The tobacco industry has a long history of attempting to influence science in order to cast doubt on evidence showing the harms of its products and to argue against the need for regulation of those products. In the 1950s when science began to establish a causal link between smoking and cancer, the industry mobilised to cast doubt on that evidence. In the 1980s and 1990s, when it became clear that second-hand smoke was harmful, the industry funded and created science that attempted to obscure that harm.¹ More recently, the tobacco industry has funded research in to newer tobacco and nicotine products and concerns have once again been raised that the industry is manipulating science for its own benefit.

Industry strategies for influencing science

Researchers from the Tobacco Control Research Group at the University of Bath have developed a typology and model – the Science for Profit Model – to explain how and why the tobacco industry (along with other harmful industries) attempts to influence science.² The authors conclude that strategies for influencing science are used to “purposefully-create misinformation, doubt, and ignorance”, to “obscure the harms of industry products and practices” and to “oppose regulation that could threaten corporate profits”.²

Below is an overview of this research, illustrating the ways in which the industry (and third parties used by the industry) uses science to further its aims. The following strategies and examples are drawn from the Science for Profit Model.

• To find out about these strategies in more depth, see the research paper on the Science for Profit Model.²

The Science for Profit Model

The Science for Profit Model²

Strategy A – Influence how science is conducted and published to skew evidence in industry’s favour

The tobacco industry has used various strategies to influence which research is – and isn’t – undertaken and published, in order to counteract independent scientific research which might show industry products and practices in an unfavourable light.

These strategies include funding research by third parties to deflect attention from industry harms. One example is research that looked for alternative causes of cancer (including hormones and nutrition) to distract attention from the link between smoking and cancer. This was conducted through the Tobacco Industry Research Committee from the 1950s onwards.³ Another example is research that focused on issues of “indoor air” (such as dirty air filters) to deflect attention from the harms of passive smoking, conducted through the Center for Indoor Air Research in the 1980s. Since 2017, research funded by PMI through the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World (FSFW) has similarly distracted attention from industry harms, including by redirecting blame towards the public health community and the media, implying that they are responsible for a slowing in the decline of smoking rates.⁴

Other strategies include undertaking “risky” research secretly, so that it can be hidden or abandoned if results harm the industry’s interests,² and manipulating study design or statistical analyses to ensure favourable findings. Another is to ‘cherry-pick’ (select the most favourable) papers to include in literature reviews to obscure parts of the evidence base.²

To see how study design affected PMI-funded science on plain packaging of cigarettes visit the Ashok Kaul and Michael Wolf pages.

In order to influence what research is published, the industry has created its own journals, such as the “Tobacco and Health” research journal which was distributed to health professionals.⁵² More recently, it has published in journals with editorial staff who have links to the industry, and used ‘pre-print’ platforms to self-publish its own non-peer-reviewed science.⁴⁶

• For more examples of how the tobacco industry influences the conduct and publication of science visit Influencing Science Case Studies

Strategy B – Influence how science is interpreted to undermine unfavourable science and create a distorted picture of the evidence base

The industry also works to distort how science and scientists are seen by the public and experts.

In the 1990s, tobacco companies launched the “Sound Science” and “Good Epidemiology” public relations campaigns. These demanded unrealistic levels of evidence in epidemiological studies examining harms caused by industry products, and were designed to prevent policy action on passive smoking.²

For decades, the industry has attacked and misrepresented science and scientists that may harm its commercial agenda. For example, in the 1990s, it criticised a US Environmental Protection Agency risk assessment which concluded that second-hand smoke was carcinogenic.² Nearly thirty years later the director of the Centre for Research Excellence: Indigenous Sovereignty and Smoking (COREISS), an FSFW grantee, used a similar argument, despite overwhelming evidence that second-hand smoke is a health risk:

“scientific studies have not proven that exposure to cigarette smoke in the car causes disease”.⁴⁷

In the 1990’s Philip Morris developed plans for what it called “Project Sunrise” – a project in which the company proposed the monitoring of individuals and organisations working in tobacco control, framing some as “extreme” and others as “moderate” in order to divide the community.⁸ Some of the many attacks on individuals working in tobacco control are documented on Martin Cullip, FOI: Stirling University and FOI: University of Bath.

• For more examples of how the tobacco industry influences the interpretation of science, visit the Influencing Science Case Studies page.

Strategy C – Influence the reach of science to create an “echo chamber” for industry’s scientific messaging

The industry disseminates messages that support its scientific stance. A common approach is to contract third party “friendly” voices to amplify scientific messages and distance these messages from industry. These messengers include front groups, designed to look like unbiased sources, organisations such as think tanks and professional associations, and “expert” individuals.²

In the 1980s, the ‘Whitecoat Project’ was Philip Morris’s secret plan to recruit ostensibly independent scientists to disseminate scientific narratives which would help it to “restore the social acceptability of smoking”.² Read more about the project on the Influencing Science: The Whitecoat Project page.

Organisations funded by FSFW have promoted industry-friendly scientific narratives on e-cigarettes and COVID-19, and endorsed science calling for weaker regulation of the industry’s products.⁴

In order to maximise press coverage of industry-favourable scientific messaging, the industry funds media outlets to disseminate its science, cite its staff, and report on its scientific events, including conferences.⁹¹⁰ One example is Filter magazine – to find out more visit the page on The Influence Foundation.

• For more examples of how the tobacco industry uses third parties to spread its scientific messages, visit the Influencing Science Case Studies page.

Strategy D – Create industry-friendly policymaking environments which shape the use of science in its favour

Tobacco companies have worked to embed their own standards of evidence in policymaking, and bring about policy reforms that increase reliance on the tobacco industry’s own science.²

In the 1990s, the tobacco industry attempted to shape risk assessment of its own products, and influence European Union (EU) regulatory mechanisms in relation to the assessment of data from epidemiological and animal studies, for example. Although they did not succeed, this would have meant that the criteria used for determining scientific ‘proof’ would have been drawn up by industry itself.²

British American Tobacco promoted regulatory reform in the EU, to make it harder to implement public health policies which conflicted with its commercial interests. This ‘Better Regulation’ or ‘Smart Regulation’ appeared to be about good governance and transparency but “in fact mandated industry’s right to be heard early in scientific debates about their products and practices.”² Read more on this topic on the EU Better Regulation page.

Strategy E – Manufacture trust in industry and its scientific messaging

The industry has worked to promote its involvement in science in order to manufacture an image of scientific credibility. Many academic institutions and journals no longer collaborate with the industry directly, due to its history of scientific deception, and so the industry uses third party organisations to push for ‘renormalisation’ of its business.¹¹¹² For instance, since it was set up in 2017, FSFW has worked to frame the industry’s involvement in science and policy as the ‘solution’ and its exclusion as counterproductive, despite industry having created the problem.⁴

At other times the industry does not disclose its involvement in science when it believes this will lend the science more credibility. Sometimes it creates third party organisations that appear to be independent, to conduct its research (e.g. Philip Morris setting up the Institute for Biological Research in Germany).¹³ At other times it uses public relations consultancies and law firms to recruit scientists.²

• For a more extensive overview of industry allies and front groups see the Industry People and Allies topic as well as the Allies Database produced by Stopping Tobacco Organizations and Products (STOP)

Desired outcome of influencing science

The desired outcome for the tobacco industry has been to create doubt about the harms of its products, or about the necessity – or efficacy of – tobacco control legislation. It has framed use of its newer products as the only realistic solution to the tobacco epidemic, and aimed to legitimise its role as a stakeholder in science and policymaking.²

These outcomes weaken policy that would reduce industry profits, prevent litigation against the industry, and maximise consumption of its products. In short, the industry’s involvement in science does not primarily advance knowledge or improve the health of populations, but maximises profits.²

Influencing Science Case Studies

For more detailed historical and contemporary examples of how tobacco companies influence science visit Influencing Science Case Studies.

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Influencing Science Case Studies
• Influencing Science: Philip Morris Changing the Conclusions of Research
• Influencing Science: Ghost Writing
• Influencing Science: Imperial Tobacco Canada
• Influencing Science: The Whitecoat Project
• Newer Nicotine and Tobacco Products
• Industry Approaches to Science on Newer Products
• COVID-19
• Tobacco Company Investments in Pharmaceutical & NRT Products
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World
• Tobacco Industry Research Committee
• Forest
• Duke University
• Tobacco Industry Research Committee
• Tobacco Institute
• Hill & Knowlton
• Ruder Finn

See the list of pages in the category Influencing Science

TCRG Research

The Science for Profit Model—How and why corporations influence science and the use of science in policy and practice, T. Legg, J. Hatchard and A.B. Gilmore, Plos One, 2021, 16(6):e0253272, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0253272

Document analysis of the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World’s scientific outputs and activities: a case study in contemporary tobacco industry agnogenesis, T. Legg, B.  Clift, A.B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2023, doi: 10.1136/tc-2022-057667

Paying lip service to publication ethics: scientific publishing practices and the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World, T. Legg, M. Legendre, A. B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control 2021;30:e65-e72, doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2020-056003

Seeking to be seen as legitimate members of the scientific community? An analysis of British American Tobacco and Philip Morris International’s involvement in scientific events, B. K. Matthes, A. Fabbri, S. Dance, L. Laurence, K. Silver, A. B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2023, doi: 10.1136/tc-2022-057809

Tobacco industry messaging around harm: Narrative framing in PMI and BAT press releases and annual reports 2011 to 2021, I. Fitzpatrick, S. Dance, K. Silver, M. Violini, T. Hird, Front. Public Health, 2022, 10:958354, doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.958354

References

The post Influencing Science appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

“Sustain Controversy”

PM’s secret method of recruiting so-called independent scientists for the project is laid out in various documents. One is BAT scientist Dr Sharon Boyce, who attended a “special meeting” on London in 1988:¹⁶

The Philip Morris philosophy of ETS was presented. This appeared to revolve around the selection, in all possible countries, of a group of scientists either to critically review the scientific literature on ETS to sustain controversy, or to carry out research on ETS. In each country a group of scientists would be carefully selected, and organised, by a national coordinating scientist.¹⁶

“No previous connections with tobacco companies”

The scientists:

“should, ideally, according to Philip Morris, be European scientists who have had no previous connections with tobacco companies and who have no previous record on the primary health issue which might … lead to problems of attribution. The mechanism by which they identify their consultants is as follows: they ask a couple of scientists in each country … to produce a list of potential consultants. The scientists are then contacted by these coordinators or by the lawyers and asked if they are interested in problems of Indoor Air Quality: tobacco is not mentioned at this stage. CV’s are obtained and obvious “anti-smokers” or those with “unsuitable backgrounds” are filtered out…”¹⁶

Philip Morris then expect the group of scientists to operate within the confines of decisions taken by PM scientists to determine the general direction of research, which apparently would then be ‘filtered’ by lawyers to eliminate areas of sensitivity.¹⁶

Boyse’s notes include a list of 18 scientists, mostly at British universities, who were suggested as possible consultants.¹⁶

“Instead of Second-Hand Smoke, What about Pet Birds as a Cause of Cancer?”

By 1990, Covington and Burling boasted of its successes of the Whitecoat project.¹⁷ “One consultant is an adviser to a particularly relevant committee of the House of Commons”.¹⁷ Another was recruited as an editor of the Lancet.¹⁷ A third was “providing medical advice to Middle eastern Governments”.¹⁷ One other consultant conducted “research into factors other than passive smoking that cause lung cancer – keeping pet birds”.¹⁷¹⁸

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Influencing Science
• Philip Morris International

References

The post Influencing Science: The Whitecoat Project appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

• This page is based on contemporaneous reports in The Montreal Gazette.¹⁹²⁰ All the direct quotes are from these newspaper articles.For further information, including documents released during the court case, see the Canadian Tobacco Industry Collection in the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents library and the litigation section of the Tobacco Laws website.

Background

The three corporations brought to trial were: Imperial Tobacco Canada,²¹ Rothmans Benson & Hedges, owned by Philip Morris International (PMI), and Japan Tobacco International subsidiary JTI McDonald. The class action suit was brought by people who contracted cancer or emphysema as a result of smoking, or were addicted to smoking. The case revolved around whether the tobacco companies met their duty to inform customers about the dangers of smoking.

Michel Descôteaux was the first witness in the trial. He began working for Imperial Tobacco in 1963 and for 20 years was its only spokesperson.²⁰In 1976, Descôteaux was public relations director for one of Canada’s biggest tobacco companies – Imperial Tobacco Canada. The company asked the 29-year-old to come up with some ideas to help the industry, which was increasingly under fire about the damage its products caused and Descôteaux wrote a memo to Imperial’s vice-president at the time, Tony Kalhok, responding to these concerns:¹⁹

“People who smoke themselves to a premature death may be good customers in the short run but they certainly contribute to the scary statistics and provide wonderful ammunition for tobacco adversaries.”¹⁹

Until he retired in 2002, Descôteaux was “one of the architects of its policy to discredit the overwhelming scientific evidence that smoking is addictive and causes cancer and other diseases.”¹⁹

Workplace Smoking Ban

In the 1980s, Alcan Aluminum Ltd. supplied Imperial with its aluminium packaging. When Alcan became one of the first companies to institute a workplace ban on smoking in 1980, Imperial Tobacco launched a campaign to convince the manufacturer to reverse its ban.¹⁹

Imperial Tobacco president and chairman Paul Paré wrote to the president of Alcan “expressing his disapproval of the ban, complaining he had not been informed about it and suggesting it might have a negative impact on relations between the two companies. “I merely register my disappointment at seeing it in place and my difficulty of reconciling it with our long-standing corporate relationships””.¹⁹

Creating Doubt

Imperial then “marshalled the forces of its public affairs department to convince Alcan to retreat from its ban.” Department director Michel Descôteaux met with a senior Alcan official and warned him that “depriving workers of the right to smoke on the job could lead to increased stress in the workplace and a rise in the number of workplace accidents.”  Descôteaux also sent Alcan officials research papers written by tobacco industry scientists which denied that there was proof of a link between cancer and smoking.

Denying Link Between Smoking and Health

In the 1976 memo, quoted above, Descôteaux said that the “position I suggest [Imperial Tobacco Canada] adopt is that we are innocent until proven guilty.”¹⁹

In response to the increasing number of studies indicating that cigarettes were dangerous to people’s health, Descoteax said that Imperial should denounce these with vigor and try to discredit them as much as possible” and should develop products “that would provide the same satisfaction as today’s cigarettes without ‘enslaving’ consumers.”¹⁹

Refusing to Warn Pregnant Employees to Follow Medical Advice

In another memo Descôteaux wrote that more women were smoking because of the women’s liberation movement:

“Perhaps it will be more difficult to convince women that they should stop smoking, enough to make every one of us some of the most ardent feminists!”¹⁹

Descôteaux went on to recommend that the company not follow advice from British American Tobacco (Imperial’s major stockholder) which said that employees should follow doctors’ advice not to smoke while pregnant. He wrote that employees should be told :

“in the absence of definitive answers to this question, many doctors advice (sic) their pregnant patients to modify their smoking habits during pregnancy as a sensible part of prenatal behaviour.”

He also said that advising employees to follow the advice of doctors “could open the door to claims for warnings on cigarette packages.”²⁰

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Influencing Science
• British American Tobacco

References

The post Influencing Science: Imperial Tobacco Canada appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

A review on sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) was published in 2001,²³ and acknowledged funding from Philip Morris (PM). The University of California concluded that tobacco industry documents relating to this review showed the extent of corporate influence on its content and conclusions.

There are adverse impacts on maternal and child health from prenatal and postnatal exposure to tobacco smoke.²² The causal link between Secondhand Smoke (SHS) and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) was first noted by the US Environmental Protection Agency, and both prenatal and postnatal exposure were listed as independent risk factors for SIDS in a 2004 report by the US Surgeon General.²² Nevertheless:

“The tobacco industry has used scientific consultants to attack the evidence that SHS causes disease, most often lung cancer.”²²

The leadership of Philip Morris were concerned that public knowledge of the health risks of second-hand would lead to an increase in tobacco regulation, such as creating more smoke-free areas in public. PM executives responded by commissioning “independent” consultants to write review articles for publication in the medical literature.²²

According to Tong et al, the first PM-funded article to be published was a literature review by consultant Peter Lee and co-author Allison Thornton. Focussed on smoking and SIDS, this stated that:

“the association between parental smoking and SIDS could have been attributable to failures in the research procedures.(…)” ²²

In 1997, PM commissioned another consultant, Frank Sullivan, to write a review of all possible risk factors for SIDS, with co-author Susan Barlow. The first draft concluded, as had the US Surgeon General, that prenatal and postnatal SHS exposure were both independent risk factors for SIDS.²² However:

“After receiving comments and meeting with PM scientific executives, Sullivan changed his original conclusions.”²²

Sullivan’s final review concluded that there was an impact for infants whose mothers smoked during pregnancy, but that postnatal effects of SHS were “less well established”.²²

According to Tong et. Al:

“Changes in the draft to support this new conclusion included descriptions of Peter Lee’s industry-funded review, a 1999 negative but underpowered study of SIDS risk and urinary cotinine levels, and criticisms of the conclusions of the National Cancer Institute report that SHS was causally associated with SIDS”²²

In April 2001 UK journal Paediatric and Perinatal Epidemiology published the Sullivan review with a disclosure statement:

“that acknowledged financial support from PM but did not acknowledge contributions from PM executives in the preparation of the review. By 2004, the Sullivan SIDS review had been cited at least 19 times in the medical literature.”²²

According to the University of California, these findings suggest that accepting tobacco industry funds can disrupt the integrity of the scientific process.²²

Tobacco Tactics resources

• Influencing Science
• Philip Morris International
• Philip Morris

References

The post Influencing Science: Phillip Morris Changing the Conclusions of Research appeared first on TobaccoTactics.

• For example, internal industry documents show that in the 1960s tobacco companies were aware that nicotine was an addictive substance,²⁴ but despite this, in 1994 Brown and Williamson’s CEO testified before the US Congress that nicotine was not addictive.²⁵
• In the 1970s seven tobacco companies used national manufacturers’ associations to promote controversy around the idea that smoking was harmful to health – a conspiracy named ‘Operation Berkshire’ – which damaged tobacco control efforts around the world.²⁶
• In the 1980s scientists working for British American Tobacco (BAT) were advised by scientists working for Brown & Williamson “about areas of research such as inhalation that should not be further pursued”.²⁷

The following are a selection of further historical and contemporary examples of tobacco industry attempts to influence science.

For an overview of the strategies tobacco companies employ to influence science visit the Influencing Science landing page. In each section below, we also link directly to the relevant strategies on the landing page, and to other pages with detail on the examples given here.

Examples of the use of third parties

Tobacco companies often disseminate their scientific messages using third parties. For more on this strategy see the landing page section: Influence the reach of science to create an “echo chamber” for industry’s scientific messaging.  See also the general page on Third Party Techniques.

• Tobacco Industry Research Committee. In the early 1950s, public relations (PR) firm Hill & Knowlton advised tobacco companies on the best way to fight against the emerging evidence of the link between smoking and cancer. Instead of denying the findings of the research, they advised companies to say that more research was needed, thereby creating doubt.³ It was under Hill & Knowlton’s advice that the Tobacco Industry Research Committee was established. Rather than explore the relationship between smoking and cancer this group looked for alternative explanations for the causes of cancer.³
• Duke University has a history of collaborating with tobacco companies, including receiving funding from Philip Morris to establish the Center for Smoking Cessation Research (CSCR).²⁸ The Director of CSCR (up until 2022),²⁹ Jed E. Rose, sat on the advisory board of Philip Morris’ (US, now Altria) “Smoker Cessation Support Initiative”.³⁰³¹ He also founded the Rose Research Center,³² and has received funding from the Philip Morris International (PMI) funded Foundation for a Smoke-Free World (FSFW).³³ FSFW is a US based charitable organisation established in 2017 with a grant from PMI, and since then exclusively funded by PMI. One of FSFW’s three main grant themes is Health and Science Research.³⁴ Research by the University of Bath’s Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) found that the Foundation functions as a scientific lobby group promoting tobacco industry interests.⁴ See also Foundation for a Smoke-Free World Grantees.

• To explore the scientific research outputs of FSFW and its grantees visit the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World: Research Database

• The Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR) was created by the industry in the late 1980’s to create doubt about the health risks of second-hand smoke.³⁵
• The European Science and Environment Forum (ESEF) was active between 1994 and 2005 as a UK-based tobacco industry funded “science watchdog” that conducted a variety of science influencing activities including trying to undermine the science of second-hand smoke, describing it as “junk science”.³⁶
• The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) is an influential UK ‘free-market’ think tank that has collaborated with the tobacco industry. Roger Bate, co-founder of the European Science and Environment Forum and lead of the IEA’s Environment Unit published a book in 1996 which was funded by BAT. The book suggested that scientists were overestimating the risk of second-hand smoke.³⁷ For more information visit IEA: Working with RJ Reynolds, BAT and Philip Morris on Environmental Risk.

Examples of concealing involvement in science

Tobacco companies covertly fund science so that research appears to be independent from the industry, whilst serving its aims. For more on this strategy visit landing page section: Influencing the conduct and publication of science.

• In the late 1980s Philip Morris developed a covert plan named the Whitecoat Project that involved funding apparently independent scientists to “resist and roll back smoking restrictions” and “restore social acceptability of smoking”.³⁸
• Ghost-writing is the practice of writing books, reports or research credited to another person. Ghost writers have been employed by tobacco companies as a science influencing tactic. For examples and more information see Influencing Science: Ghost Writing.
• In an attempt to counter the influence of corporate funding on scientific publishing, many journals require authors to submit conflict of interest (COI) statements or funding declarations. In some cases, researchers funded by the tobacco industry fail to declare conflicts of interest. This avoids scrutiny or rejection of their papers, and means industry-funded science can be presented as independent. For example, some researchers that receive grants from the PMI funded Foundation for a Smoke-Free World have failed to declare this conflict of interest when publishing tobacco related science.³⁹ This is a practice that has in some cases led to the retraction of papers.⁴⁰⁴¹

Examples of industry influencing the evidence base

Tobacco companies attempt to shape the conclusions of research to be more favourable to the industry. There are several examples of Philip Morris employing such strategies, these can be found on Influencing Science: Philip Morris changing the conclusions of research.

Recently, tobacco companies have been spending large sums on research around newer nicotine and tobacco products. Concerns have been raised about the integrity and robustness of this science.

• A 2022 Cochrane review in the UK found that all randomised control trials of HTPs were tobacco company funded and that there was a need for independent research to assess the efficacy and safety of the devices.⁴²
• There is evidence to suggest that the industry’s approach does not guarantee good quality research or prevent the industry from using strategies to influence science. A 2022 systematic review by TCRG found that clinical trials assessing the harms of heated tobacco products (HTPs) “fall short of what is needed to determine whether HTPs are beneficial to public health meaning they may not be a sound basis for tobacco control policy decisions”.⁴³ Of the 40 trials assessed, 29 were tobacco industry affiliated.⁴³ The World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) calls for regulatory decisions on tobacco products and the scientific assessment of tobacco products to be made independent of the tobacco industry.

For more information on these and other similar examples see:

Industry Approaches to Science on Newer Products and Tobacco Company Science Pages

See also Harm Reduction: A Tobacco Solution to a Tobacco Problem?

Examples of tobacco companies discrediting research

Tobacco companies have discredited unfavourable research which threatens their profits. For more information on this topic see the landing page: Manufacture trust in industry and its scientific messaging.

• In the 1990s, when regulation of second-hand smoke was being discussed, the industry wanted to discredit science that suggested second-hand smoke was a health risk. PR company APCO Associates set up a front group called The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition (TASSC) in 1994 to discredit the science of second-hand smoke by labelling it as “junk science”. Simultaneously it promoted industry friendly science as “sound science”.⁴⁴
• In a 2020 report, Philip Morris International, again referred to “junk science”, this time saying it was being used to “set political agendas” and that “poor-quality science is being used to sway the public against alternatives to cigarettes”.⁴⁵ This same report describe the dangers of “bad science” referring to issues such as vaccine scepticism and scientific illiteracy among policymakers. In this way PMI aligns tobacco industry scientific interests with reasonable public health concern, to try to build trust and credibility.²
• In a 2023 report the Institute of Economic Affairs disregarded data published by the UK’s Department of Health the year before in to how much smoking costs the NHS, saying that “The reality is that smokers pay far more in tobacco duty than they cost the state in healthcare, while non-smokers cost the state more, on average, in both healthcare and social security payments”.⁴⁶ For more on this visit the page Tobacco Industry Interference with Endgame Policies.

Examples of attacks on science and scientists

The tobacco industry also uses intimidation as a tactic to combat unfavourable research.

• Lawsuits in 2012 against Imperial Tobacco Canada (owned by BAT) revealed that in the 1970s the company made explicit efforts to undermine scientific research that proved smoking causes cancer, with Imperial’s PR representative saying that they “should denounce [the findings] with vigor and try to discredit them as much as possible.”⁴⁷ For more on this see Influencing Science: Imperial Tobacco Canada.
• A 2023 TCRG study illustrated the various forms of intimidation experienced by researchers and advocates working in tobacco control – this intimidation included reputational attacks, physical threats and the use of “vexatious” freedom of information requests.⁴⁸
• In 2009 and 2011 the University of Stirling received freedom of information (FOI) requests, on behalf of Philip Morris, attempting to access research data that had informed the UK government’s plain packaging legislation and tobacco display ban. For more information visit the FOI: Stirling University page and the Linda Bauld page.

Example of influencing the publication of science

The tobacco industry also uses various methods to try to ensure that the publication process works in its favour. For more on this topic visit How science is conducted and published to skew evidence in industry’s favour.

Preprints are academic findings published without peer review, unlike traditional journal manuscripts. Platforms that publish preprints, such as medRxiv, can be a helpful way of sharing scientific findings that are time sensitive, and therefore grew in popularity during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, lack of peer review oversight presents an opportunity for tobacco companies to influence the publication of science by publishing industry friendly research that may be rejected by peer-reviewed journals.⁴⁹

For example:

• During the COVID-19 pandemic several pre-print research articles were published that indicated tobacco may be protective against coronavirus. Some of the authors of these articles had historical links to the tobacco industry, and some of their papers in peer-reviewed journals had been retracted due to these conflicts of interest.⁴⁹
  For more on retractions and preprints see Tobacco Industry involvement in COVID-19 science
• FSFW and its grantees also use preprint platforms to publish research.⁴

Examples of involvement in scientific communities, meetings and events

Tobacco companies view scientific conferences and meetings as useful opportunities to influence science, in some cases by manufacturing controversy about scientific issues.⁵⁰

• A 2023 TCRG study found that BAT and PMI attended 213 scientific events between 2012 and 2021. Topics covered included Medicine, Biology, Chemistry, Dentistry and Pharmaceutical Science.⁵¹
• During the COVID-19 pandemic tobacco companies saw an opportunity to align with public health messaging through health related corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. For example, in April 2021 PMI co-organised an event on “Science Diplomacy” with Foreign Policy magazine that sought to “energize international cooperation on science and technology innovation to tackle misinformation” relating to the pandemic, despite PMI’s history of influencing science for profit.⁵² For more on tobacco company activities during the pandemic see COVID-19.

Tobacco company science pages

The ‘Big Four’ tobacco companies each present their scientific outputs and research agendas on science websites. Each site is representative of the company’s brand and the sort of scientific image it wants to present to consumers.

• British American Tobacco presents its science via its BAT Science website, which leads with the slogan “A Better Tomorrow”. The site highlights BAT’s research focus in to what it calls “New Category” products as well as its research and commercial interests in vaccine development via its subsidiary Kentucky Bioprocessing.⁵³ During the COVID-19 pandemic Kentucky Bioprocessing began developing a COVID-19 vaccine. For more on this visit Tobacco Company Investments in Pharmaceutical & NRT Products. BAT’s website also features a library of scientific publications.
• Imperial Brands presents its scientific outputs via its Imperial Brands Science It highlights its “Next Generation products” and the product safety testing it conducts using its Scientific Assessment Framework.⁵⁴ The site also features a research archive.
• Japan Tobacco International (JTI) presents its science via the JT Science website, where it highlights its mission to “inform, educate and collaborate with all those interested in learning about the science behind Reduced-Risk Products (RRP)”. Like Imperial brands, JTI presents a six-step safety assessment for its newer nicotine products.⁵⁵ It also has a section on the science of nicotine and a resource hub archive of JTI research.Alongside its main tobacco business Japan Tobacco Inc., parent company of JTI, has a large pharmaceutical division established in 1987,⁵⁶ which researches, develops, manufactures and distributes drugs for a range of diseases including heart disease and cancer.⁵⁷
• Philip Morris International presents its scientific agenda via the PMI Science The majority of the research it presents is focussed on its heated tobacco product IQOS. The site features a letter from Chief Life Sciences Officer Badrul Chowdhury describing how the company has “spent years disrupting its core cigarette business by developing, assessing and marketing non-combustible alternatives to cigarettes.”.⁵⁸ The site also features a library of PMI publications.

For more information on this topic visit Industry Approaches to Science on Newer Products.

Tobacco Tactics Resources

• Influencing Science
• Influencing Science: Philip Morris Changing the Conclusions of Research
• Influencing Science: Ghost Writing
• Influencing Science: Imperial Tobacco Canada
• Influencing Science: The Whitecoat Project
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World
• Foundation for a Smoke-Free World Grantees
• Industry Approaches to Science on Newer Products
• COVID-19
• Cigarette Filters
• Tobacco Company Investments in Pharmaceutical & NRT Products

See the list of pages in the category Influencing Science

TCRG Research

Document analysis of the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World’s scientific outputs and activities: a case study in contemporary tobacco industry agnogenesis, T. Legg, B.  Clift, A.B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, Published Online First: 03 May 2023. doi: 10.1136/tc-2022-057667

The Science for Profit Model—How and why corporations influence science and the use of science in policy and practice, T. Legg, J. Hatchard and A.B. Gilmore, Plos One, 2021, 16(6):e0253272, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0253272

Paying lip service to publication ethics: scientific publishing practices and the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World, T. Legg, M. Legendre, A. B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control 2021;30:e65-e72, accessed October 2023

“They try to suppress us, but we should be louder”: a qualitative exploration of intimidation in tobacco control, B.K. Matthes, R. Alebshehy, A.B. Gilmore, Globalization & Health, 19:88,  2023, doi: 10.1186/s12992-023-00991-0.

Seeking to be seen as legitimate members of the scientific community? An analysis of British American Tobacco and Philip Morris International’s involvement in scientific events, B. K. Matthes, A. Fabbri, S. Dance, L. Laurence, K. Silver, A. B. Gilmore. Tobacco Control Published Online First: 03 February 2023. doi: 10.1136/tc-2022-057809

The perils of preprints, M. C. van Schalkwyk, T. R. Hird, N. Maani, M. Petticrew, A. B. Gilmore,  BMJ, 2020; doi:10.1136/bmj.m3111

References

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