Image source: SavoryCrowdad/CC BY-SA 4.0

Key Points

• India is a country located in South Asia, part of the World Health Organization’s South-East Asia Region.
• It had a population in 2022 of 1.42 billion. Amongst those aged 15+, tobacco use prevalence is 28.6%.
• Smoking prevalence in India is 10.7%. However, the most popular form of tobacco in India is smokeless tobacco, with use prevalence of 21.4%.
• India ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in 2004, and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products in 2018.
• The Indian cigarette market is dominated by four companies, which together accounted for 98% of sales in 2022. ITC Limited holds by far the largest market share, at over 73%.
• The tobacco industry has deployed a wide range of tactics in India in recent years, including mobilisation of front groups and third parties; litigation against tobacco control measures such as graphic health warnings; and corporate social responsibility, including in partnership with government.

Since the early 2000s, India has made significant progress in tobacco control, introducing a comprehensive tobacco control law in 2004, reducing the affordability of tobacco products, and introducing graphic health warnings (GHWs) consistent with best practice worldwide.¹² However, major challenges persist. The wide range of tobacco products available in India makes regulation and enforcement particularly complicated. The Indian state is also a major shareholder of ITC Limited, which has by far the largest share of the Indian market. This means that the government has an interest in socio-economic issues – such as ensuring the welfare of farmers and manual labourers working in the Indian tobacco industry, and protection of exports – as well as in public health.³

India remains the world’s second largest consumer, producer and exporter of tobacco.⁴⁵

Tobacco Use in India

In 2022, the population of India was 1.42 billion.⁶ In the 2016-17 Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS), approximately 29% of the population aged 15+ reported current tobacco use – over 42% of males, and over 14% of females.²⁷ This means that in absolute numbers, there were almost 267 million tobacco users in India aged 15 and over.⁴ In the 2019 Global Youth Tobacco Survey (GYTS), amongst adolescents aged from 13 to 15, 8.5% reported using some form of tobacco – nearly 10% of males, and over 7% of females.²⁸

Amongst India’s smokers, the most popular product was not factory-made cigarettes but bidis: cigarettes rolled by hand in a dried leaf of the tendu tree. 7.7% of Indian adults reported smoking bidis, compared to 4% who smoked cigarettes.⁷

However, the most popular tobacco product in India overall is smokeless tobacco (SLT). More than 21% of Indians aged 15 and over reported being SLT users, compared to less than 11% who smoked, whether cigarettes, bidis, or both.²⁷ SLT use is also significant amongst women and girls: nearly 13% of females aged 15 and over were SLT users, compared to 2% who smoked.²⁷ The majority of female tobacco users in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are SLT users in India and Bangladesh.⁹ However, amongst adolescent tobacco users, smoking is more common than SLT use. Over 7% of adolescents reported current smoking, compared to just over 4% who were SLT users.²⁸

India has the second highest number of oral cancer cases globally, accounting for a third of the total.¹⁰ More than 90% of India’s oral cancer cases are caused by tobacco use and of these, more than half are caused by SLT.¹¹ The poor and less educated are worst affected, with much higher SLT use prevalence amongst these sections of the population.¹¹ There were also over a million deaths attributable to smoking in 2019, accounting for nearly 11% of all mortality in India that year.¹²

A 2020 study put the economic cost of all illness and death attributable to tobacco use between 2017 and 2018 for those over 35 years of age at US$27.5 billion.¹³ Smoking accounted for 74% of this cost; smokeless tobacco 26%.¹³ Direct medical costs alone amounted to 5.3% of all health expenditure.¹³ However, the excise tax revenue from tobacco the previous year was just 12.2% of its economic cost.¹³ In simple terms, the economic burden of tobacco use is more than eight times the value of revenue the Indian government receives in excise from tobacco products.¹³ This economic burden accounts for over 1% of India’s GDP.¹³

Tobacco in India

Market share and leading brands

The Indian cigarette market is dominated by four companies:  ITC Limited, Godfrey Phillips India Limited (GPI), VST Industries Ltd., and Philip Morris International (PMI), which together accounted for 98% of sales in 2022.¹⁴

India banned foreign direct investment in tobacco manufacturing in 2010, which means that the transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) can only access the Indian market via shareholdings and licensing agreements with local producers.¹⁵¹⁶

ITC Limited

ITC Limited (formerly India Tobacco Company Limited), dominates the Indian tobacco market, with a share of over 73% in 2022.¹⁴ Its largest shareholder is British American Tobacco (BAT), which held just under 30% of shares until March 2024.¹⁷¹⁸ The Indian state is also a major shareholder, via various state-owned insurance corporations and investment portfolios.¹⁸ Its products include India’s three bestselling brands of cigarettes: Gold Flake, Wills and Scissors.¹⁹

In a presentation to investors in June 2023, BAT CEO Tadeu Marroco stressed the importance of the company retaining at least a 25% shareholding in ITC, given that this provides BAT with seats on the ITC board and the right to veto company resolutions.²⁰ Marroco also highlighted the potential of the vast Indian market in terms of newer nicotine and tobacco products, particularly oral products such as nicotine pouches.²⁰ In March 2024, BAT reduced its holdings in ITC to 25.5%.²¹For more details see ITC Limited.

Godfrey Phillips India Limited (GPI)

GPI had a market share of almost 10% in 2022, the second largest after ITC.¹⁴ PMI is the second-largest shareholder with a stake of just over 25%.²² Major brands include Four Square, Cavenders and Tipper.¹⁹

VST Industries Ltd

VST, formerly Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company, had a market share of over 9% in 2022, the third largest.¹⁴ With a stake of over 32%, BAT is its largest shareholder.²³ Its major brands include Total, Charms and Charminar.¹⁹

TTCs’ licensing agreements

PMI has a licensing agreement with GPI, under which GPI manufactures and sells the brands Marlboro and Red & White in India, though PMI retains brand ownership internationally.¹⁴¹⁹²⁴ This gives PMI a 5.4% market share from a global ownership perspective.¹⁴ Similarly, ITC manufactures and sells the brands Berkeley and Benson & Hedges in India, though Japan Tobacco International and British American Tobacco are the global owners, respectively.¹⁴¹⁹ Both companies have a market share of less than 2%.¹⁴

• For more information on the tobacco industry in India, please see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

Smokeless tobacco and bidis

The Indian smokeless tobacco industry is based largely on small scale, rural production, for which accurate data is not available.²⁵ Local manufacturers account for significant segments of the market in several regions of India.²⁵ Similarly, bidi production depends largely on small home-based manufacturing operations and accurate data is not available.²⁵

At the national level, the biggest companies in the chewing tobacco/gutkha (see section “Undermining the gutkha ban”) market are believed to be Dhariwal Industries, Dharampal Satyapal (DS Group) and Som Sugandh Industries, which together accounted for around a quarter of sales in 2010.²⁵ There is also interest from the big cigarette companies in smokeless tobacco; Godfrey Phillips launched its own range of chewing products in 2010.²⁶ A 2021 paper found that 93% of SLT products bought in India were non-compliant with packaging regulations: either they did not have graphic health warnings, or the warnings were too small.²⁷

Tobacco farming

India is the world’s second biggest tobacco producer after China, producing over 766,000 tonnes of leaf in 2020.²⁸ This accounts for 9% of all global production.⁵ Though tobacco production in India has increased significantly in recent decades – from 438,500 tonnes in 1980 – it has fallen slightly from a high of 830,000 tonnes in 2011.²⁹

Child labour

Indian bidis feature on the U.S. Department of Labor’s 2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.³⁰ While information on child labour in the bidi industry is not widely available, a study published in 2009 found that more than 1.7 million children worked rolling bidis in India.³¹ This disproportionately affects girls, who are often drawn into the industry to support their families. Bidi rollers may work 10 to 14-hour days to produce over 1,000 bidis, in what a BBC report from 2012 described as “slave-like working conditions”.³¹

Tobacco and the economy

India is the world’s second largest exporter of tobacco leaf, after Brazil.⁵ According to UN Comtrade, India exported nearly US$816 million in raw tobacco in 2022, compared to nearly $21 million in imports.³²³³ Export figures for 2021-2022 from the Indian Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF) – a trust established by the Indian Department of Commerce – were slightly higher, at US$842 million.⁵

India exports tobacco to more than 115 countries around the world, the biggest recipient of which is Belgium, which accounts for around 18% of India’s total tobacco exports. Other major export destinations for Indian tobacco include the United Arab Emirates, Singapore and the United States.⁵

India is also a major net exporter of cigarettes. According to UN Comtrade, it exported over US$100 million in cigarettes in 2022, compared to nearly $26 million in imports.³⁴³⁵

According to IBEF, the tobacco industry in India employs about 36 million people in farming, processing, manufacturing and export activities.⁵

Illicit trade

The Tobacco Institute of India, an industry body established by ITC, GPI and VST in 1992, puts the scale of the illicit tobacco trade at a quarter of the market.³⁶ However, independent studies put that figure much lower, at around 3% to 6%.³⁷ This makes illicit trade in India relatively small by global standards.³⁸ A 2018 study, which found that 2.73% of the empty cigarette packs collected in India were illicit, noted significant differences across the country.³⁹ Areas with greater illicit trade penetration are often targeted by studies funded by the tobacco industry to exaggerate overall levels of illicit trade.⁴⁰

Studies have also cast doubt on industry claims that tobacco tax increases have led to expansion of illicit trade. For example, according to ITC, tax increases during the period 2012 to 2017 resulted in rapid growth of illicit trade, making India the fourth largest illicit market globally.⁴¹ However, a study published in 2020 by experts from the WHO and the Indian government put the illicit cigarette trade at 6% of the market in 2016-17 – an increase of just 0.9% from 2009-10.³⁸

Similarly, a joint report published in 2017 by the accountancy firm KPMG and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) argued that illicit trade – driven in part by higher taxes on cigarettes – was providing funds for terrorism and organized crime.⁴² However, both ITC and GPI are members of FICCI, which has a history of opposing tobacco control measures in India (see Influencing policy: graphic health warnings). Similarly, KPMG has strong ties with the tobacco industry going back decades, and its work on illicit trade has been strongly criticised elsewhere. Critics argue that KPMG’s research has exaggerated the scale of illicit trade and has been used to oppose tobacco control regulations such as plain packaging.

• For more information, please see STOP’s database of Tobacco Industry Allies.

Tobacco and the environment

A 2018 study estimated that in order to produce 100 billion cigarettes, nearly 67,500 tonnes of CO₂ equivalent were emitted in India in 2010 – the equivalent of 14,544 petrol-powered vehicles driven for a year.⁴³⁴⁴ The industry has also been a major cause of deforestation: it is estimated that 680 square kilometres of scrub forest were destroyed and degraded for tobacco curing and the manufacture of cigarettes and other smoking consumables between 1962 and 2002.⁴⁵

A 2022 study estimated that 170,000 tonnes of waste is produced by the packaging of tobacco products annually in India, two-thirds of which correspond to smokeless tobacco (SLT) products.⁴⁶ Analysis of segregated waste revealed that 73,500 tonnes of plastic, 6,100 tonnes of foil and 1,350 tonnes of used filters are discharged annually into the environment.⁴⁶ Cleaning up this waste costs Indian taxpayers roughly US$766 million every year.⁴⁷

• For more information on the tobacco industry in India, please see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

Roadmap to Tobacco Control

India was the eighth country to ratify the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) in 2004.⁴⁸ It ratified the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products in 2018.⁴⁹⁵⁰

The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act (COTPA), passed in 2003, is the main comprehensive tobacco control law in India. Amongst other provisions, it banned smoking in most public places, prohibited the advertising of cigarettes and other tobacco products, and banned sales to anyone under the age of 18.⁵¹ Since then, a number of rules have been introduced to aid implementation of COTPA and provide definitions.¹ In 2007-08, the government launched the National Tobacco Control Programme (NTCP), which aimed to reinforce COTPA and facilitate implementation of the tobacco control strategies contained within the WHO FCTC.⁵²

In 2020, an amendment to COTPA was drafted by the Ministry of Health.⁵³ Aiming to further strengthen the original legislation and boost compliance with WHO FCTC, it will abolish designated smoking areas, prohibit the sale of individual cigarettes (single sticks), and raise the legal age required for purchase of tobacco products from 18 to 21.⁵³⁵⁴ However, as of September 2023, this amendment has yet to become law.

Citing concerns about the health impacts of vaping on young people, the Indian government introduced a ban on electronic cigarettes in 2019. The law prohibits the production, manufacture, import, export, transport, sale, distribution, storage and advertisement of e-cigarettes.¹⁵⁵ Though their use remains rare in India as of 2023, the law closes off a huge potential market for e-cigarette companies.⁵⁶

For more details, please see the following websites:

• Legislation by country – India, Tobacco Control Laws, Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids
• India, WHO FCTC Implementation Database, WHO FCTC Secretariat
• Country profile – India, World Health Organization, WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2021

Tobacco Industry Interference in India

Tobacco industry tactics in India include mobilisation of front groups and third parties; litigation against tobacco control measures, such as graphic health warnings; and corporate social responsibility, including in partnership with government.

Delaying rollout of larger graphic health warnings

In October 2014, the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare announced its intention to increase the area covered by graphic health warnings (GHWs) on tobacco products, from 40% to 85%.⁵⁷ GHWs are a well-established, evidence-based and cost-effective measure of reducing tobacco use.⁵⁸ They may also be particularly effective in India, given both the country’s linguistic diversity and its literacy rate (as of 2018, over a quarter of the population was unable to read or write).⁵⁹⁶⁰

The tobacco industry deployed various tactics in an attempt to block this legislation. These included mobilising third parties and front groups, spreading misleading information, and submitting more than 30 legal challenges in state-level courts throughout India.⁶¹⁶²

Third parties and front groups which mobilised against the legislation included the following:

• The All India Bidi Federation
• The Tobacco Institute of India
• The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII)
• The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)
• The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM)
• The Federation of All India Farmer Associations (FAIFA)
• The Retailers Association of India (RAI)
• The International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA)

These groups wrote letters to and met with policy makers, launched campaigns in the media against the proposal, and filed legal challenges.⁶¹⁶²

For example, FAIFA bought full-page advertisements in leading national newspapers, claiming that larger GHWs would be detrimental to the livelihoods of tobacco farmers and fuel the illicit trade.⁶¹⁶³ FAIFA, CII and FICCI all wrote letters to the Minister of Health, J.P. Nadda, echoing these arguments.⁶⁴⁶⁵ The Tobacco Institute of India filed a legal challenge against the government in the High Court of Karnataka.⁶⁶ Finally, ASSOCHAM addressed a communiqué to the government, stating that the GHWs would endanger the livelihoods of more than 45 million people and lead to a flood of illicit imports.⁶⁷

These industry strategies succeeded in delaying the rollout of the 85% GHWs for a year, from April 2015 until April 2016.⁶⁸ However, the legal challenges continued even after implementation. In 2017, the High Court of Karnataka ruled that India should revert to the pre-2016 40% warnings. This decision was overruled in 2018 by the Indian Supreme Court and the 85% warnings have remained in force ever since.⁶²

The eventual introduction of the 85% GHWs saw India jump from 136^th to third position in the global ranking for size of health warnings on tobacco products.⁶⁹

Undermining the gutkha ban

Gutkha, one of India’s most popular smokeless tobacco (SLT) products, is a mix of crushed Areca nut (a well-known risk factor for several cancers even when consumed without tobacco), with tobacco, catechu, paraffin, slaked lime and flavourings.⁷⁰⁷¹ Highly addictive and very cheap, gutkha is popular amongst women and young people.⁷²

Since 2012, there have been state-level bans throughout the country in an attempt to reduce its prevalence, but it remains widely available.⁷³⁷⁴ Producers have found ways to circumvent the bans, such as by packaging and selling the constituent ingredients of gutkha separately.⁷⁴⁷⁵

In the state of Tamil Nadu, gutkha remained widely available despite being banned in 2013.⁷⁶⁷⁷ In 2016, officials from India’s Income Tax Department discovered details of a series of suspected bribes worth nearly US$6 million made by leading manufacturer MDM to public officials, allegedly to facilitate the storage, transport and sale of gutkha.⁶¹⁷⁶⁷⁸

Alleged recipients of bribes included a government minister, police officers and senior civil servants.⁷⁹ In November 2022, after four years of investigations in three states, India’s Central Bureau of Investigation filed charges against 21 individuals.⁷⁹⁷⁶

Corporate social responsibility: partnerships with government

Tobacco companies often use corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives to enhance their public image and corporate reputation.

In the implementation guidelines for Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC, the WHO states that these activities fall within its definition of tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship – and should therefore not be endorsed by Parties to the treaty.⁸⁰ However, in India, under the Companies Act 2013, all large corporations are required to spend at least 2% of their average net profit in the previous three years on CSR.⁸¹ This helps to legitimise tobacco industry CSR, as companies argue they are only fulfilling their legal duties.³In its sustainability reporting, ITC states that its CSR initiatives fall within the scope of the 2013 legislation.⁸²

ITC has contributed frequently to government programmes and has worked with government institutions.³ For example, in 2017, ITC contributed to a fund set up by the Indian government to attract funding from corporations and private donors for the provision of sanitation and clean drinking water; and to the Clean Ganga Fund, established by the government to rehabilitate the River Ganges.⁸² In his speech to shareholders at the 2017 AGM, the then ITC CEO cited several public-private partnerships with state governments in India on water management projects, stating that they aligned with a national programme which aimed to expand irrigation coverage and improve efficiency of water use.⁸³⁸⁴

This type of public-private CSR was particularly widespread during the COVID-19 pandemic. In total, between March and June 2020, the Indian tobacco industry contributed around US$36.7 million in donations to various government funds, both at federal and state level.⁸¹ The industry also partnered with other stakeholders, including NGOs, other private sector actors and even popular Bollywood singers. ITC was the biggest cash and in-kind contributor.⁸¹⁸⁵

Corporate trademarks were widely visible during these CSR activities, and the initiatives were publicised in leading newspapers and by senior politicians.⁸¹⁸⁶⁸⁷

• For more on tobacco industry activity during the pandemic, please see the COVID-19 Tobacco Tactics page and the COVID-19 monitoring database.

Relevant Links

• Global Adult Tobacco Survey GATS 2 India 2016-17, Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Mumbai and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India
• Report on Tobacco Industry Interference in India – Case Studies, S. Goel, S. Sekhar Kar, Resource Centre for Tobacco Control
• Interference by Big Tobacco and Affiliates in Tobacco Control in South Asia, Institute of Public Health Bengaluru and the International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease
• Crooked Nine: Nine Ways the Tobacco Industry Undermines Health Policy, Vital Strategies
• National Report: The Environmental Burden of Tobacco Products Wastes in India. Tobacco Use Makes You Ugly, Your Habitat Uglier, SPH AIIMS Jodhpur, ICMR-NICPR, The Union

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM)
• Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)
• ITC Limited

TCRG Research

• Advancing whole-of-government approaches to tobacco control: Article 5.3 and the challenge of policy coordination in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India and Uganda. R.A. Barry, S.M. Abdullah, A. Chugh, S. Hirpa, P. Kumar, D. Male, R. Ralston, T. Wagner-Rizvi, J. Collin, Tobacco Control 2022;31:s46-s52.
• Institutional tensions, corporate social responsibility and district-level governance of tobacco industry interference: analysing challenges in local implementation of Article 5.3 measures in Karnataka, India. P. Kumar, R.A. Barry, M.M. Kulkarni, V.G. Kamath, R. Ralston, J. Collin, Tobacco Control 2022;31:s26-s32.
• Developing more detailed taxonomies of tobacco industry political activity in low-income and middle-income countries: qualitative evidence from eight countries, B.K. Matthes, K. Lauber, M. Zatoński, L. Robertson, A.B. Gilmore, BMJ Global Health 2021;6:e004096.

For a comprehensive list of all TCRG publications, including research that evaluates the impact of public health policy, go to TCRG publications.

References

The post India Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

• The definition of noncriminal corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”.⁸⁸
• Criminal corruption are illegal acts of corruption, as defined by each country’s domestic laws (e.g., bribery, fraud and trading in influence).
• There are grey areas of corruption: some practices can be considered unethical or dishonest (i.e. noncriminal corruption), such as industry interference in policy (e.g. lobbying, creating front groups or funding science), but are not considered criminal acts of corruption.
• International laws set norms and standards for what should be considered criminal corruption, which individual countries need to formulate into domestic law.
• For tobacco industry interference tactics to be criminal acts of corruption, domestic laws would need to be changed to reflect this.
• Instances of criminal corruption involving the tobacco industry mainly involve bribing public officials.

What is corruption?

It is important to have a clear definition of what corruption is so that it can be effectively detected, investigated, prosecuted and deterred. Although there are various definitions of corruption, a useful way to think about it is whether activities are being used for non-criminal or criminal purposes.⁸⁹ The meaning of corruption also depends on where (i.e. in which jurisdiction), and at which level of governance (i.e. on the international or national level) the corrupt behaviour takes place.⁸⁸⁹⁰

Non-criminal corruption

One of the most widely accepted definitions of non-criminal corruption is proposed by Transparency International as being, “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”.⁸⁸ Using this definition, corruption can:

1. mean abuse of power for both financial and non-financial gain;⁹⁰
2. occur in the public, private or third sector;⁹⁰
3. be committed at different levels of government; by government leaders, such as politicians (i.e. ‘grand’ or ‘political’ corruption), or by street-level bureaucrats, such as public officials or civil servants (i.e. ‘petty’ or ‘administrative’ corruption).⁹⁰⁹¹

This definition is consistent with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).⁹² The World Bank,⁹³  International Monetary Fund (IMF)⁹⁴ and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)⁸⁹ also use a similar definition. The non-criminal definition of ‘corruption’ is generally used colloquially to refer to any unethical or dishonest practice and may not always be committed by those who are performing their official duties.⁹⁵ Although this use of corruption could be used for improving anti-corruption laws, strategies and interventions, it is not enough to enforce compliance and prosecute those committing corrupt behaviours.

Criminal corruption

Criminal corruption and domestic law

Criminal corruption are acts of corruption that domestic laws define as illegal, making them prosecutable and enforceable. To make acts of corruption illegal, countries must criminalise each corrupt behaviour. The major types of criminal corruption are: bribery (including facilitation payments), extortion, misappropriation (embezzlement), fraud, trading in influence (influence peddling), self-dealing, patronage, abuse of functions, creating or exploiting conflict of interest, creating or exploiting conflict of interest, favouritism (nepotism or cronyism), clientelism, illicit enrichment, money-laundering, concealment, and obstruction of justice.^92969798

At the national level, there is no single law for all criminally corrupt practices. Instead, each country has a variety of laws that may collectively pertain to, and overlap with, different corruption offences. National legislation also determines the sanctions and penalties for noncompliance, provides rules of evidence for prosecution, and decides which agencies and institutions are responsible for detecting, investigating or enforcing such laws.⁹⁹

Due to the difference of each country’s anti-corruption laws, what may be considered criminal corruption in one country may not necessarily be considered criminal corruption in another country.⁹⁰¹⁰⁰ For example, some forms of facilitation payments (i.e. payments “made to secure or speed up a routine or necessary process to which the payer is entitled anyway”⁹⁶) are considered legal in Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and the USA.¹⁰¹¹⁰²

The legal compliance of the private sector has relied primarily on self-enforcement and codes of conduct, which have not always been effective.⁹⁰ This is due to various reasons, but essentially, if these behaviours go undetected, they may not negatively impact the business. As the sole reliance on legal means of enforcement is costly and ineffective, recent anti-corruption scholars argue that businesses should adopt mechanisms to create a culture of integrity and ethical conduct.¹⁰³

Each corrupt offence needs to be comprehensively covered by domestic laws for corrupt activities to be prosecutable. Some practices may be considered corrupt, but there may be no existing legislation making that practice illegal. For example, according to Transparency International UK, the UK does not have any anti-corruption laws to adequately address cronyism, nepotism, and the revolving door abuse.⁹⁶ Revolving door abuse could be defined as “[a]n individual who moves back and forth between public office and private companies, exploiting his/her period of government service for the benefit of the companies they used to regulate”.¹⁰⁴ For examples of revolving door cases between the tobacco industry and regulators, see our Revolving Door topic.

Cronyism, nepotism, and the revolving door abuse are an exploitation of power for personal gain, which are unlikely to lead to decisions that take into consideration public interest.

Criminal corruption and international law

The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) is a legally binding international treaty that sets global anti-corruption norms and standards.⁹² Instead of providing a generic definition of corruption, the UNCAC specifies which exact corrupt behaviours should be considered criminal offences. With 186 signatories and widespread adoption of certain corrupt practices as unlawful, this treaty represents broad agreement on what consists of criminally corrupt behaviour.⁹⁰

There are a variety of international and regional governance organisations that provide similar anti-corruption norms and standards, such as the OECD, Council of Europe, African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, Inter-American Convention against Corruption and more.¹⁰⁵

Why corrupt industry practices are a barrier to effective tobacco control

Tobacco industry interference in health policy

The World Health Organisation (WHO) Framework Convention of Tobacco Control (FCTC) is a legally binding international treaty to regulate tobacco products. In particular, Article 5.3 of the FCTC obligates signatories to protect their public health policies “from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law”.¹⁰⁶ FCTC Guidelines for Implementation of Article 5.3 provide eight recommendations for Parties, including restricting public official’s interactions with the tobacco industry. Tobacco control researchers suggest that some forms of tobacco industry interference can be associated with corruption, as Article 5.3 Guidelines recommendations could be seen as good governance policies intended to address such corruption.¹⁰⁷ However, for industry interference – as outlined in Article 5.3 Guidelines – to  be considered criminal acts of corruption, they would need to be defined as such in domestic laws.

Non-criminal corruption and industry interference

Article 5.3 of the FCTC was included in response to tobacco industry use of political activities to influence health policy in their favour.¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁹ These activities have been a major barrier for developing effective tobacco control prior to implementation of the FCTC.^110111112 Despite the existence of Article 5.3, parties to the FCTC continue to identify tobacco industry interference as one of the greatest obstacles to developing national tobacco control polices.¹¹³

The tobacco industry interference can fall within non-criminal or criminal forms of corruption. In terms of non-criminal corruption, the tobacco industry uses various strategies and tactics to influence the policy making, such as lobbying, creating front groups or funding science. Although practices can be seen as unethical and dishonest, they may not necessarily be instances of criminal corruption, because there may not be any existing laws to define these behaviours as unlawful.

Criminal corruption and industry interference

As implementation of WHO FCTC Article 5.3 progresses, there is a risk that the tobacco industry will use covert methods to influence policy. Such covert methods could involve acts of criminal corruption. Denormalization of tobacco smoking and of tobacco as an acceptable business enterprise – indicated by tobacco industry disinvestment – may also pressure the tobacco industry into using underhand means to further their commercial goals.¹¹⁴¹¹⁵

Instances of criminal corruption involving the tobacco industry shows that this trend is taking place; these acts of corruption mainly involve bribing public officials. For example:

• In 2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission “charged two global tobacco companies with violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) for paying more than $5 million in bribes to government officials in Thailand and other countries to illicitly obtain tobacco sales contracts”. The two companies in question were Universal Corporation and Alliance One International, two of the world’s largest tobacco leaf sourcing companies.¹¹⁶
• Known as the “Dalligate” scandal, there is an ongoing trial concerning Silvio Zammit, who was an aide to an EU Health Commissioner John Dalli in 2012. Zammit is accused to soliciting bribes to influence the drafting of the Tobacco Products Directive.
• A BBC report in 2015 “obtained hundreds of documents that reveal how BAT employees bribed politicians, public officials and even people working for a rival company in Africa”.¹¹⁷¹¹⁸ From August 2017 to January 2021, BAT was under investigation by the UK Serious Fraud Office after allegations of corruption and bribery in Africa.^119120121 The investigation was concluded as the SFO said it did not “meet the evidential test for prosecution”.¹²¹ Further accusations of bribery were made in 2021.¹²² BAT also conducting a campaign of dirty tricks to undermine tobacco control and its competitors in South Africa.¹²³

These criminally corruption behaviours are not associated with a specific geographical region, which suggests that acts of criminal corruption by the tobacco industry is widespread. More transparency mechanisms are needed to detect and deter such behaviour, which Article 5.3. Guidelines offer.

References

The post Corruption appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

In 2012, the Kenyan Revenue Authority (KRA) held a tender, looking for a company to develop and implement an Excisable Goods Management System, for the fixing of revenue stamps to tobacco, wines, and spirits.¹²⁶
As the first tobacco track and trace system (i.e. determining where a product was produced and following it through to the point of sale) to be implemented in Africa post the World Health Organization’s Illicit Trade Protocol, Kenya’s tender outcome was important to the tobacco industry, as the selected system could go on to be adopted elsewhere.¹²⁷¹²⁸
British American Tobacco (BAT) tried, unsuccessfully, to influence the tender’s outcome in favour of the tobacco industry’s own track and trace system Codentify, through the use of a third party with close links to the tobacco company.

BAT Opposition to SICPA Solution

The KRA received 21 tender applications, including a submission by Swiss company SICPA. Its SICPATRACE@ solution had previously been implemented in California, Massachusetts, Turkey, and Brazil.¹²⁹
The tobacco industry considered SICPA’s solution a threat to the adoption of its own Codentify system,¹³⁰ with a document written by a member of the pan-industry working group on Digital Tax Verification (DTV), stating that:

“It is very important to monitor activities by SICPA and other tax stamp suppliers in your market. If we are reactive, there is a big risk that we only learn about the activities of these suppliers when a tender document is published- often describing a specific solution in such technical detail that competing technologies, such as DTV using ‘Codentify’ are excluded. This situation is ‘too late’ for the industry as the SICPA engagement will have been active and very carefully planned for some time prior to a tender.”¹³¹

A tobacco industry lobbyist argued that if SICPA’s solution was adopted it would “set a very unhealthy precedent” by locking out “every other provider in the sector”.¹³² A SICPA representative responded to this, stating that “a powerful, independent ‘track and trace’ regime would make illicit tobacco trade very difficult” and that “if you don’t want that to happen… you can replace it with something less effective”.
SICPA’s comment suggests that the industry’s support for Codentify represents support for a less-effective measure for addressing illicit tobacco trade which, given the evidence of its historical and ongoing facilitation of tobacco smuggling, may be the industry’s intention.

• For information on the tobacco industry’s historic involvement in, and more recent facilitation of, illicit tobacco trade, see also: Tobacco Smuggling.

Use of Third Party Technique: FractureCode

BAT Kenya did not tender for the service directly, but instead used a third party called FractureCode to promote Codentify. FractureCode is a Danish company established in 2002, offering track and trace, digital authentication and volume verification solutions including Codentify.¹³³ The company was a founding member of the (CAIT).
Eric Jones, BAT’s International Solutions Engagement Manager for Global Supply Chain Tracking and Verification, noted in a leaked email to BAT Kenya:

“following the launch by the KRA of the tender that clearly favoured SICPA, we agreed the use of FractureCode (FCC) to support you in fighting/amending/cancelling this tender.”¹³⁴

Jones added:

“It is worth noting that not using a third party such as FCC to respond to the tender is likely to severely reduce our ability to shape events and prevent SICPA from winning”.

Court documents relating to an employment dispute between BAT and its former employee-turned whistle-blower Paul Hopkins, state that FractureCode was “in the pay” of BAT by 2011.
Leaked industry documents suggest that FractureCode’s roles included: “to guarantee to governments that the “Codentify system works” and “to promote and sell the system to governments”.
The documents also show that BAT had “purchased” the tender on FractureCode’s behalf, had commissioned FractureCode as a consultant to represent them at a KRA question and answer session, and had drafted a letter on FractureCode’s behalf to be sent to the Commissioner General of the KRA, saying: “We, FractureCode Corporation/Codentify, a well-established Security Company in Denmark, promoting and selling Digital Tax Verification for Tobacco and Alcohol Products, would like to formally protest about the conduct of the recent KRA tender carried out by your authority”.
FractureCode also collaborated with the Danish Embassy/Foreign Affairs. Leaked emails indicate that the Danish Embassy wrote a letter on FractureCode’s behalf and met with the KRA to help get the tender extended. On 4 May 2012, a Danish Embassy staff member in Nairobi emailed the minutes of their meeting with the KRA to FractureCode stating:

“We believe the result of this meeting leaves room for your company to submit your bid and have a direct dialogue with the KRA throughout the process. The Embassy would be happy to assist you in facilitating the contract.”

The Embassy sent FractureCode an invoice for nine hours work at 915 Danish Kroner (roughly £108, as of June 2018 an hour).

Alleged Bribery of Kenyan Politician

Former BAT whistle-blower Paul Hopkins has claimed that he paid former Kenyan Justice Minister Martha Karua £50,000 in exchange for confidential information regarding procurement of the excise tax stamps. An article in The Independent revealed that BAT “then had the contract deliberately delayed while they secretly lobbied to get their own system chosen”.¹³⁵

Outcome of BAT’s Efforts to Undermine Tender

Despite BAT’s efforts to undermine the successful tender, at the end of 2012 KRA awarded the tender to SICPA.
Responding to BAT’s potential involvement, the KRA stated that:

“BAT Kenya, as an entity, has not tendered for the supply of Excise Tax Stamps, in any of the tenders floated by KRA in the past. Additionally, KRA is not aware whether BAT supported any of the past bids presented by participating companies.”¹³⁶

The tender was for a five-year contract to provide 3.55 billion stamps a year which was later increased to 12.87 billion stamps, extending from tobacco products to also include beer, bottled water, and soft drinks.¹³⁷ The implementation of SICPA’s system was completed by March 2014, and government figures indicate an increase in legal tobacco sales and tobacco tax revenue in Kenya, post implementation.

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Codentify
• Third Party Techniques
• Tobacco Smuggling
• BAT Involvement in Tobacco Smuggling
• For more examples of tobacco industry interference in Kenya, see:

Kenya- Country Profile

Kenya- Timeline: Industry Interference with the Tobacco Control Regulations 2014

Kenya- BAT’s Tactics to Undermine the Tobacco Control Regulations

• (CAIT)

TCRG Research

• Tobacco industry’s elaborate attempts to control a global track and trace system and fundamentally undermine the Illicit Trade Protocol, A. Gilmore, A.W.A. Gallagher, A. Rowell, Tobacco Control, Published Online First: 13 June 2018
• The transnational tobacco companies’ strategy to promote Codentify, their inadequate tracking and tracing standard, L. Joossens, A.B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2014;23:e3-e6

References

The post Kenya- BAT’s Tactics to Influence Track and Trace Tender appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Background

Dalli’s resignation occurred only days before he was due to launch the much anticipated, and strongly contested,¹⁴³ proposal for a strengthened EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD).
Visit our TPD: Dalligate Timeline page, for a detailed breakdown of events leading up to Dalli’s resignation.

Formal Complaint by Swedish Match

On 21 May 2012, the European Commission received a letter from snus manufacturer Swedish Match claiming that in February 2012 Maltese businessman and political canvasser for Dalli, Silvio Zammit, had used his contacts with Dalli to try to elicit €60 million from the company in return for lifting the EU ban on selling snus.¹⁴⁴ It was also alleged that Zammit had made a second bribery offer to the European Smokeless Tobacco Council (ESTOC) in March 2012.¹⁴⁵

The Commission’s Response

EU’s Anti-Fraud Office OLAF was requested to investigate the charges. Following a five month investigation, OLAF concluded that there were “a number of unambiguous and converging circumstantial evidences gathered in the course of the investigation” that suggested that Dalli “was aware of this bribery attempt and did nothing to block, stop or report these events”.¹⁴⁶
Based on OLAF’s findings, Dalli was asked to resign by José Manuel Barroso, President of the Commission. In its official press statement, the Commission stated that the OLAF investigation had substantiated the bribery claims, but that “no transaction was concluded between the company and the entrepreneur Zammit and no payment was made”.¹⁴⁷ “The OLAF report did not find any conclusive evidence of the direct participation of Dalli but did consider that he was aware of these events”.¹⁴⁷

OLAF Investigation Strongly Criticised

The OLAF report was leaked to Maltese press in April 2013.¹⁴⁵ Its findings, and OLAF’s investigation techniques, have since been widely criticised. Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), a non-profit research and campaign group seeking to expose corporate lobbying on EU policy making, commented that although the report had shown several attempts by Zammit to solicit money from Swedish Match, it presented “…no direct evidence that Dalli was being aware of these attempts”.¹⁴⁸ CEO continued: “It looks as if OLAF has selectively compiled arguments to support that Dalli had behaved inappropriately, without considering the credibility of the witnesses”.¹⁴⁸ This sentiment was echoed in Parliament where Ingeborg Grässle MEP told reporters that “The report opens up more questions than it provides answers”¹⁴⁹. OLAF’s own Supervisory Committee published a report in April 2013, concluding that OLAF’s investigation had “violated its mandate and broken EU rules”.¹⁴²
For more information on OLAF’s controversial role in ‘Dalligate’, see our pages on OLAF and its Director General, Giovanni Kessler.

Dalli’s Response

Dalli has always vehemently denied the charges, calling the affair “a systematic plan of entrapment”,¹⁵⁰ claiming “there are elements within the Commission who are not happy with this directive. And naturally, there is the tobacco industry….I am stating facts”.¹⁵¹
In December 2012, Dalli lodged a case with the European Court of Justice, seeking damages and an annulment of the Commission’s decision to force him to resign.¹⁵² These claims were dismissed in May 2015, when the Court ruled that “Dalli had resigned voluntarily”.¹⁵³
Dalli also filed a defamation case in the Belgian court against Swedish Match.¹⁵⁴¹⁵⁵
More about this case below.

Failure to Implement the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

Despite evidence of Dalli’s knowledge about the bribery attempts being weak and circumstantial, Dalli had two undisclosed meetings with tobacco industry representatives lobbying on the EU Ban on Snus Sales.¹⁴⁵ Dalli failed to implement rules of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), to which the EU is a signatory, and which obliges parties to protect public health policy from the commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry.¹⁵⁶
Dalli defended his tobacco industry meetings by arguing that politicians should be accessible to people: “One of the criticisms I receive today is that I am too accessible. But I do not think this is a bad thing for a politician. I am very accessible to everyone. Whoever phones me, I tell him to come and see me, if possible there and then. Therefore when Silvio Zammit told me that he had someone who wanted to speak to me, as many other people tell me, I accepted.”¹⁵⁷
Dalli’s argument, however, ignores that the FCTC outlines that “there is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco industry’s interests and public health policy interests”.¹⁵⁶

Meeting 1: ESTOC/Dalli, 20 August 2010

Whilst on holiday in his homeland of Malta, Dalli met with Tomas Hammargren, British American Tobacco employee and Chair of ESTOC.¹⁴⁵
Hammargren’s meeting notes report that the meeting had been “off the record” as “JD John Dalli has been strongly advised by other part of the Commission (Barroso office or just the services, C6?sic) not to meet or be lobbied by tobacco companies”.¹⁴⁵
The notes also suggest that this meeting was not to be a one-off, but part of a wider tobacco industry lobbying strategy aimed at influencing Commission officials to lift the ban on snus.¹⁴⁵

Image 1: Screengrab from Kimberley’s email to Swedish Match (taken from final OLAF report) showing that her connection with Swedish Match was purposively hidden

Meeting 2: Swedish Match Lobbyist/Dalli, 6 January 2012

In January 2012, Dalli met with Maltese internal market lawyer Gayle Kimberley in Malta. Like Meeting 1, this meeting had been brokered by Zammit.
Swedish Match paid Kimberley €5000 to meet with Dalli, but she intentionally kept her connection with Swedish Match hidden.
Image 1 shows an email sent by Kimberley to Johan Gabrielsson (Director of Public Affairs Swedish Match), shortly after her meeting with Dalli, reiterating that she had been “in no way” connected to Swedish Match, instead giving the “objective opinion of snus producers and users”.¹⁴⁵

Other Meetings: Non-Health Elements of Commission and Tobacco Industry

Dalli wasn’t alone in failing to implement FCTC rules. Evidence shows that senior staff in the highest echelons of the Commission, notably the Secretariat-General, the Legal Service and Barroso’s own Cabinet, met no less than 12 times with tobacco industry representatives.¹⁴³¹⁵⁸
None of these meetings were publicly disclosed, but in contrast to Dalli, none of these officials were formally sanctioned.
See EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision for more details on the tobacco industry’s access to Commission officials and the impact it had on the progress of the revision of the TPD.

Swedish Match Opaque Lobbying Practices

While much focus in this ‘cash for influence’ scandal has centred on Dalli’s misconduct, the tactics used by Swedish Match to undermine EU regulation received considerably less attention. Despite the company’s attempts in the aftermath of the scandal to rehabilitate its image and present itself as an innocent whistle-blower and victim,¹⁵⁹ the controversy exposed arguably unethical conduct by the company.

Failure to Adhere to Transparency Register Code of Conduct

As an interested party trying to influence EU policy making, Swedish Match has been registered with the EU’s Transparency Register since 2000.¹⁶⁰
The ‘Dalligate’ controversy revealed the company’s failure to comply with the Register’s Code of Conduct on two counts:
1 “Always identify themselves registrant by name and, by registration number, and if applicable, by the entity or entities they work for or represent; declare the interests, objectives, aims they promote and, where applicable, specify the clients or members who they represent”¹⁶¹

Although Swedish Match is registered on the Transparency Register, its lobbyist Kimberley is not. Swedish Match’s Register entry does not disclose the company’s relationship with Kimberley. ¹⁶⁰ In addition, Kimberley intentionally concealed her relationship with the tobacco company in her interaction with Dalli.¹⁴⁵

2 “Not obtain or try to obtain information or decisions dishonestly or by use of undue pressure or inappropriate behaviour”¹⁶¹

Swedish Match inappropriately sought access to a Commissioner in his private domain in Malta, arguably away from ‘parts of the Commission that had advised Dalli strongly not to meet with tobacco companies’, as per Hammargren’s meeting notes.¹⁴⁵

Perpetuating Untruthful Version of Events: ‘OLAF Told Us So’

In the aftermath of the scandal, there was confusion about how many times Dalli had met with Kimberley.
Dalli maintained that he had met Kimberley only once, whereas Swedish Match claimed there had been two meetings.
Swedish Match Vice President Public Affairs, Patrik Hildingsson, told Europolitics in an ‘exclusive interview’¹⁶² shortly after Dalli’s resignation, that Kimberley and Dalli had met in January 2012, and again in February that year. Furthermore, he claimed that Zammit had made the bribery offer at that meeting, after the Commissioner had left the room:

“He Zammit continued the meeting and asked why Dalli would take a suicidal political decision without gaining anything. The solution was simple: we had to pay”.¹⁶²

However, at the time of interview, Hildingsson was aware that no second meeting had taken place.¹⁴⁵
Although the meeting had been scheduled to take place, the meeting was rescheduled to 10 February due to adverse weather. At the last minute, Zammit had decided to meet with Dalli alone, taking a list of questions prepared by Kimberley.¹⁴⁵ The alleged bribery offer was made by Zammit to Kimberley when Zammit came back from meeting Dalli.
Swedish Match’s deception came to light when Swedish Match’s Gabrielsson met with Jose Bové MEP in March 2013.
Gabrielsson confessed that OLAF had informed him on one of the two occasions he was interviewed (2 June and 19 September 2012)¹⁴⁵ that Kimberley had lied about the second meeting, and that she had not been present. ¹⁶³ As such, Swedish Match had not only willingly deceived the press in October 2012, it also had lied about events when the company was invited to tell its side of the ‘Dalligate’ controversy at a ‘Brussels Network’ event at the European Parliament.¹⁶⁴
When asked by Bové why Swedish Match had continued to stick to an incorrect version of events, Gabrielsson replied that OLAF had instructed him so:

“They OLAF said like this, we can’t give you any orders how you, because you have done nothing wrong in this, but we have done an investigation, there is Maltese investigations, it would be preferably that this is not disturbed and this will definitely not help certain things that come out.”¹⁶³

OLAF denied this allegation.

Impact of ‘Dalligate’

Tobacco Products Directive

The tobacco industry lobbying efforts to lift the snus export ban failed.
Published three months after Dalli’s resignation, the Commission’s revised TPD proposal¹⁶⁵ maintained the snus ban, was approved by Parliament and Council, and enacted in April 2014.
Evidence suggests that ‘Dalligate’ backfired on the tobacco industry. It changed the EU political landscape, if only temporarily.¹⁴³
The scandal placed transparency of EU policy making and undue tobacco industry influence at the heart of political debate. Heightened scrutiny made previously amenable EU officials less inclined to engage with tobacco companies. In Parliament, Dalli’s departure and exposure of tobacco industry interference resulted in rare, all-party support to move the TPD forward.¹⁴³
The rapid response from Parliament and Council were instrumental in getting the TPD adopted in time for the Parliamentary elections in May 2014.

Lawsuits

In 2012, OLAF referred its ‘Dalligate’ report to Maltese authorities for further investigation. In June 2013, the Maltese Police Commissioner announced that “Malta does not have enough evidence to start criminal proceedings against former EU Health Commissioner John Dalli in a bribery case”.¹⁶⁶
Silvio Zammit however was charged with bribery and trading in influence. This lawsuit is still ongoing (January 2017).
Dalli lost his European Court of Justice case against the Commission, but also filed a lawsuit in the Belgian Courts against Swedish Match, which is still ongoing (January 2017). At some stage this lawsuit was extended to include OLAF, and in spring 2015 media reported that Belgian prosecutors had started a criminal investigation into claims of illegal wiretapping by OLAF during the Dalli investigation, and that prosecutors had requested the Commission to lift the diplomatic immunity of OLAF officials involved.¹⁵³¹⁶⁷ The Commission refused several requests, but in in July 2015 granted the request to lift Kessler’s immunity.¹⁶⁸
Kessler has filed a case with the European Court of Justice, seeking reversal of the Commission’s decision to lift his immunity, claiming that if he were to be put on trial, “it would imperil Olaf’s independence and investigations”.¹⁶⁹ In January 2017 this court case was still ongoing.

European Ombudsman investigation

In 2014 the European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, opened an investigation into the alleged failure of the Commission to implement FCTC rules with tobacco lobbyists.¹⁷⁰ She found that the Commission’s approach to publicising meetings with tobacco lobbyists was, with the exception of DG Health, inadequate. She recommended that the Commission apply DG Health’s proactive transparency policy to all Commission services and officials, irrespective of seniority.¹⁷¹
The Commission disagreed, insisting that the ethical and transparency rules in place already prevent undue influence from the tobacco industry. Based on its response, the Ombudsman then concluded that there was “maladministration on the part of the Commission”¹⁷¹.
The Ombudsman lacks the formal power to take further action.

TobaccoTactics Resources

• EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision
• TPD: Pictorial Warnings and Standardised, Plain Packaging
• TPD: Delaying the Process of Consultation
• TPD: Tobacco industry lobbying a violation of Article 5.3
• TPD: Burglaries
• TPD: Revolving Door Cases
• Snus: EU Ban on Snus Sales and Illegal Sales of Snus via the Internet

Relevant Links

• Corporate Europe Observatory, Dalligate: Smokescreen or Smoking Gun? Scandal exposes deep problem of corporate influence over Commission decision-making, 25 Oct 2012.
• Corporate Europe Observatory, Mapping the Tobacco Lobby in Brussels: a smoky business, 6 Nov 2012.

TCRG Research

• How online sales and promotion of snus contravenes current European Union legislation, S. Peeters, A.B. Gilmore, 2013, Tobacco Control, 22:266-273
• The revision of the 2014 European tobacco products directive: an analysis of the tobacco industry’s attempts to ‘break the health silo’, S. Peeters, H. Costa, D. Stuckler, M. McKee, A.B. Gilmore, 2016, Tobacco Control; 25:108-117
• Quantifying the influence of tobacco industry on EU governance: automated content analysis of the EU Tobacco Products Directive, H. Costa, A.B. Gilmore, S. Peeters, M. McKee, D. Stuckler, 2014, Tobacco Control; 23:473-478

References

The post TPD: Dalligate appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Smoking in Sri Lanka

According to the 2015 STEPWise approach to Surveillance (STEPs) Non-Communicable Disease risk factor survey results by the World Health Organization and the Sri Lankan Ministry of Health, current tobacco smoking prevalence among those aged between 18 and 69 years was 15.0% with a daily smoking prevalence rate of 10.2%. The reported prevalence for current tobacco smoking among men was 29.4% and 0.1% among women.¹⁷⁶
Results from the July 2015 Spot Survey conducted by the Alcohol and Drug Information Centre (ADIC), on males over the age of 15 years, reported a steady decrease of tobacco smoking prevalence from the beginning of the 1990s to 2015 (Image 1). ¹⁷⁷

Burden of Tobacco Use

Tobacco is estimated to be responsible for 1 in every 10 adult deaths in Sri Lanka accounting for 222 deaths per week.¹⁷⁸ The reported annual revenue of the Ceylon Tobacco Company (CTC) PLC Ltd. in 2015, Sri Lankan Rupees (LKR) 106.5 Billion, (the equivalent of approximately 722 Million US dollars) indicates the economic burden of tobacco on Sri Lankan households.¹⁷⁹ Local evidence from academics Varuni De Silva and colleagues suggests some rural low income households in Sri Lanka spend around 40% of their income on tobacco.¹⁸⁰

The Tobacco Market

British American Tobacco (BAT), holds a monopoly share of the Sri Lankan tobacco market, operating via its local counterpart British American Tobacco Holdings (Sri Lanka). The company owns 84.13% of the shares of the Ceylon Tobacco Company PLC Ltd (CTC) which is responsible for the entire manufacturing process from tobacco cultivation to cigarette production in Sri Lanka. CTC owns 99% of the market with the remaining 1% comprising of imported cigarettes.¹⁸¹ Almost 100% of the tobacco used for cigarette manufacturing in Sri Lanka is cultivated in the country, which accounted for approximately 3000 tons of tobacco in 2014.¹⁸² CTC also exports its manufactured cigarettes, which contributes approximately 1% to its overall annual revenue.

Tobacco Control Initiatives

Sri Lanka was the first country in Asia to ratify the world’s first global public health treaty, the WHO Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC), and the fourth globally.¹⁸³ It is also the first country in the South East Asian Region (SEAR) to introduce tobacco control legislation. The National Authority on Tobacco and Alcohol Act (NATA Act) was enacted in 2006 to protect public health from tobacco and alcohol related harm.¹⁸⁴

National Authority on Tobacco and Alcohol (NATA) Act¹⁸⁵

NATA act prohibits;

• sale to or by persons under 21 years of age;
• installation of vending machines for tobacco products;
• sale of tobacco products without health warning and the tar, nicotine content in each tobacco product;
• tobacco advertisements and sponsorships etc;
• free distribution etc of tobacco products;
• offences relating to trademarks;
• smoking in public places.

Packaging and Labelling Regulations ¹⁸⁷

On 1 June 2015 Sri Lanka implemented pictorial health warnings covering 80% of the top surface area of both front and back covers of tobacco packets, which also includes a text message in all three languages used in the country (Sinhala, Tamil and English).

Price and Tax Measures

Tobacco tax in Sri Lanka is governed by the Tobacco Tax Act.¹⁸⁸¹⁸⁹ Tobacco tax was revised on two occasions in 2016, and the price of the most sold brand of cigarette, John Player Gold Leaf, was raised by 143% (from LKR 35 to LKR 50) as a result. Yet, the price remained below a level that would affect the affordability of this brand.¹⁹⁰

Community Empowerment and Mobilisation

The general public of Sri Lanka, namely, community based organisations, non-governmental organisations and community groups organised informally, play a major role in tobacco control. Public pressure and support has helped policy makers and politicians to select decisions favourable for public health over alternatives favourable for the industry, for example, pictorial health warnings and advertising bans.^191192193

Industry Interference in Tobacco Control

The tobacco industry has interfered with the country’s attempts to introduce tobacco control policies.^194195196 An example of successful tobacco industry interference is when CTC took legal action against the Minister of Health, Mr. Maithripala Sirisena, over the implementation of 80% pictorial health warnings (PHW) for tobacco packets in 2012.¹⁹⁷ Mr. Maithripala Sirisena who later became the President of Sri Lanka in 2015, was the Minister of Health during the period of implementation of PHWs. He publicly claimed that the CTC tried to bribe him during the process, even though CTC denied the accusation.^198199200201
Furthermore, in 2015 CTC executives continued to hold posts in government institutions, thereby allowing them access to the policy making process. In addition, CTC is also accused of point-of-sale advertising and promotion, strategic targeting of youth and women in marketing campaigns and influencing communities via retailers and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) based activities.²⁰²²⁰³

Monitoring Tobacco Industry Interference

In June 2016, Sri Lanka launched the Centre for Combating Tobacco (CCT), a Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) tobacco industry observatory. CCT’s remit is to monitor tobacco industry interference at different levels. It’s information portal TobaccoUnmasked, replicates the model of the Tobacco Control Research Group’sTobaccoTactics website at the University of Bath and disseminates information on tobacco industry violations of the FCTC’s Article 5.3. In August 2017, CCT initiated the first ever public hotline on Article 5.3, giving public the opportunity to report violations of Article 5.3 from grass-root level upwards.

External Resources

• Alcohol and Drug Information Centre
• Ceylon Tobacco Company

References

The post Sri Lanka- Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.