientific evidence including evidence that tar and nicotine levels on tobacco packs may mislead consumers into thinking that some tobacco products are less harmful than others.⁵⁸ In addition, the EU and its member states had become signatories to the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2005, which aims to reduce the harm from tobacco. Each signatory is legally obliged to implement the provisions in this Treaty.

The TPD review took over 5 years to complete, with the majority of this time taken up in the Commission. Image 1 illustrates the different stages of the European legislative process that the TPD passed through before being enacted.

During these five years several controversies hit the news, including an opaque lobbying scandal known as ‘Dalligate’ which saw Health Commissioner John Dalli forced to resign in October 2012 following a complaint by smokeless tobacco manufacturer Swedish Match, a professional burglary of the offices of Brussels-based NGOs lobbying on tobacco control, and repeated claims of tobacco industry interference across all three EU institutions (the Commission, Parliament and the Council).⁵⁹⁶⁰⁶¹ This led to major concerns about the processes, transparency and independence of EU policymaking and the influence of the tobacco industry in Brussels. ⁶⁰⁶²

Concerns over industry interference in the EU have resurfaced in light of the 2021 TPD revision. Article 5.3 of the FCTC binds the Commission to take action to limit the influence of the tobacco industry in its policymaking processes. However, the Commission made limited changes to its practices in the period following the 2014 TPD revision. Tobacco Control advocates have called for stricter, and more proactive transparency practices to be adopted to prevent industry interference in the 2021 TPD revision process. ⁶³⁶⁴

Tobacco industry’s response to the 2014 TPD

A study led by the University of Bath ⁵⁹ examined the nature and size of the tobacco industry’s response to the 2014 TPD. Based on analysis of, among other things, 581 freedom of information (FOI) documents released by the Commission and 45 internal tobacco industry documents, the study demonstrated that the tobacco industry went to enormous effort and expense to amend and delay this legislation, and felt particularly threatened by the proposed introduction of Plain Packaging, a Point of Sale Display Ban, and an ingredients ban. For example, Philip Morris International (PMI) spent millions of euros on an elaborate lobbying campaign, involving more than 160 lobbyists. ⁵⁹

• See PMI’s Lobbying Campaign to Undermine the TPD

Other tobacco companies were similarly politically active, with the overall tobacco industry’s response closely mirroring their efforts to undermine the 2001 TPD, albeit this time with an increased use of Third Party Techniques.

Strategy in the Commission: Flooding consultation processes and targeting non-health Commissioners and their officials

The tobacco industry started actively opposing the TPD as early as 2009, aiming to block so-called “extreme policy options” such as plain packaging, Point of Sale Display Ban, and an ingredients ban at an early stage of the TPD decision-making procedure.⁶⁵ Evidence shows that the stakeholder consultation process was an important entry point for the tobacco industry to influence and delay the TPD revision. For example, a public consultation held in late 2010⁶⁶ attracted 85,000+ submissions, with the Commission commenting that “no previous public consultation launched by the European Commission has ever registered such significant participation”.⁶⁷ Despite only 2,320 submissions openly disclosing being linked to the tobacco industry, subsequent analysis of the responses showed that a large portion of submissions were attributed to tobacco industry-led mobilisation campaigns in Poland and Italy.⁶⁷ Flooding the consultation subverts the democratic process, and the sheer volume of responses significantly delayed the TPD review process.

• For more details on the tobacco industry’s tactic of flooding the public consultation, see Delaying the Process of Consultation

Other than (mis)using the formal stakeholder consultation processes, led by the Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for health and consumers (DG SANCO), the tobacco industry also actively lobbied non-health Commissioners and other DGs.⁵⁹ This was in an attempt to shift the policy debate away from health to economics, and to generate TPD opposition within the Commission. Key targets were DGs Enterprise, Trade, Internal Market, and Agriculture⁵⁹, but evidence also shows that the highest echelons of the Commission (i.e. the Secretariat-General, the Legal Service, and President Barroso and his Cabinet) had repeated undisclosed contact with the tobacco industry during the TPD review.⁵⁹⁶⁸ In contrast to DG SANCO’s practice of minuting meetings with the tobacco industry and publishing these minutes on their website, in line with FCTC 5.3, meetings between the tobacco industry and other (non-health) elements of the Commission were not routinely minuted, and none were publicly disclosed.⁵⁹ This is in clear violation of article 5.3 of the FCTC.
Some of the contact between the Commission and the tobacco industry occurred via former EU politicians or civil servants that are now employed by the tobacco industry, so-called ‘Revolving Doors‘. For example, Michel Petite used to be the Commission’s Head of Legal Service before becoming a consultant to PMI in his role at a Brussels-based law firm. In his role as PMI consultant, Petite had several exchanges (none minuted) with the Commission’s Legal Service about the TPD.⁶⁸ As is shown below, the Legal Service played a role in some of the delays and dilutions to the TPD. Dalli has since claimed that the Legal Service only started raising concerns following Petite’s involvement.⁶⁹

• To read more about other TPD revolving door cases, see TPD: Revolving Door Cases.

Strategy in Parliament: Curbing the influence of the Health Committee and targeting key MEPs in political parties and parliamentary non-health committees

The tobacco industry strongly lobbied Members of European Parliament (MEPs). PMI lobbyists had individually approached over one third of MEPs (257 of 754) when the TPD proposal was still being drafted in the Commission.⁵⁹ The lobbyists meticulously assessed each MEP’s position on TPD policy options and sensitivity to pro-tobacco arguments, and MEPs were often approached in their national constituencies where there were fewer staff to remind them of EU protocol. Third parties were employed to approach health-friendly MEPs, often hiding their tobacco industry links, and former MEPs were purposively recruited to approach MEPs on the basis of being “an old friend”.⁵⁹ Tobacco-friendly MEPs were used to attempt to isolate influential MEPs within their own parties who did not support tobacco industry positions.

As in the Commission, the tobacco industry attempted to increase the prominence of market versus public health arguments in Parliament. First, it unsuccessfully attempted to push for the Internal Market Committee (IMCO) to be the co-lead parliamentary committee with the Health Committee (ENVI), which would normally preside over a file like the TPD. Second, it tried to generate opposition from the five appointed Parliamentary Committees of Opinion, in the TPD’s case the Committees of International Trade, Internal Market, Legal Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, and Industry Research and Energy. One of the key messages targeted by the tobacco industry and third parties at MEPs was the alleged ‘spill-over’ effect of the TPD on other sectors. Image 2 shows Christmas gifts sent to MEPs in December 2013, suggesting an overspill effect on the food and alcohol industries.

Strategy on national level: creating blocking minorities

PMI also considered national level influence another key element to subverting the TPD.⁵⁹ When the Commission began drafting the TPD proposal, national level lobbying started via the TPD Regulatory Committee, a committee which met twice a year to discuss the TPD review’s progress, and consisted of the Ministries of Health of all EU Member States and DG SANCO. For example, Dutch FOI documents reveal that PMI cultivated an amicable relationship with the Dutch Department of Health. In March 2010 PMI hosted health officials at PMI’s Dutch factory.⁷⁰) In an email to the Health Department a few months earlier, PMI criticised the quality of the RAND’s TPD’s impact assessment and the short stakeholder consultation period given, asking the Department to critically review RAND’s report and challenge the period of consultation with DG SANCO.⁷¹ It’s unclear if the Health Department followed PMI’s suggestion, but email correspondence reveals that the Department promised to incorporate PMI’s input into the Dutch Government’s response to the RAND report where appropriate.⁷²

Two other national level entry points for the tobacco industry to influence the TPD were the National Parliaments and the Council of Ministers. The national parliaments have the power to scrutinise a Commission’s legislative proposal to ensure it meets the EU’s subsidiarity principle. Although unsuccessful, PMI planned to encourage sufficient negative opinions from national parliaments to trigger a so-called ‘yellow card system’, which means the Commission would have to redraft the proposal.

The tobacco industry also tried to exert influence through the Council of Ministers, the EU’s co-legislator alongside the European Parliament. On 21 June 2013 the Council voted on the Commission’s TPD proposal. Western European Member States were in favour of stricter tobacco regulations, whilst Central and Eastern Member States expressed concern with the TPD’s impact on tobacco industry jobs.⁷³ This is consistent with PMI’s document which shows that the company sought to mobilise a blocking minority in the Council by framing the debate around employment.⁷⁴
One of the Member States voicing concern was Poland, which criticised the TPD’s impact assessment for given too much weight to the health impacts of the proposal, and not enough to the impact on the tobacco industry and the competitiveness of the European tobacco industry in international markets.⁷⁵ Polish media had revealed a few months earlier how the tobacco industry had actively lobbied the Polish Prime Minister in December 2012 to oppose the TPD. ⁷⁶

Ultimately the Council reached a compromise agreement that slightly diluted the Commission’s proposal. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland and Romania did not agree, but the opposition of these Member States was not enough to block the agreement.⁷⁷

How successful was the tobacco industry’s interference in the 2014 TPD revision?

The tobacco industry’s attempts to amend and delay the TPD were successful on both counts, however, the Directive, albeit somewhat weakened, was ultimately successfully enacted.

Delays

The TPD was delayed by three years, which nearly jeopardised its adoption altogether, as the proposal had to be adopted before the Parliamentary elections in May 2014. First through the hijacking of the public consultation. Second, through intervention by the Secretary-General, the Head of the Legal Service, and the President and his Cabinet, the Commission’s Inter-service Consultation (ISC), an internal consultation with DGs affected by the proposal and a crucial element of the legislative process, was delayed three times:⁵⁹

• First, the ISC was postponed in July 2012 because the Secretary-General and Head of the Legal Service claimed that there were substantial issues in the impact assessment that needed further attention, and that there were also alleged concerns with the proposal’s legal basis.
• Second, the ISC was postponed in September 2012 by the Secretary-General and the Head of Barroso’s Cabinet because the Commission apparently sought to avoid controversy ahead of the European Council meeting in October.

• Third, it was postponed after the forced resignation of Commissioner John Dalli by President Barroso, who mandated that the ISC should wait until a new Health Commissioner was in place.

In Parliament, the vote in the plenary was delayed by a month amidst rumours of industry interference. Following the vote in the Health Committee on 10 July 2013, the plenary was scheduled to vote on 10 September 2013. Less than a week before the vote was due, the European People’s Party (EPP), the largest political party in the European Parliament and one that PMI heavily relied on for support, requested a delay of the vote, supported by two other political groups. Different justifications for this delay were given; MEPs were supposedly not given enough time to read the ENVI report, the revised TPD allegedly did not sufficiently take into account other Parliamentary Committees’ opinions, and German MEPs were up for federal elections on 22 September 2012 and therefore many would be absent for the vote.⁷⁸⁷⁹⁸⁰The TPD’s rapporteur, Linda McAvan MEP, strongly condemned the delay, arguing that “All the proper procedures for the vote had been respected and the timetable has been in place since January so the move is disappointing”.⁸¹ The postponed vote took place on 8 October 2013, when McAvan was given the mandate to progress the TPD and start negotiations with the Council.

TPD measures weakened

Intervention by the Secretariat-General and Legal Service led both to the removal of the two provisions that the tobacco industry was most concerned about – Plain Packaging and a Point of Sale Display Ban.

Email dated 7 September 2012 from DG-SANCO’s Director-General to the Secretary-General and Director-General of the Legal Service, confirming changes made to the TPD text

The Commission’s proposal was subsequently slightly diluted in Parliament and Council. This is consistent with the findings of a study led by the University of Oxford who undertook a quantitative text analysis and documented that the TPD’s provisions shifted significantly towards the tobacco industry’s position while it was going through the legislative process.⁸²

Impact of ‘Dalligate’

The evidence presented in the Bath study⁵⁹ suggests that the ‘Dalligate’ affair changed the political landscape and backfired on the tobacco industry. Serious questions began to be raised by NGOs and the media about the transparency of EU policy making and the influence of the tobacco industry in the Commission. Previously amenable DGs became, at least temporarily, less inclined to engage with the tobacco industry. In Parliament, Dalli’s departure and exposure of tobacco industry interference had resulted in rare, all-party support to move the TPD forward. The European People’s Party decided not to nominate a candidate for TPD rapporteur (which is the MEP who leads on the proposal and oversees its progress). Instead, Linda McAvan from the Social-Democrats was appointed rapporteur, a choice PMI described as ‘hostile’.⁸³. Equally, PMI’s plan to have IMCO assigned as co-lead committee did not succeed. As one MEP recalled “we guessed that the next tactic would be that they shouldn’t give proposal to the environment committee ENVI…, but it was really a nonstarter…it would have been another scandal…they shot themselves in the foot with that”.⁵⁹

Legal Challenges

The TPD was challenged in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) by several parties.

• See TPD: Legal Challenges

Issues of Concern: Better Regulation and FCTC 5.3

The evidence of strong tobacco industry interference in the TPD review raises two major policy concerns:⁵⁹

Better Regulation agenda does not necessarily serve public health interests

In case of the 2014 TPD revision, Better Regulation facilitated tobacco industry access to Commission staff, allowed the tobacco industry to frame their arguments and overwhelm the review process by mobilising an enormous response to the consultations, and delaying the TPD’s progress. Thus Better Regulation fails to take into account the ability of powerful corporate actors to dominate this policy process. This is consistent with previously raised concerns that Better Regulation favours corporate over public interests, economic over health considerations, and can be used to delay and prevent public health legislation.⁸⁴ This is particularly pertinent considering evidence that British American Tobacco (BAT), with other companies producing products damaging to health, were instrumental in pushing the Better Regulation agenda in the 1990s, anticipating that it would make it more difficult to pass public health legislation.⁸⁵

FCTC widely misunderstood and mis-implemented

FCTC Article 5.3, which requires that ‘in setting and implementing their public health policies with respect to tobacco control, parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry’, was unable to prevent tobacco industry influence on the TPD. While the Commission’s department responsible for health, DG SANCO, complied with 5.3, other parts of the Commission and some MEPs did not. For example, interventions by the highest echelons of the Commission to dilute and delay the TPD followed repeated and undisclosed contact between Commission officials and the tobacco industry, in contravention of Article 5.3. The staff involved did not suffer any consequences, while Article 5.3. was cited as a reason for Dalli’s dismissal, showing a misinterpretation and min-implementation of the Article.

Relevant Links

• To read the full 2014 TPD text, click here.
• Myth-busting briefing on the arguments used by the tobacco industry and its allies to influence the TPD, prepared by the Smoke Free Partnership

Related TobaccoTactics Resources

• TPD: Tobacco Control Measures
• TPD: Campaigning Websites
• TPD: Pictorial Warnings and Standardised, Plain Packaging
• TPD: Delaying the Process of Consultation
• TPD: Dalligate
• TPD: Burglaries
• TPD: Revolving Door Cases
• TPD: Legal Challenges
• PMI’s Lobbying Campaign to Undermine the TPD
• Industry Interference and the 2001 EU Tobacco Products Directive
• Menthol Cigarettes: Industry Interference in the EU and UK
• A list of all pages in the category Tobacco Products Directive.

References

The post EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Using Lobby Groups is one of the ways in which Tobacco Companies are Lobbying Decision Makers. Lobby Groups act on behalf of the tobacco industry, contacting regulators and policy makers with the aim to influence regulation and legislation.
The page on Lobbying Decision Makers explains the issue in more detail, discussing – amongst other things – the difference, or rather, the thin line between direct and indirect lobbying. Lobby groups speaking on behalf of the industry could be understood as direct lobbying – specifically if it is transparent who has paid them to do this. Transparency, however, is a treasure hard to find in this line of business. Apart from the groups mentioned above, Think Tanks or other policy institutions can also be involved in (indirect)lobbying.
On this page is a selection of lobbying groups, pressure groups and trade associations from around the world. Many are clearly associated with the industry as their representatives. Others echo industry arguments and do not reveal any of their donors. None of these organisations have broken any laws. For many of them we provide individual pages giving even more background information which can be found by clicking on the title of the organisation.

Lobbying and Pressure Groups

Retailers Associations

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Third Party Techniques
• Lobbying Decision Makers
• Libertarians
• Pro-Tobacco Bloggers
• Front Groups
• Think Tanks

References

The post Lobby Groups appeared first on TobaccoTactics.