Swedish Match is a Swedish tobacco company that manufactures and sells snus (image 1), moist snuff, cigars, chewing tobacco and matches. Philip Morris International (PMI) bought the company in 2022.

The company used to sell cigarettes, but decided in 1999 to divest its cigarette business to Austria Tabak.¹ Lennart Sundén, then President and CEO of Swedish Match, said at the time:

“Cigarette consumption, the industry’s most dominant source of revenue, is declining or has reached a plateau in most Western countries. For Swedish Match therefore, the divestment of our cigarette operations was a natural step. We were a strong player in local markets, but a very small player compared with our main competitors.”²

In September 2021, Swedish Match announced that it would be selling its US cigar business and focus on its oral products.³⁴ Plans to sell were put on hold in March 2022.⁵

In May 2022 Philip Morris International made an offer of US$16 billion to buy the whole company.⁶⁷ On 11 May the board of directors of Swedish Match recommended that its shareholders accept PMI’s offer.⁸

As of 10 November 2022, PMI had acquired 86% of the company, and Swedish Match Directors recommended that the remaining shareholders offer to sell their shares to PMI, via its Netherlands subsidiary Philip Morris Holland Holdings (PMHH).⁹¹⁰ On 28 November 2022 PMI announced that it held over 90% of the company, meaning it could buy the remaining shares under compulsory purchase rules and take Swedish Match off the stock market.¹¹

• For more details see Philip Morris International.

Market Share

Swedish Match’s markets for snus, its main product, are Sweden, Norway and the United States (US), although in 2010 the company aspired to become the “global smokefree leader”.¹²

In 2010 the company held around 80% of the market in Western Europe (mainly in Norway and Sweden) but it has gradually lost market share following the entry of transnational tobacco companies on the Scandinavian snus market.¹³ By 2019 Swedish Match held less than 60%. For details see Cigarette Companies Investing in Snus.

In the US, Swedish Match remains the third biggest manufacturer of snus and moist snuff with around 10% market share in 2019. Its main competitors are market leader Altria, and Reynolds American (since July 2017 wholly owned by British American Tobacco).¹⁴¹⁵

Key Brands

In 2021, the company’s key snus brands were listed on “Smokefree” web page:¹⁶

• Sweden – General, Göteborgs Rapé, Kaliber, , Kronan, and Ettan .
• Norway – General, General G.3, The Lab, Nick & Johnny
• US – General

Similarly to cigarettes, snus brands are available in different price segments, in particular premium and value price categories.

Swedish Match also sells snus-style nicotine pouches which do not contain tobacco leaf and so are not regulated as tobacco products in most countries. Its leading brand in the global market is Zyn. The large transnational tobacco companies have more recently moved into this rapidly growing market. For details see Nicotine Pouches.

Employees/Board Members: Past and Present

In June 2008 Lars Dahlgren became the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Swedish Match. Thomas Hayes became President of the US division in 2020, having previously held other leadership roles at the company.

A full list of the current company’s Board of Directors can be accessed here and the current management team here.¹⁷¹⁸

Other people that are or have been associated with the tobacco company:
Markus Ersmark Johan Gabrielsson Tomas Hammargren Cecilia Kindstrand Lars Olof Lofman Lars-Erik Rutqvist

Partnerships and Affiliations

Lorillard

In 2006 Swedish Match entered into a joint venture with Lorillard (the third largest cigarette manufacturer in the US at the time) to develop Swedish-style snus for the US market,¹⁹ but this joint venture was terminated at the end of 2009 following unsatisfactory results.²⁰

Philip Morris International

In February 2009 Swedish Match entered into a joint venture with Philip Morris International (PMI) to “commercialize Swedish snus and other tobacco products worldwide, outside of Scandinavia and the United States”.²¹ This joint venture was dissolved in 2015, allegedly because of lack of demand for snus in the test markets.²²

• For more detail on the joint venture, go to our page on SMPM International.

American Lobbyists

In January 2018, the Louisville Courier Journal reported that records of the Kentucky Legislative Ethics Commission showed that some of the highest paid people working at the Kentucky Assembly, were lobbyists paid to influence the State government by large corporations, including tobacco companies.²³ The records named two lobbyists that listed Swedish Match North America as a client:²⁴

• Katherine W. Hall
• Patrick M. Jennings

European Smokeless Tobacco Council

In 1989, Swedish Match (then known as Svenska Tobaks), co-founded the lobby group European Smokeless Tobacco Council (ESTOC).²⁵

Since 2017, ESTOC no longer appears to be active.

Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing Foundation

Swedish Match is a member of the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing Foundation (ECLT).²⁶ In addition to Swedish Match, ECLT Board members include the International Tobacco Growers Association, British American Tobacco (BAT), Imperial Tobacco, Japan Tobacco International (JTI), and PMI, amongst others. The ECLT has a partnership with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), a United Nations (UN) agency, focussed on issues related to labour such as international labour standards, social protection and unemployment.²⁷

NordCham Philippines

The company is member of NordCham Philippines, reportedly the largest Nordic Chamber of Commerce in the Asian Region.²⁸ Swedish Match has owned a factory that produces lighters in Manilla since 2007.²⁹

Controversial Marketing Strategies

Targeting Youth in Russia

In June 2012, marketing firm Proximity Russia posted promotional materials online that they had produced for SMPM International, the joint venture of Swedish Match and PMI. The company had been asked to develop promotional materials to aid the launch of Parliament snus in Russia, with the promotional materials including so-called “youth engagement materials”.³⁰ For details and images of this controversial campaign, go to TPD: Marketing to Youth.

Promoting Tobacco Use via Social Media and Online Forums

A 2010 peer-reviewed study demonstrated that, in light of increasing tobacco advertising restrictions, Swedish Match had turned to YouTube and other social media to market its products, with none of the company’s YouTube videos including adequate safeguards to prevent under-age viewing.³¹ A 2011 social network analysis further demonstrated that Swedish Match employees had been active on Facebook, with Swedish Match employee Markus Ersmark at the centre of an elaborate network of snus manufacturers, snus retailers, and pro-snus bloggers generating pro-snus content.³²

Swedish Match also used to directly contribute to online consumer forums to promote the company, its products and pro-snus messages (see images 2 and 3). The company used to have a ‘Ask the Manufacturer’ column on the American snus consumer forum SnusCENTRAL.org. In 2009 and 2010, Ersmark and a colleague directly responded to consumer questions about Swedish Match products and snus use in general. Over a period of eight months, the duo responded to 31 consumer questions, started one thread themselves, and in total posted 56 messages.³³

Relationship Building with Social Media Influencers: Hospitality for Pro-Snus Bloggers

In addition to being directly active on social media, Swedish Match have engaged in ‘influencer marketing’ in which the marketing occurs indirectly through key influencers online.³⁴ The company actively nurtured relationships with key pro-snus bloggers (of which some labelled themselves ‘snus ambassadors’) through providing hospitality and free sample products.³⁵ For example, in 2012 Swedish Match hosted a so-called “summit” for American snus bloggers in Washington DC.³⁶ A year earlier, the company hosted a delegation of American and British snus bloggers in Stockholm, visiting Swedish Match headquarters and factories, as well as a Tobacco Museum.³⁷ In May 2010 two American bloggers visited Sweden, courtesy of Swedish Match, as was the case in 2009.³⁸

Some bloggers received regular free snus samples from Swedish Match and then reviewed the products online, including British blogger Tim Haigh. Haigh and Swedish Match later became involved in a controversy which saw researchers from the University of Bath receive verbal abuse over a peer-reviewed article which highlighted that snus was being sold illegally across the EU via the Internet, contravening three EU Directives and Swedish national legislation.³⁹ For more information see our page on FOI: University of Bath.

Failed Legal Bid to Stop Plain Packaging in Norway

In December 2016, the Norwegian Parliament approved plain packaging legislation on cigarettes and snus. Swedish Match sought an injunction from the Oslo County Court to delay the legislation, arguing that the Norwegian government was in breach of the free European Economic Area (EEA) trade rules and that the intervention (plain packaging of snus boxes) was not in proportion to the health risks associated with snus.⁴⁰

In November 2017 the court rejected the Swedish Match claims, ruling that plain packaging was “an evidence-based and internationally recommended measure” adding that it was “a legitimate measure in line with the EEA Agreement”.⁴¹ The court also ruled that snus is harmful to health, and that plain packaging will contribute to the protection of public health, particularly of children and young people.

Swedish Match was ordered to pay the legal costs of the Norwegian Government.

• Litigation is a well-known tactic of tobacco companies to stop or delay tobacco legislation. For more information go to Challenging Legislation.

Tactics to Subvert the Europe-Wide Snus Sales Ban

In 1992, sales of snus were banned in Europe, following an aggressive attempt by the US Smokeless Tobacco Company to introduce smokeless tobacco to several European markets in the mid-1980s. From 2001 the EU snus sales ban has been included in the European Union (EU) Tobacco Products Directive (TPD), which was reviewed in 2014. The snus ban severely limits the growth potential of Swedish Match in Europe, and the company has been attempting to lift the snus ban in the last decade using multiple tactics. The two main platforms of the company’s opposition to the snus ban are free trade and harm reduction.

In a submission to the 2010 public consultation that was part of the TPD review, Swedish match claimed that banning snus “denies 106 million smokers in the EU access to a traditional and non-combustible tobacco alternative to their cigarette”. ⁴² The company further ‘reminded’ the Commission of the need for EU legislation to respect the principles of EU Better Regulation and that there should be a “non-competitive regulation or tobacco and nicotine products” which would not create internal market distortions.

Directly and Indirectly Lobbied Commission Officials

Swedish Match lobbied DG SANCO (Health Directorate-General), and to a larger extent, non-health elements of the Commission, in particular the Secretariat General (responsible for Better Regulation and impact assessments), the Cabinet of the Regional Policy Commissioner Hahn, and DG ENTR (Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General).

• For a list of all meetings, see TPD: Lobbying of EU Officials

Some of the meetings were facilitated by PR firm Kreab Gavin Anderson. Twice the company was accompanied by Revolving Door case Karin Riis-Jørgensen, a Danish former MEP and senior advisor of Kreab Gavin Anderson.⁴³

Murky Lobbying Practices Exposed: ‘Dalligate’ and Untrue Version of Events

On 16 October 2012, EU Health Commissioner John Dalli was forced to resign following an investigation by EU’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, into bribery claims made by Swedish Match. For more detail on this controversy, labelled by some as ‘Dalligate’ or Barrosogate’, visit the pages TPD: Dalligate and TPD: Dalligate Timeline.

The scandal, besides raising questions about the transparency around EU policy making, also exposed the murky lobbying practices of Swedish Match in its attempts to have the snus ban lifted. Evidence showed that the company had inappropriately sought access to Dalli in his private sphere in Malta via Gayle Kimberley, a Maltese lobbyist not registered at the EU Transparency Register. Swedish Match’s Director of EU Affairs, Johan Gabrielsson, one of the people at the centre of the scandal, confirmed in a statement to OLAF on 2 June 2012⁴⁴ that Swedish Match had paid the lobbyist €5,000 to gain access to Dalli and feed him information that would help shape the evidence base on snus in favour of the company’s interests.

The company intentionally hid its relationship with Kimberley who, following a meeting with Dalli in January 2012, reported to Gabrielsson that “the meeting was CONFIDENTIAL and I was in no way representing SM Match just giving the objective position of snus producers and users!”.⁴⁵

In the aftermath of the scandal, Swedish Match publicly lied at several occasions suggesting that Kimberley had met Dalli TWICE, the first time in January 2012 and the second time in February 2012 when the alleged bribery attempt had supposedly been made. In an interview following Dalli’s shock resignation, Swedish Match Vice President of EU Affairs, Patrik Hildingsson, recalled:

“There was a first meeting with Dalli in early January and a second one in February to hand over WHO science on snus. After this meeting she lobbyist sounded very upset, saying the meeting was derailed and went in a very odd direction. She told us that during the meeting Dalli had explained that all arguments behind the snus ban were actually in favour of Swedish Match. Then he said that, however, as a health commissioner, his political career would be over if he lifted the ban on snus. He said, according to the feedback I got, that it would be a political suicide to lift the ban. Then he left the meeting and we were alone with a man, an entrepreneur. He was supposed to be a friend of Dalli and did not have any relationship with Swedish Match. He continued the meeting and asked why Dalli would take a suicidal political decision without gaining anything. The solution was simple: we had to pay.”

However, when Hildingsson shared this version of events with the media, Swedish Match had already been informed by OLAF that Kimberley had lied about her presence on this supposed second meeting.⁴⁶ The second meeting between the lobbyist and Dalli had not taken place. Gabrielsson later accused OLAF of advising him to stick to an untrue story of events: “I never lied. I just said what I had been told by OLAF. That’s not a lie”.

OLAF has denied allegations that it asked Swedish Match to skew the evidence and the Commission has indicated that it will not pursue this any further.

Lobbying Members of European Parliament

In January 2013, Swedish Match was a keynote speaker at a Parliamentary event organised by the Brussels Network. MEPs Christofer Fjellner, Syed Kamall and Alexander Graf Lambdorff organised a meeting with tobacco as the agenda item, with Swedish Match given their version of their involvement in ‘Dalligate’.⁴⁷ On this occasion, Swedish Match also stuck to the untrue version of events regarding the number of times their lobbyist met Dalli.

Challenging the Snus Ban in Court

In 2016 Swedish Match requested a judicial review of the snus ban in the UK High Court, which was approved on 26 January 2017. The case was referred to the European Court of Justice. In its legal challenge, the tobacco company has been supported by the New Nicotine Alliance UK (NNA), who requested the Court to make its own submission to provide a “customer perspective on the ban and on the benefits that will follow if the ban is lifted”.⁴⁸ Gerry Stimson, a vocal advocate of tobacco harm reduction, is a Board member of the NNA.

Lobbied for legalisation of snus in the UK

Swedish Match have worked with PR company Abzed to lobby for the legalisation of snus in the UK.⁴⁹⁵⁰⁵¹ Abzed stated that it had organised the “placement of around 20 parliamentary questions on snus” and a letter to Matt Hancock, Minister for Health in 2018, co-signed by Adam Afriyie MP.⁵¹⁵⁰ This campaign continued after the UK left the EU in 2020. In December 2021, Abzed posted messages on snus forums, offering to help members of the public to write to their MPs.⁵¹⁵⁰ Abzed is not listed on UK or EU lobbying registers.

For more information on Afriyie see All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Vaping (E-Cigarettes).

Close relationship with Swedish Politicians

In the past, Swedish Match enjoyed a good relationship with Swedish politicians, including Swedish Member of European Parliament (MEP) Christofer Fjellner, who promoted a pro-snus agenda in the European Parliament and was a vocal advocate for removing the EU ban on snus sales.⁵² Shortly before Fjellner launched a petition in 2010 to mobilise opposition to the EU snus ban, Swedish Match had two meetings with the MEP (see image 4).⁵³
Swedish Match also claims a “close relationship between industry and government” in Sweden.⁵⁴ Indeed, the Swedish Government supported Swedish Match’s call for a removal of the EU snus ban, regarding it a violation of free trade principles rather than a public health issue⁵⁵⁵⁶⁵⁷, an argument first voiced by Swedish Match.⁵⁸

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Boosting Corporate Reputation

A 2011 news article in Tobacco Control pointed to Swedish Match as an example of tobacco industry philanthropy, where positive publicity was generated with little upfront community investment.⁵⁹ The tobacco company’s 2009 annual report revealed that “Australia had suffered the country’s worst wildfire disaster in a quarter of a century” and in response the tobacco company had contributed to “Emergency Relief’ by giving a “cash donation” to the Australian Salvation Army (image 5). The company stopped short of disclosing the amount of money donated.

When the authors contacted the Australian Salvation Army and asked about the size of the donation, a spokesperson for the Charity confirmed that Swedish Match had donated AU$500 (approximately £256). The donation had presented only one ten thousandth of a per cent of the company’s operating profit.

Funding Science and Scientists

For several years, Swedish Match North America was a financial donor to the University of Louisville’s Kentucky Research Challenge Trust Fund (also known as ‘Bucks for Brains’).⁶⁰

From 2005 to 2008, Swedish Match spent half a million US dollars to fund the University’s Endowed Chair in Tobacco Harm Reduction held by Brad Rodu (Image 6).⁶¹ Rodu has been a vocal supporter of lifting the EU ban on snus.⁶²

The tobacco industry has historically used science to oppose tobacco regulation and bias public opinion in favour of the tobacco companies.

• To read more about this tactic, visit Influencing Science

Marketing Snus as “Modified Risk Tobacco Product” in the US

In April 2015, the advisory panel of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rejected Swedish Match’s application to alter the health warnings of 10 variants of its General snus and claim snus is less harmful than cigarettes.⁶³

The panel concluded that the company had not provided enough evidence to support that The Swedish Experience could be replicated in the US, and had not sufficiently tested the proposed new health warning to ensure consumers would understand it and interpret it.

In December 2016, the FDA upheld the panel’s advice although it encouraged the company to amend their application and submit more evidence to support their claims.⁶⁴

In 2019, the FDA stated that eight Swedish Match snus products could be marketed in the US under the “Modified Risk Tobacco Products” (MRTP) pathway, for an initial period of 5 years.⁶⁵ The FDA emphasised that this did not mean that these products were “FDA approved” or indeed “safe”. It also specified restrictions on advertising to prevent them being targeted to youth.⁶⁵Read more about the tobacco industry and Harm Reduction.

Relevant Link

Swedish Match website

TobaccoTactics Resources

• EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision
• TPD: Lobbying of EU Officials
• TPD: EU Ban on Snus Sales
• TPD: Marketing to Youth
• TPD: University of Bath
• SMPM International
• Cigarette Companies Investing in Snus
• Nicotine Pouches
• Global Forum on Nicotine

TCRG Research

• Transnational tobacco company interests in smokeless tobacco in Europe: Analysis of internal industry documents and contemporary industry materials, S. Peeters, A. Gilmore, PLoS Medicine, 2013,10(9):1001506
• How online sales and promotion of snus contravenes current European Union legislation, S. Peeters, A. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2013; 22:266-273
• Russia: snus targeted at young & wealthy, S. Peeters, K. Evans, Tobacco Control, 2012; 21:456-459
• World: disasters are ‘brand aid’ opportunities for tobacco, G. Fooks, S. Peeters, Tobacco Control 2011, 20:4-7

References

The post Swedish Match appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Imperial Brands (previously Imperial Tobacco, for simplicity referred to as Imperial) is a transnational tobacco company that is headquartered in Bristol, United Kingdom (UK). It is the fourth largest tobacco company in the world, after Philip Morris (PMI), British American Tobacco (BAT), and Japan Tobacco International (JTI), and excluding the Chinese National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC).⁶⁶

The company has no relationship to Imperial Tobacco Canada, which is a subsidiary to BAT.

According to Euromonitor International, in 2020 Imperial Brands held  under 4% of the global cigarette market (by retail volume, including China. Figures rounded).⁶⁶ The company reported a net revenue of UK£8 billion, with conventional tobacco products contributing over 97% of total revenue, and newer nicotine and tobacco products contributing less than 3% of total revenue.⁶⁷

Its parent company, Imperial Tobacco Group was rebranded to Imperial Brands in February 2016, and consists of the following companies: Imperial Tobacco, ITG Brands, Logista, and Fontem Ventures (and within it, e-liquids manufacturer Nerudia).⁶⁸⁶⁹⁷⁰

In 2020, Imperial Brands divested from its cigar business, selling its subsidiary Worldwide Premium Cigar (including Tabacalera and Premium Cigar RoW), to tackle the company’s growing debt.⁷¹

In 2020 Imperial operated in 160 countries, selling cigarettes, roll your own (RYO) tobacco, smokeless tobacco, cigarette paper, and cigars.⁷² Its main brands are Davidoff, Gauloises Blondes, JPS, West, Fine, News, Winston, Bastos, Lambert & Butler and Parker & Simpson (cigarettes); Drum and Golden Virginia (RYO), skruf (Swedish-style Snus); Rizla (cigarette papers and filters). Its e-cigarette brand is Blu and its heated tobacco is Pulze.

The company’s key markets are the Unites States (US), Germany, Australia, Spain and the UK. In 2020, these markets contributed more than 70% of Imperial’s profit, with the remaining profit coming mostly from other European markets and African markets.⁷³

Imperial used to be the UK’s cigarette market leader, but lost that position in 2015 to JTI.⁷⁴

Employees or Board Members: Past and Present

A full list of the company’s leadership team can be accessed at Imperial’s website.

Over the course of 2019, Imperial underwent significant changes in leadership and strategy. On 3 October 2019, it was announced that Alison Cooper, Imperial’s Chief Executive since May 2010, would step down⁷⁵ The announcement came after the company issued a profit warning that reduced the company’s anticipated revenue growth.⁷⁶

In July 2020, Stefan Bomhard was appointed as the Chief Executive Officer, on a five-year contract. Bomhard previously held leadership roles at various multinational companies including Bacardi Europe, Cadbury and car dealership Inchape.⁷⁷⁷⁸

Bomhard’s appointment was followed by the announcement of a renewed five-year-strategy in January 2021.⁷³ Imperial announced renewed focus on conventional cigarettes in its priority markets, including “advertising at age-verified music festivals and comedy events” and the “use of brand influencers and product placement in bars and nightclubs”. It stated an aim to continue investing in newer products, focusing on heated tobacco products (HTPs) in Europe and e-cigarettes (also known as electronic nicotine delivery systems, or ENDS) in the US.

• For more information on Imperial’s investments, see Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products: Imperial Brands

The new strategy also referred to investment in the African markets, stating its aim to “turn Africa from an unloved asset to a platform for future growth”, with a “supportive market environment with improved affordability as incomes increase”.⁷⁹

• Read more about Tobacco Companies investment in Africa and other emerging economies on our Africa’s Tobacco Epidemic page

Other people that currently work for, or have previously been employed with, the company:
Roberto Ascoli Drago Azinovic Arthur van Benthem Ken Burnett Sue Clark Helen Clatworthy Fernando Domínguez Robert Dyrbus Gareth Davis Louise Day Kevin Freudenthal Roberto Funari David Haines Michael Herlihy Nikos Mertzanidis Peter Middleton Almos Molnar Susan Murray Iain Napier Matthew Phillips Walter Prinz Michiel Reerink Richard Ross Berge Setrakian Alessandro Tschirkov Mark Williamson Titus Wouda Kuipers Colin Wragg Malcolm Wyman Waldemar Zegar

Affiliations

Memberships

In 2020, Imperial Brands was a member or supporter of the following organisations:

Asia Pacific Travel Retail Association (APTRA)⁸⁰ | Associate Parliamentary Corporate Responsibility Group | Tobacco Europe (formerly CECCM) | European Rolling Papers Association (ERPA) | European Smoking Tobacco Association | European Travel Retail Confederation (ETRC) | Public Affairs Council⁸¹ | Tobacco and Nicotine Products Chemicals Group (formerly Tobacco Industry Platform)⁸² | Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association⁸³

Imperial Brands is, or has been, a member of the following e-cigarette trade associations, as Fontem Ventures and its e-cigarette brands:

UK Vaping Industry Association (UKVIA) |  Vape Business Ireland | France Vapotage |  VITA of Canada  |  Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) |  Scottish Grocers’ Federation (SGF)

Imperial Brands previously listed membership of the following organisations:⁸⁴

Association of Convenience Stores (ACS) | British Chamber of Commerce in Belgium | BusinessEurope | European Cigar Manufacturers Association (ECMA) | European Smokeless Tobacco Council | Euraffex/ European Affairs Expertise | Industry and Parliament Trust (see Rosemary Brook)⁸⁵ | Institute of Business Ethics⁸⁶| Kangaroo Group | MARQUES | Wirtschaftsrat

The company has also been a member of the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco-Growing Foundation (ECLT) since 2001.⁸⁷ The ECLT has a partnership with the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations agency, focussed on issues related to labour such as international labour standards, social protection and unemployment.⁸⁸ Surinder Sond from Imperial Brands is listed as a board member of the ECLT in its 2019 annual report.⁸⁹

Consultancies

Imperial Brands has worked with the following public relations (PR) companies:

• Aspect Consulting lobbied for Fontem Ventures in the UK in 2017⁹⁰
• Bell Pottinger lobbied for Imperial in the UK and Brussels from 2010 to 2016^919293949596
• FTI Consulting named Imperial Brands on its client list in 2016⁹⁷

• In 2019, Fontem Ventures was listed on the UK lobbying register as a client of David Alexander, Director of UK Sports PR agency Calacus.⁹⁸

Think Tanks

In May 2012, the Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) at the University of Bath asked Imperial to disclose which think tanks the company was funding, and had funded over the last few years. The company replied that it did “not wish to participate in your research”.⁹⁹

In response to a specific query made in 2014 in regards to Imperial’s engagement with the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), a UK-based think tank supported by corporations and which has repeatd tobacco industry messages, Imperial’s Head of Regulatory Science, Steve Stotesbury, replied: “We [Imperial] have been supporters of the IEA for many years, stretching back well over a decade”.¹⁰⁰

Imperial also held historical links with the Democracy Institute, a think tank based in the UK and US. In 2006 the company funded a book published by the Democracy Institute, which argued there was no evidence that graphic health warnings on tobacco, food, and alcohol packaging would work.¹⁰¹

• See: Countering Industry Arguments Against Plain Packaging: No Evidence Plain Packaging Will Work to read more about the evidence behind standardised packaging.

Controversial Marketing Strategies

Targeting Women and Girls

In 2011, the tobacco industry introduced cigarette packs to the market that were specifically designed to attract female consumers. Imperial launched its Richmond SuperSlims, promoted as “the first superslim brand in the value-price cigarette sector”. At the time, The Grocer retail magazine reported that the pack was embossed with a “stylish pink design”, and that it was “clearly designed to appeal to female smokers”.¹⁰²

As of 2021, Imperial Brands continue marketing their “specialist [cigarette] brands” which “appeal to specific consumer groups”¹⁰³ Amongst these is Jadé, a brand of superslim cigarettes with a logo featuring cursive letters and a stylised butterfly logo.¹⁰⁴

It is worth noting that plain packaging legislation introduced in Australia in late 2012, and in the UK in May 2016, does not address the size of the cigarette stick and its use as a marketing vehicle to target specific consumer demographics.¹⁰⁵The legislation bans slim cigarette packs, but not slim individual cigarette sticks.¹⁰⁶

• For more information on tobacco companies’ efforts to market its product to female consumers, go to Targeting Women and Girls.

Pre-empting Plain Packaging Legislation in Australia

In September 2012, a few months before plain packaging legislation was introduced in Australia, Imperial Tobacco Australia changed the packaging of its Peter Stuyvesant cigarette pack to show a ripped pack exposing plain packaging underneath (see image 1 below). The accompanying slogan said “it’s what’s on the inside that counts”.¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁸

The Australian Health Minister criticised Imperial’s marketing campaign, saying that “diseased lungs, hearts, and arteries are the reality of what is happening on the inside to a smoker”.¹⁰⁷

• For more detail on Imperial’s “it’s what’s on the inside that counts” campaign, go to Plain Packaging: Imperial Tobacco Australia Pre-empts Legislation

Image 1. Screen grab of Peter Stuyvesant packaging Australia September 2012. Screengrab from the Telegraph¹⁰⁷ (archived webpage)

Complicity in Tobacco Smuggling

Imperial has argued that tobacco control legislation, in particular plain packaging, might lead to unprecedented levels of illicit tobacco trade. The company has made these claims in its 2012 and 2014 Submissions to the UK Consultations on standardised packaging.

In 2016, ahead of the introduction of plain packaging in the UK, Imperial Brands launched a “Suspect it? Report it!” anti-illicit trade campaign. In January 2017, Imperial collaborated with the Federation of Independent Retailers (known at the time as National Federation of Retail Newsagents) to “educate independent retailers and UK smokers about the growing trade in illegal tobacco”.¹⁰⁹ The collaboration saw 50,000 packs branded with Imperial’s “Suspect it? Report it!” campaign distributed to retailers, containing infographics, posters and stickers.

In contrast to Imperial’s campaign, which portrays the tobacco company as the victim of illicit trade, there is strong historical evidence of Imperial’s complicity in facilitating the smuggling of their own cigarettes.

In 2021, Imperial (alongside BAT) was reportedly found to be oversupplying its products in Mali, through a local subsidiary company, and accused of supporting conflict in the area by fuelling the illicit trade. Imperial’s responded it is committed to opposing tobacco smuggling, which it stated “benefits no-one but the criminals involved”¹¹⁰

In 2002, genuine Imperial brands accounted for more than half of the 17 billion cigarettes smuggled into the UK.¹¹¹ The company claimed ignorance when it was questioned about over-supplying countries notorious for smuggling at the Commons Public Accounts Committee, to which Imperial’s chief executive was told: “One comes to the conclusion that you are either crooks or you are stupid, and you do not look very stupid.”¹¹²

Internal documents from Gallaher (now part of JTI), released through litigation, refer to Imperial’s “highly aggressive” smuggling activities in the 1990s, blaming Imperial’s smuggling for Gallaher’s weakening position in the UK market.¹¹³

• For more information on Imperial’s involvement in smuggling, see Imperial and Gallaher Involvement in Tobacco Smuggling or read our article Tobacco industry rallies against illicit trade – but have we forgotten its complicity? published in The Conversation, 16 March 2015.

Tactics to Subvert Tobacco Control Campaigns and Policies

Imperial has strongly opposed tobacco control legislation and regulations, including plain packaging in Australia and the UK, and the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) in the European Union (EU). The company has used a variety of strategies and tactics to influence tobacco control policies, and subvert existing regulations.

Discrediting Science and Scientists

The tobacco industry has long tried to undermine science and legitimate anti-tobacco messages from scientists to get around, weaken, or discredit tobacco control legislation. According to one tobacco executive, “doubt” was the best means “to compete with a body of fact and establish controversy”.¹¹⁴

In 2011, Imperial strongly criticised a study commissioned by the UK Department of Health,¹¹⁵ which concluded that England’s smoke-free 2007 legislation had positive benefits for public health. The study also concluded that the legislation had no obvious negative impacts on the hospitality industry, contrary to claims made by the tobacco industry.¹¹⁶

Imperial criticised the three-year review as being “lazy and deliberately selective”, and furthermore accused the study’s author, Professor Linda Bauld, of having a conflict of interest due to her links to the charity Action for Smoking and Health (ASH).¹¹⁷

• For further information on Imperial’s attempts to discredit Professor Bauld, and the subsequent hate campaign by others that followed, visit our page on Professor Linda Bauld.

Using Freedom of Information Requests to Counter Health Campaigns

In February and March 2011, acting on behalf of Imperial, Bell Pottinger, persistently requested access to research data that supported an anti-RYO tobacco health campaign run by regional charity SmokeFree South West.¹¹⁸¹¹⁹

• For more information on Imperial’s Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, see the FOI: SmokeFree South West page.

Fabricating Support through Front Groups

Imperial has used front groups to oppose tobacco control legislation. Front Groups are organisations that purport to serve a public cause while actually serving the interests of a third party, and obscuring or concealing the connection between them.¹¹⁴

In 2010, Imperial Tobacco Australia (in collaboration with PMI and BAT) financed the Alliance of Australian Retailers (AAR) to oppose the introduction of plain packaging in Australia.¹²⁰ The AAR claimed to represent the owners of local corner stores, milk bars, newsagents and service stations, but did not reveal that it was financed by tobacco companies and run by tobacco company executives and a PR company.¹²¹ The purpose of the AAR was to argue that plain packaging would cause economic damage to small Australian retailers.

• For more information on this front group, and Imperial Tobacco Australia’s involvement, visit the Alliance of Australian Retailers page.

In 2013, to promote the tobacco industry’s tracking and tracing system, Codentify, Imperial, BAT, PMI and JTI jointly set up the Digital Coding & Tracking Association (DCTA), which often failed to disclose its relationship to the tobacco industry in its statements.

• For more information, visit our page on the Digital Coding & Tracking Association (DCTA).

Corporate Political Advertising

In June 2012, Imperial attempted to influence UK Members of Parliaments’ (MPs) views on the plain packaging debate by running an anti-plain packaging advertising campaign in The House magazine, a magazine designed for MPs (see image 2 below).¹²²

The company did not reveal itself as the funder anywhere on the front page advertisement.

• For more information on Imperial’s ad, and the debate it sparked, see Imperial Promotes Opposition to Plain Packaging.

Image 2. Imperial Tobacco cover of The House magazine in plain packaging, June 2012

Hospitality for UK Politicians

In 2014, Imperial gifted Wimbledon tennis tickets to Members of Parliament (MPs) Aidan Burley, Mark Field, and Mark Pritchard.¹²³

Imperial also gifted Wimbledon tickets to Lord Pendry in 2005, 2008 and 2012.^124125126

In the 1990s, the tobacco company provided the following hospitality to MPs:¹²⁷

• Jacqui Lait MP and her husband attended the 1999 Scotland v England rugby match courtesy of Imperial
• MPs attended a 1998 and 1999 Lords v Commons Clay Pigeon Shoot at Highclere Castle sponsored by Imperial
• Conservative MPs Ian Taylor and John Townsend attended the 1997 rugby international England v New Zealand at Twickenham, courtesy of Imperial.
• In 1995, Imperial gifted a lunch and two tickets for the Men’s Singles final at Wimbledon to Liam Fox, at the time the MP for North Somerset

Our page on Tobacco Industry Hospitality for UK Politicians provides more detail on gifts and hospitality provided to MPs and peers by Imperial and other tobacco companies.

Direct Lobbying of Decision Makers: the EU Tobacco Products Directive

In the financial year 2014-2015, when the EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) was undergoing its first revision, Imperial reported to have spent €400,000 – €499,000 lobbying EU institutions, employing five fulltime equivalent staff in its Brussels office.⁸¹

Lobbying disclosure records by Conservative Members of European Parliament (MEPs) show, that in 2011 and 2013 Imperial  met with UK MEPs Giles Chichester, Ashley Fox, Emma McClarkin, and Anthea McIntyre to discuss the revision of the TPD.^128129130

Imperial and other tobacco companies were given several opportunities to share their views on the TPD review with the European Commission’s Health directorate, DG SANCO, and Health Commissioner John Dalli.¹³¹¹³²

• To read more about the controversies that lead to the resignation of then commissioner Dalli, see TPD: Dalligate

But Imperial also lobbied other directorates on the TPD. In 2011, Bell Pottinger tried to broker access to officials in DG Trade and the Secretariat General on its behalf

• for more details see Bell Pottinger and Tobias Ghersetti

In July and September 2012, Imperial attended meetings with DG ENTR (Enterprise and Industry) as part of a delegation with Tobacco Europe (known as CECCM at the time),¹³³¹³⁴ and in October 2012 the company directly met with DG Trade.¹³⁵

With the exception of DG SANCO, EU officials were not systematically transparent about their contact with Imperial and other tobacco companies at the time of the 2014 EU TPD Review.¹³⁶ Some meetings only became public knowledge due to FOI requests.

Similar concerns have re-emerged in light of the third revision of the TPD in 2021, with Tobacco Control advocates raising concerns about tobacco companies, including Imperial Brands, access to the EU institutions.

• For more information on the lack of transparency around the TPD review process, go to our page on EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision.

Documents released by the UK Department of Health have also revealed that Imperial had access to confidential information from the European Council concerning the 2014 TPD review.¹³⁷ Despite the Department of Health asking the company to explain how it came into possession of this confidential information, Imperial refused to disclose its source.

• More detail on the controversy surrounding Imperial’s access to confidential government information, can be found on Imperial Receives Inside Information from the European Council.

Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives

To help rehabilitate its image as a responsible business that “acts with integrity and lives its values”¹³⁸, Imperial ran a number of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives. These initiatives not only attempt to rehabilitate the company’s image, but also make it easier for the company to gain access to decision makers.

To make it easier for smokers to smoke whilst travelling, yet be seen to comply with smoke-free legislation, Imperial launched its Smoking Allowed campaign in 2011, aimed at providing smoking shelters across UK airports.¹³⁹ Apart from supporting smokers, Simon Clark, the director of Forest, suggested that the campaign also “challenges the Orwellian ‘denormalisation’ of smoking”.¹⁴⁰

In 2013, Imperial co-founded the Love Where You Live campaign in the UK, aimed at encouraging individuals, companies and local groups to clean up after themselves (image 3 below).¹⁴¹ The campaign gave Imperial the opportunity to partner with government, who supported the project. More information on this CSR initiative can be found on the page CSR: Imperial and Love Where You Live.

Image 3. Love Where You Live website, April 2012

In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, tobacco companies made extensive use of CSR campaigns, as a strategy to gain legitimacy, increase public trust and advance its business interests. Imperial utilised this tactic, donating ventilators and donating in support of social causes in Ukraine and Germany^142143144

Intimidating Governments with Litigation or Threat of Litigation

Imperial has legally challenged tobacco control regulations in the UK, EU and Australia, including:

• The Tobacco and Primary Medical Services (Scotland) ACT 2010. The company argued that the ban on tobacco display and cigarette vending machines falls outside the legislative scope of the Scottish Parliament.¹⁴⁵ This challenge was dismissed by the Supreme Court in December 2012, but delayed the introduction of the display ban by 2 years.
• The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Australia). Imperial unsuccessfully challenged the legality of standardised packaging legislation in Australia. For more information, go to Australia: Challenging Legislation.
• The Standardised Packaging of Tobacco Products Regulations 2015 (UK). Imperial first threatened with litigation against the UK Government in 2012, if the Government were to implement plain packaging legislation.¹⁴⁶ Following the passage of the legislation in March 2015, Imperial and others launched a legal action, which it lost in May 2016 (the day before the legislation was due to come into force).¹⁴⁷¹⁴⁸
• The 2014 EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). Imperial formally supported a legal challenge brought by PMI and BAT to invalidate the TPD as a whole, or various provisions within it. This legal challenge was dismissed in the European Court of Justice in May 2016.¹⁴⁹ More details can be found on the page TPD: Legal Challenges.

Interfering with Democratic Processes

In February 2019, a campaign was launched under the European Union (EU) Commission’s “Citizen’s Initiative” called “Let’s demand smarter vaping regulation!”¹⁵⁰ Imperial launched and part-funded this campaign which proposed revoking article 20 of the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD), which “requires EU Member States to introduce restrictions on the advertising of electronic cigarettes”.¹⁵¹

The accompanying website, promoted by Imperial Brands, portrayed it as a “grassroots” campaign to support a change in regulation, by differentiating e-cigarettes from traditional tobacco products.¹⁵²

This is a clear example of ‘astroturfing’, a well-known tactic used by the tobacco industry to interfere with tobacco control legislation.¹⁵³¹⁵⁴

• For details see: Imperial Brands Use of the EU Citizens’ Initiative

Circumventing EU Menthol Ban With New Products

The 2014 EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision, passed into UK law in 2016, banned the sale of menthol cigarettes and rolling tobacco, as menthol was deemed a ‘characterising’ flavour.¹⁵⁵

Pipe tobacco, cigars and smokeless products such as e-cigarettes and snus were exempted from this flavour ban. After lobbying from tobacco companies, and a legal case brought by the Polish Government, a four year delay was granted.¹⁵⁶¹⁵⁷ The sales ban was due to come into force in May 2020.¹⁵⁸

In December 2019, Imperial announced that it was launching a new Rizla product in the UK in January 2020; a cardboard insert which could be put into a packet of cigarettes or rolling tobacco, to infuse the product with one of two flavours – “Menthol Chill” or “Fresh Mint”. The company argued that this product was an “accessory” and therefore not covered by the tobacco product regulations.¹⁵⁹ The regulations state that the ban includes “tobacco products containing flavourings in any of their components such as filters, papers, packages, capsules or any technical features allowing modification of the smell or taste of the tobacco products concerned”.¹⁶⁰

In January 2018, Imperial had relaunched one of its cigarette brands, JPS Green, with a menthol-infused packet liner, which it claimed would be “more effective at transferring flavour to the cigarettes than traditional menthol tips”.¹⁶¹

In February 2021, Imperial released its “New Crush” Embassy cigarettes designed “specifically for ex [menthol] crushball smokers”, featuring a “cooling sensation filter”, promoted to be used specifically alongside its menthol-flavoured cardboard inserts.¹⁶²

COVID 19

Tobacco companies including PMI, JTI, Imperial Brands and Altria Group all raised their sales or profit targets, saying the industry had done better than expected in 2020 mostly in US and EU. Imperial reported an increase in revenue from cigarettes due to increased smoking rates during the pandemic. ¹⁶³¹⁶⁴ Throughout the first half of 2021, Imperial has reported growing market shares in their priority markets, and is expecting further growth from its wholly-owned European logistics business Logista.¹⁶⁵ In December 2020, French media reported that Logista had concluded an agreement with the Spanish Ministry of Health for the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines in the country.¹⁶⁶

Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products

As the harms from conventional products have become better understood, and tobacco control measures have been put in place, the cigarette market – from which tobacco companies make most of their profits – has started to shrink. To secure the industry’s longer-term future, transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have invested in, developed and marketed various newer nicotine and tobacco products.¹⁶⁷

For details of Imperial’s investments see Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products: Imperial Brands

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Fontem Ventures
• Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products: Imperial Brands
• E-cigarettes: Imperial Brands
• Cigarette Companies Investing in Snus
• Targeting Women and Girls
• Plain Packaging: Imperial Tobacco Australia Pre-empts Legislation
• Imperial and Gallaher Involvement in Tobacco Smuggling
• Linda Bauld
• FOI: SmokeFree South West
• Alliance of Australian Retailers
• Corporate Political Advertising on Plain Packaging
• Tobacco Industry Hospitality for UK Politicians
• CSR: Imperial and Love Where You Live.
• Smoking Allowed
• Australia: Challenging Legislation.
• Imperial Receives Inside Information from the European Council
• TPD: Legal Challenges
• Digital Coding and Tracking Association (DCTA)
• Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco-Growing (ECLT) Foundation

Relevant Link

• Imperial Brands website

TCRG Research

• The revision of the 2014 European tobacco products directive: an analysis of the tobacco industry’s attempts to ‘break the health silo’, S. Peeters, H. Costa, D Stuckler, M. McKee, A. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2016,25(1):108-117
• ‘It will harm business and increase illicit trade’: an evaluation of the relevance, quality and transparency of evidence submitted by transnational tobacco companies to the UK consultation on standardised packaging 2012, K. Evans-Reeves, J. Hatchard, A. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2015,24(e2):e168-e177
• Transnational tobacco company interests in smokeless tobacco in Europe: Analysis of internal industry documents and contemporary industry materials, S. Peeters, A. Gilmore, PLoS Medicine, 2013,10(9):1001506

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including TCRG research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to the Bath TCRG’s list of publications.

References

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In 2008, the WHO published a document called Tobacco industry interference with tobacco control to assist Member States in implementing the WHO FCTC Article 5.3 guidelines against such interference.¹⁶⁸ The report exposed industry tactics and described the spectrum of these practices. In short, the WHO writes:

The tobacco industry has used its economic power, lobbying and marketing machinery, and manipulation of the media to discredit scientific research and influence governments in order to propagate the sale and distribution of its deadly product.

Furthermore, the tobacco industry continues to inject large philanthropic contributions into social programs worldwide to create a positive public image under the guise of corporate social responsibility.

TobaccoTactics is built on the WHO findings while responding to the FCTC call for civil society to play an essential role in monitoring the activities of the tobacco industry.¹⁶⁹¹⁷⁰

Tobacco Industry Tactics for Resisting Effective Tobacco Control

The WHO report lists the many strategies used by the industry and its allies to monitor and undermine advances in tobacco control.

The diversity of these strategies demonstrates that the mission to thwart tobacco control is global and based on the broad objective of establishing the industry as ‘socially responsible’ and a ‘partner’ with government in tobacco control. There is also evidence of the objective of stopping or weakening policies known to affect sales.

The industry can not only manipulate the media by raising doubt about scientific research, it can also attack public media campaigns by requesting information, pursuing litigation or attempting to limit the audience and restrict the message of the campaign.

The WHO list below offers an overview of the range of industry activities, and a short definition. Tactics are linked to corresponding pages on TobaccoTactics, for further explanation.

WHO definitions

References

The post WHO Definitions of Tobacco Industry Tactics appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

• exhibited at political party conferences (for example, see our page on PMI’s Kate Marley);
• showered individual politicians with gifts and hospitality;
• and asked Members of Parliament (MPs) to host events on their behalf in the grounds of Parliament.

This page lists the MPs who have hosted events at Parliament on behalf of tobacco companies from 2012 onwards, as disclosed in the UK House of Commons Event & Function Bookings Register.

Members of Parliament who Hosted Parliamentary Events

Key Topic: Illicit Trade

The list above suggests that MPs are more likely to host events on behalf of the tobacco industry if they touch on Illicit Tobacco Trade, and to a lesser degree tobacco harm reduction.

Breach of WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

Since December 2004, the UK has been a Party to the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), which obliges Parties to protect their public health policies from the commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry.¹⁷⁸
Guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 of the Treaty state that there “is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco industry’s interest and public health policy interests”, and recommend that Parties should deal with the tobacco industry in an accountable and transparent manner, only interacting with it to the extent strictly necessary to enable Parties to effectively regulate the tobacco industry and tobacco products”.¹⁷⁹
Social events such as a “drinks reception” and launches of tobacco industry reports that promote public-private partnerships and challenge proven public health policies, are a breach of the WHO FCTC and serve the interests of the tobacco industry, not public health.

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Tobacco Industry Hospitality for UK Politicians
• Global Tobacco and Nicotine Forum 2018

References

The post UK Politicians Hosting Tobacco Event at Parliament appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

British American Tobacco Uganda (BATU), a subsidiary of British American Tobacco (BAT), has been a major driver of East Africa’s tobacco industry since it first started business in Uganda in the 1920’s.

In 2020, the company has a near-monopoly on Uganda’s tobacco market, with 51.7% of overall volume sales.¹⁸² (Based on Euromonitor data).

In 2013, BATU reported to have contracted 18,000 tobacco farmers, which resulted in the production of 16.8 million kilos of tobacco.¹⁸³ In that same year, the company provided direct employment for 200 Ugandans alongside 1500 seasonal positions.¹⁸³ Because the company also controls the selection and provision of all necessary agricultural inputs to its contracted tobacco farmers, such as seeds and fertilizer, and because its farmers are prohibited from selling tobacco to anyone else, BATU also has direct control over the tobacco farming system in Uganda.¹⁸⁴ In 2020, there were an estimated 75,000 farmers relying on the tobacco crop.¹⁸²

Uganda’s Tobacco Control Act 2015: An Unwelcome Challenge for BATU

In 2005, Uganda signed the WHO’s first global public health treaty, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and later ratified it in 2007. This, in combination with the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, which guarantees the right to health and a clean environment, motivated the drafting of the Uganda Tobacco Control Act 2015 (TCA) On 6 March 2014, the first draft of the TCA was presented before the Parliament of Uganda.¹⁸⁵

The TCA, the most progressive tobacco control measure implemented in the country, sought to “regulate the manufacture, sale, labelling, promotion, advertising, distribution, public use of tobacco products, and sponsoring of tobacco products”.¹⁸⁶
Research conducted as part of the Global Adult Tobacco Survey, representative of the entire population of Uganda, showed that the vast majority of the public supported measures associated with the TCA. Nine out of ten Ugandan adults favoured both an increase in taxes on tobacco products and a complete ban on tobacco advertising (88.2% and 89.3% respectively).¹⁸⁷
Given the tobacco industry’s track record of opposing regulations it argued would affect its profits, it is not surprising that BATU has been outspoken against the UTCB, employing many tactics to stall its passage.

BATU’s Public Arguments Against the Tobacco Control Act 2015: Same Story, Different Context

BATU proffered a variety of arguments to oppose the measures set out in the TCA. In a letter dated 14th April, 2014 to the Parliamentary Committee on Health, BATU detailed its arguments against the TCA. The main arguments included:

• It would promote illicit trade. Many of the measures, such as display bans and graphic health warnings, will spur illicit trade of tobacco products by “driving legal tobacco sales under the counter”.
• There was no evidence it would work. BATU stressed the lack of a “statistically significant direct relationship between tobacco packaging regulation…and changes in smoking prevalence rates or aggregate cigarette consumption.” In the letter, BATU did not provide any evidence to the contrary.
• Doing so would threaten livelihoods. According to BATU, not only would the TCA risk the occupations of the thousands of tobacco farmers in Uganda, but it would also mean reduced earnings and added risk for small–scale retailers.
• It’s “unreasonable”. Not only that, but BATU stated the proposed regulations were “unrealistic”, “draconian”, and “unenforceable given the retail platform in Uganda.”¹⁸³

These tactics mirror the responses typically seen by the tobacco industry in other parts of the world. For example, tobacco companies and third-parties who lobby on its behalf have been able to stall the passage of legislation, such as the revision of the Tobacco Products Directive, and plain packaging legislation in both Australia and the UK. For more information see:

• Industry Arguments Against Plain Packaging and Countering Industry Arguments against Plain Packaging
• TPD: Delaying the Process of Consultation

Behind the Scenes: BAT’s Tactics to Stall the Tobacco Control Act 2015 (TCA)

 

Image 1. Confidential document of BATU’s Key Concerns Regarding the UTCB

Promoting Single Cigarette Sales

Two leaked documents obtained by the Tobacco Control Research Group at the University of Bath revealed that, unbeknown to most, in order to oppose the TCA, BATU employed tactics which contradict its own marketing code of conduct and threatened the Parliamentarian sponsoring the bill.
The first, a confidential internal document outlining the tobacco company’s key concerns with the TCA revealed BATU violated its own marketing mandates by proposing that the selling of single cigarettes (single sticks) should not be prohibited (as suggested by Clause 15(5) of the TCA)¹⁸⁶ as it failed to “take into account the economic realities of Uganda”, adding that “consumers should be free to purchase what they can afford” (see Image 1).¹⁸⁸
The sale of single cigarettes is illegal in many countries with tobacco control policies, as it is known to appeal to children and under-age smokers who may not have the purchasing power to obtain a whole pack of cigarettes.¹⁸⁹ In BAT’s own International Marketing Principles available on their global website, the company recognises that single sticks are particularly attractive to youth and stresses that they do not support the selling or marketing of single sticks. Yet the confidential internal document revealed that the company was in fact pursuing objectives that were directly contradictory to its mandate and illegal in many parts of the world.

 

Image 2. Confidential BAT Letter to Sponsor of UTCB

BATU Intimidating MP Sponsoring the UTCB in a Confidential Letter

The second confidential internal document obtained by the Tobacco Control Research Group proved that BATU privately communicated with the Parliamentarian (MP) who was the main sponsor of the TCA, withdrawing their support from his constituency (see Image 2).¹⁹⁰
In the letter to the MP sponsoring the bill, dated 19 March 2014, BATU Managing Director Jonathan D’Souza wrote:
“We would normally start contracting farmers in the area during May but due to the economics of the operation, compounded by the uncertainty around the sector going forward, we regret to inform you that we will not be contracting farmers in Kihihi for the 2014/15 season.”¹⁹⁰
The letter cites two reasons for this uncertainty: the “proposed imposition of a tax on tobacco leaf exports” and “the repeal of the Tobacco (Control & Marketing) Act as proposed in the Tobacco Control Bill 2014”.¹⁹⁰
Mr. D’Souza explained that these challenges make it “impossible for us to commit at this point, to another season of tobacco sponsorship in Kihihi.”¹⁹⁰ The letter ended by reminding the MP that BATU was “requesting the Government to reconsider the issues noted”. Attached to the letter was a list of the names of the 709 tobacco farmers in the MP’s constituency that would no longer receive the tobacco company’s support as a result of the MP’s support of the TCA.

Meeting Secretly with Parliamentarians

In an effort to lobby legislators associated with the TCA, BATU wrote the Ugandan Clerk to Parliament to request a meeting with MPs from tobacco growing regions. In the letter, Jonathan D’Souza (Managing Director, BATU), Rob Kelsall (Managing Director, Uganda Tobacco Services), and Gilberto Kohn (Regional Leaf Manager, Leaf Tobacco & Commodities) sought permission to “organize a meeting with Members of Parliament from the above tobacco growing regions to discuss a number of operational issues touching on tobacco activities in their respective constituencies.”¹⁹¹ Attached were the names of 53 MPs whose districts encompass tobacco growing regions and whose presence was requested at the meeting.¹⁹¹
A handwritten note on the letter suggests the meeting was granted and set for 17 April 2014, which was to be hosted at the Sheraton Hotel in Kampala. A leaked copy of the presentation BAT gave to the Parliamentarians of tobacco growing regions suggests the meeting was held on 11 April 2014.¹⁹² The slides of the presentation suggested that the company’s issues with the TCA, which they lobbied against in the meeting, included the proposals to:

• Repeal the Tobacco (Control & Marketing) Act
• Ban the display of tobacco products
• Restrict smoking in public places and a radius of 100 m around them
• Restrict the sale of tobacco products
• Require large graphic health warnings on tobacco products
• Limit and regulate communication between the tobacco industry and government representatives
• Regulate advertising, promotion, and corporate social responsibility
• Set the legal smoking age limit to 21

Local media sources also claimed BAT met in secret with relevant MPs to lobby them to oppose the TCA in Spring of 2014.¹⁹³ Inside sources stated that BATU met the MPs on Wednesday 12 March 2014 at Kolping Hotel and the following day at the tobacco company’s offices and field locations and that attendees were “treated to a Cocktail dinner” and given “pocket allowances”.¹⁹³ BATU did not deny the meeting, but claimed that it was “official” rather than secret, although attendees said it was a “surprise” and did not know about the meeting beforehand.¹⁹³

Lobbying the Ministry of Trade Uganda

On several occasions, Civil society in Uganda has shown that the Ministry of Trade has interacted with the tobacco industry, in clear violations of the regulations imposed by the TCA and the FCTC.¹⁹⁴ In April 2019, the Ugandan Ministry of Trade passed a draft of proposed tobacco regulations to BATU. This resulted in a letter from British American Tobacco Uganda providing input on the proposed regulations, which generated conflicts of interest.¹⁹⁵

Lobbying against Regulation and Threatening to “Take Business Elsewhere”

The internal documents reveals the tobacco company’s other key concerns with the TCA include:

• Legal smoking age. BATU was concerned with the TCA´s proposal to increase the legal smoking age limit from 18 to 21 (Clause 2)¹⁸⁸ although the company widely broadcasts it is against appealing to young adult smokers.
• Display bans. The display ban set forth in Clause 15(3) of the TCA requires vendors of tobacco products to keep these products from being publicly displayed in a manner considered to advance the allure of tobacco products. In response, BAT argued that customers have a “right to know what products are available, interact with them (touch, feel etc) then make a decision on what they will purchase” (parenthesis original).¹⁸⁸ Such point-of-sale marketing techniques are found to be widely employed by the tobacco industry in Uganda despite attempts to regulate and restrict them.¹⁹⁶
• Corporate communication. The TCA prohibits corporate communication between the tobacco industry and the community, or corporate social responsibility.¹⁸⁶ In the leaked document, BATU stressed that “corporate communication and corporate social responsibility must be distinguished from product advertising and promotion” in the legislation.¹⁸⁸ BAT has a history of using Corporate Social Responsibility schemes as forms of advertising and marketing to youth in African countries, including Uganda. For more information on this, see the TobaccoTactics page on Uganda- BAT Marketing Strategies.

The leaked documents also provided insight into the company’s strategies in lobbying against the TCA. BATU suggested that if the TCA passed in to law (which occurred in May 2016), BATU would conduct less business within the country. This was illustrated by pointing out that if there was a “loss of business…and opportunity” in the Ugandan market, then “business will go elsewhere”; warning that the legislation puts “at risk the industry’s sponsorship of tobacco farmers”; and suggesting that “such investment may be lost to other economies with friendly business environments”.¹⁸⁸
The documents also questioned the authority of policymakers, stating that “health ministries should deal with issues pertaining to public health and other appropriate/competent organ(isation)s deal with issues pertaining to their mandate.”¹⁸⁸

Using Seemingly-Independent Front Groups to Promote Industry Objectives

To advance their influence, tobacco companies frequently use front groups, organisations that present themselves as independently promoting a pro-tobacco objective but are actually core-funded and mandated by the tobacco industry. By using a front group active in a community where tobacco legislation is being debated, the tobacco industry can create a political picture that suggests they are not the only ones against tobacco control, but that community and civil society sectors are opposed as well. Front groups are an extension of the tobacco industry, set up specifically to create the illusion of a stronger and more diverse opposition to tobacco control. For more information, see this page on tobacco industry front groups and the STOP database on tobacco industry allies around the world.

International Tobacco Growers Association

In Uganda, BATU has collaborated with a handful of front groups to oppose the TCA. In particular, the International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA) has been outspoken in opposition to tobacco control in Africa.
Although the ITGA claims to be a non-profit organisation representing the “millions of tobacco farmers” around the world,¹⁹⁷ internal documents show it was actually set up and funded by the tobacco industry specifically to be a “Front” for the industry’s “Third World lobby activities”.¹⁹⁸

Uganda Tobacco Growers Association

The Uganda Tobacco Growers Association (UTGA) has been very vocal against the TCA,  petitioning the Ugandan Government to withdraw key clauses in the bill.¹⁹⁹ In an appeal to the Ugandan Parliament signed by over 5,000 farmers, the UTGA stated “We have not experienced the exaggerated negative effects of tobacco growing,” and went on to request the clause in the bill that prohibits voluntary contributions, incentives or privileges that promote tobacco business in Uganda.¹⁹⁹
The UTGA was a member of the ITGA in 2014.²⁰⁰ As such, it was part of an organisation funded and mandated by multinational tobacco corporations. Therefore, their messages in opposition to the TCA were likely to mirror the tobacco industry’s priorities.

Nothing New: BATU’s History of Questionable Tactics and Double Standards in Uganda

This behaviour is not new. As evidenced by internal documents, academic literature, and media sources, BAT has conducted business in a questionable manner in the past. There is a clear contrast between the company’s conduct in Africa in comparison to its conduct in markets with greater levels of tobacco control regulation. 

TobaccoTactics Resources:

• Uganda – Country Profile
• British American Tobacco Uganda
• Uganda – BAT Marketing Strategies
• Uganda – Timeline: Industry Interference with the Uganda Tobacco Control Bill 2014
• Uganda – Infographic on Industry Interference with the Uganda Tobacco Control Bill
• British American Tobacco in Africa: A History of Double Standards.
• All Africa pages

References

The post Uganda- BAT’s Tactics to Undermine the Tobacco Control Bill appeared first on TobaccoTactics.