Image source: Nathan Hughes Hamilton/CC BY 2.0 DEED

Key Points

• Indonesia is a country in Southeast Asia, part of the World Health Organization’s South-East Asia Region.
• It is the fourth most populous country in the world, with a population in 2022 of 275.5 million.
• Tobacco use prevalence is high, particularly amongst men. 34.5% of all adults were current tobacco users in 2021, including 65.5% of men.
• Indonesia has neither signed nor ratified the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. As a non-party, it is ineligible to join the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.
• The Indonesian tobacco market is dominated by local manufacturers PT Gudang Garam Tbk and PT Djarum, as well as Philip Morris International.
• Recent tobacco industry tactics in Indonesia include the use of third parties; the targeting of youth with tobacco marketing, both at point of sale and online, as well as via event sponsorship; and sponsorship of popular sports such as badminton and football.

According to the authors of a 2023 paper, “Indonesia has a high smoking prevalence that has not diminished significantly since 1990”. This has been driven by male smoking rates which remain amongst the highest in the world.¹² It is the only country in Asia to have neither signed nor ratified the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC),³ and nor is there any comparable national framework for tobacco control.¹ Industry interference in policymaking is ongoing, as there is no effective legal mechanism to prevent it.⁴⁵ Smoking has long been a part of Indonesian culture, particularly for men, something which tobacco companies have exploited through aggressive marketing tactics that aim to reinforce smoking as a normal or even essential masculine behaviour.⁵⁶ This high degree of social acceptability means that the government treats the industry as a legitimate stakeholder.⁷ One key challenge, therefore, is to de-normalise tobacco use, as part of a comprehensive tobacco control plan.⁷⁸

Tobacco Use in Indonesia

The link between smoking and masculinity is deeply embedded within Indonesian culture.⁸⁹ This has been reinforced by tobacco marketing which associates tobacco products with characteristics traditionally considered masculine, such as strength, heroism and self-control.⁸⁹

In 2021, tobacco use prevalence amongst adults was 34.5%; 70.2 million adults were current users of tobacco.¹⁰ Nearly two-thirds (65.5%) of Indonesian men reported using tobacco, compared to around 3% of women.¹⁰

In 2019, nearly 20% of students aged from 13 to 15 reported tobacco use.¹¹ Around 36% of males in this age group reported current tobacco use compared to 3.5% of females.¹¹

Kreteks – cigarettes consisting of tobacco, cloves and flavourings such as chocolate, dried fruit and coffee – are by far the most popular tobacco product in Indonesia. According to government figures from 2017, kreteks accounted for more than 95% of the cigarettes sold that year.¹² The cloves provide a unique flavour and smell, and also contain eugenol, a chemical compound which reduces the harshness of the smoke.¹³ In 2021, close to 30% of all Indonesian adults – around 60 million of the country’s 70 million adult tobacco users – reported smoking kreteks.¹⁰

There were an estimated 246,000 deaths attributable to smoking in 2019, accounting for nearly 15% of all mortality in Indonesia that year.¹⁴ Research published in 2022 estimated the total cost of smoking to the Indonesian economy in 2019 at between Rp184.36 trillion (US$13 billion) and Rp410.76 trillion (US$29 billion).¹⁵ The same study found that direct healthcare costs accounted for between Rp17.9 trillion (US$1.3 billion) and Rp27.7 trillion (US$2 billion), most of which is covered by the Social Security Agency for Health, equivalent to 57-59% of total direct expenditure on healthcare.¹⁵

Tobacco in Indonesia

Market share and leading brands

In 2022, market research company Euromonitor International put the value of the Indonesian tobacco market at over US$34 billion.¹⁶ It is the second-largest cigarette market in the world.¹⁷

The market leader in Indonesia is the local kretek manufacturer PT Gudang Garam Tbk (Gudang Garam), with nearly one-third of the market in 2022.¹⁸¹⁹

Its closest competitor is Philip Morris International (PMI), with a slightly smaller share.¹⁸ PMI operates in Indonesia via its subsidiaries PT Philip Morris Indonesia and PT HM Sampoerna Tbk (Sampoerna).¹⁸²⁰ At the time of its acquisition by PMI in 2005, Sampoerna was the leading tobacco company in Indonesia.²⁰²¹

PT Djarum (Djarum), another local kretek producer, has the third-largest market share, around half that of the two leading companies.¹⁸²²

Like PMI, other transnational tobacco companies have sought to expand into Indonesia by acquiring local companies. In 2009, British American Tobacco (BAT) bought an 85% stake in PT Bentoel Internasional Investama Tbk (Bentoel) – at the time the fourth largest tobacco company in the country.²¹ In 2011, the South Korean company Korea Tobacco & Ginseng (KT&G) – which has a partnership with PMI for its newer nicotine and tobacco products – bought a controlling share of Indonesia’s sixth-largest tobacco company, PT Trisakti Purwosari Makmur.²¹²³ Similarly, Japan Tobacco International (JTI) acquired two Gudang Garam subsidiaries, Karyadibya Mahardhika and its distributor, PT Surya Mustika Nusantara, in 2017.²¹ However, BAT, JTI and KT&G each had market shares of less than 2% as of 2022.¹⁸

In 2022, the top four brands of cigarette in Indonesia were all kreteks. Gudang Garam has around one-third of the market. Djarum, A Mild and Dji Sam Soe (the latter two both PMI/Sampoerna brands) each have around a one-tenth share. Others, including PMI’s premium cigarette Marlboro, have smaller shares.²⁴

• For more information on the tobacco industry in Indonesia, see the Tobacco Supply Chain Database.

Tobacco farming and child labour

Tobacco is grown in Indonesia almost entirely on small, family-run farms, and 90% of production comes from just three provinces: East Java, Central Java, and West Nusa Tenggara.²⁵

In 2021, Indonesia reported production of over 237,000 tonnes of raw tobacco, making it the fourth largest producer in the world after China, India and Brazil.²⁶ Production has varied since 2010, from a low of less than 127,000 tonnes in 2016 to a high of nearly 270,000 tonnes in 2019. However, the overall trend in recent decades has been upwards, as shown in the graph below:

Figure 1: Tobacco production, 1980 to 2021.²⁷ Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization/Our World in Data | CC BY

The area harvested under tobacco crop also increased by over 30% between 2000 and 2020, to nearly 220,000 hectares.²⁸

A 2017 report by the World Bank found that poverty was widespread amongst tobacco farmers in Indonesia. Nearly three-quarters of tobacco farmers were poor compared to around one-tenth of the general population.²⁹ Most tobacco-farming households received some form of government social assistance, and more than 60% reported food insecurity.²⁹

Research published in 2020 found that Indonesian tobacco farmers would be better off economically if they grew other crops or pursued alternative, non-agricultural livelihoods.³⁰ Tobacco is also vulnerable to adverse weather conditions in comparison to other crops. In 2016, a period of much higher-than-average rainfall, while non-tobacco farmers made a modest income, tobacco farmers’ income was almost zero.³⁰

Tobacco-farming households had significantly higher labour costs than those growing other crops.³¹ Tobacco farmers also used child labour, both hired and household, more frequently compared to those growing other crops.³⁰ Similarly, more children from tobacco farms missed school.³⁰ Farmers reported using child labour because tobacco growing does not usually pay enough to hire adult workers.³⁰

An investigation by The Guardian in 2018 visited the village of Beleke, on the island of Lombok, where it found almost all children above the age of four doing tobacco work during harvest season.³² This followed a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 2016, which stated that thousands of children work in tobacco farming in Indonesia. HRW found children engaged in dangerous work in four Indonesian provinces, interviewing more than 130. They reported serious health and safety issues, including acute nicotine poisoning as a result of handling tobacco leaves (also known as green tobacco sickness) and contact with pesticides and other chemicals.²⁵

HRW’s interviews with tobacco farmers and traders revealed a lack of human rights due diligence in the tobacco supply chain in Indonesia, particularly regarding child labour.²⁵ The farmers and traders interviewed supplied large Indonesian and transnational companies including Gudang Garam, Sampoerna, Djarum and Bentoel.²⁵

• For more information on the tobacco industry and child labour, please see the pages on CSR: Child Labour and the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco-Growing Foundation (ECLT).

Tobacco and the economy

Given its high level of tobacco consumption, Indonesia has long been a net importer of tobacco leaf, despite also being a major producer.³¹ In 2022, it imported over US$617 million in raw tobacco, compared to around US$266 million in exports.³³³⁴

However, it is a net exporter of cigarettes: over US$913 million in 2022, compared to US$118 million in imports.³⁵³⁶

In 2020 the WHO reported that the contribution of the tobacco industry to the Indonesian economy was relatively small; tobacco manufacturing generates just 0.6% of total employment, while tobacco farmers represent only 1.6% of the agricultural workforce. Most families involved in tobacco growing and kretek rolling also receive some form of social assistance – meaning that the Indonesian state is essentially subsidising poorly-paid employment in the tobacco industry.³⁷

Illicit trade

A study published in 2019, which collected packs of cigarettes from respondents in Indonesia, found that 20% of the 1,440 smokers surveyed reported ever smoking illicit cigarettes. However, among the 1,201 packs researchers collected, only 20 (i.e. 1.6%) had no excise stamp, a fake excise stamp, or no graphic health warning – and hence were potentially illicit. Price appears to be a factor, with people on lower incomes more likely to purchase illicit cigarettes, though consumption of illicit cigarettes was not found to be a long-term behaviour.³⁸ However, a 2021 study estimated that the share of illicit cigarette consumption in the country increased from 5% in 2013 to 19% in 2018.³⁹

Globally, Free Trade Zones (FTZs) are well known to facilitate the illicit tobacco trade.⁴⁰ There are four FTZs in Indonesia, where cigarette production and trade are exempted from excise duties, making the price much lower. Cigarettes leak from these FTZs, becoming illicit in the process, as the packs bear no excise stamps.⁴¹ In August 2023, Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission announced that a senior official from the Bintan Free Trade and Port Zone had been arrested on charges of data manipulation and receiving bribes from cigarette companies, to allow greater flows of duty-free cigarettes through the zone.⁴²

Internal industry documents suggest that historically, BAT has been involved in illicit trade in Indonesia and the broader region.⁴³ A 1994 internal BAT document points to Indonesia – along with Malaysia – as a conduit of illicit products to the Philippines.⁴⁴ A BAT-commissioned study from the 1980s also documented Indonesian consumers’ preference for its smuggled products.⁴⁵

As part of the third round of the Philip Morris International initiative PMI IMPACT, PMI is funding the Institute for Development of Economics and Finance, an Indonesian think tank, to “examine the market for NTHRPs [nicotine and tobacco harm reduction products] and how to prevent illicit trade in this growing sector, with research to include surveys and limited group discussions”.⁴⁶

• For more information on PMI IMPACT, please see the following pages: PMI IMPACT, List of Successful PMI IMPACT Applicants and Organisations linked to PMI IMPACT.

Tobacco and the environment

Indonesia is the world’s second-biggest contributor to marine plastic pollution after China, responsible for 1.29 million tonnes of debris entering the ocean annually.⁴⁷ Of this waste, cigarette butts are the most commonly-littered item.⁴⁸ The Global Center for Good Governance in Tobacco Control has estimated the cost of tobacco-related marine pollution and waste management in Indonesia at Rp49 trillion (US$3.1 billion) per year.⁴⁹

• For more information, please see the page on Tobacco and the Environment and the long read on Plastics, the Environment and the Tobacco Industry.

Roadmap to Tobacco Control

Indonesia is not a party to the WHO FCTC, and is therefore ineligible to join the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. As of 2023, there appears to be little political will either to ratify the WHO FCTC or to create a comparable national framework for tobacco control. This has led to a fragmented approach across different government departments and prevented the development of coherent tobacco control policies.¹

However, Indonesia has committed to an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) five-year plan on health, under which it has pledged to reaffirm collective positions against industry interference and for implementation of control measures, for both tobacco and alcohol.⁵⁰

In 2009, the passage of Law No. 36 authorised the Ministry of Health to introduce tobacco control regulation, including on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (TAPS); smoke-free spaces; and packaging and labelling of tobacco products.⁵¹ This was followed in 2012 by Indonesia’s principal tobacco control law, Government Regulation 109 (PP 109/2012).⁵¹ These laws prohibit smoking on public transport, and in educational facilities and places of worship, though other types of enclosed public spaces, including workplaces, restaurants and government facilities, may provide smoking areas.⁵²⁵³ More stringent regulations at the subnational level are permitted.⁵² As of June 2023, 456 (around 86%) of Indonesia’s 520 cities and districts had adopted smoke-free policies, though implementation remains a challenge.⁵⁴

Indonesia is one of the few countries that still permits tobacco advertising on television, though it may not be broadcast until after 9:30pm.⁵²⁵¹ While Law No. 36 and PP 109/2012 also introduced graphic health warnings (GHWs) on tobacco packaging and banned misleading terms such as “light” and “low-tar”, the law was not retroactive for tobacco products that already had these words in their branding, and other misleading features – such as colours, numbers and symbols – are still permitted.⁵²⁵¹

As of 2024, various other limitations remain. There are no restrictions on internet sales or the sale of individual cigarettes (single sticks); there is no national law regulating the sale, use, advertising, promotion, sponsorship, packaging or labelling of e-cigarettes; and tobacco industry corporate social responsibility (CSR) is still permitted.⁵¹⁵³ Cigarettes in Indonesia also remain relatively cheap. In 2022, the price of the bestselling brand of cigarettes was just over US$2.⁵³

In 2018, President Widodo issued a decree containing a list of government regulations to be revised, which included PP 109/2012.⁵⁵ Tobacco control advocates have seen this as an opportunity to push for stronger regulations, such as larger GHWs, higher excise taxes on cigarettes and a comprehensive ban on TAPS.⁵⁵ However, this process has stalled, amidst conflict between different government ministries and opposition from farmers’ associations and other groups (see section “Use of third parties”).⁵⁵ As of March 2024, the revision of PP 109/2012 had yet to advance.

For more details, please see the following websites:

• Legislation by Country/Jurisdiction – Indonesia, Tobacco Control Laws, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
• Country profile – Indonesia, World Health Organization, WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2023

Interference in Indonesia by Tobacco Industry and Allies

Tobacco industry tactics in Indonesia include the use of third parties; the targeting of youth with tobacco marketing, both at point of sale and online, as well as via event sponsorship; and sponsorship of popular sports such as badminton and football.

Use of third parties

The tobacco industry has long used third parties and front groups to advance its interests, as a means of achieving greater credibility and overcoming public mistrust.

The Indonesian Tobacco Farmers’ Association (Asosiasi Petani Tembakau Indonesia, APTI), a lobby group, opposes the WHO FCTC, and has urged the Indonesian government not to ratify the treaty.⁵⁶ It has also frequently lobbied against increases in excise taxes on tobacco products. In 2019, APTI held a rally in front of the Ministry of Finance, to demand the repeal of an increase in excise and the retail price of cigarettes, and the revision of a regulation requiring at least 50% of the Tobacco Excise Revenue Sharing Fund to be allocated to health purposes.⁵⁷

APTI has also opposed the proposed revision to Indonesia’s main tobacco control law, PP 109/2012. In 2022, in Temanggung, a major tobacco-growing region in Central Java, APTI representatives were seen at a public event displaying banners asking the local government for support in opposing the proposal.⁵⁸ APTI also sent official letters to President Widodo opposing the revision, stating that it would negatively affect the livelihoods of people working in the tobacco sector, particularly farmers.⁵⁵

Another lobby group which has opposed of any revision of PP 109/2012 is the Indonesian Tobacco Community Alliance (Aliansi Masyarakat Tembakau Indonesia, AMTI), a coalition of tobacco industry stakeholders – including cigarette manufacturers – established in 2010.⁵⁹ It reportedly has close links to the PMI subsidiary Sampoerna.⁶⁰⁶¹ AMTI has sought to portray tobacco control as an agenda imposed on Indonesia by foreign actors who do not understand the local context – a common tobacco industry tactic in the country.⁶²⁶³

Both APTI and AMTI are affiliates of the International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA), a global front group funded and run by the ‘Big Four’ transnational tobacco companies (TTCs), as well as two major leaf merchants.⁶⁴⁶⁵⁶⁶ Though ITGA claims to defend the interests of tobacco farmers and their communities around the world, it uses tobacco farmers as a means of opposing tobacco control regulations and protecting the interests of the TTCs.⁶⁶

Controversial marketing strategies: targeting youth

The tobacco industry has long seen young people as a vital target market; tobacco use generally starts in adolescence. In Indonesia, the mean age of smoking initiation amongst males is 18.3 years, while smoking prevalence amongst Indonesian adolescents (aged 10 to 18) increased from 7% in 2013 to 9% in 2018.⁶⁷⁶⁸

In Indonesia, there is a high concentration of tobacco retailers, high exposure to point-of-sale advertising and no restriction on the display of cigarette packs in retail outlets – all of which are associated with increased tobacco use amongst adolescents.⁵³⁶⁸⁶⁹ In addition, many retailers are located close to schools; enforcement of the ban on sales to minors is very weak; while sales of single sticks, which make smoking more accessible to young people, are still permitted.⁶⁹⁶⁸⁷⁰ Retailers therefore have an important role in recruiting new, young smokers, and maintaining growth of the market.⁶⁸

Indonesia’s incomplete TAPS regulations have also allowed the tobacco industry to switch to less regulated forms of advertising such as event sponsorship and internet marketing, often targeting young people.⁷¹

For example, the popular music festival SoundrenAline, which has been running in Indonesia since 2002, was founded by Sampoerna.⁷² Following a visit to SoundrenAline 2016, researchers reported that Sampoerna branding and the slogan “Go Ahead” were found throughout the festival site. Sampoerna A brand cigarettes were widely sold, including by cigarette girls and boys – a form of direct one-on-one marketing.⁷¹⁷³ Cigarettes that were not a Sampoerna brand were confiscated at the entrance.⁷¹ As of 2022, Sampoerna was still the sponsor of the event and owner of the registered trademark for “SoundrenAline”.⁷²

With over 111 million users, Indonesia has one of the world’s largest Instagram audiences, over half of whom are aged between 13 and 24.⁷⁴ According to the Tobacco Enforcement and Reporting Movement (TERM), as of 2023, around 70% of online tobacco marketing in Indonesia took place on Instagram.⁷⁵⁷⁶ Most of this marketing is indirect and community based. Rather than display their products directly, the tobacco companies build online communities of followers with a common interest such as music, travel or sport, as a means of improving brand visibility and indirectly promoting their products.⁷⁶⁷⁵

Controversial marketing strategies: sponsorship of popular sports

Tobacco industry sponsorship of sport is as old as professional athletic competition itself.⁷⁷ It aims to create links between pre-existing associations people may have with sports (such as fun, excitement, strength, etc.) with tobacco branding and products; promote an image of tobacco use as normal and healthy; and appeal to young people.⁷⁸

In Indonesia, TAPS has historically been very widespread in popular sports.⁷⁹ Badminton, for instance, which the New York Times has described as part of Indonesia’s “national identity”, has long been a vehicle for tobacco industry sponsorship.⁸⁰ From 2006, Djarum was the corporate sponsor of the national badminton trials for children and adolescents aged from 5 to 18.⁸¹ The trials were shown on national television, and participants were required to wear clothing which displayed the Djarum logo.⁶⁸⁸¹

Ten civil society organisations reported Djarum to the National Commission on Child Protection, arguing that the sponsorship violated Indonesia’s child protection law.⁸¹ In 2019, Djarum agreed to remove its logos from the badminton trials.⁸²⁸³ It also withdrew its sponsorship from future trials, which critics argued would undermine development of young talent. However, in 2021 the state-owned telecommunications firm Telkom replaced Djarum as sponsor.⁸¹

Djarum owns the PB Djarum badminton club in Kudus, Central Java, which has a youth academy, as well as a club in Jakarta.⁸⁰⁷⁵⁸⁴ The company also continues to market itself and its products indirectly via Djarum-associated social media accounts which focus on badminton-related content.⁷⁶⁷⁵

An investigation into tobacco marketing on social media in Indonesia, India and Mexico around the 2022 FIFA World Cup found that 92% of the football-themed tobacco marketing originated from Indonesia, with 81% being produced by Djarum alone.⁷⁹

Both Gudang Garam and Djarum, via their respective brands Intersoccer and Super Soccer, sponsored live World Cup viewing parties. Super Soccer, which describes itself as the “home of soccer fans in Indonesia”, promotes its activities on social media to hundreds of thousands of followers.⁷⁹ It developed a “Soccerphoria” event series and campaign specifically for the World Cup, which were heavily promoted across its accounts. As well as the live viewing parties, these events involved mural painting, branded clothes, and limited-edition World Cup cigarette packs designed by local artists.⁷⁹

In 2019, Djarum bought the Italian Serie B club Como 1907, via its subsidiaries SENT Entertainment Ltd and Mola TV. Mola, a television streaming service, has broadcast a reality TV series following 24 young footballers trying to succeed at Como 1907.

• For more on this topic please see the pages on Football Sponsorship and Social Media.

Relevant Links

• Indonesia factsheet, Tobacco Atlas
• Indonesia Tax Scorecard, Tobacconomics
• Dashboard Kawasan Tanpa Rokok [Smoke-Free Area Dashboard], Indonesia Ministry of Health
• Situation reports: Indonesia, Tobacco Enforcement and Reporting Movement, Vital Strategies
• Indonesia, Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance
• Front Groups Indonesia, Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco in LMICs
• Greenwashing
• Gudang Garam and sports endorsement
• Lobby Groups
• Tobacco Industry Tactics

References

The post Indonesia Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

This page provides details of the debate over e-cigarette advertising that guided the push for further regulation in and around 2013. In particular, it analyses concerns over companies marketing e-cigarettes to youth, and provides some examples of (controversial) e-cigarette adverts.

The connected pages on early regulation and UK marketing rules contain information specific to this period of time.

• Up to date information can be found on the main e-cigarette page, including links to information on regulation around the world.
• It also links to pages for each of the transnational tobacco companies and their products. Their main brands are presented in a diagram on the newer nicotine and tobacco products page, and in an associated table.
• See also the timeline of tobacco companies’ early investments in e-cigarettes.

A 2021 Cancer Research UK report on E-cigarette Marketing in the UK summarises evidence from adult and youth surveys, as well as policy compliance studies and gives a comprehensive overview of the topic.⁸⁵

Early Spending on the Marketing of e-cigarettes

Research from the University of Stirling revealed that spending on e-cigarette promotion in the UK increased from £1.7m in 2010 to £13.1m in 2012. In addition, in the second half of 2013, a British American Tobacco subsidiary spent £3.6m in two months to promote the launch of its e-cigarette brand, Vype in the UK.⁸⁶⁸⁷

• Also see E-cigarettes, E-cigarettes: E-cigarettes: Marketing Rules and E-cigarettes: Early Regulation.

British American Tobacco subsidiary Vype e-cigarette advert as used on billboards, UK, January 2014.

Concerns

In the UK, the advertising of tobacco products has been banned in most of its forms since 1965. Restrictions applying specifically to the marketing of e-cigarettes did not exist until 2014, when the European Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) was introduced.⁸⁸

• For more information on the TPD provisions on marketing e-cigarettes, see the page E-cigarettes: UK marketing rules.

A year before the TPD, in 2013, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) expressed concerns that, without regulation, such devices may be “marketed in a way that may ultimately promote smoking.”⁸⁹ Similar concerns were also being raised by research into the marketing of e-cigarettes in the UK, published by CRUK in 2013. The research highlighted that e-cigarettes were being targeted at two distinct consumer groups:⁸⁷

• The committed smoker,
• Young social smoker or non-smoker.

The same year, a report by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention in the United States (US) found that “from 2011 to 2012, electronic cigarette use increased significantly among middle school (0.6% to 1.1%) and high school (1.5% to 2.8%) students…”⁹⁰ While these percentages are relatively low, they account for nearly 2 million students in the US. E-cigarettes were increasingly being positioned as socially attractive and part of a rapidly growing trend, while being sold at exclusive events and popular venues like parties and festivals.⁹¹ Therefore, many public health researchers and advocates started to agree on the need to regulate the marketing of e-cigarettes to ensure they were not made to appeal to young people and non-smokers.

According to research,⁸⁶⁸⁷ consumer marketing of e-cigarettes was happening via:

• Television adverts
• Sports and cultural sponsorship
• Celebrity endorsement
• Social networking
• Online advertising
• Point of Sale displays
• Pricing strategies
• Product innovation

The following concerns, relating specifically to young people, have been raised (this list is not exhaustive):

• Glamorising use by using celebrity endorsement and promotion at glamorous events e.g. free handouts at New York Fashion Week⁹²⁹³
• Sexualising use in paid adverts⁹⁴
• Using social media such as Facebook and Twitter⁸⁷⁹⁵⁹⁶

Concerns about e-cigarette marketing practices⁸⁷

Marketing to youth

E-cigarettes were also being marketed in a way which emulated very successful tobacco advertising: asserting an independent identity and a lifestyle choice, aligning oneself with celebrities, fashionable and youthful places and activities.⁸⁷⁹⁷ Both independent e-cigarette companies and tobacco company e-cigarette subsidiaries engaged in marketing activities that can be interpreted as appealing to youth, even if the company line is that this is not its intention.

Independent e-cigarette companies

Independent e-cigarette companies (those which are not associated with tobacco companies) have tended “to distance their products from tobacco.”⁸⁷

The following marketing techniques have been used by independents. Evidence exists that each of these strategies has been successful with youth audiences in conventional cigarette promotion:

Aesthetic appeal including attractiveness, coolness, colours and innovative packaging and flavour variations. Research on tobacco clearly indicates the appeal of such characteristics and flavourings to youth audiences.^9899100

• The Internet and social media tools, used to display attractive price promotions, competitions and group discount vouchers; Price is an important determinant in purchasing behaviour, particularly amongst young people,¹⁰¹ and the internet presents a direct route of communication to such audiences.¹⁰²
• Celebrity endorsements and celebrity-inspired styling. This strategy is a marketing technique, ¹⁰³ and also a public relations activity to promote trust in a product.¹⁰⁴
• Sports sponsorship (including football and motorsport, see image 1 ). Research found that corporate sponsorship of sports teams leads children to absorb the corporate marketing messages and influence purchasing decisions.^105106107 For example, Sky Cig made its first club-specific sponsorship deal in October 2013 (see section below), after having had an advertising presence within football for two seasons. In June 2013, London venue The O2 signed a multi-year partnership deal with E-Lites, allowing guests to use and buy the products in and around the arena.¹⁰⁸

Image 1: Motorsport sponsorship, reminiscent of conventional cigarette sponsorship, e.g. Marlboro and Formula 1

Tobacco Companies

Professor Gerard Hastings, a co-author of the 2013 Cancer Research UK report on the marketing of e-cigarettes said:

“The fact that multinational tobacco companies are moving in on this market is of particular concern. From past experience, we know they are deceitful, determined and deeply detrimental to public health.”⁹⁵

Research shows that, in the case of the smokeless tobacco product snus, the tobacco industry talks about harm reduction, but internal documents reveal that smokeless tobacco was seen as an opportunity to target smokers that were considering quitting, smokers in smokefree public places and a health conscious generation no longer interested in starting smoking.¹⁰⁹

Tobacco companies’ message was somewhat different to that of the independent e-cigarette companies and the nicotine products of the pharmaceutical industry. The tobacco industry has tended to frame the independents as not understanding smokers’ needs, and the pharmaceutical industry as offering unappealing products.⁸⁷Tobacco companies, instead, marketed their e-cigarettes as a dual-use products which allow smokers to access nicotine inside social venues (Image 2).

• For more information on the Tobacco Industry’s interest in harm reduction, see our dedicated page.

Image 2:Vype advert promoting indoor use of e-cigarettes

British American Tobacco’s Vype

In 2013, British American Tobacco’s at-the-time subsidiary CN Creative outlined the target audience of their e-cigarette, Vype, as existing smokers:

“The new product is a similar weight and size to a tobacco cigarette, has a soft-tip filter and features an LED light which glows a soft red when in use. This example, demonstrates how BAT have used their existing knowledge and expertise in the smoking market and applied it to a new product and market”¹¹⁰

As part of its £3.6m campaign to promote Vype, CN Creative:

• Emphasised characteristics such as freedom, sociability and fun
• Employed social media strategies in addition to print media adverts
• Used attractive young people in Vype branding cars to tour the UK’s cities to promote the e-cigarette¹¹¹
• Opened what was called the first social venue centred entirely around e-cigarettes: the Vype Social night club in Shoreditch, a young trendy area of London (see Image 3) Using the tagline “Sociability Reborn” (Image 4), the e-cigarette ‘lounge’ was promoted heavily using social media, actively stirring discussion and therefore publicity. However, the club was closed soon after it was opened in November 2013. ¹¹²

Image 3: Vype bar, Shoreditch, London, open in November 2013

Image 4: Vype promotional tagline “Sociability Reborn”

BAT also received criticism in October 2013 when an advert for Vype appeared in an online children’s game (Image 5)

Image 5: Advert for Vype appears in children’s online game, October 2013

• For more information on Vype and other BAT products see E-cigarettes: British American Tobacco

Lorillard’s Blu

Blu was an independent US e-cigarette company, acquired by US tobacco company Lorillard in 2010 (and later by Imperial Tobacco in 2015). Lorillard spent £19m promoting Blu.

In the third quarter of 2013, Blu owned 49% of the US e-cigarette market share.^8687113

An analysis of the marketing methods of companies selling smokeless products observed 879 adverts for Blu e-cigarettes in print and on television between 1 June 2012 and August 31 2012.¹¹⁴ Some have argued that marketing techniques for e-cigarettes mimic the successful advertising of cigarettes in a by-gone era¹¹⁵ (image 6).

Image 6: Comparison between iconic cigarette advert and new Blu e-cigarette advertising

Amongst other techniques, Lorillard has used the following strategies, all of which are known to appeal to youth audiences, as shown above:

• Celebrity endorsement – Actress Jenny McCarthy and actor Stephen Dorff acted as promotional “faces” for the brand (see images 7 and 8). In one ad, Dorff says: “It’s time we take our freedom back,” before going on to say that Blu e-cigarettes can be smoked “at a basketball game … in a bar with your friends … virtually anywhere.” Inhaling with swagger, he adds: “Come on, guys, rise from the ashes.”¹¹⁶
• Sports endorsement
• Sexuality (Image 9)
• Innovative packaging – Innovative packs alert users when they come within fifty feet of another user. Both packs start vibrating and flashing a blue light. As an alternative to this users can modify their preferences and share social media details with the other users.¹¹⁷
• No reason to quit – Blu does not position e-cigarettes as a way to stop smoking, as evidenced by their US advertisement slogan–“Why quit? Switch to Blu” (Image 1

Image 7: Stephen Dorff in ironically styled Blu e-cigarette advert

Image 8: Actress Jenny McCarthy endorses Blu e-cigarettes on the product website

Image 9: Sexualising e-cigarette use

Image 10: E-cigarettes as another way of smoking

• For more information on the development of blu see E-cigarettes: Imperial Tobacco

Sky Cig

The inaugural television advert for Sky Cig was first broadcast on Tuesday 15 January 2012 (this was before Lorillard took over the UK e-cigarette brand in October 2013 – by then already successful). Showing young people performing youthful activities, partying, mountain biking, relaxing in bed, and travelling. The voice-over emphases that “Life is about now” ….”Life is only asking you one thing…” – to which the answer is: “Who are you sharing it with?” Throughout the advert, in sync with the questions asked, the camera zooms-in repeatedly on the Sky Cig branded package of e-cigarettes carried by, or placed next to, all the young people depicted in the ad. As if in response to the questions posed, the voiceover ends the advert simply stating: “Sky Cig”. After a complaint to the Advertising Standards Agency (ASA), Sky Cig the advert was not permitted to run again in its original form, as is explained at the page on E-cigarettes: UK Marketing Rules.

The advert is reminiscent of the Philip Morris Be Marlboro cigarette adverts which have been aired in 50 countries around the world. The Be Marlboro campaign has been widely criticised for its youth appeal and, after running for over a year, has been banned by authorities in Germany.¹¹⁸

In October 2013, just when Skicig was taken over by Lorillard, the company signed a deal with the Wolverhampton Wanderers. Under first club-specific sponsorship deal, fans of the football club will be allowed to buy and use e-cigarettes within certain areas of the Molineux Stadium. Smoking has been banned within English football stadiums since 2007 when the ban on smoking in enclosed public places and workplaces came into effect; however, regulation around the use of e-cigarettes in public places is less clear cut.¹¹⁹

TobaccoTactics Resources

• E-cigarettes
• E-cigarettes: Early Regulation
• E-cigarettes: At The Pharmacy
• E-cigarettes: Marketing Rules
• Harm Reduction
• Product Innovation
• British American Tobacco’s subsidiaries CN Creative and Nicoventures

External Reources

• Stanford Research into the Impact of Tobacco Advertising: E-cigarettes.

References

The post E-cigarettes: Marketing appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

The Twitter-account named @tobacco_tactics is not ours!

A few days after the launch of TobaccoTactics.org, a twitter account was set up to impersonate the wiki, and the editors of the site.
Using the TobaccoTactics logo and URL, those who set up this account violate Twitter policies.
Twitter has been notified.

Ten out the 15 first followers are names featuring on TobaccoTactics, for instance as libertarians or pro-smoking bloggers.

Update

As of 5 April 2013, Twitter suspended the false Tobacco_Tactics account.
Online Strategy

References

The post Twitter Impersonation appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

Swedish Match is a Swedish tobacco company that manufactures and sells snus (image 1), moist snuff, cigars, chewing tobacco and matches. Philip Morris International (PMI) bought the company in 2022.

The company used to sell cigarettes, but decided in 1999 to divest its cigarette business to Austria Tabak.¹²⁴ Lennart Sundén, then President and CEO of Swedish Match, said at the time:

“Cigarette consumption, the industry’s most dominant source of revenue, is declining or has reached a plateau in most Western countries. For Swedish Match therefore, the divestment of our cigarette operations was a natural step. We were a strong player in local markets, but a very small player compared with our main competitors.”¹²⁵

In September 2021, Swedish Match announced that it would be selling its US cigar business and focus on its oral products.¹²⁶¹²⁷ Plans to sell were put on hold in March 2022.¹²⁸

In May 2022 Philip Morris International made an offer of US$16 billion to buy the whole company.¹²⁹¹³⁰ On 11 May the board of directors of Swedish Match recommended that its shareholders accept PMI’s offer.¹³¹

As of 10 November 2022, PMI had acquired 86% of the company, and Swedish Match Directors recommended that the remaining shareholders offer to sell their shares to PMI, via its Netherlands subsidiary Philip Morris Holland Holdings (PMHH).¹³²¹³³ On 28 November 2022 PMI announced that it held over 90% of the company, meaning it could buy the remaining shares under compulsory purchase rules and take Swedish Match off the stock market.¹³⁴

• For more details see Philip Morris International.

Market Share

Swedish Match’s markets for snus, its main product, are Sweden, Norway and the United States (US), although in 2010 the company aspired to become the “global smokefree leader”.¹³⁵

In 2010 the company held around 80% of the market in Western Europe (mainly in Norway and Sweden) but it has gradually lost market share following the entry of transnational tobacco companies on the Scandinavian snus market.¹³⁶ By 2019 Swedish Match held less than 60%. For details see Cigarette Companies Investing in Snus.

In the US, Swedish Match remains the third biggest manufacturer of snus and moist snuff with around 10% market share in 2019. Its main competitors are market leader Altria, and Reynolds American (since July 2017 wholly owned by British American Tobacco).¹³⁷¹³⁸

Key Brands

In 2021, the company’s key snus brands were listed on “Smokefree” web page:¹³⁹

• Sweden – General, Göteborgs Rapé, Kaliber, , Kronan, and Ettan .
• Norway – General, General G.3, The Lab, Nick & Johnny
• US – General

Similarly to cigarettes, snus brands are available in different price segments, in particular premium and value price categories.

Swedish Match also sells snus-style nicotine pouches which do not contain tobacco leaf and so are not regulated as tobacco products in most countries. Its leading brand in the global market is Zyn. The large transnational tobacco companies have more recently moved into this rapidly growing market. For details see Nicotine Pouches.

Employees/Board Members: Past and Present

In June 2008 Lars Dahlgren became the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Swedish Match. Thomas Hayes became President of the US division in 2020, having previously held other leadership roles at the company.

A full list of the current company’s Board of Directors can be accessed here and the current management team here.¹⁴⁰¹⁴¹

Other people that are or have been associated with the tobacco company:
Markus Ersmark Johan Gabrielsson Tomas Hammargren Cecilia Kindstrand Lars Olof Lofman Lars-Erik Rutqvist

Partnerships and Affiliations

Lorillard

In 2006 Swedish Match entered into a joint venture with Lorillard (the third largest cigarette manufacturer in the US at the time) to develop Swedish-style snus for the US market,¹⁴² but this joint venture was terminated at the end of 2009 following unsatisfactory results.¹⁴³

Philip Morris International

In February 2009 Swedish Match entered into a joint venture with Philip Morris International (PMI) to “commercialize Swedish snus and other tobacco products worldwide, outside of Scandinavia and the United States”.¹⁴⁴ This joint venture was dissolved in 2015, allegedly because of lack of demand for snus in the test markets.¹⁴⁵

• For more detail on the joint venture, go to our page on SMPM International.

American Lobbyists

In January 2018, the Louisville Courier Journal reported that records of the Kentucky Legislative Ethics Commission showed that some of the highest paid people working at the Kentucky Assembly, were lobbyists paid to influence the State government by large corporations, including tobacco companies.¹⁴⁶ The records named two lobbyists that listed Swedish Match North America as a client:¹⁴⁷

• Katherine W. Hall
• Patrick M. Jennings

European Smokeless Tobacco Council

In 1989, Swedish Match (then known as Svenska Tobaks), co-founded the lobby group European Smokeless Tobacco Council (ESTOC).¹⁴⁸

Since 2017, ESTOC no longer appears to be active.

Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing Foundation

Swedish Match is a member of the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing Foundation (ECLT).¹⁴⁹ In addition to Swedish Match, ECLT Board members include the International Tobacco Growers Association, British American Tobacco (BAT), Imperial Tobacco, Japan Tobacco International (JTI), and PMI, amongst others. The ECLT has a partnership with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), a United Nations (UN) agency, focussed on issues related to labour such as international labour standards, social protection and unemployment.¹⁵⁰

NordCham Philippines

The company is member of NordCham Philippines, reportedly the largest Nordic Chamber of Commerce in the Asian Region.¹⁵¹ Swedish Match has owned a factory that produces lighters in Manilla since 2007.¹⁵²

Controversial Marketing Strategies

Targeting Youth in Russia

In June 2012, marketing firm Proximity Russia posted promotional materials online that they had produced for SMPM International, the joint venture of Swedish Match and PMI. The company had been asked to develop promotional materials to aid the launch of Parliament snus in Russia, with the promotional materials including so-called “youth engagement materials”.¹⁵³ For details and images of this controversial campaign, go to TPD: Marketing to Youth.

Promoting Tobacco Use via Social Media and Online Forums

A 2010 peer-reviewed study demonstrated that, in light of increasing tobacco advertising restrictions, Swedish Match had turned to YouTube and other social media to market its products, with none of the company’s YouTube videos including adequate safeguards to prevent under-age viewing.¹⁵⁴ A 2011 social network analysis further demonstrated that Swedish Match employees had been active on Facebook, with Swedish Match employee Markus Ersmark at the centre of an elaborate network of snus manufacturers, snus retailers, and pro-snus bloggers generating pro-snus content.¹⁵⁵

Swedish Match also used to directly contribute to online consumer forums to promote the company, its products and pro-snus messages (see images 2 and 3). The company used to have a ‘Ask the Manufacturer’ column on the American snus consumer forum SnusCENTRAL.org. In 2009 and 2010, Ersmark and a colleague directly responded to consumer questions about Swedish Match products and snus use in general. Over a period of eight months, the duo responded to 31 consumer questions, started one thread themselves, and in total posted 56 messages.¹⁵⁶

Relationship Building with Social Media Influencers: Hospitality for Pro-Snus Bloggers

In addition to being directly active on social media, Swedish Match have engaged in ‘influencer marketing’ in which the marketing occurs indirectly through key influencers online.¹⁵⁷ The company actively nurtured relationships with key pro-snus bloggers (of which some labelled themselves ‘snus ambassadors’) through providing hospitality and free sample products.¹⁵⁸ For example, in 2012 Swedish Match hosted a so-called “summit” for American snus bloggers in Washington DC.¹⁵⁹ A year earlier, the company hosted a delegation of American and British snus bloggers in Stockholm, visiting Swedish Match headquarters and factories, as well as a Tobacco Museum.¹⁶⁰ In May 2010 two American bloggers visited Sweden, courtesy of Swedish Match, as was the case in 2009.¹⁶¹

Some bloggers received regular free snus samples from Swedish Match and then reviewed the products online, including British blogger Tim Haigh. Haigh and Swedish Match later became involved in a controversy which saw researchers from the University of Bath receive verbal abuse over a peer-reviewed article which highlighted that snus was being sold illegally across the EU via the Internet, contravening three EU Directives and Swedish national legislation.¹⁶² For more information see our page on FOI: University of Bath.

Failed Legal Bid to Stop Plain Packaging in Norway

In December 2016, the Norwegian Parliament approved plain packaging legislation on cigarettes and snus. Swedish Match sought an injunction from the Oslo County Court to delay the legislation, arguing that the Norwegian government was in breach of the free European Economic Area (EEA) trade rules and that the intervention (plain packaging of snus boxes) was not in proportion to the health risks associated with snus.¹⁶³

In November 2017 the court rejected the Swedish Match claims, ruling that plain packaging was “an evidence-based and internationally recommended measure” adding that it was “a legitimate measure in line with the EEA Agreement”.¹⁶⁴ The court also ruled that snus is harmful to health, and that plain packaging will contribute to the protection of public health, particularly of children and young people.

Swedish Match was ordered to pay the legal costs of the Norwegian Government.

• Litigation is a well-known tactic of tobacco companies to stop or delay tobacco legislation. For more information go to Challenging Legislation.

Tactics to Subvert the Europe-Wide Snus Sales Ban

In 1992, sales of snus were banned in Europe, following an aggressive attempt by the US Smokeless Tobacco Company to introduce smokeless tobacco to several European markets in the mid-1980s. From 2001 the EU snus sales ban has been included in the European Union (EU) Tobacco Products Directive (TPD), which was reviewed in 2014. The snus ban severely limits the growth potential of Swedish Match in Europe, and the company has been attempting to lift the snus ban in the last decade using multiple tactics. The two main platforms of the company’s opposition to the snus ban are free trade and harm reduction.

In a submission to the 2010 public consultation that was part of the TPD review, Swedish match claimed that banning snus “denies 106 million smokers in the EU access to a traditional and non-combustible tobacco alternative to their cigarette”. ¹⁶⁵ The company further ‘reminded’ the Commission of the need for EU legislation to respect the principles of EU Better Regulation and that there should be a “non-competitive regulation or tobacco and nicotine products” which would not create internal market distortions.

Directly and Indirectly Lobbied Commission Officials

Swedish Match lobbied DG SANCO (Health Directorate-General), and to a larger extent, non-health elements of the Commission, in particular the Secretariat General (responsible for Better Regulation and impact assessments), the Cabinet of the Regional Policy Commissioner Hahn, and DG ENTR (Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General).

• For a list of all meetings, see TPD: Lobbying of EU Officials

Some of the meetings were facilitated by PR firm Kreab Gavin Anderson. Twice the company was accompanied by Revolving Door case Karin Riis-Jørgensen, a Danish former MEP and senior advisor of Kreab Gavin Anderson.¹⁶⁶

Murky Lobbying Practices Exposed: ‘Dalligate’ and Untrue Version of Events

On 16 October 2012, EU Health Commissioner John Dalli was forced to resign following an investigation by EU’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, into bribery claims made by Swedish Match. For more detail on this controversy, labelled by some as ‘Dalligate’ or Barrosogate’, visit the pages TPD: Dalligate and TPD: Dalligate Timeline.

The scandal, besides raising questions about the transparency around EU policy making, also exposed the murky lobbying practices of Swedish Match in its attempts to have the snus ban lifted. Evidence showed that the company had inappropriately sought access to Dalli in his private sphere in Malta via Gayle Kimberley, a Maltese lobbyist not registered at the EU Transparency Register. Swedish Match’s Director of EU Affairs, Johan Gabrielsson, one of the people at the centre of the scandal, confirmed in a statement to OLAF on 2 June 2012¹⁶⁷ that Swedish Match had paid the lobbyist €5,000 to gain access to Dalli and feed him information that would help shape the evidence base on snus in favour of the company’s interests.

The company intentionally hid its relationship with Kimberley who, following a meeting with Dalli in January 2012, reported to Gabrielsson that “the meeting was CONFIDENTIAL and I was in no way representing SM Match just giving the objective position of snus producers and users!”.¹⁶⁸

In the aftermath of the scandal, Swedish Match publicly lied at several occasions suggesting that Kimberley had met Dalli TWICE, the first time in January 2012 and the second time in February 2012 when the alleged bribery attempt had supposedly been made. In an interview following Dalli’s shock resignation, Swedish Match Vice President of EU Affairs, Patrik Hildingsson, recalled:

“There was a first meeting with Dalli in early January and a second one in February to hand over WHO science on snus. After this meeting she lobbyist sounded very upset, saying the meeting was derailed and went in a very odd direction. She told us that during the meeting Dalli had explained that all arguments behind the snus ban were actually in favour of Swedish Match. Then he said that, however, as a health commissioner, his political career would be over if he lifted the ban on snus. He said, according to the feedback I got, that it would be a political suicide to lift the ban. Then he left the meeting and we were alone with a man, an entrepreneur. He was supposed to be a friend of Dalli and did not have any relationship with Swedish Match. He continued the meeting and asked why Dalli would take a suicidal political decision without gaining anything. The solution was simple: we had to pay.”

However, when Hildingsson shared this version of events with the media, Swedish Match had already been informed by OLAF that Kimberley had lied about her presence on this supposed second meeting.¹⁶⁹ The second meeting between the lobbyist and Dalli had not taken place. Gabrielsson later accused OLAF of advising him to stick to an untrue story of events: “I never lied. I just said what I had been told by OLAF. That’s not a lie”.

OLAF has denied allegations that it asked Swedish Match to skew the evidence and the Commission has indicated that it will not pursue this any further.

Lobbying Members of European Parliament

In January 2013, Swedish Match was a keynote speaker at a Parliamentary event organised by the Brussels Network. MEPs Christofer Fjellner, Syed Kamall and Alexander Graf Lambdorff organised a meeting with tobacco as the agenda item, with Swedish Match given their version of their involvement in ‘Dalligate’.¹⁷⁰ On this occasion, Swedish Match also stuck to the untrue version of events regarding the number of times their lobbyist met Dalli.

Challenging the Snus Ban in Court

In 2016 Swedish Match requested a judicial review of the snus ban in the UK High Court, which was approved on 26 January 2017. The case was referred to the European Court of Justice. In its legal challenge, the tobacco company has been supported by the New Nicotine Alliance UK (NNA), who requested the Court to make its own submission to provide a “customer perspective on the ban and on the benefits that will follow if the ban is lifted”.¹⁷¹ Gerry Stimson, a vocal advocate of tobacco harm reduction, is a Board member of the NNA.

Lobbied for legalisation of snus in the UK

Swedish Match have worked with PR company Abzed to lobby for the legalisation of snus in the UK.^172173174 Abzed stated that it had organised the “placement of around 20 parliamentary questions on snus” and a letter to Matt Hancock, Minister for Health in 2018, co-signed by Adam Afriyie MP.¹⁷⁴¹⁷³ This campaign continued after the UK left the EU in 2020. In December 2021, Abzed posted messages on snus forums, offering to help members of the public to write to their MPs.¹⁷⁴¹⁷³ Abzed is not listed on UK or EU lobbying registers.

For more information on Afriyie see All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Vaping (E-Cigarettes).

Close relationship with Swedish Politicians

In the past, Swedish Match enjoyed a good relationship with Swedish politicians, including Swedish Member of European Parliament (MEP) Christofer Fjellner, who promoted a pro-snus agenda in the European Parliament and was a vocal advocate for removing the EU ban on snus sales.¹⁷⁵ Shortly before Fjellner launched a petition in 2010 to mobilise opposition to the EU snus ban, Swedish Match had two meetings with the MEP (see image 4).¹⁷⁶
Swedish Match also claims a “close relationship between industry and government” in Sweden.¹⁷⁷ Indeed, the Swedish Government supported Swedish Match’s call for a removal of the EU snus ban, regarding it a violation of free trade principles rather than a public health issue^178179180, an argument first voiced by Swedish Match.¹⁸¹

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Boosting Corporate Reputation

A 2011 news article in Tobacco Control pointed to Swedish Match as an example of tobacco industry philanthropy, where positive publicity was generated with little upfront community investment.¹⁸² The tobacco company’s 2009 annual report revealed that “Australia had suffered the country’s worst wildfire disaster in a quarter of a century” and in response the tobacco company had contributed to “Emergency Relief’ by giving a “cash donation” to the Australian Salvation Army (image 5). The company stopped short of disclosing the amount of money donated.

When the authors contacted the Australian Salvation Army and asked about the size of the donation, a spokesperson for the Charity confirmed that Swedish Match had donated AU$500 (approximately £256). The donation had presented only one ten thousandth of a per cent of the company’s operating profit.

Funding Science and Scientists

For several years, Swedish Match North America was a financial donor to the University of Louisville’s Kentucky Research Challenge Trust Fund (also known as ‘Bucks for Brains’).¹⁸³

From 2005 to 2008, Swedish Match spent half a million US dollars to fund the University’s Endowed Chair in Tobacco Harm Reduction held by Brad Rodu (Image 6).¹⁸⁴ Rodu has been a vocal supporter of lifting the EU ban on snus.¹⁸⁵

The tobacco industry has historically used science to oppose tobacco regulation and bias public opinion in favour of the tobacco companies.

• To read more about this tactic, visit Influencing Science

Marketing Snus as “Modified Risk Tobacco Product” in the US

In April 2015, the advisory panel of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rejected Swedish Match’s application to alter the health warnings of 10 variants of its General snus and claim snus is less harmful than cigarettes.¹⁸⁶

The panel concluded that the company had not provided enough evidence to support that The Swedish Experience could be replicated in the US, and had not sufficiently tested the proposed new health warning to ensure consumers would understand it and interpret it.

In December 2016, the FDA upheld the panel’s advice although it encouraged the company to amend their application and submit more evidence to support their claims.¹⁸⁷

In 2019, the FDA stated that eight Swedish Match snus products could be marketed in the US under the “Modified Risk Tobacco Products” (MRTP) pathway, for an initial period of 5 years.¹⁸⁸ The FDA emphasised that this did not mean that these products were “FDA approved” or indeed “safe”. It also specified restrictions on advertising to prevent them being targeted to youth.¹⁸⁸Read more about the tobacco industry and Harm Reduction.

Relevant Link

Swedish Match website

TobaccoTactics Resources

• EU Tobacco Products Directive Revision
• TPD: Lobbying of EU Officials
• TPD: EU Ban on Snus Sales
• TPD: Marketing to Youth
• TPD: University of Bath
• SMPM International
• Cigarette Companies Investing in Snus
• Nicotine Pouches
• Global Forum on Nicotine

TCRG Research

• Transnational tobacco company interests in smokeless tobacco in Europe: Analysis of internal industry documents and contemporary industry materials, S. Peeters, A. Gilmore, PLoS Medicine, 2013,10(9):1001506
• How online sales and promotion of snus contravenes current European Union legislation, S. Peeters, A. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2013; 22:266-273
• Russia: snus targeted at young & wealthy, S. Peeters, K. Evans, Tobacco Control, 2012; 21:456-459
• World: disasters are ‘brand aid’ opportunities for tobacco, G. Fooks, S. Peeters, Tobacco Control 2011, 20:4-7

References

The post Swedish Match appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

The Reason Foundation is an American think tank which describes its mission as “advancing a free society by developing, applying, and promoting libertarian principles, including individual liberty, free markets, and the rule of law”. It’s states that it aims to “change the way people think about issues, and promote policies that allow and encourage individuals and voluntary institutions to flourish”. It also identifies itself as an institution that engages in policy research.¹⁹¹

Relationship with the Tobacco Industry

Tobacco industry funding

The Reason Foundation has accepted funding from Altria since 2011.^192193194

It reported receiving contributions worth close to US$14 million in its 2021 financial statements, however, no funders were named.¹⁹⁵

Historical industry funding

• The 1981/1982 Annual Report of the Reason Foundation listed Brown & Williamson Tobacco, a subsidiary of British American Tobacco, as a “Contributor”.¹⁹⁶
• Philip Morris USA’s 1993 contribution report disclosed contributing $10,000 to the Reason Foundation in 1993, and $40,000 in the previous year as “General Support”.¹⁹⁷
• Philip Morris USA also reported contributions of $20,000 in 2000, with a similar sum proposed for the following year.¹⁹⁸

Communicating Pro-Tobacco Messages

The think tank has a number of different communication channels, namely, Reason magazine, a blog and a TV channel. Each of these channels has promoted anti-regulation messages in relation to tobacco tax measures, plain packaging, regulations to control e-cigarette use and menthol bans.¹⁹⁹

There has also been repeated criticism of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and its approach to harm reduction.^200201202

Interference at COP

The FCTC Conference of the Parties (COP) is the governing body which keeps the implementation of the FCTC under review.²⁰³

COP7

In September 2016, a few weeks before COP7, Julian Morris, the Reason Foundation’s Vice President of Research, authored a policy brief in which he argued that the World Health Organization’s (WHO) opposition to tobacco harm reduction was a threat to public health. He accused the FCTC of being a threat to good governance and transparency, because the two preceding COPs in 2012 and 2014 did not allow the participation of the “affected”, namely, tobacco users, vendors, and farmers. According to Morris, the WHO ought to be in favour of e-cigarettes and harm reduction.²⁰⁴

COP9

In February 2021, the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Vaping, set up an inquiry into COP 9 “to collect evidence and issue a report on the FCTC’s Conference of Parties 9”.²⁰⁵ Guy Bentley, director of Consumer Freedom at the Reason Foundation,²⁰⁶ made a submission to the inquiry which supported the use of “reduced-risk nicotine products” and criticised the FCTC for a lack of focus on harm reduction strategies.²⁰⁷

It also argued that “As a consequence of sidelining harm reduction strategies and limiting input for evidence and guidance, the FCTC has failed to achieve its aim of reducing tobacco use”, and that there was a lack of diversity in voices heard around harm reduction.²⁰⁷

• See the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Vaping page for more information on the inquiry and associated consultation report.

Tobacco Tax

The Reason Foundation has regularly argued against tobacco tax increases in the United States (US), using common industry arguments.

In 2021, it spoke out against proposed federal tobacco and nicotine product tax increases, stating that “high taxes don’t push most smokers to quit” and that the changes would unfairly impact low and middle-income Americans. It also argued that tax increases could fuel tobacco smuggling, threaten community safety, and lead to job losses among retailers.²⁰⁸²⁰⁹

Prior to this, the Reason Foundation strongly opposed proposed tobacco tax increases in three states in the US in 2016, arguing that the government was making money at the expense of smokers.^210211212 It engaged in a similar campaign in 2014, claiming that in Canada, increased tobacco tax led to an increase in the illicit tobacco trade.²¹³

Newer nicotine and tobacco products

The Reason Foundation has argued that increased regulations around the sale and use of e-cigarettes would harm public health.^214215216 It has also opposed tax increases on e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products (HTPs), arguing that they would be highly regressive and have a devastating impact on public health.²¹⁷

The Reason Foundation has published articles supporting the use of HTPs, including PMI’s IQOS.²¹⁸²¹⁹ It has also stated “This harm-reduction approach offers a win-win whereby businesses and jobs are created and thrive by making it as enjoyable as possible for people to quit smoking”.²²⁰

Menthol and flavoured tobacco products

The Reason Foundation has regularly opposed banning the use of menthol as a characterizing flavour in cigarettes in the US, again using common industry arguments.

In July 2022, it submitted a public comment to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) arguing that the proposed US-wide ban²²¹ “will not present significant public health benefits” and “prohibition will result in a host of unintended consequences, including increased tobacco smuggling, burdens on law enforcement, and more frequent interactions between law enforcement and minority communities”.¹⁹⁹

It has also published several articles opposing the ban, regularly using the arguments that it would create an illicit market that would disproportionally effect black people,²²²²²³ and that the federal government was denying their “moral agency”.²²⁴

In February 2023, Reason Foundation policy analyst, Jacob James Rich, published a non peer-reviewed analysis of cigarette sales in Massachusetts, following the state’s ban on the sale of flavoured tobacco products, including menthol cigarettes, in 2020.²²⁵²²⁶ This paper stated that as a result of the law, an increase in cigarettes sales was seen in the states boarding Massachusetts, outweighing the sales decline of menthol cigarettes in Massachusetts. However, research has shown that most neighbouring states did not see increases in overall tobacco sales;²²⁷ any increases that were seen, were not statistically significant;²²⁸ and the decline in cigarette sales in Massachusetts greatly outweighed any increase in bordering states.²²⁹²³⁰

An associated commentary article published by the Reason Foundation also stated that the ban “primarily sent buyers to other states and illicit markets, so other cities and states should consider the real-world impacts of implementing similar prohibitions”. However, evidence of an increase in illicit trade is not provided.²³¹ Academic research shows that menthol bans are effective public health measures, and there is little evidence that they increase illicit trade.

The Reason Foundation has spoken out against other US state flavoured tobacco product bans, including those proposed in Denver,²³² Colorado²³³ and New York.²³⁴

• For more information see Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco and Flavoured and Menthol Tobacco in the US

Plain Packaging

The Reason Foundation has spoken out against plain packaging, claiming that the policy would not stop smokers from smoking.²³⁵

Staff with tobacco industry links

The Reason Foundation provides a list of its staff on its website.²³⁶ The following staff member has a history of tobacco industry engagement:

• Jacob Sullum, Senior Editor of Reason Magazine, has been a member of the Foundation since the late 1980s. He published many books, articles and reports favourable to the tobacco industry and was featured in a tobacco industry-led campaign against second hand smoking regulations.^{237238239240241242}

• Guy Bentley, Director of Consumer Freedom, and Editor of the Reason Foundation’s Harm Reduction Newsletter, previously contributed to a report on “sin taxes” by the Adam Smith Institute (ASI).²⁰⁶ ASI has a history of accepting funding from the tobacco industry.

TobaccoTactics Resources

• Plain Packaging in the UK: Tobacco Industry Built Alliances
• Third Party Techniques
• Atlas Network

Relevant Link

• Reason Foundation website

References

The post Reason Foundation appeared first on TobaccoTactics.