Image source: © Guillaume Piolle/CC BY 3.0

Key Points

• Lebanon is located on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. It is served by the World Health Organization’s Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean (EMRO).
• It has a population of 5.5 million, with an estimated tobacco use prevalence for those aged 15 and over of 39%.
• Lebanon ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) in 2005. It has not ratified the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.
• Lebanon has a state-owned tobacco monopoly, the Regie Libanaise de Tabacs et Tombacs, known as the Regie, which controls the domestic market. Transnational tobacco companies only have access to the Lebanese market through the Regie.
• In recent years, tobacco industry lobbying has prevented the introduction of graphic health warnings; the Regie has sought to influence Lebanon’s delegation to the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the WHO FCTC; and the industry has conducted extensive corporate social responsibility activities, some of which have involved Lebanese state institutions.

Lebanon has some of the highest rates of tobacco use in the world. It is ranked third in the world for cigarette consumption per capita.¹ A 2019 survey also suggested that waterpipe use prevalence is particularly high, and higher amongst women than men.² Tobacco products were easily affordable until the start of Lebanon’s economic crisis in 2019.¹ Though they have become less affordable since then, the decline in affordability has been weaker compared to that for other goods.³ At just 9.9% of the retail price, the tax imposed on tobacco products falls well short of the 75% recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO).⁴⁵ Though a comprehensive tobacco control law was introduced in 2011, there have been major challenges with implementation and enforcement.⁶

Tobacco Use in Lebanon

In 2022, the population of Lebanon was 5.5 million.⁷ In 2019, the WHO estimated overall tobacco use prevalence to be 39% amongst the population aged 15 and over, based on all national survey data from 1990.⁸ An academic study carried out in 2019 found similar results. Based on a cross-sectional household survey, it found prevalence of cigarette smoking among adults aged between 18 and 69 of just over 35% (49% males; 21.5% females).² It also found overall waterpipe use prevalence of 39.5%, and at over 46%, prevalence for women was higher than for men (nearly 33%).² Almost half of current cigarette smokers reported smoking more than 20 cigarettes per day, while most waterpipe users smoked at least three sessions per week.²

In 2017, Lebanon reported tobacco use among boys aged 13-15 of 35% – the highest amongst the 19 EMRO countries which carried out the Global School-based Student Health Survey between 2001 and 2018.⁹ The corresponding figure for Lebanese girls that year was 28%.⁹ A study carried out amongst Lebanese adolescents aged 11 to 18 between 2016 and 2017 found ever use of waterpipe of 34%.¹⁰

There were an estimated 7,810 deaths attributable to smoking in 2019, accounting for over 23% of all mortality in Lebanon for that year.¹¹ A study published in 2014 put the economic burden of tobacco use in Lebanon in 2008 at US$326.7 million, or 1.1% of national GDP.¹²

A 2019 study on e-cigarette use amongst school and university students aged from 17 to 23 found that 14.5% reported ever use, with 8% reporting current use.¹³ However, at the time of writing, data on e-cigarette use amongst Lebanese adults remains scarce.

Tobacco in Lebanon

The Lebanese state tobacco monopoly

The Lebanese tobacco industry is controlled entirely by a state-owned company, the Regie Libanaise des Tabacs et Tombacs (referred to here as “the Regie”).¹⁴¹⁵ The Regie has exclusive rights to tobacco manufacturing and distribution, tobacco imports and exports, and to the purchase of locally grown tobacco leaf. It also oversees an anti-smuggling unit.¹⁶ The Regie distributes local and imported tobacco products to licensed wholesalers, at prices it determines with the Ministry of Finance (MoF).¹⁶¹⁷ These wholesalers then sell the tobacco products to retailers across Lebanon.¹⁶ Though these retailers are also licensed by the Regie, they are not under its direct control and largely depend on the wholesalers for their tobacco supply.¹⁶ The Regie sets the profit margin and weekly quota of sold tobacco for both wholesalers and retailers.¹⁶

Overseen by the MoF, the Regie’s performance has a direct impact on the public treasury.¹⁶ Not only does this provide the Regie with significant access to policy makers, it also creates conflict with other government departments (such as Health), as the MoF may oppose measures which damage the Regie’s profitability.¹⁶⁶

Market share and leading brands

As of 2022, the Regie had a share of over 55% of the tobacco market, up from 45% in 2017.¹⁸ The leading transnational tobacco company (TTC) in Lebanon was Philip Morris International (PMI), with a market share of nearly 15%, followed by Japan Tobacco International (JTI) on over 11%, Imperial Brands on almost 10%, and British American Tobacco (BAT) on 6.5%.¹⁸

Transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) only have access to the Lebanese market via the Regie. In return for purchasing Lebanese tobacco leaf, the Regie imports manufactured tobacco products to sell on the Lebanese market and buys Virginia tobacco leaf for the manufacture of local brand cigarettes.¹⁶ Since 2016, international brands have also been made in Lebanon at Regie manufacturing facilities, as per agreements with the Big Four TTCs.^19202122

The Regie brand Cedars is by far the most popular brand of cigarettes in Lebanon, with a market share of 55% in 2022.²³ PMI’s Marlboro is in second place with a share of around 14%.²³ JTI’s Winston is third (8%), followed by BAT’s Kent and Imperial Brands’ Gitanes (both around 5%).²³ All other brands have a market share of 3% or less.²³

Tobacco farming and child labour

In 2020, tobacco was being cultivated on 1.32% of Lebanon’s agricultural land.²⁴ In 2021, tobacco production was just over 10,000 tonnes, down slightly from a high of 12,800 tonnes in 2001.²⁵ This makes Lebanon the fifth-largest tobacco producer amongst the 14 EMRO countries for which data is available.²⁶

Lebanese tobacco leaf is purchased exclusively by the Regie via a price support programme, under which the Regie purchases from farmers at a given yearly price and quantity which is determined by the MoF.¹⁶ According to Hamade (2014), the price paid is well over the average paid to farmers in other sectors in Lebanon; essentially, it is a subsidy which reinforces farmers’ dependence on tobacco growing and disincentivises any transition towards other crops.¹⁴¹⁶

Lebanese tobacco featured on the 2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor produced by the U.S. Department of Labor.²⁷ Tobacco production is very labour intensive and involves all or most members of the household, which includes women and children.¹⁴ On top of enduring poor wages and working conditions, female workers are also at risk of sexual violence in tobacco-growing communities.²⁸

• For information on tobacco industry responses to accusations of complicity in child labour, please see the pages on CSR: Child Labour and the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco-Growing Foundation (ECLT).

Tobacco and the economy

Lebanon is a net importer of raw tobacco. According to Comtrade data, in 2022, it imported over US$40.5 million in raw tobacco, compared to under US$16.4 million in exports.²⁹³⁰

Lebanon is also a net importer of cigarettes. In 2022, Lebanese cigarette imports were nearly US$16.5 million, compared to less than US$1 million in exports.³¹³²

It is also a net importer of waterpipe tobacco. Its imports were worth US$17.3 million in 2022, compared to exports of under US$70,000.³³³⁴

Illicit trade

Industry documents suggest that illicit trade was used by the TTCs as a means of building market share and furthering regional expansion during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990).³⁵ With governance weak and legal cigarette production in decline, the TTCs flooded the Lebanese market with cheap contraband products.³⁵ Though the government made direct appeals to these companies, requesting that they stop supplying distributors involved in this illicit trade, it had little effect.³⁵ The documents also show that the TTCs sought to use the issue of illicit trade as leverage in negotiations on establishing manufacturing presence in the country.³⁵

Today, reliable data on the scale of the illicit trade in Lebanon are not available. An industry-funded report by the consultancy Oxford Economics (OE) indicated that by the first quarter of 2019 the illicit trade accounted for 28.1% of the market in tobacco products.³⁶³⁷ However, this data may not be reliable given OE’s long relationship with the tobacco industry. Not only was this particular study funded by PMI, BAT and JTI, but also prepared according to terms of reference agreed with all three companies.³⁷ These terms of reference are not disclosed, while the methodology used is highly susceptible to industry interference.³⁸

Exaggerating the scale of illicit trade is a well-documented tactic which has been used by the tobacco industry all over the world as a means of opposing tobacco control regulations. See Illicit Tobacco Trade for further details.

• For more information on the tobacco industry in Lebanon, please see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

Roadmap to Tobacco Control

Lebanon ratified the WHO FCTC in 2005.³⁹ It has yet to ratify the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.⁴⁰

In August 2011, Lebanon passed Law No. 174, its first ever tobacco control law.⁶ This was the result of years of advocacy led by the National Tobacco Control Program (NTCP) (a government organisation within the Ministry of Public Health), alongside academics, tobacco control advocates, civil society organisations, local and international NGOs, and policy makers.⁶ Law No. 174 banned smoking in all indoor public spaces; banned tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; and introduced larger text warnings on tobacco products, with the potential to add graphic health warnings at a later date.⁶

However, enforcement remains a challenge, particularly regarding the provision for smokefree spaces. This measure was properly enforced for just three months, thanks in part to strong lobbying from restaurants and other establishments offering waterpipe.⁶ There has also been a lack of political will to enforce the law.⁶ In late 2012, the then Minister of the Interior implied that the police would be flexible about enforcing the law during the holiday period.⁴¹ The Ministry of Tourism also stopped enforcing the law, alleging a negative impact on Lebanon’s tourist industry and stating that it did not have the resources necessary to monitor implementation.⁶⁴²

For more details, please see the following websites:

• Legislation by country – Lebanon, Tobacco Control Laws, Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids
• Lebanon, WHO FCTC Implementation Database, WHO FCTC Secretariat
• Country profile – Lebanon, World Health Organization, WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2021

Tobacco Industry Interference in Lebanon

Tobacco industry tactics in Lebanon include lobbying, which has prevented the introduction of graphic health warnings; attempting to influence Lebanon’s delegation to the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the WHO FCTC; and corporate social responsibility.

Portraying tobacco as a symbol of resistance

Part of the revenue the Regie collects from imported tobacco products is used to cover the subsidies given to tobacco growers in rural areas, particularly in the south of the country.¹⁶⁶ Given that this area was previously occupied by Israel, keeping farmers on this land is seen by the state as an important geopolitical objective.⁶ Indeed, both Nassif Seklaoui, Chairman and General Manager of the Regie, and the speaker of the Lebanese parliament, have explicitly linked tobacco growing to the struggle of the Lebanese people and their resistance to foreign occupation.⁴³ Such strategies aim to instil the belief that tobacco is a strategic industry and a source of national pride. As the opening statement of a Regie pamphlet from 2011 reads, “The tobacco crop has become a symbol of resilience, resistance and people’s attachment to the Nation’s land.”¹⁴

Influencing policy: health warnings

Law 174 significantly increased the size of the textual health warnings on tobacco products in Lebanon, from 15% to 40% of the principal surface areas.⁶⁴⁴ A further decree in 2012 defined the text of the warnings, though implementation was delayed, reportedly due the Regie lobbying the Minister of Finance.⁴⁵⁴⁶ Since then, the larger text warnings have been widely implemented – though the measure still falls short of the 50% or more coverage recommended by the WHO FCTC.⁴⁷⁴⁸

Law 174 did also allow for the introduction of graphic health warnings (GHWs) at a later date, subject to the signing of an implementation decree by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance.⁴⁷ According to Lebanese tobacco control advocates, of all provisions in Law 174, this was the hardest to obtain, due to fierce opposition from the tobacco industry, including the Regie.⁴⁶ During discussions on Law 174 in 2011, some members of the Lebanese parliament objected to the inclusion of GHWs, echoing industry positions on the issue.⁴⁶ Though the implementation decree for GHWs was elaborated in 2011 and updated in 2016, it has still not been approved, reportedly due to industry interference and lobbying.⁴⁷ As of 2021, GHWs had yet to be implemented.⁴⁹

Interacting with the Lebanese delegation to the COP

In 2018, the Regie hosted a meeting attended by six government officials at its headquarters, ahead of the Eighth Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP8) to the WHO FCTC. In the Regie’s own words, the meeting aimed to define a position that “addresses the threats that the items on COP8 agenda for next October pose to tobacco sector”.⁵⁰ There was also a presentation laying out the Regie’s positions on decisions made at the previous COP, as well as the proposals to be discussed at COP8.⁵⁰

Delivering this presentation, Mariam Hariri, the Regie’s Head of General Management, stated:

“We cannot look at tobacco sector only from the perspective of health damage; we must rather look at it with a comprehensive and impartial view. We must take into consideration the economic benefits it offers and the specificity of Lebanon.”⁵⁰

This meeting contravened the implementation guidelines for Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC, which urge parties to limit interactions with the tobacco industry to those strictly necessary for effective regulation of the industry and its products.⁵¹

The Regie has also lobbied foreign diplomats. In May 2022, the German ambassador to Beirut visited Regie headquarters in Hadath. He was briefed on “the Regie’s achievements in agricultural, industrial, and commercial fields, among others, as well as about the societal role that it had played during the recent years.”⁵²

• For more on the relationship between diplomats and the tobacco industry, please see Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco Companies.

Corporate social responsibility

In 2016, the Regie launched its sustainable development plan, entitled “Development Vision for a Brighter Tomorrow”. Its stated aim was “promoting economic development, environment protection, fighting illicit trade & child labor, and improving the living of workers & farmers and the communities where we operate.”⁴³ The plan was launched at a ceremony which was supported by the speaker in the Lebanese parliament, and attended by notable figures from business, politics, finance and the trade union movement.⁴³ These included senior civil servants from government departments including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy and Lebanese customs.⁴³

Since then, the Regie has conducted extensive CSR activities, including some directed at or involving Lebanese state institutions. For example, it donated US$2.6 million to the Lebanese Army in 2021.¹⁶ It also engaged in CSR during the COVID-19 pandemic, donating US$1 million to the Lebanese government to support repatriating Lebanese students abroad and to buy ventilators for COVID-19 patients.⁵³

The Regie has also organised “women empowerment training sessions” for the daughters of tobacco farmers in different areas of Lebanon. These sessions had the support of local authorities; for example, some were held in municipal buildings or involved the participation of local councillors.⁵⁴⁵⁵

The Regie has also carried out CSR in partnership with TTCs. In 2017, in an initiative financed by PMI Lebanon, the Regie offered scholarships to 136 children of tobacco farmers in the north of the country – the fourth consecutive year it had done so.⁵⁶

• For more on tobacco industry activity during the pandemic, please see the COVID-19 Tobacco Tactics page and the COVID-19 monitoring database.

Relevant Links

• AUB tobacco researchers and Lebanese activists press conference on economic impacts of Law 174: The tobacco control law is good for the economy and public health, American University of Beirut
• Prevalence of cigarette and waterpipe tobacco smoking among adults in three Eastern Mediterranean countries: a cross-sectional household survey, R. Nakkash, Y. Khader, A. Chalak, R. Abla, N. M. E. Abu-Rmeileh, A. Mostafa, M. Jawad, J. H. Lee and R. G. Salloum, BMJ open, 2022, 12(3), e055201
• The passage of tobacco control law 174 in Lebanon: reflections on the problem, policies and politics, R.T. Nakkash, L. Torossian, T. El Hajj, J. Khalil and R.A. Afifi, Health Policy and Planning, 2018, Volume 33, Issue 5, pp. 633–644
• K2P COVID-19 Series: Prompting Government Action for Tobacco Control in Lebanon during COVID-19 Pandemic, R. Saleh, R. Nakkash, A. Harb and F. El-Jardali, 2020, Knowledge to Policy (K2P) Center, Beirut, Lebanon
• The Economics of Tobacco in Lebanon: An Estimation of the Social Costs of Tobacco Consumption, Salti, J. Chaaban and N. Naamani, Substance Use & Misuse, 2014, 49:6, 735-742

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Eastern Mediterranean Region
• Oxford Economics
• Tobacco Farming

TCRG Research

• The Lebanese Regie state-owned tobacco monopoly: lessons to inform monopoly-focused endgame strategies, H. Alaouie, J.R. Branston and M.J. Bloomfield, 2022, BMC Public Health, 22, 1632.
• Developing more detailed taxonomies of tobacco industry political activity in low-income and middle-income countries: qualitative evidence from eight countries, B.K. Matthes, K. Lauber, M. Zatoński, L. Robertson, A.B. Gilmore, BMJ Global Health 2021;6:e004096.
• Tobacco industry commissioned reports on illicit tobacco trade in the Eastern Mediterranean Region: how accurate are they? Sandberg, A.W.A. Gallagher and R. Alebshehy, 2020, Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal, 26(11):1320–1322.

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to TCRG publications.

References

The post Lebanon Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Key Points

• Bangladesh is a country in South Asia, part of the World Health Organization’s South-East Asia Region.
• It has a population of 171.2 million, with tobacco use prevalence of 43.7%.
• Smoking prevalence is high, at 23.5%. However, smokeless tobacco (SLT) use prevalence is even higher, at 27.5%.
• Bangladesh ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) in 2004. It has not ratified the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.
• The Bangladeshi cigarette market is dominated by British American Tobacco Bangladesh, followed by Japan Tobacco International’s local subsidiary United Dhaka Tobacco Company Limited. There are also local cigarette, bidi and SLT producers.
• Recent tobacco industry tactics in Bangladesh include direct lobbying of civil servants, which successfully obtained an exemption to lockdown restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic; using diplomats to lobby in its interests; and the mobilisation of third-party organisations against tobacco control.

In 2016, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina declared her intention to make Bangladesh tobacco free by 2040.⁵⁷ Bangladesh has in recent years increased its compliance with the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), created a dedicated tobacco control cell and introduced a health surcharge on all tobacco products.⁵⁷⁵⁸ However, according to a study published in 2022, no measures have been adopted to implement Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC.⁵⁹ Industry interference in public policy – particularly by British American Tobacco Bangladesh (BATB), in which the state holds a share of over 9% – is an ongoing challenge.⁵⁹⁶⁰ The study’s authors argue that progress in minimising such interference is essential if the commitment to a creating a tobacco-free Bangladesh by 2040 is to be met.⁵⁹

Tobacco Use in Bangladesh

In 2022, the population of Bangladesh was 171.2 million.⁶¹ Among adults aged from 18 to 69, overall tobacco use prevalence was nearly 44% as of 2018 (almost 60% of men and over 28% of women).⁶²

As of 2018, 23.5% of Bangladeshi adults smoked.⁶² Cigarettes were the most popular product: amongst current tobacco smokers, over 99% reported using cigarettes, compared to 32.5% who reported smoking bidis (cigarettes rolled by hand in a dried leaf of the tendu tree).⁶² There was a major gender difference, with nearly 47% of men reporting current smoking at the time of the survey, compared to 1% of women.⁶²

At 27.5%, smokeless tobacco (SLT) use is even more common than smoked tobacco.⁶² This is due in part to the high prevalence of SLT use amongst Bangladeshi women. Over 28% of Bangladeshi women used SLT, compared to nearly 27% of men.⁶²Most female tobacco users in low- and middle-income countries are SLT users in India and Bangladesh.⁶³ Popular SLT products include betel quid with zarda, betel quid with sadapata, pan masala with tobacco and gul.⁶²

Amongst adolescents aged from 13 to 17, nearly 10% used tobacco in some form as of 2014, with almost 14% of boys using tobacco compared to 2% of girls.⁶⁴ The rate for cigarette smoking was nearly 8%, with 11% of boys smoking compared to 1.5% of girls.⁶⁴

There were an estimated 106,000 deaths attributable to smoking in 2019, accounting for over 12% of all mortality in Bangladesh that year.⁶⁵ The total annual cost of tobacco use in Bangladesh was estimated at BDT৳305.6 billion (US$3.6 billion) in 2018, which was equivalent to 1.4% of GDP in 2017-18.⁶⁶ Direct healthcare costs accounted for BDT৳83.9 billion, of which 24% was covered by public health expenditure. This is a significant outlay, representing 8.9% of the healthcare budget in 2018-19.⁶⁶ However, most of the costs attributable to tobacco use – both direct and indirect – are borne by tobacco users and their families.⁶⁶ While the economic contribution of the tobacco industry to Bangladeshi GDP was estimated at BDT৳229.11 billion ($US2.7 billion) in 2018, this was still BDT৳76.54 billion (US$911 million) less than the annual costs attributable to tobacco use. Tobacco therefore results in a net loss to the Bangladeshi economy.⁶⁶⁶⁷

Tobacco in Bangladesh

Market share and leading brands

In 2022, market research company Euromonitor International estimated the Bangladeshi tobacco market to be worth nearly BDT৳420 billion – over US$4.5 billion.⁶⁸⁶⁹

British American Tobacco Bangladesh (BATB) dominates the Bangladeshi tobacco market, with a market share of over 84.5% in 2022.¹⁸ Its portfolio includes the three bestselling brands of cigarette in the country: Royal, Derby and Hollywood.²³ The Bangladeshi state holds a stake of more than 9% in BATB, both directly, and through two state-owned assets.⁶⁰

BATB’s closest competitor is Japan Tobacco International (JTI), which has a market share of over 9% following its 2018 acquisition of the United Dhaka Tobacco Company Limited (UDTCL), the tobacco business of the Akij Group conglomerate.¹⁸⁷⁰⁷¹ Its leading brands are Sheikh and Navy.²³

Smaller domestic companies include Abul Khair Tobacco Company, Alpha Tobacco Manufacturing Company and Nasir Tobacco Industries Ltd.⁷²

• For more information on the tobacco industry in Bangladesh, please see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

Smokeless tobacco and bidis

Accurate, up-to-date information on the SLT industry in Bangladesh is scarce. SLT producers are mostly home based and work informally, which makes for a fragmented market.⁷³⁷⁴ However, larger companies include Kaus Chemical Works, which sells Hakimpuri Zarda, one of the most popular zarda products (made of dried and boiled tobacco leaves, lime, areca nut, additives, tannins and spices) in the country; and Baba Al-Tajer Dhaka.⁷³⁷⁵⁷⁶

Similarly, reliable and up-to-date information about bidi production is not available. However, a 2012 investigation found 117 bidi factories spread throughout the country.⁷⁷ The leading bidi company in Bangladesh is the Akiz Bidi Company; others include Aziz Bidi, Maya Bidi and Bangla Bidi.⁷⁸

Tobacco farming

Large-scale tobacco agriculture began in Bangladesh following independence in 1971, when BATB began growing in the greater Rangpur area.⁷⁹ Today, tobacco is grown throughout the country, with significant tobacco-growing regions including Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari, Kushtia, Manikganj, Tangail, Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar.⁷⁹

Bangladeshi tobacco production was steady at around 40,000 tonnes annually from the late 1970s until 2009, at which point it began to increase rapidly, peaking at just under 130,000 tonnes in 2019.⁸⁰ In 2020 Bangladesh declared nearly 86,000 tonnes, making it the 12^th largest tobacco producer in the world.⁸⁰⁸¹

Child labour

Human rights organisations have documented child labour in tobacco fields in Bangladesh.⁸² In 2020, a video report published by Unfairtobacco and Bangladeshi NGO UBINIG showed children missing school in order to help their families with the tobacco harvest.⁸³ Another video report documented the impacts of tobacco farming on Bangladeshi women, including the challenge of combining long hours working on the harvest with domestic tasks; negative health effects, including respiratory problems, fevers, and loss of appetite; as well as poor economic returns.⁸⁴

In 2016, the Swedish NGO Swedwatch published a report based on research in three leaf cultivation areas which supply BATB.⁸⁵ It documented widespread child labour and negative impacts on the health and wellbeing of farm labourers, both children and adults.⁸⁵ It also showed how the use of flawed contracts and uncertain promises contributed to over-indebtedness and trapped many farmers in poverty.⁸⁵ In response, BAT conducted an internal review which, according to the company, “did not raise any significant concerns and indicated that the report as a whole is not representative of the reality on the ground.”⁸⁶ A subsequent investigation BAT commissioned to consulting firm DNV GL supported its internal review.⁸⁷

Bangladeshi bidis feature on the U.S. Department of Labor’s 2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.⁸⁸ It is estimated that at least half of the workforce in the Bangladeshi bidi industry is aged between 4 and 14; average wages are between US$0.77 and US$1.57 per day.⁷⁸ A 2012 investigation found that most bidi workers were women and children.⁷⁷ According to several workers, managers and people in communities around the bidi factories surveyed, this is because their labour is much cheaper and they are less capable of organising for higher wages or better working conditions.⁷⁷

• For information on tobacco industry responses to accusations of complicity in child labour, please see the pages on CSR: Child Labour and the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco-Growing Foundation (ECLT).

Tobacco and the economy

Bangladesh is a net exporter of tobacco. In 2015, the last year for which data is currently available from UN Comtrade (as of September 2023), Bangladesh exported US$43.5 million in raw tobacco, compared to just over US$8 million in imports.⁸⁹⁹⁰ However, it is a net importer of factory-made cigarettes. The same year, it imported over US$3 million in cigarettes, compared to just over US$354,000 in exports.⁹¹⁹²

Illicit trade

A World Bank report published in 2019 found that Bangladesh had a low estimated incidence of illicit trade in cigarettes (2%), compared to estimated global rates of 10-12%.⁹³ According to the report, annual revenue losses from the illicit cigarette trade are about US$100 million, around 4% of total tobacco revenues.⁹³ Bangladesh has strong legal and institutional structures to combat illicit trade, including a cigarette stamp and banderol system to ensure compliance with taxation, robust law enforcement and stiff penalties for smuggling.⁹³

Though the illicit bidi trade is likely to be larger than that for cigarettes, revenue loss has so far been low given that bidis were barely taxed at all until recently.⁹³ The illicit trade in smokeless tobacco is also likely to be significant, though in the absence of any track and trace system or even tax stamps on SLT products, it is impossible to estimate the illicit share of the SLT market accurately.⁷³ A 2022 study found that “Almost all ST [smokeless tobacco] products bought in Bangladesh (…) were non-compliant with the local packaging requirements and hence potentially illicit”.⁷³

Tobacco and the environment

A 2020 study found various forms of contamination due to tobacco growing in Bangladesh, both in the soil and in nearby water sources. The most important parameter found to be significantly higher in tobacco-growing land was the pesticide aldicarb.⁸¹ Classified as “extremely hazardous” by the WHO, this chemical is banned in 125 countries, though its use remains widespread.⁹⁴ The same study calculated the environmental cost of tobacco curing (due to carbon emissions) at US$310 per acre used for tobacco cultivation.⁸¹

Another report stated that contamination of water and soil by tobacco farming is endangering the livelihoods of nearly 800,000 people in the Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar districts who depend on the Matamuhuri river for fishing and cultivation of food crops.⁹⁵ Swedwatch also documented deforestation and forest degradation linked to farms in Bandarban and Chakoria which supply BATB.⁸⁵ It alleged that BATB has contributed to these problems by failing to prevent sourcing of fuel wood from natural forests and by supporting the construction of kilns in forest areas.⁸⁵

• For more information on the tobacco industry in Bangladesh, please see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

Roadmap to Tobacco Control

Bangladesh was the first country to sign the WHO FCTC on 16 June 2003.⁹⁶ It ratified the treaty a year later.⁹⁷ However, it has not signed the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.⁹⁸

The Smoking and Tobacco Products Usage (Control) Act (2005) is the principal law governing tobacco control in Bangladesh. The Act is comprehensive and covers smokefree spaces; tobacco advertising; the sale of tobacco to and by minors; and the packaging and labelling of tobacco products, among other areas.⁹⁹ However, the law had some major limitations. For example, it mandated only textual health warnings on smoked tobacco products, which is problematic in Bangladesh given the popularity of smokeless tobacco.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, although it banned advertising of tobacco products, it did not comprehensively cover sponsorship.¹⁰⁰

The Act was amended in 2013 and implementation rules were introduced in 2015, increasing compliance with the WHO FCTC. However, the industry was given a 12-month transition period to fully comply.¹⁰⁰ Even then, industry interference – principally by British American Tobacco Bangladesh (BATB) – has succeeded in delaying full implementation of the Amendment.¹⁰⁰ For example, though the Amendment mandated graphic health warnings (GHWs) on the upper half of all tobacco packaging, as of May 2022 – over seven years since the implementation rules were first published in the country’s official gazette – GHWs were still printed on the lower half of tobacco products.¹⁰⁰ Though this is considered a complete measure by the WHO, it means that the GHWs may be less visible to many Bangladeshi consumers. This is because tobacco products are often sold by mobile sellers out of steel trays which cover the lower half of the products.¹⁰⁰

Other major loopholes remain. Designated smoking areas are still permitted in certain public places; there are no restrictions on the sale of individual cigarettes (single sticks), small packets of cigarettes, or tobacco products via the internet; and there are no restrictions on use, advertising, promotion and sponsorship, or packaging and labelling of e-cigarettes.⁹⁹

However, as of June 2022, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) was preparing a new amendment to the Smoking and Tobacco Products Usage (Control) Act, which contains a number of global best practices.¹⁰¹ If passed, it would eliminate designated smoking areas; ban corporate social responsibility (CSR) by tobacco companies; ban the sale of single sticks; ban the display of tobacco products at points of sale; and increase the size of graphic health warnings (GHWs) on tobacco products from 50% to 90%.¹⁰¹ It also aims to ban the sale of e-cigarettes.¹⁰¹

In 2015, the Bangladeshi government began to levy a 1% Health Development Surcharge (HDS) on all tobacco products, which brings in around US$71 million a year, designed to support key government health initiatives including tobacco control.¹⁰² However, this funding has not always been easily accessible to the MoHFW. As of March 2021, the National Tobacco Control Cell (NTCC), which sits within the MoHFW, was working on a long-term tobacco control programme which would have smoother access to HDS funding.¹⁰²

For more details, please see the following websites:

• Legislation by country – Bangladesh, Tobacco Control Laws, Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids
• Bangladesh, WHO FCTC Implementation Database, WHO FCTC Secretariat
• Country profile – Bangladesh, World Health Organization, WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2021

Tobacco Industry Interference in Bangladesh

Recent tobacco industry tactics in Bangladesh include direct lobbying of civil servants, which successfully obtained an exemption to lockdown restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic; using diplomats to lobby in its interests; and the mobilisation of third-party organisations against tobacco control.

Influencing policy: conflicts of interest

According to a study published in 2022, no measures have been adopted to implement Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC in Bangladesh.⁵⁹ The tobacco industry continues to influence policymaking, particularly BATB, in which the government holds a share of over 9%.⁵⁹⁶⁰

This incident also demonstrates how much the tobacco industry (particularly BATB) is connected with government in Bangladesh.⁵⁹ The Secretary at the MoI, who granted the lockdown exemptions to BATB and UDTCL, simultaneously had a seat on the BATB board as a non-executive director.⁵⁹ This arrangement between the MoI and BATB appears to date back to at least 2010.¹⁰⁸

Several other senior civil servants also sit as independent or non-executive members on the BATB board, including a secretary at the Prime Minister’s Office.^109110111108

A study published in 2022 stressed that the presence of senior government officials on the BATB board leads both to individual and institutional conflicts of interest.⁵⁹ However, a former Secretary at the MoI has denied this, stating that tobacco control is not discussed at BATB board meetings.¹¹²

• For more on tobacco industry activity during the pandemic, please see the COVID-19 Tobacco Tactics page and the COVID-19 monitoring database.

Influencing policy: lobbying by diplomats

There have also been cases of lobbying of Bangladeshi authorities by foreign diplomats on behalf of the two main transnational tobacco companies operating in the country. In 2017, the British High Commissioner in Bangladesh intervened on behalf of BATB in a tax dispute between BATB and the NBR. Similarly, in 2021, the Japanese Ambassador sent a letter to the Bangladeshi Finance Minister criticising tax reforms which had impacted JTI, as well as restrictions on the marketing and sale of certain JTI products. The letter also complained of “anti-competitive” behaviour, alluding to BATB’s domination of the Bangladeshi tobacco market.

• For more information, please see the pages on UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT: Bangladesh and Japanese Diplomats Lobbying for JTI.

Use of third parties

In June 2022, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) published another draft amendment to the Smoking and Tobacco Products Usage (Control) Act (2005) – Bangladesh’s main tobacco control law – and asked for input from relevant stakeholders (see section Roadmap to Tobacco Control).¹¹³

In response, the MoHFW received letters criticising the amendment from various trade associations, including the Federation of Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industries (FBCCI) and the Foreign Investors’ Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), both of which have tobacco industry links.¹¹⁴¹¹⁵

In July 2022, a “policy dialogue” event – widely reported in the press – was held at a five-star hotel in Dhaka by the Intellectual Property Association of Bangladesh (IPAB). Speakers argued the amendment would reduce tax revenue, increase illicit trade and threaten livelihoods, reportedly describing it as “unrealistic”, “unimplementable” and “counterproductive”.¹¹⁶ On its website, IPAB lists BATB among its corporate members, from which it acknowledges receiving “extensive support”, and two members of IPAB’s executive committee also hold senior positions at BATB.^117118119120

Another participant at the event was the executive director of FICCI, which lists BATB, Philip Morris Bangladesh and United Dhaka Tobacco Company Ltd (UDTCL) as member organisations.^116121122123 FICCI also includes tobacco industry executives on its board of directors, including the managing director of UDTCL, author of the letter to the Ministry of Industries requesting an exemption from COVID-19 restrictions in 2020 (see Influencing policy: conflicts of interest).¹⁰⁵¹²⁴

A 2018 investigation by the public health NGO PROGGA concluded that BATB’s infiltration of influential business and trade organisations constituted a major barrier to greater tobacco control in Bangladesh.¹²⁵

• For more information on business organisations in Bangladesh and neighbouring countries see Trade Associations.

Relevant Links

• Live: Tobacco Industry Interference on Amendment of Tobacco Control Law 2022, Center for Research and Advocacy to Fight Tobacco
• National STEPS Survey for Non-communicable Diseases Risk Factors in Bangladesh 2018, National Institute of Preventive and Social Medicine (NIPSOM)
• The economic cost of tobacco use in Bangladesh: A health cost approach, Bangladesh Cancer Society

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• South East Asian Region
• Trade Associations
• Greenwashing

TCRG Research

• Tobacco industry interference to undermine the development and implementation of graphic health warnings in Bangladesh, M.H. Shahriar, M.M. Hasan, M.S. Alam, B.K. Matthes, A.B. Gilmore, A.B.M. Zubair, Tobacco Control, 2023, doi: 10.1136/tc-2022-057538
• Achieving a tobacco-free Bangladesh by 2040: a qualitative analysis of the tobacco advertising environment and prohibitions in Bangladesh, A. Tselengidis, S. Adams, B. Freeman, S.M. Alam, P.A.S. Astuti, J. Cranwell, BMJ Open 2023;13:e069620, doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2022-069620
• Advancing whole-of-government approaches to tobacco control: Article 5.3 and the challenge of policy coordination in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India and Uganda, R. Barry, S.M. Abdullah, A. Chugh, S. Hirpa, P. Kumar, D. Male, R. Ralston, T. Wagner-Rizvi, J. Collin, Tobacco Control, 2022;31:s46-s52
• Developing more detailed taxonomies of tobacco industry political activity in low-income and middle-income countries: qualitative evidence from eight countries, B.K. Matthes, K. Lauber, M. Zatoński, L. Robertson, A.B. Gilmore, BMJ Global Health 2021;6:e004096.
• Estimating the magnitude of illicit cigarette trade in Bangladesh: protocol for a mixed-methods study, S. Abjullah, R. Huque, L. Bauld, H. Ross, A. Gilmore, R.M. John, K. Siddiqi, Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17(13), 4791

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to TCRG publications.

References

The post Bangladesh Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

There have been multiple instances of lobbying by ambassadors and other diplomats from the UK, as well as Japan and Switzerland. Much of this lobbying activity has taken place in low and middle-income countries (LMICs).¹²⁷ These countries are important sources of new customers for tobacco companies as markets in higher income countries where consumption is generally falling.^128129130

Diplomats are also involved in activities which help promote the tobacco industry via local media, such as visiting tobacco farms or factories. Other engagement supports tobacco companies’ product promotions, or corporate social responsibility strategy. These activities help to raise the profile of tobacco companies, enhance their reputations, and support the ‘normalisation’ of the industry.^126131132

Background

Parties to the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) have an obligation to protect public health policies from the “commercial and vested interests of the tobacco industry” and any contact with tobacco industry representatives, or others seeking to further their interests, must be “limited” and “transparent”.¹³³ The implementation guidelines to Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC recommend that Parties limit interactions with the tobacco industry to those that are absolutely necessary to regulating the industry, and ensure the transparency of those interactions that do occur.¹³³  The guidelines also recommend parties treat state-owned tobacco companies in the same way as any other tobacco company, including avoiding any “preferential treatment”.¹³³

In addition, the guidelines state that “… Whenever possible, interactions should be conducted in public, for example through public hearings, public notice of interactions, disclosure of records of such interactions to the public”.¹³³

However even in countries with a high level of compliance with the WHO FCTC requirements, diplomatic missions rarely achieve this level of transparency. Information on tobacco industry engagement has largely been found through media investigations and Freedom of Information requests (FOIs).

In October 2014, the 6^th Conference of the Parties (COP) decided to urge parties: “to raise awareness and adopt measures to implement Article 5.3 and its implementing Guidelines among all parts of government including diplomatic missions.”¹³⁴ Another decision required governments to “take into account their public health objectives in their negotiation of trade and investment agreements”.¹³⁵

Nevertheless, diplomats continue to lobby for tobacco companies around the world.¹²⁶

Countries whose diplomatic representatives have lobbied on behalf of tobacco companies overseas  include the UK, Germany and Japan, who are all Parties to the WHO FCTC,¹³⁶ as well as the United States and Switzerland. BAT, PMI and Japan Tobacco all have offices in Geneva, Switzerland, the location of the World Health Organization and other key international bodies.

UK

There are specific guidelines covering the engagement of British (UK) officials working overseas designed to limit contact with tobacco companies, and support compliance with Article 5.3. After the UK Ambassador to Panama lobbied on behalf of British American Tobacco (BAT),¹³⁷ the guidelines were revised in 2013.¹³⁸ These guidelines state that “Posts must not…Engage with local foreign governments on behalf of the tobacco industry, except in cases where local policies could be considered protectionist or discriminatory”.¹³⁸

Engagement and lobbying

Despite having guidelines in place to support compliance with the WHO FCTC, FOI requests and media investigations have revealed that British diplomats continue to interact with the tobacco industry more than is necessary. UK diplomats have lobbied for BAT in Bangladesh,¹³⁹¹⁴⁰ Hungary,¹⁴¹ and Pakistan.^{137142143144145}

UK officials have also disclosed contact with tobacco companies in Panama and Venezuela,¹⁴⁶¹⁴⁷ Laos,¹⁴⁸ Cuba,¹⁴⁹ and Burundi.¹⁵⁰

In 2018, UK advocacy organisation Action on Smoking & Health (ASH) called this a “global pattern of engagement” by British officials to defend BAT’s interests.¹⁵¹

• For more details see UK Diplomats Lobbying on Behalf of BAT.

Tobacco industry events

UK government guidelines state that staff must not:

“Attend or otherwise support receptions or high-profile events, especially those where a tobacco company is the sole or main sponsor and/or which are overtly to promote tobacco products or the tobacco industry (such as the official opening of a UK tobacco factory overseas)”.¹³⁸

However, UK staff have attended such events, generating considerable local media coverage.

For example, in 2019 the British ambassador to Yemen opened a cigarette factory in a free trade zone in Jordan, celebrating the expansion of the tobacco company Kamaran which is part-owned by BAT.^126152153154

In 2020, staff from the UK high commission in Pakistan attended a promotional event for a BAT product in Pakistan.¹⁵⁵

• See UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT for details.

Engaging with industry allies

The links between diplomatic missions and tobacco companies can be more indirect, via funding third party allies of the industry. The UK guidelines state that diplomats should not “endorse projects which are funded directly or indirectly by the tobacco industry”.  However, a 2019 investigation by The Guardian found that the British high commission in Malaysia had given funding to a Kuala Lumpur based think tank (IDEAS) for several years. At the same time the think tank was also receiving money from tobacco companies and was lobbying against plain packaging regulation and tobacco taxes.¹⁵⁶  While the UK had already implemented plain packaging regulations, tobacco control was being undermined overseas.

Attending meetings with the tobacco industry

Tobacco companies attend meetings and events organised directly by UK government departments, such as the FCO (now FCDO) or the DIT (now Department for Business and Trade).¹⁴⁶  They also attend those held by regional, national or local business organisations such as chambers of commerce.

Responses to FOI requests show that when the attendance of UK government officials at such events is disclosed, there is little detail about the specific purpose or content of these meetings,¹³⁹¹⁴¹ It may simply be described as relating to ‘doing business’ in the country.¹⁴⁷

Business vs public health interests?

The UK guidelines for overseas staff (last updated in 2013) allow for the communication of “basic trade, investment and political information”, although this is not defined.¹³⁸ One of the activities used to justify interaction by UK diplomats is “resolving business problems that are potentially discriminatory”.^{137139141157158} This has been criticised as running counter to the WHO FCTC guidelines.¹²⁶¹⁵⁹

While transparency is required for tobacco industry interactions in 2018, the UK government told Parliament that it “does not catalogue the representations it makes on behalf of companies”.^160161162  Research by the Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) concluded that the stated WHO FCTC goal of “maximum transparency” is not being achieved in the UK.¹²⁶¹⁵⁴

Japan

In 2021, the Ambassador of Japan to Bangladesh lobbied the government of Bangladesh on behalf of Japan Tobacco International (JTI).  In a letter to the Bangladesh Finance Minister the Ambassador criticised 2019 taxation changes for their impact on JTI. It also complained about the activities of competitors, and licensing demands.¹⁶³

• For details, including the lobbying letter, see Japanese Diplomats Lobbying for JTI

The Japanese Ambassador to Ethiopia was present at the signing of a deal between the Ethiopian government and JTI in 2016,  when the Ministry of Public Enterprise sold 40% of its National Tobacco Enterprise to the Japanese company.¹⁶⁴ Japanese diplomats have also toured tobacco farms and JTI factories in Tanzania and Zambia.¹⁶⁵¹⁶⁶

Japan Tobacco International is the overseas subsidiary of Japan Tobacco (JT), which is one third-owned by the Japanese government.¹⁶⁷

Germany

In May 2022, the German ambassador to Beirut visited the offices of Regie, the Lebanese Tobacco and Tobacco Inventory Administration.¹²⁶¹⁶⁸

Denmark

The Imani Centre for Policy and Education, a Ghana-based think tank,  received money from the Danish embassy while lobbying against tobacco control.¹⁵⁶¹⁶⁹

Switzerland

Switzerland is not Party to the WHO FCTC.

In 2019, Swiss diplomats approached the government of the Republic of Moldova on behalf of Philip Morris International (PMI) seeking an opportunity to discuss new tobacco legislation.^170171172  The proposed legislation included significant tax increases on heated tobacco products, in which PMI has invested.¹⁷⁰¹⁷³

The same year, PMI helped fund an inaugural event for the new Swiss Embassy in Moscow.¹⁷⁴¹⁷⁵

• For more details see Swiss Diplomats Lobbying for PMI

USA

Although the US is not Party to the WHO FCTC, it has specific laws and guidance that prohibit its diplomats from promoting the sale or export of tobacco, or influencing non-discriminatory restrictions on tobacco marketing.^176177178179 However, US diplomats have enabled meetings between tobacco companies and government representatives.

The US ASEAN Business Council organises delegations of US businesses, including Philip Morris International (PMI), which meet high level officials in the ASEAN region.¹⁷⁶  PMI was at the time a vice chair of its Customs & Trade Facilitation Committee and used this opportunity to meet with government officials from the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Vietnam.¹⁷⁶¹⁸⁰

Why it matters

The examples above illustrate contraventions of the WHO FCTC, an international treaty, and in many cases breaches of national guidelines. As TCRG research points out, all of these activities also undermine the spirit of these laws, by apparently serving the commercial interests of transnational tobacco companies and helping to ‘normalise’ the industry in the eyes of policy makers and the public.¹²⁶

The implementation guidelines of Article 5.3 urge Parties to exclude the tobacco industry completely from the public health policy arena.  The guidelines also urge them not to participate in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities which are used by the tobacco industry and as an alternative means to access policy makers, as well as for public relations and product promotion.¹²⁶

In August 2019, in direct response to the exposure of lobbying by Swiss diplomats, the WHO released a statement urging governments to comply with Article 5.3 and to “proactively aspire to reduce the number of people starting and continuing smoking, to promote health and preserve future generations”.¹⁸¹

TobaccoTactics Resources

• UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT
• UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT: Bangladesh
• UK Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco: Burundi
• Swiss Diplomats Lobbying for PMI
• Japanese Diplomats Lobbying for JTI
• Third Party Techniques

TCRG Research

A “willingness to be orchestrated”: Why are UK diplomats working with tobacco companies?, R. Alebshehy, K. Silver, P. Chamberlain, Frontiers in Public Health, 17 March 2023, Sec. Public Health Policy, Volume 11 – 2023, doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.977713

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including TCRG research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to the Bath TCRG’s list of publications.

References

The post Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco Companies appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

In January 2021, the Ambassador of Japan to Bangladesh lobbied the government of Bangladesh on behalf of Japan Tobacco International (JTI).  See below for details.

Background

Japan ratified the WHO FCTC in 2004. The Japanese government owns a 31% share in Japan Tobacco International.¹⁸⁹

The 2020 Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index gave Japan the worst overall score of all countries included, with extensive policy interference and conflicts of interest.¹⁸⁹ The index reported that Japan is one of the countries that persists in seeing the tobacco industry as economically crucial. It also allows the tobacco industry to have a say in the development of tobacco control measures.¹⁸⁹

Japanese Ambassador Lobbying for JTI in Bangladesh

In January 2021, the Ambassador of Japan, Ito Naoki, sent a letter to the Bangladesh Finance Minister with the subject line:

“Re: Japan International’s (JTI) Landmark Investment in Bangladesh and Repeated Challenges Posed Due to Policy Shifts and Anti-Competitive Activities”¹⁶³

The three-page letter criticised taxation changes in 2019 which “significantly hit JTI” and restrictions on the importation and selling of certain JTI products. It also complained of anti-competitive activities by competitors and “undue” demands by a licensing authority. In the last case the ambassador said: “When respected Cabinet Secretary  became aware if the issue, he stepped in and solved the issue in rapid speed”.¹⁶³

The letter ended with the ambassador telling the Finance Minister:

“I believe that Japanese investors are carefully watching the action of the government as JTI Bangladesh is a single largest flagship investment from Japan. Success of JTI is an important factor for decision making of potential investors in Japan.”¹⁶³

The letter can be read in full here

The Japan Society for Tobacco Control criticised the lobbying in a letter to Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, saying: “…it is legally impossible for him to work with or to otherwise act in the interest of the tobacco industry.”¹⁹⁰¹⁹¹

TobaccoTactics Resources

Influencing foreign tobacco legislation via diplomats is a known tobacco industry tactic.

For more background and examples see Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco Companies

Also see:

• Third Party Techniques
• Japan Tobacco International
• Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products: Japan Tobacco International

TCRG Research

A “willingness to be orchestrated”: Why are UK diplomats working with tobacco companies?, R. Alebshehy, K. Silver, P. Chamberlain, Frontiers in Public Health, 17 March 2023, Sec. Public Health Policy, Volume 11 – 2023, doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.977713

References

The post Japanese Diplomats Lobbying for JTI appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

British health charity Action on Smoking & Health (ASH) described this as a “global pattern of engagement” by British officials to defend BAT’s interests.¹⁹⁶ Much of this lobbying activity has taken place in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) which are important target markets for tobacco companies as those in higher income countries become increasingly regulated and less lucrative.¹⁹⁷¹⁹⁸

Background

Parties to the FCTC have an obligation to protect public health policies from the “commercial and vested interests of the tobacco industry” and any contact with tobacco industry representatives, or others seeking to further their interests, must be “limited” and “transparent”.¹⁹⁹²⁰⁰

The UK government, a signatory to the FCTC, has had rules in place on the engagement of civil servants with the tobacco industry since 1999.²⁰¹ After the exposure of direct lobbying for BAT by a British diplomat in Panama in 2012, pressure from ASH helped lead to further strengthening of these guidelines to support compliance with the FCTC, to be “more prescriptive in relation to provision of support to the tobacco industry”, and to restate and clarify the term “maximum transparency” in the engagement between tobacco companies and government staff overseas.²⁰²

UK Diplomats Lobbying for British American Tobacco

Despite guidelines being revised, in 2017 a senior UK diplomat lobbied the government of Bangladesh on behalf of BAT.¹⁴⁰ There has also been repeated contact between officials of the UK Department of International Trade (DIT) and the tobacco industry in Panama and Venezuela since 2014;¹⁴⁶¹⁴⁷ direct lobbying by the UK Ambassador on behalf of BAT in Hungary in relation to taxation in 2014 and 2015;¹⁴¹ and the public association of a senior British diplomat with overt BAT lobbying of the Pakistani government over health warnings on cigarette packaging in 2015.^203204205

It was also reported that a UK government trade advisor had been seconded to work in BAT’s offices in Hungary in 2015.¹⁴⁶

Bangladesh

In September 2017, it was revealed that the British High Commissioner in Bangladesh had lobbied on behalf of BAT Bangladesh (BATB) in a tax dispute with the Bangladesh Board of Revenue over £170 million in unpaid VAT for incorrectly categorised cigarettes.^140206207]¹³⁹

DIT officials, including the Director and Deputy Director, were also involved in multiple meetings, e-mails and phone calls with BAT relating to this issue between 2015 and 2017.¹³⁹

• For more details, go to UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT: Bangladesh.

Panama

Latin America is a key market for BAT, which held 46% of the cigarette market in 2015.²⁰⁸ As early as 2002, a report by the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) warned of the tobacco industry goal to “forestall any meaningful regulation of the industry’s practices or products” in the region.²⁰⁹

The FCTC came into force in Panama in 2008, but in 2012, the Financial Times revealed that UK Ambassador Michael Holloway had lobbied the government of Panama on behalf of BAT over tax increases on tobacco, and the impact of the “alarming growth” in smuggled cigarettes on “one of the most important British Companies”.²¹⁰

At the time a Foreign Office spokesperson said that “our Ambassador was following our strict guidelines on lobbying, which allow us to offer assistance to firms operating overseas, including in resolving business problems that are potentially discriminatory”,²⁰³ a defence which has been criticised as running counter to FCTC guidelines.²¹¹ The same argument has been used to justify lobbying in Hungary in 2014/15 and Bangladesh in 2017.¹⁴¹¹³⁹

Since the UK government guidelines were revised in 2013, stating “Posts must not …Attend or otherwise support receptions or high profile events, especially those where a tobacco company is the sole or main sponsor…”,²⁰² further contact between UK diplomats in Panama and BAT has been disclosed: “six meetings between BAT and embassy staff. Including two BAT ‘receptions’”.¹⁴⁶

Venezuela

Venezuela became a party to the FCTC in 2006, but appears to have had limited success with compliance with WHO guidelines on article 5.3, including the requirement for transparency.²¹²²¹³

Following Freedom of Information (FOI) requests made by ASH, the DIT disclosed interaction with BAT (Bigott) Venezuela at 25 meetings between 2013 and 2017, mostly meetings of the Venezuelan and British Chambers of Commerce and “CEO Breakfast meetings”.¹⁴⁷

Little detail of the specific purpose or content of these meetings is given, and it is unclear which officials were present. In one instance, BAT and several other British companies met in 2016 with the Venezuelan Trade & Foreign Investment Minister at the British Embassy to “share the challenges and complexities they face when doing business in Venezuela aiming to obtain the Minister’s support with those issues and to arrange further bilateral meetings”.¹⁴⁷

Providing an opportunity to lobby the Venezuelan government appears beyond the “basic trade, investment and political information” allowed under the 2013 guidelines.²⁰²

Issues of Concern

This global pattern of activity, of BAT enlisting UK diplomats to lobby on their behalf and promoting their economic interests above those of public health, is problematic for multiple reasons.

Breach of FCTC Article 5.3

The lobbying activity clearly breaches the spirit, and at times the letter, of Article 5.3 FCTC, which highlight the well documented tactics of the tobacco industry “to interfere with the setting and implementing of tobacco control measures”.¹⁹⁹²⁰⁰

The FCTC is very specific on limiting contact with the industry: “Parties should interact with the tobacco industry only when and to the extent strictly necessary to enable them to effectively regulate the tobacco industry and tobacco products”.¹⁹⁹²⁰⁰ The extended interaction in Panama and Bangladesh clearly falls outside this definition of necessary contact.

There are also specific recommendations regarding transparency: “… Whenever possible, interactions should be conducted in public, for example through public hearings, public notice of interactions, disclosure of records of such interactions to the public”.¹⁹⁹²⁰⁰None of the transparency recommendations appear to have been followed by UK diplomats in Bangladesh prior to a Freedom of Information Request.

Breach of UK Guidelines for Diplomats

Jointly issued by the UK Department of Health (DH) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) the 2013 guidelines state that “Posts must not…Engage with local foreign governments on behalf of the tobacco industry, except in cases where local policies could be considered protectionist or discriminatory”.²⁰¹ Senior officials and politicians have argued that the retrospective tax demand from the Bangladesh government is discriminatory.²⁰² Under the guidelines some assistance can be given in “resolving business problems, e.g. customs of port clearance, smuggling, trademark violations etc”²⁰² but national taxation policy would seem to fall better under the direction “to assist tobacco companies to comply with foreign government laws or regulations”.²⁰²

The need for transparency is emphasised in the UK guidelines: “in the event that interactions with the tobacco industry are necessary, these should be conducted with the maximum of transparency to demonstrate our compliance with the FCTC”. Given the lack of detail and the use of blanket exemptions, the UK government’s FOI releases are far from ‘transparent’, notably the 2018 letter from the UK Ambassador in Bangladesh was omitted. British politicians have also publicly stated that the UK government “does not catalogue the representations it makes on behalf of companies”.^214215216

“Business as Usual?”

FOI requests have revealed frequent contact with the tobacco industry at business meetings and events organised by the FCO/DIT, and local Chambers of Commerce.¹⁴⁶ Since 2016 BATB has been involved in the “Tax working group of the EU Bangladesh Business Climate Dialogue” and taken part in discussions of government budgets, taxation and “market conditions” where the Director of DIT has been present.¹³⁹ In addition to BATB, contact has been disclosed with the Imperial Tobacco controlled Lao Tobacco Company in Laos;¹⁴⁸ with Habanos/Brascuba,a joint venture with Imperial Tobacco in Cuba;²¹⁷ and with a tobacco company “owned by a British national” in Burundi.²¹⁸

• For more information on the lobbying activity in Burundi, see UK Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco: Burundi

Services and assistance provided are described by the UK government as being the same as for any other UK businesses.^139147148 The responses offered in defence of these lobbying activities suggests that, despite clear UK government guidelines for the conduct of overseas officials, elements of the UK Government still consider the tobacco industry to be an industry like any other, and are therefore conducting “business as usual” in conflict with the UK’s own tobacco control policies.²¹⁹ In the official dealings with the industry, it does not appear to be taken into account that the tobacco industry does not operate like other businesses.^199200220

From August 2017 to January 2021, BAT was under investigation by the UK Serious Fraud Office after allegations of corruption and bribery in Africa.^221222223 The investigation was concluded as the SFO said it did not “meet the evidential test for prosecution”.²²³

Undermining Tobacco Control Programmes

A priority for the WHO in Bangladesh (as part of the Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce Tobacco Use)²²⁴ has been to help the National Board of Revenue to build capacity on tobacco taxation”.²²⁵ The UK Department of Health is also “supporting the implementation of tobacco control measures” in low and middle income countries with £15 million of Overseas Development Assistance funds allocated to 2030.²¹⁹

The intervention of UK diplomats on behalf of BAT in Bangladesh and elsewhere appears to be in direct conflict with the aims of these programmes.¹⁴⁶

Relevant Link

• ASH briefing: How British diplomats have defended BAT’s overseas activities, Action on Smoking and Health, 26 April 2018

TobaccoTactics Resources

Influencing foreign tobacco legislation via diplomats is a known tobacco industry tactic. Also see:

• Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco Companies
• UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT: Bangladesh
• UK Diplomats Lobbying for Tobacco: Burundi
• Third Party Techniques

Other instances where BAT tried to hinder regulations:

• BAT Funded Lobbying Against Plain Packaging
• Kenya- BAT’s Tactics to Undermine the Tobacco Control Regulations
• Kenya- BAT’s Tactics to Influence Track and Trace Tender
• BAT Involvement in Tobacco Smuggling

TCRG Papers

A “willingness to be orchestrated”: Why are UK diplomats working with tobacco companies?, R. Alebshehy, K. Silver, P. Chamberlain, Frontiers in Public Health, 17 March 2023, Sec. Public Health Policy, Volume 11 – 2023, doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.977713

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including TCRG research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to the Bath TCRG’s list of publications.

References

The post UK Diplomats Lobbying for BAT appeared first on TobaccoTactics.