There have been multiple instances of lobbying by ambassadors and other diplomats from the UK, as well as Japan and Switzerland. Much of this lobbying activity has taken place in low and middle-income countries (LMICs).² These countries are important sources of new customers for tobacco companies as markets in higher income countries where consumption is generally falling.³⁴⁵

Diplomats are also involved in activities which help promote the tobacco industry via local media, such as visiting tobacco farms or factories. Other engagement supports tobacco companies’ product promotions, or corporate social responsibility strategy. These activities help to raise the profile of tobacco companies, enhance their reputations, and support the ‘normalisation’ of the industry.¹⁶⁷

Background

Parties to the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) have an obligation to protect public health policies from the “commercial and vested interests of the tobacco industry” and any contact with tobacco industry representatives, or others seeking to further their interests, must be “limited” and “transparent”.⁸ The implementation guidelines to Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC recommend that Parties limit interactions with the tobacco industry to those that are absolutely necessary to regulating the industry, and ensure the transparency of those interactions that do occur.⁸  The guidelines also recommend parties treat state-owned tobacco companies in the same way as any other tobacco company, including avoiding any “preferential treatment”.⁸

In addition, the guidelines state that “… Whenever possible, interactions should be conducted in public, for example through public hearings, public notice of interactions, disclosure of records of such interactions to the public”.⁸

However even in countries with a high level of compliance with the WHO FCTC requirements, diplomatic missions rarely achieve this level of transparency. Information on tobacco industry engagement has largely been found through media investigations and Freedom of Information requests (FOIs).

In October 2014, the 6^th Conference of the Parties (COP) decided to urge parties: “to raise awareness and adopt measures to implement Article 5.3 and its implementing Guidelines among all parts of government including diplomatic missions.”⁹ Another decision required governments to “take into account their public health objectives in their negotiation of trade and investment agreements”.¹⁰

Nevertheless, diplomats continue to lobby for tobacco companies around the world.¹

Countries whose diplomatic representatives have lobbied on behalf of tobacco companies overseas  include the UK, Germany and Japan, who are all Parties to the WHO FCTC,¹¹ as well as the United States and Switzerland. BAT, PMI and Japan Tobacco all have offices in Geneva, Switzerland, the location of the World Health Organization and other key international bodies.

UK

There are specific guidelines covering the engagement of British (UK) officials working overseas designed to limit contact with tobacco companies, and support compliance with Article 5.3. After the UK Ambassador to Panama lobbied on behalf of British American Tobacco (BAT),¹² the guidelines were revised in 2013.¹³ These guidelines state that “Posts must not…Engage with local foreign governments on behalf of the tobacco industry, except in cases where local policies could be considered protectionist or discriminatory”.¹³

Engagement and lobbying

Despite having guidelines in place to support compliance with the WHO FCTC, FOI requests and media investigations have revealed that British diplomats continue to interact with the tobacco industry more than is necessary. UK diplomats have lobbied for BAT in Bangladesh,¹⁴¹⁵ Hungary,¹⁶ and Pakistan.^1217181920

UK officials have also disclosed contact with tobacco companies in Panama and Venezuela,²¹²² Laos,²³ Cuba,²⁴ and Burundi.²⁵

In 2018, UK advocacy organisation Action on Smoking & Health (ASH) called this a “global pattern of engagement” by British officials to defend BAT’s interests.²⁶

• For more details see UK Diplomats Lobbying on Behalf of BAT.

Tobacco industry events

UK government guidelines state that staff must not:

“Attend or otherwise support receptions or high-profile events, especially those where a tobacco company is the sole or main sponsor and/or which are overtly to promote tobacco products or the tobacco industry (such as the official opening of a UK tobacco factory overseas)”.¹³

However, UK staff have attended such events, generating considerable local media coverage.

For example, in 2019 the British ambassador to Yemen opened a cigarette factory in a free trade zone in Jordan, celebrating the expansion of the tobacco company Kamaran which is part-owned by BAT.^1272829

In 2020, staff from the UK high commission in Pakistan attended a promotional event for a BAT product in Pakistan.³⁰

• See UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT for details.

Engaging with industry allies

The links between diplomatic missions and tobacco companies can be more indirect, via funding third party allies of the industry. The UK guidelines state that diplomats should not “endorse projects which are funded directly or indirectly by the tobacco industry”.  However, a 2019 investigation by The Guardian found that the British high commission in Malaysia had given funding to a Kuala Lumpur based think tank (IDEAS) for several years. At the same time the think tank was also receiving money from tobacco companies and was lobbying against plain packaging regulation and tobacco taxes.³¹  While the UK had already implemented plain packaging regulations, tobacco control was being undermined overseas.

Attending meetings with the tobacco industry

Tobacco companies attend meetings and events organised directly by UK government departments, such as the FCO (now FCDO) or the DIT (now Department for Business and Trade).²¹  They also attend those held by regional, national or local business organisations such as chambers of commerce.

Responses to FOI requests show that when the attendance of UK government officials at such events is disclosed, there is little detail about the specific purpose or content of these meetings,¹⁴¹⁶ It may simply be described as relating to ‘doing business’ in the country.²²

Business vs public health interests?

The UK guidelines for overseas staff (last updated in 2013) allow for the communication of “basic trade, investment and political information”, although this is not defined.¹³ One of the activities used to justify interaction by UK diplomats is “resolving business problems that are potentially discriminatory”.^1214163233 This has been criticised as running counter to the WHO FCTC guidelines.¹³⁴

While transparency is required for tobacco industry interactions in 2018, the UK government told Parliament that it “does not catalogue the representations it makes on behalf of companies”.³⁵³⁶³⁷  Research by the Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) concluded that the stated WHO FCTC goal of “maximum transparency” is not being achieved in the UK.¹²⁹

Japan

In 2021, the Ambassador of Japan to Bangladesh lobbied the government of Bangladesh on behalf of Japan Tobacco International (JTI).  In a letter to the Bangladesh Finance Minister the Ambassador criticised 2019 taxation changes for their impact on JTI. It also complained about the activities of competitors, and licensing demands.³⁸

• For details, including the lobbying letter, see Japanese Diplomats Lobbying for JTI

The Japanese Ambassador to Ethiopia was present at the signing of a deal between the Ethiopian government and JTI in 2016,  when the Ministry of Public Enterprise sold 40% of its National Tobacco Enterprise to the Japanese company.³⁹ Japanese diplomats have also toured tobacco farms and JTI factories in Tanzania and Zambia.⁴⁰⁴¹

Japan Tobacco International is the overseas subsidiary of Japan Tobacco (JT), which is one third-owned by the Japanese government.⁴²

Germany

In May 2022, the German ambassador to Beirut visited the offices of Regie, the Lebanese Tobacco and Tobacco Inventory Administration.¹⁴³

Denmark

The Imani Centre for Policy and Education, a Ghana-based think tank,  received money from the Danish embassy while lobbying against tobacco control.³¹⁴⁴

Switzerland

Switzerland is not Party to the WHO FCTC.

In 2019, Swiss diplomats approached the government of the Republic of Moldova on behalf of Philip Morris International (PMI) seeking an opportunity to discuss new tobacco legislation.⁴⁵⁴⁶⁴⁷  The proposed legislation included significant tax increases on heated tobacco products, in which PMI has invested.⁴⁵⁴⁸

The same year, PMI helped fund an inaugural event for the new Swiss Embassy in Moscow.⁴⁹⁵⁰

• For more details see Swiss Diplomats Lobbying for PMI

USA

Although the US is not Party to the WHO FCTC, it has specific laws and guidance that prohibit its diplomats from promoting the sale or export of tobacco, or influencing non-discriminatory restrictions on tobacco marketing.^51525354 However, US diplomats have enabled meetings between tobacco companies and government representatives.

The US ASEAN Business Council organises delegations of US businesses, including Philip Morris International (PMI), which meet high level officials in the ASEAN region.⁵¹  PMI was at the time a vice chair of its Customs & Trade Facilitation Committee and used this opportunity to meet with government officials from the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Vietnam.⁵¹⁵⁵

Why it matters

The examples above illustrate contraventions of the WHO FCTC, an international treaty, and in many cases breaches of national guidelines. As TCRG research points out, all of these activities also undermine the spirit of these laws, by apparently serving the commercial interests of transnational tobacco companies and helping to ‘normalise’ the industry in the eyes of policy makers and the public.¹

The implementation guidelines of Article 5.3 urge Parties to exclude the tobacco industry completely from the public health policy arena.  The guidelines also urge them not to participate in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities which are used by the tobacco industry and as an alternative means to access policy makers, as well as for public relations and product promotion.¹

In August 2019, in direct response to the exposure of lobbying by Swiss diplomats, the WHO released a statement urging governments to comply with Article 5.3 and to “proactively aspire to reduce the number of people starting and continuing smoking, to promote health and preserve future generations”.⁵⁶

TobaccoTactics Resources

• UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT
• UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT: Bangladesh
• UK Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco: Burundi
• Swiss Diplomats Lobbying for PMI
• Japanese Diplomats Lobbying for JTI
• Third Party Techniques

TCRG Research

A “willingness to be orchestrated”: Why are UK diplomats working with tobacco companies?, R. Alebshehy, K. Silver, P. Chamberlain, Frontiers in Public Health, 17 March 2023, Sec. Public Health Policy, Volume 11 – 2023, doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.977713

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including TCRG research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to the Bath TCRG’s list of publications.

References

The post Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco Companies appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Tactics range from the exploitation of farmers and use of child labour to threats and intimidation, and a “continent-spanning spy network”. All to pursue BAT’s own commercial goals.

Examples from across the region feature on an illustrative map, and below are links to further reading which provide a comprehensive understanding of the company’s activities in Africa.

Sabotage, Deceit and Duplicity: British American Tobacco Uncovered

Significant new reports and briefings can be found on the BAT Uncovered micro-site of TCRG’s partner organisation STOP at exposetobacco.org

These cover new allegations of bribery across Africa, and dirty tricks in South Africa.

Briefing papers on BAT’s alleged capture of state agencies, potential complicity in smuggling in South Africa and alleged connection to an attempted bribery conspiracy in Zimbabwe will be published on this site in due course.

Buying Influence and Advantage in Africa

Analysis of whistleblower documents by the Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) at the University of Bath found a “large number of questionable payments” made by BAT over a five-year period.  This huge international corporation used these payments to influence policy and undermine competing tobacco companies, both international and local.

• Read the report summary: Buying Influence and Advantage in Africa: An Analysis of British American Tobacco’s Questionable Payments

BAT made payments impacting ten countries in East and Central Africa. They were made to politicians and civil servants, staff of competitor companies, journalists, farmers and others involved in positions of potential influence.  The use of these payments appeared to be systematized and supported by senior staff, including in BAT’s London office.

The full report details the payments and describes the serious consequences of this unethical business activity. It also suggests that governments globally should more closely examine BAT’s behaviour.

• Read the full report: “Unlawful Bribes?”: A documentary analysis showing British American Tobacco’s use of payments to secure policy and competitive advantage in Africa⁶¹

The leaked source documents are publicly available in the UCSF Industry Documents Library Africa Collection (University of California, San Francisco).

Dirty Tricks in South Africa

In the report on British American Tobacco in South Africa, TCRG researchers explain how BAT has fought to maintain its dominance of this key market over decades, in the face of increased competition and growing illicit trade. The report describes how the company has used “any means necessary” to hold its position, including paying another company to run a “massive secret surveillance and informant network in Southern Africa on behalf of BAT”.

The report details BAT’s use of third party service providers, allegedly overseen and run by senior operatives at BAT’s London headquarters.  It also explains how BAT is “yet to face meaningful consequences for its actions either in the region or at home in the U.K.” after the U.K. Serious Fraud Office (SFO) dropped its five-year investigation in January 2021.

BAT has repeatedly denied accusations of corporate espionage, corruption and law-breaking,⁶² but new analysis of leaked documents raises serious questions about BAT’s activities in South Africa, particularly in relation to tobacco smuggling and tax evasion.

The research by the TCRG was carried out in collaboration with BBC’s Panorama, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the Organized Crime and Reporting Project.

• Read the report: British American Tobacco in South Africa: Any Means Necessary

See also:

The BBC’s Panorama documentary programme, broadcast on 13 September 2021, which “unveils new revelations about the corrupt practices deployed by one of Britain’s biggest companies.”⁶³

• Watch ‘Dirty Secrets of the Cigarette Business’ (BBC iPlayer, UK only, registration required)
• Watch on BBC World Saturday 18 September 2021 (Africa link, switch to other regions at the bottom of the page, note times are GMT)

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism

• Read: Smoke Screen: BAT’s agents brokered bribe proposal⁶⁴
• Listen: Smoke Screen: Love, bribes, lies and spies in the tobacco industry

Victoria Hollingsworth tells the true story of corrupt practices behind the scenes at British American Tobacco. Hear from the very people caught up in this world as the Bureau sinks deep into the dirty underbelly of the tobacco industry in South Africa.

BAT in Africa: A History of Double Standards

TobaccoTactics details the history of BAT’s double standards, exposing a difference between its stated goals and principles, and its activities in low and middle-income African countries.  It includes links to earlier allegations against BAT, featured in a 2015 Panorama programme and media coverage at the time.

• See British American Tobacco in Africa: A History Double Standards

This page brings the story up to date…

• See British American Tobacco in Africa: Continuing Allegations of Misbehaviour

References

The post The BAT Files: How British American Tobacco Bought Influence in Africa appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Here we look at the some of the research published since then which have added to our understanding of the company.

For more details on the pages published by Tobacco Tactics on British American Tobacco in Africa visit The BAT Files.

Introduction

In 2015, the BBC’s Panorama programme used documents from an industry whistleblower to highlight allegations of alleged bribery by British American Tobacco.

According to the evidence supplied by former BAT employee Paul Hopkins, the firm allegedly arranged bribes totalling US$26,000 for officials in Rwanda, Burundi and Comoros Islands. BAT insisted it conducted its business with honesty, integrity and transparency.

Even though BAT and those featured in the program issued denials about the allegations, in 2015 the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) began investigating, leading to a formal criminal investigation into BAT and associated persons in 2017.

In January 2021 the SFO concluded: “Following extensive investigation and a comprehensive review of the available evidence, the SFO has concluded its investigation into British American Tobacco, its subsidiaries and associated persons. The evidence in this case did not meet the evidential test for prosecution as defined in the Code for Crown Prosecutors.”

The SFO added that it would “continue to offer assistance to the ongoing investigations of other law enforcement partners. We thank our international law enforcement partners, and in particular the Kenyan Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), for their assistance in the SFO’s investigation.”⁶⁹

Document analysis

In 2021, new research was published adding to the understanding of BAT’s operations in Africa. Panorama followed up on its 2015 programme, which mainly focussed on East and Central Africa, with a new investigation into operations in Southern Africa. ⁷⁰ Alongside this STOP published its own reports.

The Tobacco Control Research Group at the University of Bath also did a deeper analysis of the Hopkins documents and a second set of documents disclosed from a court case in Uganda involving former BAT employee Solomon Muyita. Both Hopkins and Muyita had invoked BAT’s whistleblower policy.^{7172 73}

BAT payments

This analysis looked at 236 payments totalling US$601,502 made between July 2008 and May 2013 to dozens of people including politicians, civil servants, journalists, farmers and staff at competitor companies.

BAT made payments impacting 10 countries Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

Payments took multiple forms including hand-delivered cash, bank wire transfers, spending money, cars, campaign donations, per diems, and plane tickets.

According to the research, the payments were used for two broad purposes. To obtain information and influence policy and to gather information and undermine competitors. The authors conclude:

“The available evidence suggests BAT’s use of payments in Africa was extensive, systematised, and supported at a high level within parts of the company. Payments were used to buy political and competitive advantage.”⁷⁴

According to the analysis of the documents sets, the information suggests payments were a routine part of BAT’s business practices in Africa, with senior staff aware of the practice. Third party companies, referred to as “service providers”, were contracted to undertake consultancy services for BAT to make the payments.

BAT’s official policy on corruption as stated on its website is: “Corruption causes distortion in markets and harms economic, social and political development, particularly in developing countries. Our Standards of Business Conduct make clear that it is wholly unacceptable for our companies and employees to be involved or implicated in any way in corrupt practice.”⁷⁵

Influencing policy

As the original research in 2015 revealed, BAT had been aiming to influence policy changes in several countries. The analysis of these two document sets confirmed and expanded this area of concern.

Attempts were made to frustrate the passing of legislation based on the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in Burundi, Comoros, Rwanda and Uganda. Civil servants and politicians in particular were targeted through the payments. As a result tobacco control legislation in three of the countries is still not compliant with the FCTC while Uganda had a bitter four-year battle to pass its Tobacco Control Act.

The payments were also used to undermine efforts to control tobacco smuggling. In Kenya, BAT campaigned to have its own system in place for tracking tobacco products rather than an independent one as mandated by the Illicit Trade Protocol.⁷⁴

Sabotaging competitors

BAT has a very strong market position in Africa and looks to maintain and expand that position. As such payments appear linked to gaining information on competitors – these include Mastermind Tobacco Kenya, Continental Tobacco Uganda and Leaf Tobacco & Commodities Uganda. It also targeted international rival Japan Tobacco International (JTI) which was operating in Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic Congo.

Tactics used included funding a fake trade union to foment labour unrest, pay for sources inside companies and take advantage of complaints to regulators.

Other examples of payments

The evidence that BAT used payments to influence policy and damage competitors between over a number of years is not the first time that a tobacco company has been accused of such activity.

Evidence from Australia suggests that the tobacco industry may have used bribery in the 1970s to help bring down a minority Tasmanian government attempting to impose a tobacco tax, although the police inquiry cleared the politician in question.⁷⁶ A 2000 court case brought by the European Union and its member states accused tobacco companies of bribing public officials as part of its global scheme to smuggle cigarettes.⁷⁷⁷⁸ Maithripala Sirisena who later became the President of Sri Lanka in 2015, alleged that, when trying to introduce large pictorial health warnings as Health Minister, BAT tried to bribe him, although this was “categorically denied” by the company.⁷⁹

The findings also align with widespread evidence from South Africa of payments to monitor and undermine competitors.

Tobacco smuggling in Mali

While the two document sets from the whistleblowers provided evidence of wide-ranging payments across many countries, another investigation in 2021 uncovered further concerns.

The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) had access to internal BAT documents as well as trade data and interviews with participants to document activities in the country.⁸⁰. It found that BAT took advantage of the precarious military situation and over-supplied the country with cigarettes. In doing so this keeps BAT brands in circulation; but also generates profits for jihadists and militias.

“This is their playground,” Hana Ross, a University of Cape Town economist who researches tobacco, said of the industry. “They know they can get away with stuff. It’s much easier to bribe. It’s much easier to cheat the system,’’ she said. “Governments here are generally weak. This is where they do things that they don’t dare to do in Europe anymore.”⁸⁰

A spokesperson for BAT said: “At BAT, we have established anti-illicit trade teams operating at global and local levels. We also have robust policies and procedures in place to fight this issue and fully support regulators, governments and international organizations in seeking to eliminate all forms of illicit trade.”

Further reading

BAT Uncovered

British American Tobacco in South Africa: Any Means Necessary

Buying Influence and Advantage in Africa: An Analysis of British American Tobacco’s Questionable Payments

Tobacco Tactics Resources

The BAT Files

British American Tobacco: Dirty Deeds in Africa

References

The post British American Tobacco in Africa: Continuing Allegations of Misbehaviour appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

A Freedom Of Information (FOI) request submitted by British charity Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) revealed repeated contact from 2013 to 2017 between Pacific Tobacco International (PTI), a tobacco company based in Zimbabwe, and UK embassy staff and diplomats in Burundi.⁸⁸

UK Diplomats Assisting Tobacco Company in Burundi

The FOI revealed that senior staff, including the Ambassador at the time (William Gedding), and his predecessor (Ben Llewellyn-Jones), have had repeated contact with PTI in relation to “a long-running compensation claim dating back to 2004 by PTI against the government of Burundi, following PTI being evicted from their premises with some assets seized or damaged”.⁸⁸ The FOI does not state who represented PTI in discussions with the British officials. From 2014 to 2017 the company’s Global CEO was Nick Hales, a former British American Tobacco executive.⁸⁹

The repeated contact between British officials and PTI included a formal letter, phone calls and meeting, and served “to update FCO officials on the slow-moving dispute, and as occasionally appropriate, to offer assistance to try and resolve it”.⁸⁸ The recorded purpose of some of the contact was to “to determine what assistance could be given” or “where UK could and could not help”.⁸⁸ One meeting in the capital Bujumbura in August 2017, involving the Ambassador and the Senior Advisor of the President of Burundi, was to “to discuss resolution options for the dispute”.⁸⁸

The apparent justification for UK government involvement with PTI was that the company was “owned by a British national”.⁸⁸ At the time, the PTI website stated that the company’s Chairman was Adam Molai.⁹⁰ Molai was the founder of Savannah Tobacco which rebranded as PTI in 2017, presenting itself as a “proudly Zimbabwean” company.⁹¹ From the information disclosed, its involvement in Burundi is unclear.

The FCTC and UK guidelines state that “Posts must not…Engage with local foreign governments on behalf of the tobacco industry, except in cases where local policies could be considered protectionist or discriminatory”.⁸⁵⁸⁶⁸⁷

Given the lack of detail and context in the FOI it is not at all clear whether this was the case in Burundi.

TobaccoTactics Resources

Since the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) came into force in 2005, there have been several instances of direct lobbying by British diplomats overseas on behalf of British American Tobacco (BAT) and its subsidiaries, with repeated contact between UK government overseas staff and the company. For more information see :

• UK Diplomats Lobbying on Behalf of BAT
• UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT: Bangladesh

Influencing foreign tobacco legislation via diplomats is a known tobacco industry tactic.

For more background and examples see Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco Companies

Also see:

• Third Party Techniques
• Burundi- Country Profile

TCRG Research

A “willingness to be orchestrated”: Why are UK diplomats working with tobacco companies?, R. Alebshehy, K. Silver, P. Chamberlain, Frontiers in Public Health, 17 March 2023, Sec. Public Health Policy, Volume 11 – 2023, doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.977713

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including TCRG research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to the Bath TCRG’s list of publications.

References

The post UK Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco: Burundi appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Smoking in Burundi

Data reported to the World Health Organization (WHO), as part of the reporting on the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) suggests that current smoking prevalence in Burundi amongst men is 11% and women is 6%. ⁹⁸. The Tobacco Atlas estimates that more than 3000 children (under 15 years) use tobacco each day in Burundi.⁹⁹ In 2020,  approximately 2700 people died from tobacco-related causes.⁹⁹

Tobacco in Burundi

Although there are multiple tobacco companies operating in Burundi, British American Tobacco (BAT) maintains a strong presence within the country.¹⁰⁰

Roadmap to Tobacco Control

In an effort to curb the escalating tobacco epidemic in the country, the government of Burundi ratified the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) on the 22nd November 2005.¹⁰¹ On the 20th February 2006 Burundi became a party to the convention¹⁰¹ and in so doing acknowledged the importance of tobacco control to safeguarding public health.¹⁰²

Despite having ratified the FCTC in 2005, it took six years for the first tobacco control law to be passed in parliament. On 10 October 2011, a new public health law, the “Decree No. 630/3007/CAB/2011 on Health Warnings and Prohibiting the Sale of Cigarettes to Minors and in Certain Public Places” was enforced.¹⁰³ The law, the first of its kind to legislate tobacco control measures in Burundi, was the primary tobacco control legislation in the country until 2018. Provisions within the law covered the following but fell short of the FCTC requirements:

• Health warnings on tobacco packaging;
• Limiting the sale of cigarettes to minors;
• Limiting the sale of cigarettes in certain public places (schools, hospitals, and stadiums);
• imposing high tax rates on tobacco products.¹⁰³¹⁰⁴

Law on the Code of the Supply of Health Care and Services (May 2018)

Law No. 1/012 of 2018 on the Code of the Supply of Health Care and Services introduced new tobacco control regulations in 2018, as a step forward into further implementation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The following regulations were adopted in this new comprehensive legislation:

• Smoke free environments: Smoking is banned in all indoor public places, all indoor workplaces, and on public transport. In addition, the law prohibits smoking in outdoor places where others are exposed to tobacco smoke. ¹⁰⁵
• Tobacco advertising and promotion has been banned across the country ¹⁰⁵
• Tobacco industry sponsorship has been partially banned, given that article 118 of the No. 1/012 Law banned sponsorship if it has the purpose or effect of promotion directly or indirectly tobacco products. Hence, it leaves a grey area around sponsorship where the tobacco industry may act. ¹⁰⁵
• Tobacco Packaging and Labelling: health warnings are mandatory for at least 50% of the front and back of the packs. ¹⁰⁵

The No. 1/012 Law of 2018 has represented an enormous step forward for Burundi in the road to tobacco control. However, it is worth noting that is a common tactic of the tobacco industry to use its influence and leverage its political relationships to support the passage of weak tobacco control legislation. It often is because once some form of legislation is enacted, there is often less political will to develop further, stronger tobacco control legislation.¹⁰⁶

Extensive research published in 2021 by the Tobacco Control Research Group at the University of Bath, a partner in STOP, and in conjunction with BBC’s Panorama, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project uncovered multiple instances of British American Tobacco seeking to frustrate tobacco control measures in Africa.

• For more details visit The BAT Files on TobaccoTactics

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• British American Tobacco
• Africa’s Tobacco Epidemic
• A list of TobaccoTactics pages on Africa

References

The post Burundi- Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.