There have been multiple instances of lobbying by ambassadors and other diplomats from the UK, as well as Japan and Switzerland. Much of this lobbying activity has taken place in low and middle-income countries (LMICs).² These countries are important sources of new customers for tobacco companies as markets in higher income countries where consumption is generally falling.³⁴⁵

Diplomats are also involved in activities which help promote the tobacco industry via local media, such as visiting tobacco farms or factories. Other engagement supports tobacco companies’ product promotions, or corporate social responsibility strategy. These activities help to raise the profile of tobacco companies, enhance their reputations, and support the ‘normalisation’ of the industry.¹⁶⁷

Background

Parties to the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) have an obligation to protect public health policies from the “commercial and vested interests of the tobacco industry” and any contact with tobacco industry representatives, or others seeking to further their interests, must be “limited” and “transparent”.⁸ The implementation guidelines to Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC recommend that Parties limit interactions with the tobacco industry to those that are absolutely necessary to regulating the industry, and ensure the transparency of those interactions that do occur.⁸  The guidelines also recommend parties treat state-owned tobacco companies in the same way as any other tobacco company, including avoiding any “preferential treatment”.⁸

In addition, the guidelines state that “… Whenever possible, interactions should be conducted in public, for example through public hearings, public notice of interactions, disclosure of records of such interactions to the public”.⁸

However even in countries with a high level of compliance with the WHO FCTC requirements, diplomatic missions rarely achieve this level of transparency. Information on tobacco industry engagement has largely been found through media investigations and Freedom of Information requests (FOIs).

In October 2014, the 6^th Conference of the Parties (COP) decided to urge parties: “to raise awareness and adopt measures to implement Article 5.3 and its implementing Guidelines among all parts of government including diplomatic missions.”⁹ Another decision required governments to “take into account their public health objectives in their negotiation of trade and investment agreements”.¹⁰

Nevertheless, diplomats continue to lobby for tobacco companies around the world.¹

Countries whose diplomatic representatives have lobbied on behalf of tobacco companies overseas  include the UK, Germany and Japan, who are all Parties to the WHO FCTC,¹¹ as well as the United States and Switzerland. BAT, PMI and Japan Tobacco all have offices in Geneva, Switzerland, the location of the World Health Organization and other key international bodies.

UK

There are specific guidelines covering the engagement of British (UK) officials working overseas designed to limit contact with tobacco companies, and support compliance with Article 5.3. After the UK Ambassador to Panama lobbied on behalf of British American Tobacco (BAT),¹² the guidelines were revised in 2013.¹³ These guidelines state that “Posts must not…Engage with local foreign governments on behalf of the tobacco industry, except in cases where local policies could be considered protectionist or discriminatory”.¹³

Engagement and lobbying

Despite having guidelines in place to support compliance with the WHO FCTC, FOI requests and media investigations have revealed that British diplomats continue to interact with the tobacco industry more than is necessary. UK diplomats have lobbied for BAT in Bangladesh,¹⁴¹⁵ Hungary,¹⁶ and Pakistan.^1217181920

UK officials have also disclosed contact with tobacco companies in Panama and Venezuela,²¹²² Laos,²³ Cuba,²⁴ and Burundi.²⁵

In 2018, UK advocacy organisation Action on Smoking & Health (ASH) called this a “global pattern of engagement” by British officials to defend BAT’s interests.²⁶

• For more details see UK Diplomats Lobbying on Behalf of BAT.

Tobacco industry events

UK government guidelines state that staff must not:

“Attend or otherwise support receptions or high-profile events, especially those where a tobacco company is the sole or main sponsor and/or which are overtly to promote tobacco products or the tobacco industry (such as the official opening of a UK tobacco factory overseas)”.¹³

However, UK staff have attended such events, generating considerable local media coverage.

For example, in 2019 the British ambassador to Yemen opened a cigarette factory in a free trade zone in Jordan, celebrating the expansion of the tobacco company Kamaran which is part-owned by BAT.^1272829

In 2020, staff from the UK high commission in Pakistan attended a promotional event for a BAT product in Pakistan.³⁰

• See UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT for details.

Engaging with industry allies

The links between diplomatic missions and tobacco companies can be more indirect, via funding third party allies of the industry. The UK guidelines state that diplomats should not “endorse projects which are funded directly or indirectly by the tobacco industry”.  However, a 2019 investigation by The Guardian found that the British high commission in Malaysia had given funding to a Kuala Lumpur based think tank (IDEAS) for several years. At the same time the think tank was also receiving money from tobacco companies and was lobbying against plain packaging regulation and tobacco taxes.³¹  While the UK had already implemented plain packaging regulations, tobacco control was being undermined overseas.

Attending meetings with the tobacco industry

Tobacco companies attend meetings and events organised directly by UK government departments, such as the FCO (now FCDO) or the DIT (now Department for Business and Trade).²¹  They also attend those held by regional, national or local business organisations such as chambers of commerce.

Responses to FOI requests show that when the attendance of UK government officials at such events is disclosed, there is little detail about the specific purpose or content of these meetings,¹⁴¹⁶ It may simply be described as relating to ‘doing business’ in the country.²²

Business vs public health interests?

The UK guidelines for overseas staff (last updated in 2013) allow for the communication of “basic trade, investment and political information”, although this is not defined.¹³ One of the activities used to justify interaction by UK diplomats is “resolving business problems that are potentially discriminatory”.^1214163233 This has been criticised as running counter to the WHO FCTC guidelines.¹³⁴

While transparency is required for tobacco industry interactions in 2018, the UK government told Parliament that it “does not catalogue the representations it makes on behalf of companies”.³⁵³⁶³⁷  Research by the Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) concluded that the stated WHO FCTC goal of “maximum transparency” is not being achieved in the UK.¹²⁹

Japan

In 2021, the Ambassador of Japan to Bangladesh lobbied the government of Bangladesh on behalf of Japan Tobacco International (JTI).  In a letter to the Bangladesh Finance Minister the Ambassador criticised 2019 taxation changes for their impact on JTI. It also complained about the activities of competitors, and licensing demands.³⁸

• For details, including the lobbying letter, see Japanese Diplomats Lobbying for JTI

The Japanese Ambassador to Ethiopia was present at the signing of a deal between the Ethiopian government and JTI in 2016,  when the Ministry of Public Enterprise sold 40% of its National Tobacco Enterprise to the Japanese company.³⁹ Japanese diplomats have also toured tobacco farms and JTI factories in Tanzania and Zambia.⁴⁰⁴¹

Japan Tobacco International is the overseas subsidiary of Japan Tobacco (JT), which is one third-owned by the Japanese government.⁴²

Germany

In May 2022, the German ambassador to Beirut visited the offices of Regie, the Lebanese Tobacco and Tobacco Inventory Administration.¹⁴³

Denmark

The Imani Centre for Policy and Education, a Ghana-based think tank,  received money from the Danish embassy while lobbying against tobacco control.³¹⁴⁴

Switzerland

Switzerland is not Party to the WHO FCTC.

In 2019, Swiss diplomats approached the government of the Republic of Moldova on behalf of Philip Morris International (PMI) seeking an opportunity to discuss new tobacco legislation.⁴⁵⁴⁶⁴⁷  The proposed legislation included significant tax increases on heated tobacco products, in which PMI has invested.⁴⁵⁴⁸

The same year, PMI helped fund an inaugural event for the new Swiss Embassy in Moscow.⁴⁹⁵⁰

• For more details see Swiss Diplomats Lobbying for PMI

USA

Although the US is not Party to the WHO FCTC, it has specific laws and guidance that prohibit its diplomats from promoting the sale or export of tobacco, or influencing non-discriminatory restrictions on tobacco marketing.^51525354 However, US diplomats have enabled meetings between tobacco companies and government representatives.

The US ASEAN Business Council organises delegations of US businesses, including Philip Morris International (PMI), which meet high level officials in the ASEAN region.⁵¹  PMI was at the time a vice chair of its Customs & Trade Facilitation Committee and used this opportunity to meet with government officials from the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Vietnam.⁵¹⁵⁵

Why it matters

The examples above illustrate contraventions of the WHO FCTC, an international treaty, and in many cases breaches of national guidelines. As TCRG research points out, all of these activities also undermine the spirit of these laws, by apparently serving the commercial interests of transnational tobacco companies and helping to ‘normalise’ the industry in the eyes of policy makers and the public.¹

The implementation guidelines of Article 5.3 urge Parties to exclude the tobacco industry completely from the public health policy arena.  The guidelines also urge them not to participate in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities which are used by the tobacco industry and as an alternative means to access policy makers, as well as for public relations and product promotion.¹

In August 2019, in direct response to the exposure of lobbying by Swiss diplomats, the WHO released a statement urging governments to comply with Article 5.3 and to “proactively aspire to reduce the number of people starting and continuing smoking, to promote health and preserve future generations”.⁵⁶

TobaccoTactics Resources

• UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT
• UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT: Bangladesh
• UK Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco: Burundi
• Swiss Diplomats Lobbying for PMI
• Japanese Diplomats Lobbying for JTI
• Third Party Techniques

TCRG Research

A “willingness to be orchestrated”: Why are UK diplomats working with tobacco companies?, R. Alebshehy, K. Silver, P. Chamberlain, Frontiers in Public Health, 17 March 2023, Sec. Public Health Policy, Volume 11 – 2023, doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.977713

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including TCRG research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to the Bath TCRG’s list of publications.

References

The post Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco Companies appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

• Menthol and flavoured cigarettes are widely available in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) many of which have high smoking rates
• LMICs have young populations – flavours appeal to young people, who may not understand the harms of flavoured tobacco
• Recently high-income countries have put bans in place; at the same time there has been marked growth of menthol market share in some LMICs
• There is a lack of regulation to reduce the appeal of flavours e.g. plain packs and advertising bans at point-of-sale or near schools
• Targets for new and improved bans include flavour capsules, and flavour references on packaging and cigarette sticks
• A ban on all flavourings may be easier and more effective in preventing product substitution
• A lack of data, especially in low-income countries, hinders the development of good regulation
• Multinational tobacco companies can threaten income from tobacco exports if governments attempt to put tobacco controls in place

This page covers flavoured tobacco, including menthol cigarettes, in low and middle-income countries (LMICs).⁶¹⁶²

Background

Flavoured tobacco products are available in various forms around the world, including products previously only used in particular regions or countries. For example in Indonesia, the vast majority of smokers use kretek, clove-flavoured cigarettes,⁶³⁶⁴ and they are now available in other countries.⁶⁵⁶⁶

Flavoured tobacco is used in waterpipe, a device which originated in middle-eastern countries and is increasingly popular elsewhere, including among young people.⁶⁷

Here we focus on what are often called ‘conventional’ products, like cigarettes and cigarillos, which are sold by large transnational tobacco companies (TTCs): Philip Morris International (PMI), British American Tobacco (BAT), Imperial Brands (IMB, previously Imperial Tobacco) and Japan Tobacco International (JTI) (JTI also owns Nakhla in Egypt, which produces flavoured waterpipe) We summarise findings from Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) research on the extent of flavoured and menthol cigarette use in LMICs and the development of the market for ‘capsule’ products (cigarettes with flavour capsules in the filter).

We describe specific challenges for LMICs, including flavour regulation and evidence gathering. We then summarise flavour market evidence and research, first relating to LMICs in general and then by World Health Organization (WHO) region and individual countries (where available).

• For general background and evidence, including information on the global market, and details of specific bans and associated industry interference, see Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco.

For details of product regulation at country level, see the searchable database on the Tobacco Control Laws website, published by the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids (CTFK). For countries that are parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) progress towards implementation of relevant articles, including newer products, is detailed in the FCTC implementation database

Specific challenges for LMICs

LMICs with no ban often have other major tobacco control policy gaps that are not necessarily menthol/flavour related but worsen the negative impact of menthol/flavours.⁶⁸ One such policy is plain, or standardised, packaging,  which can include restrictions on flavour descriptors as well as colours on packaging which are known to signify flavour (e.g. green for menthol).⁶⁹ However, plain packaging policies have yet to be implemented in many countries, including some high-income countries, so this would be a significant challenge in LMICs. Another relevant policy is the prohibition of marketing, especially near schools.⁷⁰

Governments have more conflicts of interest in tobacco growing areas as they receive much needed foreign currency for tobacco exports,  and multinational companies can threaten this income stream if governments attempt to put tobacco controls in place.⁶⁸⁷¹  However, apart from rare exceptions the tobacco industry contributes little overall to the balance of payments.⁷²⁷³

Regulatory challenges

The WHO published brief guidance on the regulation of menthol and flavoured tobacco which summarised some regulatory options including restrictions on: the sale of menthol branded products,  the use of menthol at noticeable levels (giving a ‘characterising flavour’),  or banning any menthol ingredients.⁷⁴  The report points to likely opposition from the tobacco industry in countries or regions with an established menthol market.⁷⁴ This was the case with the European Union (EU) menthol ban which only came into full force in 2020, after the tobacco industry had successfully lobbied for a delay. Testing for characterising flavour is more difficult and expensive than a ban on ingredients; this makes banning menthol as an ingredient particularly efficient for LMICs.

The WHO noted that:

“A ban on all flavour agents that increase tobacco product attractiveness, rather than focusing on menthol exclusively, can provide an alternate route to restricting menthol, and may prevent the unwanted introduction of menthol substitutes.”⁷⁴

Research and data

As of 2021, when TCRG researchers conducted a review of evidence on menthol/flavour in LMICs,⁷⁵ there were very few research papers from countries in Eastern Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean region, and Africa.

Lack of data means that it is hard to monitor markets and company shares in specific countries.  Market research service Euromonitor (which receives project funding from Philip Morris International) includes no low-income countries and is proprietary, making it expensive and hard to access even for the middle-income countries which are included.

More research is needed on menthol and flavour in LMICs to help governments monitor the tobacco industry and its products, as recommended by the WHO: “An evidence base using data collected from the region of interest can provide more direct support for regulation.”⁷⁴

Market in LMICs

Evidence suggests menthol and flavoured tobacco products are widely used in LMICs.  Data from the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Policy Evaluation Project suggests that menthol is smoked by more than 20% of smokers in several middle-income countries. Although the dates vary (see the note above on data challenges) this research gives an indication of the scale of the problem. The highest rates were found in Zambia (42% in 2014) and Thailand (35% in 2012). Kenya and India also had over 20% menthol smokers, with China just under just under that level.⁷⁶

A study from Johns Hopkins University, between 2015 and 2017, found a range of flavoured and capsule cigarettes on the market in those LMICs with the highest number of smokers: Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Russia, Thailand, and Vietnam.⁷⁷

The main TTCs operating in these countries (PMI, JTI, and BAT) mostly sold menthol or mint flavours. China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC) sold  a mix of flavours.⁷⁷

There is also evidence from a number of studies that menthol and flavour tobacco use is rising, either as a proportion of the market or substantively.  Evidence from TCRG research shows that after the implementation of the European Union (EU) menthol ban in 2020, there was a marked increase in the share of menthol/flavoured products in some LMICs.⁷⁵ A study of cigarette packs in Brazil, Indonesia, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand, and Vietnam, between 2013 and 2016, found that the number of flavour capsule variants on the market was growing.⁷⁸ Most were mint and menthol flavour but with others the flavour was unclear from the product name.⁷⁸

A number of studies have identified related marketing activities.  Marketing strategies for flavour capsules are likely driving their global growth particularly among young people in LMICs.⁷⁹

TCRG’s review  of tobacco industry strategies underpinning the growth of menthol/flavoured tobacco use in LMICs  highlighted widespread marketing in stores (including retailers near schools), on billboards, on TV, online and via brand ambassadors. The packaging of flavoured and menthol products, legally displayed in stores, was  found to be colourful with non-conventional, appealing names for flavours.⁷⁵

Tobacco companies also use symbols on cigarette sticks to indicate that they contain capsules.⁸⁰ Researchers studying this form of marketing in LMICs have described the space on a cigarette as “valuable communicative real estate” for tobacco companies, which could be better used to display public health messages.⁸⁰

Research and data from specific regions and countries is summarised below. We refer in many places to TCRG research based on 2019 cigarette market data from Euromonitor. In this data ‘high market share’ means 20% or more of the total cigarette market in that country in 2019. ‘High market share growth’ means that the share doubled between 2005-19 and was growing from 2017.⁷⁵ We link to regional and country profile pages on TobaccoTactics, where available.

Africa

Nigeria has high menthol/flavour market share and high market share growth.⁷⁵

Cameroon has high market share, the only other country in the region for which this data was available. (For Egypt see Eastern Mediterranean region below.)⁷⁵

Tanzania

JTI sells a menthol cigarette called Sweet Menthol through its subsidiary in Tanzania. It describes this product as “the leading local mainstream menthol brand”.⁸¹

Zambia

JTI owned brand Sweet Menthol is the third most popular cigarette in Zambia.  It is cheap and is usually sold as single sticks.⁸²  On its webpage for Zambia, JTI describes itself  as a leaf farming company, and does not mention that it sells cigarettes in the country. A locally owned company, Roland Imperial,  also sells menthol cigarette brands.⁸³

ITC survey data showed a high prevalence of menthol smokers in Zambia, with 43% of smokers choosing the product.⁸⁴ Menthol was most commonly used among younger smokers, those with a middle income, and those that don’t smoke every day. Over a third of smokers indicated that they thought menthol cigarettes were less harmful than non-menthol.⁸⁴

Kenya

ITC survey data from Kenya also suggests a high prevalence of menthol smokers.⁸⁴⁸⁵ In 2018, 21% of smokers with a regular cigarette brand smoked menthol or sweet menthol (although Euromonitor estimates that only 7% of cigarette sales are menthol).⁷⁵  More women smoke menthol than men in Kenya, and two thirds of smokers believed that menthol is less harmful than other cigarettes.⁸⁴⁸⁵

Ethiopia

In 2015, Ethiopia enacted a total flavour ban on all forms of tobacco.

• For details see Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco

This was a pre-emptive ban as flavour sales were low. However there has been a lack of enforcement at the retail level.⁶⁸ Flavoured products are not made in Ethiopia and more collaboration with customs is needed to prevent illicit importation.⁶⁸ There is also a lack of awareness that the ban includes waterpipe products.⁷⁴

Since 2017, two years after the ban was enacted, JTI has owned 70%  the state owned tobacco company, NTE.⁸⁶

Latin America

Menthol cigarettes are popular in Latin America, and increasingly so in some countries.⁷⁵ Guatemala and Peru have high market share and high market share growth. There is high market share in Columbia and the Dominican Republic, and high market share growth in Argentina, Bolivia and Costa Rica.⁷⁵

Use of flavour capsule cigarettes is particularly high in Chile and Mexico.⁸⁷  According to BAT’s annual report in 2014,  sales of  flavour capsule cigarettes had increased in the region despite price rises, while overall cigarette sales were down.⁸⁸

A study of over 1,000 retailers located close to schools in Latin American cities (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Peru) found that the majority (85%) sold flavoured cigarettes, and most (71%) sold capsule versions.⁷⁰ (Similar findings were reported in Uruguay, a high income country, immediately before the implementation of plain pack regulations in 2020.)⁸⁹

These products were frequently displayed near the point of sale, or confectionary. Some stores also had advertisements and price promotions.⁷⁰ Unconventional flavour descriptors such as “fusion blast” and “ruby ice” were very common.⁹⁰

Brazil

Survey data from 2016-2017 among adult smokers in Brazil found that over 50% supported a ban on menthol and over 60% supported a ban on all additives.⁹¹ Support did not vary across sociodemographic groups. When menthol smokers were asked what they would do if menthol cigarettes were banned, a third reported they would quit, around 20% would reduce the amount they smoked and a similar number would switch to non-menthol cigarettes. Slightly fewer said they would still find a way to get menthol cigarettes.⁹¹

ITC survey data from the same period suggested that 8% of smokers with a regular cigarette brand smoked menthol.⁹² 13% believed that menthol cigarettes were less harmful than non-menthol cigarettes, and over a third reported that they were smoother on the throat and chest.  Nearly two thirds  of surveyed smokers supported a complete ban on all cigarette additives, including flavourings.⁹²

An online sample of women aged 16- 26 (smokers and non-smokers) preferred packs with flavour descriptors.⁹³

• The tobacco industry has used a range to tactics to undermine and delay Brazil’s menthol ban. For details see Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco

Chile

In 2013, Chile sought to implement a law banning substances that cause higher levels of addiction, harm or risk, leading to tobacco industry resistance and interference.⁷⁴

• For details see Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco

Mexico

Studies of retailers in Mexican cities, found that the majority sold menthol and flavoured products, and more than half of stores situated near schools sold flavour capsule cigarettes.⁹⁴⁹⁵ Many flavoured cigarettes have descriptors which suggest there is a flavour, but the type of flavour is unclear: chemical analysis of dual flavoured cigarettes suggested flavours were menthol and another flavour, for example fruit.⁹⁶

A study in Mexico City found that colour and flavour descriptors on cigarette packs made the products more appealing, and some smokers believed they would taste better.⁹⁷

Guatemala

A study of convenience store retailers in Guatemala found that all sold flavoured tobacco products.⁹⁸

The majority (88%) of indoor tobacco advertisements in Guatemala were found to be for capsule cigarettes.⁹⁸

South East Asia & Western Pacific

There is high market share of menthol/flavour in India, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, and high market share growth in Vietnam.⁷⁵  A 2010 study noted that governments in the region had no legislation banning exotic flavours of cigarettes and cigarettes with new flavours had appeared in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.⁹⁹

Philippines

Menthol has been advertised to appeal to young women in the Philippines since the 1970s with menthol brands common for many decades.¹⁰⁰ PMI, JTI, BAT and Korea Tobacco & Ginseng (KT&G) all sell flavoured capsule cigarettes in the Philippines.¹⁰¹

Menthol packs studied in the Philippines were harder than non-menthol (for capsule protection) giving a quality feel. Flavoured capsule brands had a greater technological appeal,¹⁰¹ and packs were rated as more attractive by young adults.¹⁰²

Blue and white packs were perceived to be less harmful than other colours, as were the descriptors ‘light’ and ‘cool’, whereas the term ‘strong’ was perceived as more harmful.¹⁰²  Researchers called for greater action and support for banning flavour additives.

Malaysia

In Malaysia, menthol cigarette marketing has been aimed at young people and women.  In the 1980s Brown and Williamson’s Newport menthol cigarettes were marketed in Malaysia with youthful American images and were sold at a cheap price point.¹⁰³ An internal document from 1993 reveals how the company was developing sweet and fruit flavours for the Malaysian market. ¹⁰³¹⁰⁴ A 2003 study noted that the menthol variant of Cartier Vendome (a BAT brand at the time) was described as ‘pearl tipped’ so likely to appeal to women.¹⁰⁵

In 2013, vanilla, mint and fruit flavoured cigarettes were on sale, and strawberry cigarette packs with pink packaging were documented.¹⁰⁶

China

In China ‘flavour capsule’ was found to be one of the most common cigarette terms used in online tobacco marketing.  One website explicitly linked flavour capsules with female smokers.¹⁰⁷

Indonesia

In Indonesia the dominant cigarettes are kreteks which are flavoured with cloves.  Industry attempts to introduce their own cloved flavoured products had failed at least to 2004.¹⁰⁸  In 2009 PMI and BAT acquired two domestic manufacturers which allowed them access to the kretek market.¹⁰⁹ In 2009 PMI launched the first super slims kretek for women and Marlboro black menthol for young men.  By 2012 BAT had launched several kretek brands. Both companies were aware that kreteks  are particularly carcinogenic due to the presence of toxic chemical compounds: Anethole, Coumarin and Eugenol.¹⁰⁹

In Indonesia the flip lid of the cigarette packet was used by Esse (owned by Korean Tobacco & Ginseng, KT&G) to promote the brand with phrases evoking flavour, like “sweet surprise” and “its honey”.  Research found seven cigarette brands with capsules.  Flavours included mint, menthol, berry and honey.¹¹⁰

Eastern Mediterranean

There is high market share growth in in Pakistan and Egypt .⁷⁵

• See also Waterpipe for information on the role of flavours in promoting these products.

Eastern Europe

Data shows that in Russia menthol/flavour has both a high market share and high market share growth.⁷⁵

Other LMICs in the region with high market share growth are Ukraine, Bosnia Herzegovina, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.⁷⁵

Relevant Links

WHO Advisory note: banning menthol in tobacco products (2016)

WHO Case studies for regulatory approaches to tobacco products: menthol in tobacco products (2018)

WHO FCTC decision on banning waterpipe flavour (2016)

A global map of menthol bans is available on Tobacco Atlas: Product Sales

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco
• Menthol Cigarettes: Industry Interference in the EU and UK

TCRG Research

A growing menace: menthol and flavoured tobacco products in LMIC, M. Zatonski, K. Silver, S. Plummer, R. Hiscock, Tobacco Induced Diseases, 2022;20(April):39, doi:10.18332/tid/146366
STOP research summary (May 2022)

Marketing of flavour capsule cigarettes: a systematic review, C. Kyriakos, M. Zatonski, F. Filippidis, Tobacco Control, Published Online First: 18 January 2022, doi: 10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2021-057082[/ref]

Flavour capsule cigarette use and perceptions: a systematic review, C.N. Kyriakos, M.Z. Zatoński, F.T. Filippidis, Tobacco Control, Published Online First: 04 October 2021, doi: 10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2021-056837

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to TCRG publications.

References

The post Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco in LMICs appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Tactics range from the exploitation of farmers and use of child labour to threats and intimidation, and a “continent-spanning spy network”. All to pursue BAT’s own commercial goals.

Examples from across the region feature on an illustrative map, and below are links to further reading which provide a comprehensive understanding of the company’s activities in Africa.

Sabotage, Deceit and Duplicity: British American Tobacco Uncovered

Significant new reports and briefings can be found on the BAT Uncovered micro-site of TCRG’s partner organisation STOP at exposetobacco.org

These cover new allegations of bribery across Africa, and dirty tricks in South Africa.

Briefing papers on BAT’s alleged capture of state agencies, potential complicity in smuggling in South Africa and alleged connection to an attempted bribery conspiracy in Zimbabwe will be published on this site in due course.

Buying Influence and Advantage in Africa

Analysis of whistleblower documents by the Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) at the University of Bath found a “large number of questionable payments” made by BAT over a five-year period.  This huge international corporation used these payments to influence policy and undermine competing tobacco companies, both international and local.

• Read the report summary: Buying Influence and Advantage in Africa: An Analysis of British American Tobacco’s Questionable Payments

BAT made payments impacting ten countries in East and Central Africa. They were made to politicians and civil servants, staff of competitor companies, journalists, farmers and others involved in positions of potential influence.  The use of these payments appeared to be systematized and supported by senior staff, including in BAT’s London office.

The full report details the payments and describes the serious consequences of this unethical business activity. It also suggests that governments globally should more closely examine BAT’s behaviour.

• Read the full report: “Unlawful Bribes?”: A documentary analysis showing British American Tobacco’s use of payments to secure policy and competitive advantage in Africa¹¹⁵

The leaked source documents are publicly available in the UCSF Industry Documents Library Africa Collection (University of California, San Francisco).

Dirty Tricks in South Africa

In the report on British American Tobacco in South Africa, TCRG researchers explain how BAT has fought to maintain its dominance of this key market over decades, in the face of increased competition and growing illicit trade. The report describes how the company has used “any means necessary” to hold its position, including paying another company to run a “massive secret surveillance and informant network in Southern Africa on behalf of BAT”.

The report details BAT’s use of third party service providers, allegedly overseen and run by senior operatives at BAT’s London headquarters.  It also explains how BAT is “yet to face meaningful consequences for its actions either in the region or at home in the U.K.” after the U.K. Serious Fraud Office (SFO) dropped its five-year investigation in January 2021.

BAT has repeatedly denied accusations of corporate espionage, corruption and law-breaking,¹¹⁶ but new analysis of leaked documents raises serious questions about BAT’s activities in South Africa, particularly in relation to tobacco smuggling and tax evasion.

The research by the TCRG was carried out in collaboration with BBC’s Panorama, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the Organized Crime and Reporting Project.

• Read the report: British American Tobacco in South Africa: Any Means Necessary

See also:

The BBC’s Panorama documentary programme, broadcast on 13 September 2021, which “unveils new revelations about the corrupt practices deployed by one of Britain’s biggest companies.”¹¹⁷

• Watch ‘Dirty Secrets of the Cigarette Business’ (BBC iPlayer, UK only, registration required)
• Watch on BBC World Saturday 18 September 2021 (Africa link, switch to other regions at the bottom of the page, note times are GMT)

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism

• Read: Smoke Screen: BAT’s agents brokered bribe proposal¹¹⁸
• Listen: Smoke Screen: Love, bribes, lies and spies in the tobacco industry

Victoria Hollingsworth tells the true story of corrupt practices behind the scenes at British American Tobacco. Hear from the very people caught up in this world as the Bureau sinks deep into the dirty underbelly of the tobacco industry in South Africa.

BAT in Africa: A History of Double Standards

TobaccoTactics details the history of BAT’s double standards, exposing a difference between its stated goals and principles, and its activities in low and middle-income African countries.  It includes links to earlier allegations against BAT, featured in a 2015 Panorama programme and media coverage at the time.

• See British American Tobacco in Africa: A History Double Standards

This page brings the story up to date…

• See British American Tobacco in Africa: Continuing Allegations of Misbehaviour

References

The post The BAT Files: How British American Tobacco Bought Influence in Africa appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Here we look at the some of the research published since then which have added to our understanding of the company.

For more details on the pages published by Tobacco Tactics on British American Tobacco in Africa visit The BAT Files.

Introduction

In 2015, the BBC’s Panorama programme used documents from an industry whistleblower to highlight allegations of alleged bribery by British American Tobacco.

According to the evidence supplied by former BAT employee Paul Hopkins, the firm allegedly arranged bribes totalling US$26,000 for officials in Rwanda, Burundi and Comoros Islands. BAT insisted it conducted its business with honesty, integrity and transparency.

Even though BAT and those featured in the program issued denials about the allegations, in 2015 the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) began investigating, leading to a formal criminal investigation into BAT and associated persons in 2017.

In January 2021 the SFO concluded: “Following extensive investigation and a comprehensive review of the available evidence, the SFO has concluded its investigation into British American Tobacco, its subsidiaries and associated persons. The evidence in this case did not meet the evidential test for prosecution as defined in the Code for Crown Prosecutors.”

The SFO added that it would “continue to offer assistance to the ongoing investigations of other law enforcement partners. We thank our international law enforcement partners, and in particular the Kenyan Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), for their assistance in the SFO’s investigation.”¹²³

Document analysis

In 2021, new research was published adding to the understanding of BAT’s operations in Africa. Panorama followed up on its 2015 programme, which mainly focussed on East and Central Africa, with a new investigation into operations in Southern Africa. ¹²⁴ Alongside this STOP published its own reports.

The Tobacco Control Research Group at the University of Bath also did a deeper analysis of the Hopkins documents and a second set of documents disclosed from a court case in Uganda involving former BAT employee Solomon Muyita. Both Hopkins and Muyita had invoked BAT’s whistleblower policy.^{125126 127}

BAT payments

This analysis looked at 236 payments totalling US$601,502 made between July 2008 and May 2013 to dozens of people including politicians, civil servants, journalists, farmers and staff at competitor companies.

BAT made payments impacting 10 countries Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

Payments took multiple forms including hand-delivered cash, bank wire transfers, spending money, cars, campaign donations, per diems, and plane tickets.

According to the research, the payments were used for two broad purposes. To obtain information and influence policy and to gather information and undermine competitors. The authors conclude:

“The available evidence suggests BAT’s use of payments in Africa was extensive, systematised, and supported at a high level within parts of the company. Payments were used to buy political and competitive advantage.”¹²⁸

According to the analysis of the documents sets, the information suggests payments were a routine part of BAT’s business practices in Africa, with senior staff aware of the practice. Third party companies, referred to as “service providers”, were contracted to undertake consultancy services for BAT to make the payments.

BAT’s official policy on corruption as stated on its website is: “Corruption causes distortion in markets and harms economic, social and political development, particularly in developing countries. Our Standards of Business Conduct make clear that it is wholly unacceptable for our companies and employees to be involved or implicated in any way in corrupt practice.”¹²⁹

Influencing policy

As the original research in 2015 revealed, BAT had been aiming to influence policy changes in several countries. The analysis of these two document sets confirmed and expanded this area of concern.

Attempts were made to frustrate the passing of legislation based on the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in Burundi, Comoros, Rwanda and Uganda. Civil servants and politicians in particular were targeted through the payments. As a result tobacco control legislation in three of the countries is still not compliant with the FCTC while Uganda had a bitter four-year battle to pass its Tobacco Control Act.

The payments were also used to undermine efforts to control tobacco smuggling. In Kenya, BAT campaigned to have its own system in place for tracking tobacco products rather than an independent one as mandated by the Illicit Trade Protocol.¹²⁸

Sabotaging competitors

BAT has a very strong market position in Africa and looks to maintain and expand that position. As such payments appear linked to gaining information on competitors – these include Mastermind Tobacco Kenya, Continental Tobacco Uganda and Leaf Tobacco & Commodities Uganda. It also targeted international rival Japan Tobacco International (JTI) which was operating in Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic Congo.

Tactics used included funding a fake trade union to foment labour unrest, pay for sources inside companies and take advantage of complaints to regulators.

Other examples of payments

The evidence that BAT used payments to influence policy and damage competitors between over a number of years is not the first time that a tobacco company has been accused of such activity.

Evidence from Australia suggests that the tobacco industry may have used bribery in the 1970s to help bring down a minority Tasmanian government attempting to impose a tobacco tax, although the police inquiry cleared the politician in question.¹³⁰ A 2000 court case brought by the European Union and its member states accused tobacco companies of bribing public officials as part of its global scheme to smuggle cigarettes.¹³¹¹³² Maithripala Sirisena who later became the President of Sri Lanka in 2015, alleged that, when trying to introduce large pictorial health warnings as Health Minister, BAT tried to bribe him, although this was “categorically denied” by the company.¹³³

The findings also align with widespread evidence from South Africa of payments to monitor and undermine competitors.

Tobacco smuggling in Mali

While the two document sets from the whistleblowers provided evidence of wide-ranging payments across many countries, another investigation in 2021 uncovered further concerns.

The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) had access to internal BAT documents as well as trade data and interviews with participants to document activities in the country.¹³⁴. It found that BAT took advantage of the precarious military situation and over-supplied the country with cigarettes. In doing so this keeps BAT brands in circulation; but also generates profits for jihadists and militias.

“This is their playground,” Hana Ross, a University of Cape Town economist who researches tobacco, said of the industry. “They know they can get away with stuff. It’s much easier to bribe. It’s much easier to cheat the system,’’ she said. “Governments here are generally weak. This is where they do things that they don’t dare to do in Europe anymore.”¹³⁴

A spokesperson for BAT said: “At BAT, we have established anti-illicit trade teams operating at global and local levels. We also have robust policies and procedures in place to fight this issue and fully support regulators, governments and international organizations in seeking to eliminate all forms of illicit trade.”

Further reading

BAT Uncovered

British American Tobacco in South Africa: Any Means Necessary

Buying Influence and Advantage in Africa: An Analysis of British American Tobacco’s Questionable Payments

Tobacco Tactics Resources

The BAT Files

British American Tobacco: Dirty Deeds in Africa

References

The post British American Tobacco in Africa: Continuing Allegations of Misbehaviour appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Background

The population of Tanzania was estimated to be 59.7 million in 2020, about two thirds of which is under the age of 25.¹³⁹ In 2019, the country had a median age of just 18 years. Life expectancy for men is 63.6years and 67.2 years for women. ¹⁴⁰

Tanzania is a presidential republic. President John Mugufuli was sworn in for his second, five-year term on 5 November 2020.¹⁴¹ The World Bank classified Tanzania as a lower-middle income economy in 2021.¹⁴²

Tobacco Use in Tanzania

In 2019, adult daily smoking prevalence in Tanzania reached 6%, according to the World Health Organization’s Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic 2021. ¹⁴³. Every year, approximately 17,200 people die from tobacco consumption in Tanzania. ¹⁴⁴

According to the latest figures, 12.4% of boys and 8.8% of girls were tobacco users. Smokeless tobacco use among young boys was 6.9% and among girls 5.5%.¹⁴⁵

Tobacco in Tanzania

In 2018, 107,009 tonnes of tobacco were produced in Tanzania.¹⁴⁶ Tobacco is the second-largest export crop in the country, representing approximately 30-35% of the yearly exports.¹⁴⁷

According to Euromonitor International, the primary tobacco companies present in Tanzania are the Tanzania Cigarette Company (a subsidiary of Japan Tobacco International, JTI), which dominates the market at 96.1%, as well as British American Tobacco (BAT) with 1.3% and Philip Morris International (PMI) with 1.2%.¹⁴⁸

In 2020, 5.2 million cigarettes were sold in the country. The cigarette market was worth TZS 900 billion (about US$3.88 billion) in 2019, and the cigars/cigarillos/other smoking tobacco market TZS 38.4 billion (US$165.6 million). Some smokeless tobacco products are also sold in Tanzania, including Swedish Match’s Red Man snuff and several e-cigarettes including Imperial Brand’s Blu. However, sales in this category remain negligible.¹⁴⁸

Roadmap to Tobacco Control

Tanzania became a party to the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) on 29 July 2007.¹⁴⁵Shisha tobacco was banned in 2016 for, among other reasons, a concern that young people were introduced to tobacco this way. It led to a reduction in the demand for smoking tobacco in the country.¹⁴⁷

However, in-country legislation is not fully compliant with the WHO’s FCTC.¹⁴⁹ The Tobacco Products Regulations Act (2003), and its ensuring regulations described in the Tobacco Regulations Act (2014) includes:

• A ban on smoking in any enclosed public space;
• A total ban on advertising in printed press, on television, on radio and online;
• Sales or distribution of promotional items bearing references to tobacco companies or their brands;
• Publicity of tobacco industry corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes, with sanctions including a fine or up to three years imprisonment;
• Written health warnings in English and Swahili covering one third of the package’s surface (as of 2016)

Despite these positive measures, graphic health warnings are not required. Point-of-sale advertising is also permitted.¹⁴⁷

In June 2017, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) held a meeting on the Implementation of Articles 17 and 18 at Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. The meeting emphasized safeguarding farmers and the environment.¹⁵⁰

Tobacco products were taxed in 2019 at a rate of 32.1%, which falls short of the WHO-recommended 70%.¹⁴⁵ As of 2021, cigarettes were not less affordable than in 2010 in Tanzania, an indicator used for surveillance in the WHO report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic. ¹⁴³

Tobacco Industry Interference

The tobacco industry is closely intertwined with policymakers and the government. The Tanzanian government owns shares in the Tanzania Cigarette Company.¹⁴⁷ The tobacco industry was involved as a “stakeholder” in the formation of the Tobacco Products Regulations Act TPRA in 2003, according to a report from the Framework Convention Alliance (FCA) network, which oversees FCTC implementation.

In 2010, at the fourth Conference of Parties (COP4) to WHO FCTC, the delegation from Tanzania had the highest proportion of tobacco industry representatives. The delegate from the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare claimed that he was “acting on instructions” when he opposed Articles 9 and 10.¹⁵¹ In 2019, the tobacco industry as a whole received an endorsement from the President while he was in Malawi to open the tobacco auction market there.¹⁵².

Tobacco industry-funded front groups are also active in the country. In 2010 and 2011, the International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA) held meetings in Zanzibar and Tanzania. The Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco-Growing Foundation (ECLT), which is funded by tobacco companies, launched a programme in the Urambo District, a major tobacco growing area of Tanzania, in November 2011.

The Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index (GTIII), which is authored by the Global Center on Good Governance in Tobacco Control ranked Tanzania 29^th out of 34 countries in the 2020 Index, indicating “continuing interference” by the industry. It recommended that the country meaningfully implement Article 5.3 guidelines to avoid conflicts of interest, reject partnerships and agreements with the tobacco industry and implement measures to limit interactions with the industry. It recommended that a new tobacco control bill be tabled and legislated as soon as possible. Tobacco-related CSR activities must also be planned and a Code of Conduct established for government officials.¹⁵²

Extensive research published in 2021 by the Tobacco Control Research Group at the University of Bath, a partner in STOP, and in conjunction with BBC’s Panorama, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project uncovered multiple instances of British American Tobacco seeking to frustrate tobacco control measures in Africa.

• For more details visit The BAT Files on TobaccoTactics

Relevant Links

• JTI in Tanzania website

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Africa’s Tobacco Epidemic
• British American Tobacco
• International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA)
• Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco-Growing Foundation (ECLT)

References

The post Tanzania-Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.